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 PREFACE 
Since the 19th century, cooperative banks have been an important feature of 
the India and European banking landscape. On present trends, this is likely 
to remain the case at least well into the 21st century, as most cooperative 
banks seem healthy and many of them are increasing their market shares. 
Nevertheless, the importance of cooperative banks, the implications of their 
specific nature, and the dynamics of their interaction with other types of 
banks have at times escaped fitting attention among policymakers and in the 
literature. This paper attempts to help remedy this. 
 
The paper argues that the success of cooperative banks can be explained by 
their evolving comparative advantages. Originally devised to overcome 
problems of asymmetric information in favor of borrowers, their current 
success appears driven to a significant extent by problems of asymmetric 
information in favor of banks. As consumer-owned institutions, cooperative 
banks have a comparative advantage in gaining the trust of their customers. 
 
Nevertheless, cooperative banks face fundamental challenges rooted in their 
institutional set-up. Most cooperatives were designed from the outset to 
perpetually accumulate capital. This was done by defining members’ 
ownership rights as applying only to the notional value represented by paid-
up membership shares (and any capitalized dividends) and by limiting the 
disbursement of profits. As a result, the economic value of a cooperative, net 
of debts and the nominal value of member shares, constitutes an 
intergenerational endowment without final owners. It is available to current  
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members, under the implicit or explicit understanding that they will further 
grow the endowment and pass it on to the next generation of members. In 
this interpretation, cooperative bank managers can be seen as custodians of 
this endowment. 
 
The existence of such an owner-less endowment constitutes a major 
challenge to the governance systems of a cooperative. It reduces members’ 
incentives to exert effective oversight over management, while at the same 
time increasing the need for such oversight. In many respects, governance 
systems may struggle to meet this challenge. These systems were originally 
designed for small institutions functioning within close communities, but are 
now being applied with little fundamental change to large, complex, 
financial conglomerates. 
 
Moreover, the functioning of corporate governance mechanisms could be 
hampered by collective action problems that appear more daunting than in 
investor-owned companies, the absence or reduced impact of market signals, 
and in many cases lower disclosure of Information. 
 
In cooperative banks, two important risks may materialize when corporate 
governance systems fail. First, managers may use the intergenerational 
endowment for purposes other than members’ best interests. In particular, 
they may use it as a tool for empire-building. Second, there is a risk that 
inevitable attempts to appropriate (part of) the endowment may succeed. 
 
V 
From a financial stability point of view, the competitive dynamics between 
cooperative and commercial banks merit special attention. Cooperatives can 
use their low cost and often abundant capital and the absence of a profit 
maximization constraint to pursue expansion plans that put competitive 
pressure on other financial institutions. If, mindful of this risk, prudential 
authorities insist that cooperatives achieve similar returns on equity as 
commercial banks, they may end up pushing cooperatives to expand into 
risky activities that they cannot adequately control. Further financial stability 
concerns relate to the impact of cooperatives’ potentially limited ability to 
raise capital and features of their business model on their capacity to 
withstand crisis situations. Within networks of cooperatives, internal 
solidarity mechanisms should limit the impact of smaller shocks and so 
should peer pressure and supervision of smaller cooperatives by apex 
organizations. But this also raises some problems, including possibly 
insufficient market exit or governance issues. Moreover, the balance of 
power within networks of cooperatives merits attention. 
 
The paper concludes that, in general, cooperatives need more scope to 
manage their capital, allowing them to better raise and shed capital in 
function of their needs. Furthermore, improvements are needed to 
cooperatives’ governance systems. Such improvements could include 
strengthened disclosure requirements; various measures to increase member 
involvement; mechanisms that allow members to organize themselves and 
challenge management, in particular on fundamental questions regarding the 
future and size of the institution; increased minimum investment levels for  
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members; deliberate exposure to market mechanisms; the addition of 
independent and well-qualified board members; specific prudential 
oversight; and a clear separation between external and internal governance 
systems in networks of cooperatives. For cooperatives policymakers need to 
ensure that the competition between different types of banks take place on as 
level a playing field as possible, avoiding policies that may create artificial 
advantages in favor of a specific ownership form. 
 
The history of Cooperative Bank in India is quite old. As a matter of fact 
cooperative banks in one form or other do exist since early 20th century 
throughout the world. 
 
Especially cooperative movements in general is some how related to 
Freedom movement of our country. 
 
Historically cooperative banks are very successful in meeting the financial 
need of a small man / businessman industrialist or a person of any weaker, 
women, self employed individuals etc. 
Up until about 10-15 years ago the banking was based on mutual trust and 
because of a local nature of the institution. The lone and bank always 
enjoyed personal relationship. 
 
The board of Directors though not bankers, but most of the time 
philanthropist, well respected among the society. Lone also in most cases 
were honest and wanted to improve quality of life by hard work and in a  
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planned way. Board of Directors equally enjoyed reputation in the society as 
SOCIAL REFORMERS, and people of high integrity. They take pride in 
running such financial institutions profitably in the interest of Stake holders 
primarily and for interest of society in general. 
 
This has changed drastically in last few years. All successful banks elect 
their directors periodically and with this process vested interest group  
entered in to co-operative Banks. They sought personal financial gain there 
legal / illegal means without due consideration of Banking norms and the 
guidelines of Reserve Bank of India and of State Co-operative controlling 
authority.  
 
Madhavpura Mercantile Co-operative Bank defaulted and this is the classic 
example of how grad & nepotism creped in to the once upon a time very 
fine cooperative Banking system. 
 
The MMCB collapsed many small banks which invested in MMCB of their 
hard earned profit for better return on investment in terms of interest etc. 
Out MMCB defaulted and thus all such small cooperative banks whose 
investment was in MMCB also collapsed.  
 
In the process the blame game started. R.B.I. was on the target as to why 
they did not monitor the health of cooperative Banks! 
Subsequently R.B.I. became extremely active and started introducing many  
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controls, by virtue of many reporting requirements and for the compliance 
of the same.  
 
Co-operative banks all these years always functioned traditionally. They are 
neither equipped, nor having any expertise to comply with new reporting 
system. 
 
This his precisely created “GOVERNANCE” issues in co-operative banks. 
This study is an attempt to discuss various aspects / issues in Governance 
Practices of co-operative Banks. 
 
This paper does not seek to pass any overall judgment on the merits of the 
Co-operative ownership form relative to the available alternatives. It is clear 
from recent history that all governance forms have both problems and 
comparative advantages. Nonetheless, comparisons with other governance 
systems, in particular with commercial banks, are made throughout the paper 
in order to help identify particular strengths and weaknesses. It is also 
important to keep in mind that the cooperative sector is very diverse, with 
big differences across the country and between, for example, big and small 
co-operatives. This paper did not seek to study this diversity in all its 
richness, focusing mostly on the “generic” co-operative instead. This means 
that not all issues raised are equally relevant to all cooperatives. 
 
This is a sample survey conducted among 22 urban co-operative banks of 
Gujarat. The survey concentrated on commercial banks. Both quantitative 
and qualitative data were collected for this study. 
 
IX 
INDEX 
 
 
Sr. No. 
 
CONTENTS PAGE NO. 
 Preface IV - IX 
 Acknowledgement X - XII 
 Table of Contents XIV - XIII 
 List of Tables XIX - XX 
 List of Annexure XXI - XII 
Chapter - 1 Overview of Banking Industry In India  1 - 57 
Chapter – 2  Overview of Cooperative Banks 1 - 87 
Chapter – 3 Literature review and Conceptual Frame Work 1 - 94 
Chapter – 4 Research Methodology 1 - 8 
Chapter – 5 Analysis and Interpretation of Governance Practices 1 - 37 
Chapter – 6 Summary of Findings and Suggestions 1 - 24 
 Annexure -1 to 9 
Questionnaire 
Bibliography 
 
1 – 8 
1 - 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XIII 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
Topics No. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
Page No. 
                               
CHAPTER  01 
OVERVIEW OF BANKING INDUSTRY IN INDIA 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 3 
1.2 Industry scenario of Indian Banking Industry  7 
1.3 Aggregate performance of the Banking Industry 11 
1.4 Interest rate scene 12 
1.5 Government Policy 13 
1.6 Implications of some Recent Policy Measures  14 
1.7 Challenges facing Banking industry  16-22 
1.8 Emerging Economic scene 23-28 
1.9 Future landscape of Indian Banking 28-32 
1.10 Changes in the structure of Banks 32-42 
1.11 Risk Management  42.49 
1.12 Rural and Social Banking issues 50-52 
1.13 Human Resource Management  52-54 
1.14 References 55-57 
  
CHAPTER  02 
 
OVERVIEW OF CO-OPERATIVE BANKS 
 
 
2.1 Historical Roots Cooperative Bank in Europe and India 2 
2.2 Cooperative Movements in India  4-7 
2.3 Cooperative Banking in India  8-19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XIV 
2.4 Characteristics of Urban cooperative Banking in India, 
Governance : Indian Context  
 
20-29 
2.5 Reforms in Banking sector 29-42 
2.6 Challenges for Urban Cooperative Banks 43-56 
2.7 Performance measurement and Disclosure practices 57-70 
2.8 Growth and Development of the UCB in Gujarat 70-74 
2.9 Role of the UCB’s in Indian Banking system 75-76 
2.10 Evaluation of the Role of UCB’s 76-77 
2.11 UCB’s Problems and Prospects 77-87 
 
 
 
CHAPTER  03 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAME WORK 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 1 
3.2 Literature review 1-2 
3.3 Elements of corporate Governance 2-18 
3.4 Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector  19-20 
3.5 Corporate Governance in Search of suitable definition  21-22 
3.6 Significance of corporate Governance   22-24 
3.7 Corporate Governance and financial sector  24-26 
3.8 Corporate Governance and Banking, The Linkage  26-33 
3.9 Policy frame work of corporate Governance in Indian 
Banking  
33-36 
3.10 Corporate Governance Policy implementation in India  36-41 
3.11 The Model Policy for Good Governance in Bank 41-43 
3.12 Governance rating methodology 43-45 
3.13 Governance : Cooperative Banking Vision 45-59 
3.14 Implementing Governance in Urban Cooperative Banks 60-77 
 
 
 
 
 
XV 
3.15 Steps for Strengthening through Cooperative 
Governance  
 
77-89 
3.16 References 90-94 
  
CHAPTER  4 
 
RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Rational of the Study 1-2 
4.2 Research Methodology 
 Problem of the study 
 Objective of the study 
 Universe of the study 
 Period of study, Data collection, Sample for the 
study and analysis 
 Contribution of the study 
3-5 
4.3 Over view of Chapter Plan 5-6 
4.4 Limitation of the Study 6-7 
  
CHAPTER  5 
 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES  
 
 
 EMPRICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA 2 
5.1 Age of the Bank 3 
5.2 Nos. of Branches 4 
5.3 Board Members 5 
5.4 Board Accountability 5 
5.5 Responsibilities of The Board 6 
5.6 Nos. of Directors 7 
5.7 Appointment of Board Members 9 
5.8 Professional Qualifications of Board Members 10 
5.9 The powers of the Board  11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XVI 
5.10 Duties and Responsibilities of the Board  11-12 
5.11 Board Effectiveness  13 
5.12 Board Meetings 13-16 
5.13 Assessment performance and effectiveness 17-18 
5.14 Board Committees  19 
5.15 Internal Audit  20 
5.16 Concurrent Audit 21 
5.17 Appointment of Auditors 22 
5.18 Established practices for Auditors 23 
5.19 Compliance with  IFRS 24 
5.20 Induction and training 25 
5.21 Conflict of Interest   25 
5.22 Appointment and tenure of office 26 
5.23 Succession Plans 26-27 
5.24 Share holding  27 
5.25 Strategy, Values, Performance and Compliance 28-29 
5.26 Reports to Regulators 30-32 
5.27 Risk Management  33 
5.28 Corporate Social responsibility  34 
5.29 Legal Frame Work  35 
5.30 Governance Effectiveness  36 
5.31 Rate of Apex Bank in Effective Governance 37 
  
CHAPTER  6 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
 
 
  
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
 
6.1 The Corporate Governance procedure applied in 
Banking sector  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XVII 
6.2 The Board 2 
6.3 Appointment of the Board 2-3 
6.4 Tenure of Office 3-4 
6.5 Roles and Responsibilities of the Board 4-7 
6.6 Committees of the Board  7 
6.7 Remuneration  7 
6.8 Supply and disclosure of Information 8-9 
6.9 Board Balance 9 
6.10 Role of Chairman and Chief Executive 10 
  
SHARE  HOLDERS 
 
 
6.11 Approval of major Decisions by Share Holders 10-11 
6.12 Corporate Social Responsibility 11 
6.13 Existing Legal Frame Work 12 
6.14 Existing corporate Governance procedures  13 
6.15 Effectiveness of regulatory and Supervisory Systems 13-14 
6.16 Summary of Findings and Suggestions 14-18 
6.17 Suggestions 19-24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XVIII 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 
No. 
TITLE OF TABLE  Chapter 
Page No 
 
1.1 Organisational Structure of Cooperative Credit Institutions 1.7 
2.1 State wise Financial Indication of Urban  Co-Operative Banks 
as on 31st March 2008  (Rs. In Crores) 
2.18 
2.2 Progress of UCB’S in Gujarat 2.72 
2.3 District wise Statistical Data of Urban Co-Operative Banks 2.74 
3.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms  3.18 
3.2 Impact on cost of Capital by other factors 3.23 
3.3 Governance Status in Indian Banking  3.37-40 
3.4 Memorandum of Understanding with State Governments  3.49 
3.5 Mergers / Amalgamations for Urban Cooperative Banks 3.50 
5.1 Empirical Analysis of Data 5.3 
5.2 Nos. Branches in Sample Banks 5.4 
5.3 Nos. of directors in sample Banks 5.7 
5.4 Board Member’s in sample Banks 5.8 
5.5 Professional Qualifications of Board members 5.10 
5.6 Existing Board Operating Documents 5.13 
5.7 Board Effectiveness 5.14 
5.8 Board Meeting Frequency 5.15 
5.9 Assessment of Performance and Effectiveness 5.17 
5.10 Board committee 5.19 
5.11 Internal Audit System in Sample Banks 5.20 
5.12 Concurrent Audit System in Sample Banks 5.21 
5.13 Appointment procedure of Auditors  5.22 
5.14 Established Practices for Auditors  5.23 
 
 
 
 
 
XIX 
5.15 Compliance with IFRS 5.24 
5.17 Existence of Succession plan  5.27 
5.18 Strategy, Value and Performance compliance  5.29 
5.19 Reports to Regulators 5.30 
5.20 R.B.I. Returns 5.32 
5.21 Effectiveness of Governance in sample Banks 5.36 
5.22 Rate of Apex Bank in effective Governance  5.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XX 
LIST OF ANNEXURES 
 
Annexure  Title  Of Annexure  Page No 
 
 ASSETS & LIABILITY MANAGEMENT   
1.1 Statement of Interest Rate sensitivity  1-A 
1.2 Statement of Structural Liquidity 1-B 
   
 DIRECTIVES  
2.1 Statement of Advances against Shares and Debenture 2-A 
2.2 Annual NPA Statement 2-B 
2.3 Daily call & Notice money operations 2-C 
2.4 Loan and Advances to Directors 2-D 
   
 FRAUDS  
3.1 Report on Actual or suspected Frauds  3-A 
3.2 Reports on outstanding Frauds 3-B 
3.3 Quarterly Progress Report on Large Value Frauds 3-C 
3.4 Report or Dacoities / Robberies / Theft / Burglaries 3-D 
   
 LICENCING  
4.1 Statement of Offices in India  4-A 
   
 OSS STATEMENTS (Offsite Surveillance system)  
5.1 Statement of Assets and Liabilities 5-A 
5.2 Statement of Earnings 5-B 
5.3  Statement of Assets quality 5-C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XXI 
5.4 Statement on Non performing Assets Large Exposures, 
Segment wise Adv; NDTL / NOF Ratio 
 
5-D 
5.5 Statement of Bank Profile 5-E 
 PLANNING  
6.1 Priority Sector and Weaker Section Advances  6-A 
6.2 Credit flow to minority communities 6-B 
6.3 USB’s investment in other USB’s / Institutions  6-C 
   
 REHABILITATION  
7.1 Annual Financial review 7-A 
7.2 Quarterly Progress Report  7-B 
   
 RETURNS  
8.1 Information on Balance sheet items  8-A 
8.2 Statement of Compliance with CRR (Cash Reserve 
Ratio), SLR (Statuary liquidity ratio) 
8-B 
8.3 Statement of Unsecured Loans and Advances to 
Directors / Firms in which they have Interest 
8-C 
8.4 Statement of Unclaimed Deposit Accounts not operated 
more than 10 years 
8-D 
8.5 Assets and Liabilities as on Friday of the month 8-E 
8.6 Annual Statement of Assets and Liabilities 8-F 
8.7 Monetary Aggregates  8-G 
   
 RBI RATING  
9.1 CAMELS Ratings 9-A TO 9-F 
 
 
 
XXII 
 1 
Chapter - 1 
Overview of Banking Industry in India 
 Introduction: 
 Industry scenario of Indian Banking Industry 
 Current Scenario 
 Aggregate Performance of the Banking Industry 
o Interest Rate Scene: 
o Governmental Policy 
 Implications of Some Recent Policy Measures 
 Challenges Facing by Banking Industry: 
 Users of Banking Services:  
o General Users 
o Industrial Users 
 Bank Marketing In the Indian Perspective 
 Bank Marketing Mix and Strategies 
o Product 
o Price  
o Promotion  
o Place  
 Bank Marketing Strategies 
 Challenges to Indian Banking:  
o Deregulation 
o Modified New rules 
o Efficiency 
o Diffused customer loyalty 
o Misaligned mindset 
o Competency gap 
 Strategic options to cope with the challenges 
 2 
 Banking Industry Vision 2010 
o Emerging Economic Scene 
o Future Landscape of Indian Banking  
o Changes in the Structure of Banks  
o Product Innovation and Process Re-Engineering 
o Technology In Banking 
o Risk Management 
o Regulatory and legal environment 
o Rural and Social Banking Issues 
o Human Resources Management 
 References 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Introduction: 
 
Indian banking is the lifeline of the nation and its people. Banking has helped in 
developing the vital sectors of the economy and usher in a new dawn of 
progress on the Indian horizon. The sector has translated the hopes and 
aspirations of millions of people into reality. But to do so, it has had to control 
miles and miles of difficult terrain, suffer the indignities of foreign rule and the 
pangs of partition. Today, Indian banks can confidently compete with modern 
banks of the world.  
 
Before the 20th century, usury, or lending money at a high rate of interest, was 
widely prevalent in rural India. Entry of Joint stock banks and development of 
Cooperative movement have taken over a good deal of business from the hands 
of the Indian money lender, who although still exist, have lost his menacing 
teeth. 
 
In the Indian Banking System, Cooperative banks exist side by side with 
commercial banks and play a supplementary role in providing need-based 
finance, especially for agricultural and agriculture-based operations including 
farming, cattle, milk, hatchery, personal finance etc. along with some small 
industries and self-employment driven activities. 
 
Generally, co-operative banks are governed by the respective co-operative acts 
of state governments. But, since banks began to be regulated by the RBI after 1st 
March 1966, these banks are also regulated by the RBI after amendment to the 
Banking Regulation Act 1949. The Reserve Bank is responsible for licensing of 
banks and branches, and it also regulates credit limits to state co-operative 
banks on behalf of primary co-operative banks for financing SSI units. 
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Banking in India originated in the first decade of 18th century with The General 
Bank of India coming into existence in 1786. This was followed by Bank of 
Hindustan. Both these banks are now defunct. After this, the Indian government 
established three presidency banks in India. The first of three was the Bank of 
Bengal, which obtains charter in 1809, the other two presidency bank, viz., the 
Bank of Bombay and the Bank of Madras, were established in 1840 and 1843, 
respectively. The three presidency banks were subsequently amalgamated into 
the Imperial Bank of India (IBI) under the Imperial Bank of India Act, 1920 – 
which is now known as the State Bank of India. 
 
A couple of decades later, foreign banks like Credit Lyonnais started their 
Calcutta operations in the 1850s. At that point of time, Calcutta was the most 
active trading port, mainly due to the trade of the British Empire, and due to 
which banking activity took roots there and prospered. The first fully Indian 
owned bank was the Allahabad Bank, which was established in 1865. 
 
By the 1900s, the market expanded with the establishment of banks such as 
Punjab National Bank, in 1895 in Lahore and Bank of India, in 1906, in 
Mumbai – both of which were founded under private ownership. The Reserve 
Bank of India formally took on the responsibility of regulating the Indian 
banking sector from 1935. After India‟s independence in 1947, the Reserve 
Bank was nationalized and given broader powers. 
 
As the banking institutions expand and become increasingly complex under the 
impact of deregulation, innovation and technological upgradation, it is crucial to 
maintain balance between efficiency and stability. During the last 30 years since 
nationalization tremendous changes have taken place in the financial markets as 
well as in the banking industry due to financial sector reforms. The banks have 
shed their traditional functions and have been innovating, improving and 
coming out with new types of services to cater emerging needs of their 
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customers. Banks have been given greater freedom to frame their own policies. 
Rapid advancement of technology has contributed to significant reduction in 
transaction costs, facilitated greater diversification of portfolio and 
improvements in credit delivery of banks. Prudential norms, in line with 
international standards, have been put in place for promoting and enhancing the 
efficiency of banks.  The process of institution building has been strengthened 
with several measures in the areas of debt recovery, asset reconstruction and 
securitization, consolidation, convergence, mass banking etc. 
 
Despite this commendable progress, serious problem have emerged reflecting in 
a decline in productivity and efficiency, and erosion of the profitability of the 
banking sector. There has been deterioration in the quality of loan portfolio 
which, in turn, has come in the way of bank‟s income generation and 
enchancement of their capital funds. Inadequacy of capital has been 
accompanied by inadequacy of loan loss provisions resulting into the adverse 
impact on the depositors‟ and investors‟ confidence. The Government, 
therefore, set up Narasimham Committee to look into the problems and 
recommend measures to improve the health of the financial system.  
 
The acceptance of the Narasimham Committee recommendations by the 
Government has resulted in transformation of hitherto highly regimented and 
overbureaucratized banking system into market driven and extremely 
competitive one. 
 
 The massive and speedy expansion and diversification of banking has not been 
without its strains. The banking industry is entering a new phase in which it will 
be facing increasing competition from non-banks not only in the domestic 
market but in the international markets also. The operational structure of 
banking in India is expected to undergo a profound change during the next 
decade. With the emergence of new private banks, the private bank sector has 
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become enriched and diversified with focus spread to the wholesale as well as 
retail banking. The existing banks have wide branch network and geographic 
spread, whereas the new private banks have the clout of massive capital, lean 
personnel component, the expertise in developing sophisticated financial 
products and use of state-of-the-art technology. 
 
Gradual deregulation that is being ushered in while stimulating the competition 
would also facilitate forging mutually beneficial relationships, which would 
ultimately enhance the quality and content of banking. In the final phase, the 
banking system in India will give a good account of itself only with the 
combined efforts of cooperative banks, regional rural banks and development 
banking institutions which are expected to provide an adequate number of 
effective retail outlets to meet the emerging socio-economic challenges during 
the next two decades. The electronic age has also affected the banking system, 
leading to very fast electronic fund transfer. However, the development of 
electronic banking has also led to new areas of risk such as data security and 
integrity requiring new techniques of risk management. 
 
Cooperative (mutual) banks are an important part of many financial systems. In 
a number of countries, they are among the largest financial institutions when 
considered as a group. Moreover, the share of cooperative banks has been 
increasing in recent years; in the sample of banks in advanced economies and 
emerging markets analyzed in this paper, the market share of cooperative banks 
in terms of total banking sector assets increased from about 9 percent in mid-
1990s to about 14 percent in 2004. 
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Industry scenario of Indian Banking Industry: 
 
The growth in the Indian Banking Industry has been more qualitative than 
quantitative and it is expected to remain the same in the coming years. Based on 
the projections made in the "India Vision 2020" prepared by the Planning 
Commission and the Draft 10th Plan, the report forecasts that the pace of 
expansion in the balance-sheets of banks is likely to decelerate. The total assets 
of all scheduled commercial banks by end-March 2010 is estimated at Rs 
40,90,000 crores. That will comprise about 65 per cent of GDP at current 
market prices as compared to 67 per cent in 2002-03. Bank assets are expected 
to grow at an annual composite rate of 13.4 per cent during the rest of the 
decade as against the growth rate of 16.7 per cent that existed between 1994-95 
and 2002-03. It is expected that there will be large additions to the capital base 
and reserves on the liability side.  
The Indian Banking industry, which is governed by the Banking Regulation Act 
of India, 1949 can be broadly classified into two major categories, non-
scheduled banks and scheduled banks. Scheduled banks comprise commercial 
banks and the co-operative banks. In terms of ownership, commercial banks can 
be further grouped into nationalized banks, the State Bank of India and its group 
banks, regional rural banks and private sector banks (the old/ new domestic and 
foreign). These banks have over 67,000 branches spread across the country. 
 
The Public Sector Banks(PSBs), which are the base of the Banking sector in 
India account for more than 78 per cent of the total banking industry assets. 
Unfortunately they are burdened with excessive Non Performing assets (NPAs), 
massive manpower and lack of modern technology. On the other hand the 
Private Sector Banks are making tremendous progress. They are leaders in 
Internet banking, mobile banking, phone banking, ATMs. As far as foreign 
banks are concerned they are likely to succeed in the Indian Banking Industry.  
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In the Indian Banking Industry some of the Private Sector Banks operating are 
IDBI Bank, ING Vyasa Bank, SBI Commercial and International Bank Ltd, 
Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. and banks from the Public Sector include Punjab 
National bank, Vijaya Bank, UCO Bank, Oriental Bank, Allahabad Bank among 
others. ANZ Grindlays Bank, ABN-AMRO Bank, American Express Bank Ltd, 
Citibank are some of the foreign banks operating in the Indian Banking 
Industry. 
 
As far as the present scenario is concerned the Banking Industry in India is 
going through a transitional phase. The first phase of financial reforms resulted 
in the nationalization of 14 major banks in 1969 and resulted in a shift from 
Class banking to Mass banking. This in turn resulted in a significant growth in 
the geographical coverage of banks. Every bank had to earmark a minimum 
percentage of their loan portfolio to sectors identified as “priority sectors”. The 
manufacturing sector also grew during the 1970s in protected environs and the 
banking sector was a critical source. The next wave of reforms saw the 
nationalization of 6 more commercial banks in 1980. Since then the number of 
scheduled commercial banks increased four-fold and the number of bank 
branches increased eight-fold. 
 
After the second phase of financial sector reforms and liberalization of the 
sector in the early nineties, the Public Sector Banks (PSB) s found it extremely 
difficult to compete with the new private sector banks and the foreign banks. 
The new private sector banks first made their appearance after the guidelines 
permitting them were issued in January 1993. Eight new private sector banks 
are presently in operation. These banks due to their late start have access to 
state-of-the-art technology, which in turn helps them to save on manpower costs 
and provide better services. 
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During the year 2000, the State Bank Of India (SBI) and its 7 associates 
accounted for a 25 percent share in deposits and 28.1 percent share in credit. 
The 20 nationalized banks accounted for 53.2 percent of the deposits and 47.5 
percent of credit during the same period. The share of foreign banks (numbering 
42), regional rural banks and other scheduled commercial banks accounted for 
5.7 percent, 3.9 percent and 12.2 percent respectively in deposits and 8.41 
percent, 3.14 percent and 12.85 percent respectively in credit during the year 
2000. 
 
Current Scenario: 
 
The industry is currently in a transition phase. On the one hand, the PSBs, 
which are the mainstay of the Indian Banking system are in the process of 
shedding their flab in terms of excessive manpower, excessive non Performing 
Assets (Npas) and excessive governmental equity, while on the other hand the 
private sector banks are consolidating themselves through mergers and 
acquisitions.  
 
PSBs, which currently account for more than 78 percent of total banking 
industry assets are saddled with NPAs (a mind-boggling Rs 830 billion in 
2000), falling revenues from traditional sources, lack of modern technology and 
a massive workforce while the new private sector banks are forging ahead and 
rewriting the traditional banking business model by way of their sheer 
innovation and service. The PSBs are of course currently working out 
challenging strategies even as 20 percent of their massive employee strength has 
dwindled in the wake of the successful Voluntary Retirement Schemes (VRS) 
schemes. 
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The private players however cannot match the PSB‟s great reach, great size and 
access to low cost deposits. Therefore one of the means for them to combat the 
PSBs has been through the merger and acquisition (M& A) route. Over the last 
two years, the industry has witnessed several such instances. For instance, Hdfc 
Bank‟s merger with Times Bank Icici Bank‟s acquisition of ITC Classic, 
Anagram Finance and Bank of Madura. Centurion Bank, Indusind Bank, Bank 
of Punjab, Vysya Bank are said to be on the lookout. The UTI bank- Global 
Trust Bank merger however opened a pandora‟s box and brought about the 
realization that all was not well in the functioning of many of the private sector 
banks. 
 
Private sector Banks have pioneered internet banking, phone banking, anywhere 
banking, mobile banking, debit cards, Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) and 
combined various other services and integrated them into the mainstream 
banking arena, while the PSBs are still grappling with disgruntled employees in 
the aftermath of successful VRS schemes. Also, following India‟s commitment 
to the W To agreement in respect of the services sector, foreign banks, including 
both new and the existing ones, have been permitted to open up to 12 branches a 
year with effect from 1998-99 as against the earlier stipulation of 8 branches. 
 
Talks of government diluting their equity from 51 percent to 33 percent in 
November 2000 has also opened up a new opportunity for the takeover of even 
the PSBs. The FDI rules being more rationalized in Q1FY02 may also pave the 
way for foreign banks taking the M& A route to acquire willing Indian partners. 
 
Meanwhile the economic and corporate sector slowdown has led to an 
increasing number of banks focusing on the retail segment. Many of them are 
also entering the new vistas of Insurance. Banks with their phenomenal reach 
and a regular interface with the retail investor are the best placed to enter into 
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the insurance sector. Banks in India have been allowed to provide fee-based 
insurance services without risk participation, invest in an insurance company for 
providing infrastructure and services support and set up of a separate joint-
venture insurance company with risk participation. 
 
Aggregate Performance of the Banking Industry: 
 
Aggregate deposits of scheduled commercial banks increased at a compounded 
annual average growth rate (Cagr) of 17.8 percent during 1969-99, while bank 
credit expanded at a Cagr of 16.3 percent per annum. Banks‟ investments in 
government and other approved securities recorded a Cagr of 18.8 percent per 
annum during the same period. 
 
In FY01 the economic slowdown resulted in a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth of only 6.0 percent as against the previous year‟s 6.4 percent. The WPI 
Index (a measure of inflation) increased by 7.1 percent as against 3.3 percent in 
FY00. Similarly, money supply (M3) grew by around 16.2 percent as against 
14.6 percent a year ago. 
 
The growth in aggregate deposits of the scheduled commercial banks at 15.4 
percent in FY01 percent was lower than that of 19.3 percent in the previous 
year, while the growth in credit by SCBs slowed down to 15.6 percent in FY01 
against 23 percent a year ago.  
 
The industrial slowdown also affected the earnings of listed banks. The net 
profits of 20 listed banks dropped by 34.43 percent in the quarter ended March 
2001. Net profits grew by 40.75 percent in the first quarter of 2000-2001, but 
dropped to 4.56 percent in the fourth quarter of 2000-2001.  
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On the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) front while most banks managed to 
fulfill the norms, it was a feat achieved with its own share of difficulties. The 
CAR, which at present is 9.0 percent, is likely to be hiked to 12.0 percent by the 
year 2004 based on the Basle Committee recommendations. Any bank that 
wishes to grow its assets needs to also shore up its capital at the same time so 
that its capital as a percentage of the risk-weighted assets is maintained at the 
stipulated rate. While the IPO route was a much-fancied one in the early „90s, 
the current scenario doesn‟t look too attractive for bank majors. 
 
Consequently, banks have been forced to explore other avenues to shore up their 
capital base. While some are wooing foreign partners to add to the capital others 
are employing the M& A route. Many are also going in for right issues at prices 
considerably lower than the market prices to woo the investors.  
 
Interest Rate Scene: 
 
The two years, post the East Asian crises in 1997-98 saw a climb in the global 
interest rates. It was only in the later half of FY01 that the US Fed cut interest 
rates. India has however remained more or less insulated. The past 2 years in 
our country was characterized by a mounting intention of the Reserve Bank Of 
India (RBI) to steadily reduce interest rates resulting in a narrowing differential 
between global and domestic rates. 
 
The RBI has been affecting bank rate and CRR cuts at regular intervals to 
improve liquidity and reduce rates. The only exception was in July 2000 when 
the RBI increased the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) to stem the fall in the rupee 
against the dollar. The steady fall in the interest rates resulted in squeezed 
margins for the banks in general. 
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Governmental Policy: 
 
After the first phase and second phase of financial reforms, in the 1980s 
commercial banks began to function in a highly regulated environment, with 
administered interest rate structure, quantitative restrictions on credit flows, 
high reserve requirements and reservation of a significant proportion of lendable 
resources for the priority and the government sectors. The restrictive regulatory 
norms led to the credit rationing for the private sector and the interest rate 
controls led to the unproductive use of credit and low levels of investment and 
growth. The resultant „financial repression‟ led to decline in productivity and 
efficiency and erosion of profitability of the banking sector in general. 
 
This was when the need to develop a sound commercial banking system was 
felt. This was worked out mainly with the help of the recommendations of the 
Committee on the Financial System (Chairman: Shri M. Narasimham), 1991. 
The resultant financial sector reforms called for interest rate flexibility for 
banks, reduction in reserve requirements, and a number of structural measures. 
Interest rates have thus been steadily deregulated in the past few years with 
banks being free to fix their Prime Lending Rates(PLRs) and deposit rates for 
most banking products. Credit market reforms included introduction of new 
instruments of credit, changes in the credit delivery system and integration of 
functional roles of diverse players, such as, banks, financial institutions and 
non-banking financial companies (Nbfcs). Domestic Private Sector Banks were 
allowed to be set up, PSBs were allowed to access the markets to shore up their 
Cars. 
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Implications of Some Recent Policy Measures: 
 
The allowing of PSBs to shed manpower and dilution of equity are moves that 
will lend greater autonomy to the industry. In order to lend more depth to the 
capital markets the RBI had in November 2000 also changed the capital market 
exposure norms from 5 percent of bank‟s incremental deposits of the previous 
year to 5 percent of the bank‟s total domestic credit in the previous year. But 
this move did not have the desired effect, as in, while most banks kept away 
almost completely from the capital markets, a few private sector banks went 
overboard and exceeded limits and indulged in dubious stock market deals. The 
chances of seeing banks making a comeback to the stock markets are therefore 
quite unlikely in the near future. 
 
The move to increase Foreign Direct Investment FDI limits to 49 percent from 
20 percent during the first quarter of this fiscal came as a welcome 
announcement to foreign players wanting to get a foot hold in the Indian 
Markets by investing in willing Indian partners who are starved of networth to 
meet CAR norms. Ceiling for FII investment in companies was also increased 
from 24.0 percent to 49.0 percent and have been included within the ambit of 
FDI investment. 
 
The abolishment of interest tax of 2.0 percent in budget 2001-02 will help banks 
pass on the benefit to the borrowers on new loans leading to reduced costs and 
easier lending rates. Banks will also benefit on the existing loans wherever the 
interest tax cost element has already been built into the terms of the loan. The 
reduction of interest rates on various small savings schemes from 11 percent to 
9.5 percent in Budget 2001-02 was a much awaited move for the banking 
industry and in keeping with the reducing interest rate scenario, however the 
small investor is not very happy with the move. 
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Some of the not so good measures however like reducing the limit for tax 
deducted at source (TDS) on interest income from deposits to Rs 2,500 from the 
earlier level of Rs 10,000, in Budget 2001-02, had met with disapproval from 
the banking fraternity who feared that the move would prove counterproductive 
and lead to increased fragmentation of deposits, increased volumes and 
transaction costs. The limit was thankfully partially restored to Rs 5000 at the 
time of passing the Finance Bill in the Parliament. 
 
Public Sector banks that imbibe new concepts in banking, turn tech savvy, 
leaner and meaner post VRS and obtain more autonomy by keeping 
governmental stake to the minimum can succeed in effectively taking on the 
private sector banks by virtue of their sheer size. Weaker PSU banks are 
unlikely to survive in the long run. Consequently, they are likely to be either 
acquired by stronger players or will be forced to look out for other strategies to 
infuse greater capital and optimize their operations. 
 
Foreign banks are likely to succeed in their niche markets and be the innovators 
in terms of technology introduction in the domestic scenario. The outlook for 
the private sector banks indeed looks to be more promising vis-à-vis other 
banks. While their focused operations, lower but more productive employee 
force etc will stand them good, possible acquisitions of PSU banks will 
definitely give them the much needed scale of operations and access to lower 
cost of funds. These banks will continue to be the early technology adopters in 
the industry, thus increasing their efficiencies. Also, they have been amongst the 
first movers in the lucrative insurance segment. Already, banks such as Icici 
Bank and Hdfc Bank have forged alliances with Prudential Life and Standard 
Life respectively. This is one segment that is likely to witness a greater deal of 
action in the future. In the near term, the low interest rate scenario is likely to 
affect the spreads of majors. This is likely to result in a greater focus on better 
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asset-liability management procedures. Consequently, only banks that strive 
hard to increase their share of fee-based revenues are likely to do better in the 
future. 
 
Challenges Facing by Banking Industry: 
The bank marketing is than an approach to market the services profitability. It is 
a device to maintain commercial viability. The changing perception of bank 
marketing has made it a social process. The significant properties of the holistic 
concept of management and marketing has made bank marketing a device to 
establish a balance between the commercial and social considerations, often 
considered to the be opposite of each other. A collaboration of two words banks 
and marketing thus focuses our attention on the following:  
 
* Bank marketing is a managerial approach to survive in highly competitive 
market as well as reliable service delivery to target customers.  
 
* It is a social process to sub serve social interests. 
 
* It is a fair way of making profits 
 
* It is an art to make possible performance-orientation. 
 
* It is a professionally tested skill to excel competition.  
Users of Banking Services:  
The emerging trends in the level of expectation affect the formulation of 
marketing mix. Innovative efforts become essential the moment it finds a 
change in the level of expectations. There are two types of customers using the 
services of banks, such as general customers and the industrial customers.  
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General Users: 
Persons having an account in the bank and using the banking facilities at the 
terms and conditions fixed by a bank are known as general users of the banking 
services. Generally, they are the users having small sized and less frequent 
transactions or availing very limited services of banks.  
Industrial Users: 
The industrialists, entrepreneurs having an account in the bank and using credit 
facilities and other services for their numerous operations like establishments 
and expansion, mergers, acquisitions etc. of their businesses are known as 
industrial users. Generally, they are found a few but large sized customers.  
Bank Marketing In the Indian Perspective: 
The formulation of business policies is substantially influenced by the emerging 
trends in the national and international scenario. The GDP, per capita income, 
expectation, the rate of literacy, the geographic and demographic 
considerations, the rural or urban orientation, the margins in economic systems, 
and the spread of technologies are some of the key factors governing the 
development plan of an organization, especially banking organization.  
In ours developing economy, the formulation of a sound marketing mix is found 
a difficult task. The nationalization of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is a 
landmark in the development of Indian Banking system that have paved 
numerous paths for qualitative-cum quantities improvements in true sense. 
Subsequently, the RBI and the policy makers of the public sector commercial 
banks think in favor of conceptualizing modern marketing which would bring a 
radical change in the process of quality up gradation and village to village 
commercial viability.  
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Bank Marketing Mix and Strategies: 
The first task before the public sector commercial Banks is to formulate that 
Bank marketing mix which suits the national socio-economic requirements. 
Some have 4 P's and some have 7 P's of marketing mix. The common four Ps of 
Marketing mix are as follows:-  
Product: 
To be more specific the peripheral services need frequent innovations, since this 
would be helpful in excelling competition. The product portfolio designing is 
found significant to maintain the commercial viability of the public sector 
banks. The banks professionals need to assign due weightage to their physical 
properties. They are supposed to look smart active and attractive.  
Price:  
Price is a critical and important factor of bank marketing mix due numerous 
players in the industry . Most consumers will only be prepared to invest their 
money in search of extraordinary or higher returns. They are ready to pay 
additional value if there is a perception of extra product value. This value may 
be improved performance, function, services, reliability, promptness for 
problem solving and of course, higher rate of return   
Promotion: 
Bank Marketing is actually is the marketing of reliability and faith of the people 
.It is the responsibility of the banking industry to take people in favor through 
Word of mouth publicity, reliability showing through long years of 
establishment and other services.  
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Place: 
The choice of where and when to make a product available will have significant 
impact on the customers. Customers often need to avail banking services fast for 
this they require the bank braches near to their official area or the place of easy 
access.  
Bank Marketing Strategies: 
The marketing research considered being a systematic gathering, recording and 
analysis of data makes ways for making and innovation the marketing decisions. 
The information collected from the external sources by conducting surveys 
helps bank professional in different wants.  
In the bank services, the formulation of overall marketing strategies is 
considered significant with the view point of tapping the potentials, expanding 
the business and increasing the marketing share. The increasing domination and 
gaining popularity banks, the popularity banks, the profitable schemes of the 
non-banking organization mounting craze among the customers for private 
banks have made the task of influencing the impulse of customers a bit difficult.  
The marketing research simplifies the task of studying the magnitude of 
competition by opinion surveys and the feed back customers, the multi-
dimensional changes in the services mix can be made productive if it is based 
on marketing research.  
Challenges to Indian Banking:  
The banking industry in India is undergoing a major change due to the 
advancement in Indian economy and continuous deregulation. These multiple 
changes happening in series has a ripple effect on banking industry which is 
trying to be organized completely, regulated sellers of market to completed 
deregulated customers market 
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1. Deregulation:  
This continuous deregulation has given rise to extreme competition with greater 
autonomy, operational flexibility, and decontrolled interest rate and liberalized 
norms and policies for foreign exchange in banking market. The deregulation of 
the industry coupled with decontrol in the interest rates has led to entry of a 
number of players in the banking industry. Thereby reduced corporate credit off 
which has resulted in large number of competitors battling for the same pie.  
2. Modified New rules:    
As a result, the market place has been redefined with new rules of the game. 
Banks are transforming to universal banking, adding new channels with 
lucrative pricing and freebees to offer. New channels squeezed spreads, 
demanding customers better service, marketing skills heightened competition, 
defined new rules of the game pressure on efficiency. Need for new orientation 
diffused customer loyalty. Bank has led to a series of innovative product 
offerings catering to various customer segments, specifically retail credit.  
3. Efficiency:   
Excellent efficiencies are required at banker's end to establish a balance 
between the commercial and social considerations Bank need to access low cost 
funds and simultaneously improve the efficiency and efficacy. Owing to cut-
throat competition in the industry, banks are facing pricing pressure, have to 
give thrust on retail assets.  
4. Diffused customer loyalty:  
Attractive offers by MNC and other nationalized banks, customers have become 
more demanding and the loyalties are diffused. Value added offerings bound 
customers to change their preferences and perspective. These are multiple 
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choices; the wallet share is reduced per bank with demand on flexibility and 
customization. Given the relatively low switching costs; customer retention 
calls for customized service and hassle free, flawless service delivery. 
 
5. Misaligned mindset:  
These changes are creating challenges, as employees are made to adapt to 
changing conditions. The employees are resisting to change and the seller 
market mindset is yet to be changed. These problems coupled with fear of 
uncertainty and control orientation. Moreover banking industry is accepting the 
latest technology but utilization is far below from satisfactory level. 
 
6. Competency gap:  
The competency gap needs to be addressed simultaneously otherwise there will 
be missed opportunities. Placing the right skill at the right place will determine 
success. The focus of people will be doing work but not providing solutions, on 
escalating problems rather than solving them and on disposing customers 
instead of using the opportunity to cross sell. Strategic options to cope with 
the challenges:  
Dominant players in the industry have embarked on a series of strategic and 
tactical initiatives to sustain leadership. The major initiatives incorporate: 
 
a) Focus on ensuring reliable service delivery through Investing on and  
    implementing right technology.. 
 
b) Leveraging the branch networks and sales structure to mobilize low cost 
current and savings deposits. 
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c) Making aggressive forays in the retail advances segments of home and 
personal loans. 
 
d) Implementing initiatives involving people, process and technology to reduce 
the fixed costs and the cost per transaction. 
 
e) Focusing on fee based income to compensate foe squeezed spread. 
 
f) Innovating products to capture customer 'mind share' to begin with and later 
the wallet share. 
 
g) Improving the asset quality as Basel II norms.  
 
The banking environment of today is rapidly changing and the rules of 
yesterday no longer applicable. The corporate and the legal barriers that 
separate the various banking, investment and insurance sectors are less well 
defined and the cross-over are increasing. As a consequence the marketing 
function is also changing to better support the bank in this dynamic market 
environment. The key marketing challenge today is to support and advice on the 
focus positioning and marketing resources needed to deliver performance on the 
banking products and services. Marketing, as an investment advisor, is about 
defining 4Ps and implementing key strategic initiatives to Market segments, 
increasingly redefined, relevant micro-segments to survive and flourish in the 
highly competitive market  
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Banking Industry Vision 2010: 
 Emerging Economic Scene: 
 
 The financial system is the lifeline of the economy. The changes in the 
economy get mirrored in the performance of the financial system, more 
so of the banking industry. The Committee, therefore felt, it would be 
desirable to look at the direction of growth of the economy while drawing 
the emerging contours of the financial system. The “ India Vision 2020" 
prepared by the Planning Commission, Government of India, is an 
important document, which is likely to guide the policy makers, in the 
years to come. The Committee has taken into consideration the economic 
profile drawn in India Vision 2020 document while attempting to 
visualise the future landscape of banking Industry. 
 
 India Vision 2020 envisages improving the ranking of India from the 
present 11th to 4th among 207 countries given in the World Development 
Report in terms of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It also envisages 
moving the country from a low-income nation to an upper middle-income 
country. To achieve this objective, the India Vision aims to have an 
annual growth in the GDP of 8.5 per cent to 9 per cent over the next 20 
years. Economic development of this magnitude would see quadrupling 
of real per capita income. When compared with the average growth in 
GDP of  4-6% in the recent past, this is an ambitious target. This would 
call for considerable investments in the infrastructure and meeting the 
funding requirements of a high magnitude would be a challenge to the 
banking and financial system. 
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 India Vision 2020 sees a nation of 1.3 billion people who are better 
educated, healthier, and more prosperous. Urban India would encompass 
40% of the population as against 28 % now. With more urban 
conglomerations coming up, only 40% of population would be engaged 
in agricultural sector as against nearly two thirds of people depending on 
this sector for livelihood. Share of agriculture in the GDP will come 
down to 6% (down from 28%). Services sector would assume greater 
prominence in our economy. The shift in demographic profile and 
composition of GDP are significant for strategy planners in the banking 
sector. 
 
 Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector would emerge as a major 
contributor to employment generation in the country. Small Scale sector 
had received policy support from the Government in the past considering 
the employment generation and favourable capital-output ratio. This 
segment had, however, remained vulnerable in many ways. Globalization 
and opening up of the economy to international competition has added to 
the woes of this sector making bankers wary of supporting the sector. It is 
expected that the SME sector will emerge as a vibrant sector, contributing 
significantly to the GDP growth and exports. 
 
 India‟s share in International trade has remained well below 1%. Being 
not an export led economy (exports remaining below 15% of the GDP), 
we have remained rather insulated from global economic shocks. This 
profile will undergo a change, as we plan for 8-9% growth in GDP.  
Planning Commission report visualizes a more globalised economy.  Our 
international trade is expected to constitute 35% of the GDP.  
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 In short, the Vision of India in 2020 is of a nation bustling with energy, 
entrepreneurship and innovation. In other words, we hope to see a 
market-driven, productive and highly competitive economy. To realize 
the above objective, we need a financial system, which is inherently 
strong, functionally diverse and displays efficiency and flexibility. The 
banking system is, by far, the most dominant segment of the financial 
sector, accounting for as it does, over 80% of the funds flowing through 
the financial sector. It should, therefore, be  our endeavor to develop a 
more resilient, competitive and dynamic financial system with best 
practices that supports and contributes positively to the growth of the 
economy.    
 
 The ability of the financial system in its present structure to make 
available investible resources to the potential investors in the forms and 
tenors that will be required by them in the coming years, that is, as equity, 
long term debt and medium and short-term debt would be critical to the 
achievement of plan objectives. The gap in demand and supply of 
resources in different segments of the financial markets has to be met and 
for this, smooth flow of funds between various types of financial 
institutions and instruments would need to be facilitated. 
 
 Government‟s policy documents list investment in infrastructure as a 
major area which needs to be focused. Financing of infrastructure 
projects is a specialized activity and would continue to be of critical 
importance in the future. After all, a sound and efficient infrastructure is a 
sine qua non for sustainable economic development. 
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 Infrastructure services have generally been provided by the public sector 
all over the world in the past as these services have an element of public 
good in them. In the recent past, this picture has changed and private 
financing of infrastructure has made substantial progress. This shift 
towards greater role of commercial funding in infrastructure projects is 
expected to become more prominent in coming years. The role of the 
Government would become more and more of that of a facilitator and the 
development of infrastructure would really become an exercise in public-
private partnership. „India Infrastructure Report‟ (Rakesh Mohan 
Committee - 1996) placed financing of infrastructure as a major 
responsibility of banks and financial institutions in the years to come. The 
report estimated the funding requirements of various sectors in the 
infrastructure area at Rs 12,00,000 crore by the year 2005-06. Since the 
estimated availability of financing from Indian financial institutions and 
banks was expected at only Rs 1,20,000 crore, a large gap is left which 
needs to be filled through bilateral/multilateral/government funding.  
 
 It has been observed globally that project finance to developing 
economies flows in where there is relatively stable macro-economic 
environment. These include regulatory reforms and opening of market to 
competition and private investment. Liberalized financial markets, 
promoting and deepening of domestic markets, wider use of risk 
management tools and other financial derivative products, improved legal 
framework, accounting and disclosure standards etc are some of the other 
aspects which would impact commercial funding of infrastructure 
projects. 
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 The India Vision document of Planning Commission envisages Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) to contribute 35% (21% now) to gross capital 
formation of the country by 2020. Government has announced a policy to 
encourage greater flow of FDI into the banking sector. The recent 
amendment bill introduced in Parliament to remove the 10% ceiling on 
the voting rights of shareholders of banking companies is a move in this 
direction. The working group expects this to have an impact on the 
capital structure of the banks in India in the coming years. 
 
 Consequent to opening up of the economy for greater trade and 
investment relations with the outside world, which is imperative if the 
growth projections of India Vision 2020 were to materialize, we expect 
the banking Industry‟s business also to be driven by forces of 
globalization. This may be further accentuated with the realisation of full 
convertibility of the rupee on capital account and consequent free flow of 
capital across the borders.  An increase in the income levels of the people 
would naturally lead to changes in the spending pattern also. This could 
result in larger investments in the areas like entertainment and leisure, 
education, healthcare etc and naturally, these would attract greater 
participation of the banking system.  
 
 On the basis of the projection made by the Draft 10th Five Year Plan on 
relevant macro indicators such as GDP and extending the trend for a 
further period of three years, it is estimated that GDP at current market 
prices during 2009-10 would be Rs.61,40,000 crore.  Taking  into account 
the on-going reform measures,  expected Basel II needs, and financial 
dis-intermediation, the pace of expansion in the balance sheets of banks is 
likely to decelerate.  Thus total assets of all scheduled commercial banks 
by end March 2010 may be taken as Rs.40,90,000 crore as a working 
estimate.  At that level, the annual composite rate of growth in total assets 
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of Scheduled Commercial Banks would be about 13.4 per cent to be over 
2002-03 as compared to 16.7 per cent between 1994-95 and 2002-03.  It 
will form about 65 per cent of GDP at current market prices as compared 
to 67 per cent in 2002-03.   
 
 On the liability side, there may be large augmentation to capital base.  
Reserves are likely to increase substantially.  Banks will relay more on 
borrowed funds.  Hence, the pace of accretion to deposits may slow 
down. 
 
 On the asset side,  the pace of growth in both advances and investment 
may slacken.  However, under advances, the share of bills  may increase.  
Similarly, under investment, the share of „others‟ may increase.  
 
 Future Landscape of Indian Banking  
 
 Liberalization and de-regulation process started in 1991-92 has made a 
sea change  in the banking system. From a totally regulated environment, 
we have gradually moved into a market driven competitive system. Our 
move towards global benchmarks has been, by and large, calibrated and 
regulator driven. The pace of changes gained momentum in the last few 
years. Globalization would gain greater speed in the coming years 
particularly on account of expected opening up of financial services under 
WTO. Four trends change the banking industry world over, viz. 1) 
Consolidation of players through mergers and acquisitions, 2) 
Globalisation of operations, 3) Development of new technology and 4) 
Universalisation  of banking.  With technology acting as a catalyst, we 
expect to see great changes in the banking scene in the coming years. The 
Committee has attempted to visualize the financial world 5-10 years from 
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now. The picture that emerged is somewhat  as discussed below.  It 
entails emergence of  an integrated and diversified financial system. The 
move towards universal banking has already begun. This will gather 
further momentum bringing non-banking financial institutions also, into 
an integrated financial system. 
 
 The traditional banking functions would give way to a system geared to 
meet all the financial needs of the customer. We could see emergence of 
highly varied financial products, which are tailored to meet specific needs 
of the customers in the retail as well as corporate segments. The advent of 
new technologies could see the emergence of new financial players doing 
financial intermediation. For example, we could see utility service 
providers offering say, bill payment services or supermarkets or retailers 
doing basic lending operations. The conventional definition of banking 
might undergo changes. 
 
 The competitive environment in the banking sector is likely to result in 
individual players working out differentiated strategies based on their 
strengths and market niches. For example, some players might emerge as 
specialists in mortgage products, credit cards etc. whereas some could 
choose to concentrate on particular segments of business system, while 
outsourcing all other functions.  Some other banks may concentrate on 
SME segments or high net worth individuals by providing specially 
tailored services beyond traditional banking offerings to satisfy the needs 
of customers they understand better than a more generalist competitor.  
 
 International trade is  an area where India‟s presence is expected to show 
appreciable increase.  Presently, Indian share in the global trade is just 
about 0.8%.  The long term projections for growth in international trade is 
placed at an average of  6% per annum.  With the growth in IT sector and 
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other IT Enabled Services, there is  tremendous potential for business 
opportunities.  Keeping in view the GDP growth forecast under India 
Vision 2020, Indian exports can be expected to grow at a sustainable rate 
of 15% per annum in the period ending with 2010.  This again will  offer 
enormous scope to Banks in India to increase their forex business and 
international presence.   Globalization would provide opportunities for 
Indian corporate entities to expand their business in other countries.  
Banks in India wanting to increase their international presence could 
naturally be expected to follow these corporates and other  trade flows in 
and out of India. 
 
 Retail lending will receive greater focus. Banks would compete with one 
another to provide full range of financial services to this segment. Banks 
would use multiple delivery channels to suit the requirements and tastes 
of customers. While some customers might value relationship banking 
(conventional branch banking), others might prefer convenience banking 
(e-banking).  
 
 One of the concerns is quality of bank lending.  Most significant 
challenge before banks is the maintenance of rigorous credit standards, 
especially in an environment of increased competition for new and 
existing clients.  Experience has shown us that the worst loans are 
often made in the best of times.  Compensation through trading gains is 
not going to support the banks forever.  Large-scale efforts are needed to 
upgrade skills in credit risk measuring, controlling and monitoring as also 
revamp operating procedures.  Credit evaluation may have to shift from 
cash flow based analysis to “borrower account behaviour”,  so that the 
state of readiness of Indian banks for Basle II regime improves.  
Corporate lending is already undergoing changes. The emphasis in future 
would be towards more of fee based services rather than lending 
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operations. Banks will compete with each other to provide value added 
services to their customers. 
 
 Structure and ownership pattern would undergo changes. There would be 
greater presence of international players in the Indian financial system. 
Similarly, some of the Indian banks would become global players. 
Government is taking steps to reduce its holdings in Public sector banks 
to 33%. However the indications are that their PSB character may still  be 
retained.  
 
 Mergers and acquisitions would gather momentum as managements will 
strive to meet the expectations of stakeholders. This could see the 
emergence of 4-5 world class Indian Banks. As Banks seek niche areas, 
we could see emergence of some national banks of global scale and a 
number of regional players. 
 
 Corporate governance in banks and financial institutions would assume 
greater importance in the coming years and this will be reflected in the 
composition of the Boards of Banks. 
 
 Concept of social lending would undergo a change. Rather than being 
seen as directed lending such lending would be business driven. With 
SME sector expected to play a greater role in the economy, Banks will 
give greater overall focus in this area. Changes could be expected in the 
delivery channels used for lending to small borrowers and agriculturalists 
and unorganized sectors (micro credit). Use of intermediaries or franchise 
agents could emerge as means to reduce transaction costs. 
 
 Technology as an enabler is separately discussed in the report. It would 
not be out of place, however, to state that most of the changes in the 
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landscape of financial sector discussed above would be technology 
driven. In the ultimate analysis, successful institutions will be those 
which continue to leverage the advancements in technology in re-
engineering processes and delivery modes and offering state-of-the-art 
products and services providing complete financial solutions for different 
types of customers. 
 
 Human Resources Development would be another key factor defining the 
characteristics of a successful banking institution. Employing and 
retaining skilled workers and specialists, re-training the existing 
workforce and promoting a culture of continuous learning would be a 
challenge for the banking institutions.  
 
 Changes in the Structure of Banks  
 
 The financial sector reforms ushered in the year 1991 have been well 
calibrated and timed to ensure a smooth transition of the system from a 
highly regulated regime to a market economy. The first phase of reforms 
focused on modification in the policy framework, improvement in 
financial health through introduction of various prudential norms and 
creation of a competitive environment.  The second phase of reforms 
started in the latter half of 90s, targeted strengthening the foundation of 
banking system, streamlining procedures, upgrading technology and 
human resources development and further structural changes.  The 
financial sector reforms carried out so far have  made the balance sheets 
of banks look healthier and helped them move towards achieving global 
benchmarks in terms of prudential norms and best practices.  
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 Under  the  existing  Basel  Capital  Accord,  allocation  of  capital  
follows  a  one-size-fit-all approach.  This would be replaced by a risk 
based approach to capital allocation.  While regulatory minimum capital 
requirements would still continue to be relevant and an integral part of the 
three pillar approach under Basel II, the emphasis is on risk based 
approach relying on external ratings as well as internal rating of each 
asset and capital charge accordingly.  The internal risk based approach 
would need substantial investments in technology and development  of 
MIS tools.  For a rating tool for internal assessment to be effective, past 
data for 3 to 5 years would be required and as such, Indian banking 
system will have to build up the capabilities for a smooth migration to the 
new method.   
 
 Another aspect which is included in Basel II accord is a provision for 
capital allocation for operational risk.  This is a new parameter and even 
internationally evaluation tools are not yet fully  developed.  This would 
be another area where banking system will have to reckon additional 
capital needs and functioning of its processes.   
 
 The financial sector reforms have brought in the much needed 
competition in the market place.  The competition to the existing banks 
came mainly from the techno-savvy private sector banks.  In the coming 
years, we expect to see greater flow of foreign capital to come into the 
Indian banking sector.  Opening up of banking sector to global players 
would see banks facing global competition.   
 
 Technology is expected to be the main facilitator of change in the 
financial sector.  Implementation of technology solutions involves huge 
capital outlay.   Besides the heavy investment costs, technology 
applications also have a high degree of obsolescence.   Banks will need to 
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look for ways to optimize resources for technology applications.   In this 
regard, global partnerships on technology and skills sharing may help. 
 
 The pressure on capital structure is expected to trigger a phase of 
consolidation in the banking industry.  Banks could achieve consolidation 
through different ways.  Mergers and acquisitions could be one way to 
achieve this.  In the past, mergers were initiated by regulators to protect 
the interests of depositors of weak banks.  In recent years, market led 
mergers between private banks have taken place.  It is expected that this 
process would gain momentum in the coming years.  Mergers between 
public sector banks or public sector banks and private banks could be the 
next logical thing / development  to happen as market players tend to 
consolidate their position to remain in competition. 
 
 Consolidation could take place through strategic alliances / partnerships.  
Besides helping banks to achieve economy of scale in operations and 
augment capital base, consolidation could help market players in other 
ways also to strengthen their competitiveness.  The advantage could be in 
achieving better segmentation in the market.  Strategic alliances and 
collaborative approach, as an alternative to mergers and acquisitions, 
could be attempted to reduce transaction costs through outsourcing, 
leverage synergies in operations and avoid problems related to cultural 
integration.  If consolidation is taken too far, it could lead to misuse of 
dominant market positions.  Rapid expansion in foreign markets without 
sufficient knowledge of local economic conditions could increase 
vulnerability of individual banks. 
 
 Public Sector Banks had, in the past, relied on Government support for 
capital augmentation. However, with the Government making a conscious 
decision to reduce its holding in Banks, most Banks have approached the 
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capital market for raising resources.  This process could gain further 
momentum when the government holding gets reduced to 33% or below.    
It is expected that pressures of market forces would be the determining 
factor for the consolidation in the structure of these banks.   If the process 
of consolidation through mergers and acquisitions gains momentum, we 
could see the emergence of a few large Indian banks with international 
character.  There could be some large national banks and several local 
level banks.   
 
 Opening up of the financial sector from 2005, under WTO, would see a 
number of Global banks taking large stakes and control over banking 
entities in the country.  They would bring with them capital, technology 
and management skills. This will increase the competitive spirit in the 
system leading to greater efficiencies. Government policy to allow greater 
FDI in banking and the move to amend Banking Regulation Act to 
remove the existing 10% cap on voting rights of shareholders are pointers 
to these developments.  
 
 The cooperative banks have played a crucial part in the development of 
the economy.  The primary agricultural societies which concentrate on 
short-term credit and rural investment credit institutions supported by 
District / State level cooperative banks have played a crucial role in the 
credit delivery in rural areas.  The Urban Cooperative Banks have found 
their own niche in urban centres.  These institutions in the cooperative 
sector need urgent capital infusion to remain as sound financial entities.  
Cooperative sector comes under State jurisdiction while commercial 
banking operations are regulated by the Reserve Bank of India.  The 
duality in control had weakened the supervisory set up for these 
institutions. It is expected that certain amendments to the Banking 
Regulation Act introduced recently in the Parliament with the objective of 
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strengthening the regulatory powers of the Reserve Bank of India would 
pave the way for strengthening of cooperative / financial institutions.  It is 
expected that these banks would upgrade skills of their staff and improve 
the systems and procedures to compete with commercial bank entities.   
 
 Consolidation would take place not only in the structure of the banks, but 
also in the case of services.  For instance, some banks would like to shed 
their non-core business portfolios to others. This could see the emergence 
of niche players in different functional areas and business segments such 
as housing, cards, mutual funds, insurance, sharing of their infrastructure 
including ATM Network, etc. 
 
 Rationalization of a very large network of branches, which at present has 
rendered the system cost ineffective and deficient in service would take 
place. Most of the banks would have adopted core-banking solutions in a 
fully networked environment. Back office  functions would be taken 
away from branches to a centralized place. While brick and mortar 
branches would continue to be relevant in the Indian scenario, the real 
growth driver for cost cutting would be virtual branches viz., ATMs, 
Internet Banking, mobile banking, kiosks etc., which can be manned by a 
few persons and run on 24 x 7 basis to harness the real potential of these 
technological utilities, there will be strategic alliances / partnership 
amongst banks and this phenomenon has already set in.   
 
 As we move along, the concept of branch banking will undergo changes. 
Banks will find that many of the functions could be outsourced more 
profitably without compromising on the quality of service. Specialized 
agencies could come forward to undertake Marketing and delivery 
functions on behalf of banks. This could see banking products being sold 
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outside the four walls of a branch. Banks would then concentrate on 
developing new products and earning fee based income. 
 
 The composition of bank staff will change. As total computerization will 
render a part of the workforce surplus, banks will go for a rightsizing 
exercise.  Some may resort to another round of VRS to shed excess flab 
while some other may go for re-deployment to strengthen marketing 
arms.  With greater use of technology and outsourcing of services in 
different areas, the manpower recruitment will mostly be in specialized 
areas and technology applications. With commitment shifting from the 
organization to the profession, we could see greater lateral movement of 
banking personnel. Training and skill development will, however, 
continue to be key HR functions. With the age profile of staff undergoing 
changes, banks will have to focus on leadership development and 
succession planning.  Knowledge management will become a critical 
issue. 
 
 Management structure of banks will also undergo drastic changes in the 
coming years.  Instead of the present pyramid structure, the banks will 
move towards reduction in tiers to ultimately settle for a flat structure.  
Product-wise segmentation will facilitate speedier decision-making.  
 
 Product Innovation and Process Re-Engineering 
 
 With increased competition in the banking Industry, the net interest 
margin of banks has come down over the last one decade. Liberalization 
with Globalization will see the spreads narrowing further to 1-1.5% as in 
the case of banks operating in developed countries. Banks will look for 
fee-based income to fill the gap in interest income. Product innovations 
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and process re-engineering will be the order of the day. The changes will 
be motivated by the desire to meet the customer requirements and to 
reduce the cost and improve the efficiency of service. All banks will 
therefore go for rejuvenating their costing and pricing to segregate 
profitable and non-profitable business. Service charges will be decided 
taking into account the costing and what the traffic can bear. From the 
earlier revenue = cost + profit equation i.e., customers are charged to 
cover the costs incurred and the profits expected, most banks have 
already moved into the profit =revenue - cost equation. This has been 
reflected in the fact that with cost of services staying nearly equal across 
banks, the banks with better cost control are able to achieve higher profits 
whereas the banks with high overheads due to under-utilisation of 
resources, un-remunerative branch network etc., either incurred losses or 
made profits not commensurate with the capital employed. The new 
paradigm in the coming years will be cost = revenue - profit. 
 
 As banks strive to provide value added services to customers, the market 
will see the emergence of strong investment and merchant banking 
entities. Product innovation and creating brand equity for specialized 
products will decide the market share and volumes.  New products on the 
liabilities side such as forex linked deposits, investment-linked deposits, 
etc. are likely to be introduced, as investors with varied risk profiles will 
look for better yields.  There will be more and more of tie-ups between 
banks, corporate clients and their retail outlets to share a common 
platform to shore up revenue through increased volumes.   
 
 39 
  Banks will increasingly act as risk managers to corporate and other 
entities by offering a variety of risk management products like options, 
swaps and other aspects of financial management in a multi currency 
scenario. Banks will play an active role in the development of derivative 
products and will offer a variety of hedge products to the corporate sector 
and other investors.   For example, Derivatives in emerging futures 
market for commodities would be an area offering opportunities for 
banks. As the integration of markets takes place internationally, 
sophistication in trading and specialized exchanges for commodities will 
expand. As these changes take place, banking will play a major role in 
providing financial support to such exchanges, facilitating settlement 
systems and enabling wider participation.  
 
 Bancassurance is catching up and Banks / Financial Institutions have 
started entering insurance business.  From mere offering of insurance 
products through network of bank branches, the business is likely to 
expand through self-designed insurance products after necessary 
legislative changes.  This could lead to a spurt in fee-based income of the 
banks.   
 
 Similarly, Banks will look analytically into various processes and 
practices as these exist today and may make appropriate changes therein 
to cut costs and delays.  Outsourcing and adoption of BPOs will become 
more and more relevant, especially when Banks go in for larger volumes 
of retail business.  However, by increasing outsourcing of operations 
through service providers, banks are making themselves vulnerable to 
problems faced by these providers.  Banks should therefore outsource 
only those functions that are not strategic to banks‟ business.  For 
instance, in the wake of implementation of 90 days‟ delinquency norms 
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for classification of assets, some banks may think of engaging external 
agencies for recovery of their dues and in NPA management.    
 
 Banks will take on competition in the front end and seek co-operation in 
the back end, as in the case of networking of ATMs.  This type of co-
opetition will become the order of the day as Banks seek to enlarge their 
customer base and at the same time to realize cost reduction and greater 
efficiency.  
 Technology In Banking 
 
 Technology will bring fundamental shift in the functioning of banks. It 
would not only help them bring improvements in their internal 
functioning but also enable them to provide better customer service. 
Technology will break all boundaries and encourage cross border banking 
business. Banks would have to undertake extensive Business Process Re-
Engineering and tackle issues like a) how best to deliver products and 
services to customers b) designing an appropriate organizational model to 
fully capture the benefits of technology and business process changes 
brought about. c) how to exploit technology for deriving economies of 
scale and how to create cost efficiencies, and d) how to create a customer 
- centric operation model. 
 
 Entry of ATMs has changed the profile of front offices in bank branches. 
Customers no longer need to visit branches for their day to day banking 
transactions like cash deposits, withdrawals, cheque collection, balance 
enquiry etc.   E-banking and Internet banking have opened new avenues 
in “convenience banking”.  Internet banking has also led to reduction in 
transaction costs for banks to about a tenth of branch banking. 
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 Technology solutions would make flow of information much faster, more 
accurate and enable quicker analysis of data received.  This would make 
the decision making process faster and more efficient. For the Banks, this 
would also enable development of appraisal and monitoring tools which 
would make credit management much more effective.  The result would 
be a definite reduction in transaction costs, the benefits of which would 
be shared between banks and customers.   
 
 While application of technology would help banks reduce their operating 
costs in the long run, the initial investments would be sizeable.  IT spent 
by banking and financial services industry in USA is approximately 7% 
of the revenue as against around 1% by Indian Banks.  With greater use 
of technology solutions, we expect IT spending of Indian  banking system 
to go up significantly.   
 
 One area where the banking system can reduce the investment costs in 
technology applications is by sharing of facilities.  We are already seeing 
banks coming together to share ATM Networks.  Similarly, in the coming 
years, we expect to see banks and FIs coming together to share facilities 
in the area of payment and settlement, back office processing, data 
warehousing, etc.  While dealing with technology, banks will have to deal 
with attendant operational risks.  This would be a critical area the Bank 
management will have to deal with in future.   
 
 Payment and Settlement system is the backbone of any financial market 
place.   
 
 The present Payment and Settlement systems such as Structured Financial 
Messaging System (SFMS), Centralised Funds Management System 
(CFMS), Centralised Funds Transfer System (CFTS) and Real Time 
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Gross Settlement System (RTGS) will undergo further fine-tuning to 
meet international standards.  Needless to add, necessary security checks 
and controls will have to be in place.  In this regard, Institutions such as 
IDRBT will have a greater role to play. 
 
 Risk Management: 
 
 Risk is inherent in any commercial activity and banking is no exception 
to this rule.  Rising global competition, increasing deregulation, 
introduction of innovative products and delivery channels have pushed 
risk management to the forefront of today‟s financial landscape.  Ability 
to gauge the risks and take appropriate position will be the key to 
success.  It can be said that risk takers will survive, effective risk 
managers will prosper and risk averse are likely to perish.   In the 
regulated banking environment, banks had to primarily deal with credit or 
default risk.  As we move into a perfect market economy, we have to deal 
with a whole range of market related risks like exchange risks, interest 
rate risk, etc.  Operational risk, which had always existed in the system, 
would become more pronounced in the coming days as we have 
technology as a new factor in today‟s banking.   Traditional risk 
management techniques become obsolete with the growth of derivatives 
and off-balance sheet operations, coupled with diversifications.  The 
expansion in E-banking will lead to continuous vigilance and revisions of 
regulations. 
 
 Building up a proper risk management structure would be crucial for the 
banks in the future. Banks would find the need to develop technology 
based risk management tools.  The complex mathematical models 
programmed into risk engines would provide the foundation of limit 
management, risk analysis, computation of risk-adjusted return on capital 
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and active management of banks‟ risk portfolio.  Measurement of risk 
exposure is essential for implementing hedging strategies.   
 
 Under Basel II accord, capital allocation will be based on the risk 
inherent in the asset. The implementation of Basel II accord will also 
strengthen the regulatory review process and, with passage of time, the 
review process will be more and more sophisticated.    Besides regulatory 
requirements, capital allocation would also be determined by the market  
forces.    External users of financial information will demand better inputs 
to make investment decisions.  More detailed and more frequent reporting 
of risk positions to banks‟ shareholders will be the order of the day.  
There will be an increase in the growth of consulting services such as 
data providers, risk advisory bureaus and risk reviewers.  These reviews 
will be intended to provide comfort to the bank managements and 
regulators as to the soundness of internal risk management systems. 
 
 Risk management functions will be fully centralized and independent 
from the business profit centres.  The risk management process will be 
fully integrated into the business process.  Risk return will be assessed for 
new business opportunities and incorporated into the designs of the new 
products.  All risks – credit, market and operational and so on will be 
combined, reported and managed on an integrated basis.  The demand for 
Risk Adjusted Returns on Capital (RAROC) based performance measures 
will increase.  RAROC will be used to drive pricing, performance 
measurement, portfolio management and capital management. 
 
 Risk management has to trickle down from the Corporate Office to 
branches or operating units. As the audit and supervision shifts to a risk 
based approach rather than transaction orientation, the risk awareness 
levels of line functionaries also will have to increase. Technology related 
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risks will be another area where the operating staff will have to be more 
vigilant in the coming days.   
 
 Banks will also have to deal with issues relating to Reputational Risk as 
they will need to maintain a high degree of public confidence for raising 
capital and other resources. Risks to reputation could arise on account of 
operational lapses, opaqueness in operations and shortcomings in 
services. Systems and internal controls would be crucial to ensure that 
this risk is managed well.    
 
 The legal environment is likely to be more complex in the years to come.  
Innovative financial products implemented on computers, new risk 
management software, user interfaces etc., may become patentable.  For 
some banks, this could offer the potential for realizing commercial gains 
through licensing.   
 
 Advances in risk management (risk measurement) will lead to 
transformation in capital and balance sheet management.  Dynamic 
economic capital management will be a powerful competitive weapon.  
The challenge will be to put all these capabilities together to create, 
sustain and maximise shareholders‟ wealth.  The bank of the future has to 
be a total-risk-enabled enterprise, which addresses the concerns of 
various stakeholders‟ effectively. 
 
 Risk management is an area the banks can gain by cooperation and 
sharing of experience among themselves. Common facilities could be 
considered for development of risk measurement and mitigation tools and 
also for training of staff at various levels.  Needless to add, with the 
establishment of best risk management systems and implementation of 
prudential norms of accounting and asset classification, the quality of 
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assets in commercial banks will improve on the one hand and at the same 
time, there will be adequate cover through provisioning for impaired 
loans.  As a result, the NPA levels are expected to come down 
significantly. 
  Regulatory and legal environment 
 The advent of liberalization and globalization has seen a lot of changes in 
the focus of Reserve Bank of India as a regulator of the banking industry.   
De-regulation of interest rates and moving away from issuing operational 
prescriptions have been important changes.  The focus has clearly shifted 
from micro monitoring to macro management.  Supervisory role is also 
shifting more towards off-site surveillance rather than on-site inspections.  
The focus of inspection is also shifting from transaction-based exercise to 
risk-based supervision.   In a totally de-regulated and globalised banking 
scenario, a strong regulatory framework would be needed.   The role of 
regulator would be critical for: 
 ensuring soundness of the system by fixing benchmark standards for 
capital adequacy and prudential norms for key performance parameters.   
 adoption of best practices especially in areas like risk-management, 
provisioning, disclosures, credit delivery, etc.   
 adoption of good corporate governance practices. 
 creation of an institutional framework to protect the interest of depositors.   
 regulating the entry and exit of banks including cross-border institutions.   
 
 Further, the expected integration of various intermediaries in the financial 
system would add a new dimension to the role of regulators.  Also as the 
co-operative banks are expected to come under the direct regulatory 
control of RBI as against the dual control system in vogue, regulation and 
supervision of these institutions will get a new direction.   
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 Some of these issues are addressed in the recent amendment Bill to the 
Banking Regulation Act introduced in the Parliament. 
 
 The integration of various financial services would need a number of 
legislative changes to be brought about for the system to remain 
contemporary and competitive.  The need for changes in the legislative 
framework has been felt in several areas and steps have been taken in 
respect of many of these issues, such as, 
 
 abolition of SICA / BIFR setup and formation of a National Company 
Law Tribunal to take up industrial re-construction.   
 Ii) enabling legislation for sharing of credit information about borrowers 
among lending institutions.   
 
 Integration of the financial system would change the way we look at 
banking functions. The present definition of banking under Banking 
Regulation Act would require changes, if banking institutions and non-
banking entities are to merge into a unified financial system 
 
 While the recent enactments like amendments to Debt Recovery Tribunal 
(DRT) procedures and passage of Securitisation and Reconstruction of 
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 
(SARFAESI Act) have helped to improve the climate for recovery of 
bank dues, their impact is yet to be felt at the ground level.   It would be 
necessary to give further teeth to the legislations, to ensure that recovery 
of dues by creditors is possible within a reasonable time.  The procedure 
for winding up of companies and sale of assets will also have to be 
streamlined. 
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 In the recent past, Corporate Debt Restructuring has evolved as an 
effective voluntary mechanism.  This has helped the banking system to 
take timely corrective actions when borrowing corporates face 
difficulties.   With the borrowers gaining confidence in the mechanism, it 
is expected that CDR setup would gain more prominence making NPA 
management somewhat easier.  It is expected that the issue of giving 
statutory backing for CDR system will be debated in times to come. 
 
 In the emerging banking and financial environment there would be an 
increased need for self-regulation. This is all the more relevant in the 
context of the stated policy of RBI to move away from micro-
management issues. Development of best practices in various areas of 
banks‟ working would evolve through  self-regulation rather than based 
on regulatory prescriptions.  
 Role of Indian Banks‟ Association would become more pronounced as a 
self regulatory body. Development of benchmarks on risk management, 
corporate governance, disclosures, accounting practices, valuation of 
assets, customer charter, Lenders‟ Liability, etc. would be areas where 
IBA would be required to play a more proactive role.  The Association 
would also be required to act as a lobbyist for getting necessary 
legislative enactments and changes in regulatory guidelines.   
 
 HR practices and training needs of the banking personnel would assume 
greater importance in the coming days.  Here again, common benchmarks 
could be evolved.   
 
 Talking about shared services, creation of common database and 
conducting research on contemporary issues to assess anticipated changes 
in the business profile and market conditions would be areas where 
 48 
organizations like Indian Banks‟ Association are expected to play a 
greater role.   
 
 Evolution of Corporate Governance being adopted by banks, particularly 
those who have gone public, will have to meet global standards over a 
period of time. In future, Corporate Governance will guide the way Banks 
are to be run. Good Corporate Governance is not a straight jacketed 
formula or process; there are many ways of achieving it as international 
comparisons demonstrate, provided the following three basic principles 
are followed:- 
 Management should be free to drive the enterprise forward with the 
minimum interference and maximum motivation.  
 Management should be accountable for the effective and efficient use of 
this freedom.  There are two levels of accountability – of management to 
the Board and of the Board to the Shareholders.  The main task is to 
ensure the continued competence of management, for without adequate 
and effective drive, any business is doomed to decline. As stated by 
J.Wolfensohn, President, World Bank – “Corporate governance is 
about promoting corporate fairness, transparency and 
accountability”. 
 
 In order to enlist the confidence of the global investors and international 
market players, the banks will have to adopt the best global practices of 
financial accounting and reporting.  This would essentially involve 
adoption of judgmental factors in the classification of assets, based on 
Banks‟ estimation of the future cash flows and existing environmental 
factors, besides strengthening the capital base accordingly. 
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 When we talk about adoption of International accounting practices and 
reporting formats it is relevant to look at where we stand and the way 
ahead.  Accounting practices being followed in India are as per 
Accounting Standards set by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
India (ICAI). Companies are required to follow disclosure norms set 
under the Companies Act and SEBI guidelines relating to listed entities. 
Both in respect of Accounting Practices and disclosures, banks in India 
are guided by the Reserve bank of India guidelines issued from time to 
time. Now these are, by and large, in line with the Accounting Standards  
of ICAI and other regulatory bodies. It is pertinent to note that 
Accounting Standards of ICAI are based on International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) being followed in a large number of countries. 
Considering that US forms 40% of the financial markets in the world 
compliance with USGAAP has assumed greater importance in recent 
times. Many Indian banks desirous of raising resources in the US market 
have adopted accounting practices under USGAAP and we expect more 
and more Indian Financial entities to move in this direction in the coming 
years. 
 
 There are certain areas of differences in the approach under the two main 
international accounting standards being followed globally. Of late, there 
have been moves for convergence of accounting standards under IAS and 
USGAAP and this requires the standard setters to agree  on a single, high-
quality answer.  Discussions in the accounting circles indicate that 
convergence of various international accounting standards into a single 
global standard would take place by 2007.   
 
 
 In the Indian context, one issue which is likely to be discussed in the 
coming years is the need for a common accounting standard for financial 
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entities.  While a separate standard is available for financial entities under 
IAS, ICAI has not so far come out with an Indian version in view of the 
fact that banks, etc. are governed by RBI guidelines.  It is understood that 
ICAI is seized of the matter.  It is expected that banks would migrate to 
global accounting standards smoothly in the light of these developments, 
although it would mean greater disclosure and tighter norms. 
 Rural and Social Banking Issues 
 
 Since the second half of 1960s, commercial banks have been playing an 
important role in the socio-economic transformation of rural India.  
Besides actively implementing Government sponsored lending schemes, 
Banks have been providing direct and indirect finance to support 
economic activities. Mandatory lending to the priority sectors has been an 
important  feature of Indian banking. The Narasimham committee had 
recommended for doing away with the present system of directed lending 
to priority sectors in line with liberalization in the financial system.  The 
recommendations were, however, not accepted by the Government. In the 
prevailing political climate in the country any drastic change in the policy 
in this regard appears unlikely.  
 
 The banking system is expected to reorient its  approach to rural lending. 
“Going Rural” could be the new market mantra.  Rural market comprises 
74% of the population, 41% of Middle class and 58% of disposable 
income. Consumer growth is taking place at a fast pace in  17113 villages 
with a population of more than 5000.  Of  these, 9989 villages are in 7 
States, namely Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamilnadu, 
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.  Banks‟ approach to the rural lending 
will be guided mainly by commercial considerations in future.  
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 Commercial Banks, Co-operatives and Regional Rural Banks are the 
three major segments of rural financial sector in India.  Rural financial 
system, in future has a challenging task of facing the drastic changes 
taking place in the banking sector, especially in the wake of economic 
liberalization. There is an urgent need for rural financial system to 
enlarge their role functions and range of services offered so as to emerge 
as "one stop destination for all types of credit requirements of people in 
rural/semi-urban centres.  
 Barring commercial banks, the other rural financial institutions have a 
weak structural base and the issue of their strengthening requires to be 
taken up on priority. Co-operatives will have to be made viable by 
infusion of capital. Bringing all cooperative institutions under the 
regulatory control of RBI would help in better control and supervision 
over the functioning of these institutions. Similarly Regional Rural banks 
(RRBs) as a group need to be made structurally stronger. It would be 
desirable if NABARD takes the initiative to consolidate all the RRBs into 
a strong rural development entity.  
 Small Scale Industries have,  over the last five decades, emerged as a 
major contributor to the economy, both in terms of employment 
generation and share in manufactured output and exports.  SSIs account 
for 95% of the industrial units and contribute about 40% of the value 
addition in the manufacturing sector.  There are more than 32 lac units 
spread all over the country producing over 7500 items and providing 
employment to more than 178 lac persons. The employment generation 
potential and favourable capital-output ratio would make small scale 
sector remain important for policy planners.   
 
 Removal of quantitative restrictions on a large number of items under the 
WTO and opening up of Indian market to greater international 
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competition  have thrown both challenges and opportunities for the SSI 
sector. Low capital base and weak management structure make these 
units vulnerable to external shocks, more easily. However the units which 
can adopt to the changing environment and show imagination in their 
business strategy will thrive in the new environment. 
 
 Instead of following the narrow definition of SSI, based on the 
investment in fixed assets, there is a move to look at Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME) as a group for policy thrust and encouragement. For 
SMEs, banks should explore the option of E-banking channels to develop 
web-based relationship banking models, which are customer-driven and 
more cost-effective.  Government is already considering a legislation for 
the development of SME sector to facilitate its orderly growth.  
  In the next ten years, SME sector will emerge more competitive and 
efficient and knowledge-based industries are likely to acquire greater 
prominence.  SMEs will be dominating in industry segments such as 
Pharmaceuticals, Information Technology and Biotechnology.  With 
SME sector emerging as a vibrant sector of the Indian economy, flow of 
credit to this sector would go up significantly. Banks will have to sharpen 
their skills for meeting the financial needs of this segment. Some of the 
Banks may emerge as niche players in handling SME finance. Flow of 
credit to this Sector will be guided purely by commercial considerations 
as Banks will find SMEs as an attractive business proposition. 
 Human Resources Management 
 
 The key to the success of any organization lies in how efficiently the 
organization manages its‟ human resources.  The principle applies equally 
and perhaps more aptly to service institutions like banks.  The issue is all 
the more relevant to the public sector banks who are striving hard to keep 
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pace with the technological changes and meet the challenges of 
globalization.   
 
 In order to meet the global standards and to remain competitive, banks 
will have to recruit specialists in various fields such as Treasury 
Management, Credit, Risk Management, IT related services, HRM, etc. in 
keeping with the segmentation and product innovation. As a 
complementary measure, fast track merit and performance based 
promotion from within would have to be institutionalized to inject 
dynamism and youthfulness in the workforce.   
 
 To institutionalize talent management, the first priority for the banking 
industry would be to spot, recognize and nurture the talent from within.  
Secondly, the industry has to attract the best talent from the market to 
maintain the required competitive edge vis-a-vis global players. However, 
the issue of critical importance is how talent is integrated and sustained in 
the banks. Therefore, a proper system of talent management has to be put 
in place by all the banks.   
 
 As the entire Indian banking industry is witnessing a paradigm shift in 
systems, processes, strategies, it would warrant creation of new 
competencies and capabilities on an on-going basis for which an 
environment of continuous learning would have to be created so as to 
enhance knowledge and skills. 
 
 Another important ingredient of HR management is reward and 
compensation which at present do not have any linkage to skills and 
performance.  A system of reward and compensation that attracts, 
recognizes and retains the talent, and which is commensurate with 
performance is an urgent need of the industry. 
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 An equally important issue relevant to HRM is to create a conducive 
working environment in which the bankers can take commercial 
decisions judiciously and, at the same time, without fear.   This calls for a 
re-look into the vigilance system as it exists today, and perhaps there is a 
need to keep the banking industry out of the CVC.  The Banks‟ Boards 
may be allowed to have their own system of appropriate checks and 
balances as well as accountability. 
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Historical Roots  - Co-Operative Banks in Europe and India : 
 
The cooperative banking sector in Europe was created in response to the 
economic challenges and deprivation large swathes of the population 
faced in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Most continental European 
cooperative banks were established on the basis of the ideas of Hermann 
Schulze (1808–83) and Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen (1818–88). Both 
men were moved by the poverty and misery they observed, especially 
during the famine of 1848, and noted that ordinary people had no access 
to credit, except perhaps from usurary lenders. They independently 
started to promote the idea of credit cooperatives during the middle of the 
19th century, Schultz aiming at helping urban small business owners and 
artisans and Raiffeisen seeking to assist the rural poor.  
 
The rationale was similar to the one behind current microfinance 
initiatives in developing countries, namely to provide people with the 
tools and resources to collectively and individually help themselves. 
From Germany the cooperative banking concept gradually spread to the 
rest of the continent and to the Nordic countries. In the British Isles, 
cooperative banks have somewhat different historical roots: building 
societies date back to the 18th century and were associated with a 
revivalist Christian movement that became popular among working class 
and lower middle class segments of society. UK and Irish credit unions 
only appeared during the second half of the 20th century and were based 
on US credit unions, which themselves were inspired by Canadian 
adaptations of the German cooperative banking concept (Hansmann, 
1996). 
 
While they were generally grassroots organizations, in many cases the 
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development of cooperative banking was initiated, nurtured and 
supported by outside forces, including governments. In France, 
government involvement has been very extensive throughout the history 
of the cooperative banking sector, the Finnish cooperative banking sector 
was set up in a top-down process with government support, and 
Portuguese agricultural credit cooperatives thank their growth since the 
1970s in part to government support. In several countries, including Italy, 
Belgium and France, the post-Rerun Novarum social catholic movement 
supported the development of cooperative banks. In addition, many 
cooperative banks have been set up by, or with the support of, trade 
unions or agricultural associations and have maintained close links with 
these organizations. 
 
 
European cooperative banks flourished because they overcame important 
market imperfections. Commercial banks in 19th century Europe were 
focused on servicing the needs of the emerging industry, wealthy 
individuals, and governments, and often took excessive risks with their 
clients‘ money. Even if they wanted to, servicing poorer layers of the 
population ran into problems of imperfect and/or asymmetric information 
and difficult and/or uneconomic enforceability of (small-scale) contracts, 
problems which still plague rural credit markets in developing countries 
to this day (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). 
 
 As noted by Hansmann (1996), these problems gave rise to the 
emergence of two types of institutions: savings banks were established 
from 1810-1825 onwards, to overcome problems of opportunistic 
behavior by banks (in particular, excessive risk-taking), while cooperative 
banks were established from the mid-19th century onwards, to overcome 
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problems of opportunistic behavior by borrowers. Raiffeisen experienced 
such opportunistic behavior first-hand when he set up his first credit 
institution, which provided loans to poor people financed by funds 
collected from wealthy donors. The institution failed as many borrowers 
could not be made to repay their loans and donors lost interest. 
 
Cooperative banks could overcome these problems because member-
consumers financed the institution and were involved in its decision-
making processes. Within small communities, relatively intimate 
knowledge of each other‘s credit- and trustworthiness ensured that loans 
were only provided to borrowers who could be expected to repay them. 
The financial incentives members had to monitor each other, and the 
relatively small and homogenous membership base of early cooperatives 
ensured that peer pressure provided incentives for borrowers to repay, 
consistent with the analysis of Stiglitz (1990). Beyond financial 
incentives, social relations among members were also a contributing 
factor to the success of cooperatives. 
 
    
Cooperative Movement in India  
 
The  Indian  cooperative movement,  like  its  counterparts  in other  
countries of  the world has been essentially a child of distress.  Based on 
the recommendations of Sir Frederick Nicholson (1899) and Sir Edward 
Law (1901), the Cooperative Credit Societies Act was passed in 1904, 
paving the way for the establishment of cooperative credit societies in 
rural and urban areas on the patterns of Raiffeisen and Schulze Delitzch 
respectively.  The Cooperative Societies Act of 1912 recognized the 
formation of non-credit societies and  the  central  cooperative  
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organizations/federations.  The  state  patronage  to  the cooperative  
movement  continued  even  after  1947,  the  year  in  which  India  
attained freedom.    The  independent  India  accepted  the  concept  of  
planned  economy  and cooperative  organizations  were  assigned  an  
important  role.    
 
 The  policy  of  the Government towards the cooperative movement was 
guided by the recommendations of the Saraiya Committee, which stated 
that .the cooperative society has an important role to  play  as  the  most  
suitable  medium  for  the  democratization  of  economic  planning..   
Various  expert  committees,  which  examined  the  problem  of  rural  
credit  subsequently, have come to the same conclusion, without 
exception, that in the Indian context, there is no alternative from the point 
of view of structural appropriateness, to cooperatives at the village  level.    
The  Rural  Credit  Survey  Committee  (1954),  the  first  comprehensive 
enquiry into problems of rural credit, after a detailed examination of the 
entire gamut of issues  including  the  social  ethos  of  rural  society,  
summed  up  its  findings  in  the celebrated dictum that .cooperation has 
failed, but cooperation must succeed..  
  
Since 1950s, the cooperatives in India have made remarkable progress in 
the various segments of  Indian economy.  During  the  last  century,  the 
cooperative movement  has entered  several  sectors  like  credit,  
banking,  production,  processing, distribution/marketing,  housing,  
warehousing,  irrigation,  transport,  textiles  and  even industries.  In fact, 
dairy and sugar cooperatives have made India a major nation in the world 
with regard to milk and sugar production. Today, India can claim to have 
the largest network of cooperatives in the world  numbering more than  
half a million, with a membership of more than 200 million. Of the 
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primary (village) level cooperatives, around 28 percent with 137 million 
memberships are agricultural cooperatives, dealing directly or  indirectly  
with  agricultural  sector.    The  cooperative network  in  the  country  is  
rather strong  covering  all  the  villages  in  the  country  and  more  than  
67  percent  of  the households have been brought under the cooperative 
hold.  Cooperatives supply about 46 percent of the total rural credit 
(including agricultural credit), account for 36 percent of the total 
distribution of  fertilizers, produce about 55  percent of  the total sugar 
and constitute for 28 percent of the rural fair shops (distributing consumer 
articles).   Though cooperative movement has made remarkable progress 
in several areas, certain glaring defects have also developed in the 
movement, which have been, in a way, defeating the very objectives  of  
these  institutions.    The following are the unique features of  Indian 
cooperative movement.  
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TABLE  1 
 
Organizational Structure of Cooperative Credit Institutions 
 
 
 
Co-operative Credit Institutions 
 
 
Rural Co-operative 
Credit Institutions 
 
 
Short-term Structure    Long-term Structure 
 
 
 
State Co- operative 
Banks (29) 
 
 State Co-operative  
Agriculture and Rural  
Development Banks  
 
 
District Central Co- 
operative Banks (367)  
 
 
 
Primary Agricultural      
Credit Societies  
(92,000)  
 Primary Co-operative  
Agriculture and 
Rural  
Development Banks  
    
 Urban Co-
operative Banks 
(2090) 
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COOPERATIVE  BANKING  IN INDIA   : 
 
 Historically,  Governments  and  policy  makers  have  paid  more  
attention  to agricultural  cooperatives  and  thus,  the  growth  and  
development  of  the  Indian cooperative  movement  is  heavily  
tilted  in  favor  agricultural  cooperatives  in general  and  in  
particular,  credit  cooperatives.  In  some  areas  like  dairy,  urban 
banking  and  sugar,  the  cooperatives  have  achieved  success  to  
an  extent  but there are larger areas where they have not been so 
successful.  
 
 The cooperative credit movement in modern India, curiously, is a 
state initiated movement.  The state partnership is, perhaps, the 
unique feature of the Indian cooperative movement.    As of today, 
Government contribution to the share capital of primary 
agricultural cooperatives accounts for about 7.5 percent of the total.  
 
 Paradoxically,  the  state  partnership  which  was  conceived  as  a  
measure  for strengthening the cooperative institutions had paved 
the way for ever-increasing state  control  over  cooperatives,  their  
increasing  officialization  and  politicization culminating in 
virtually depriving the cooperatives of their vitality as well as their 
democratic and autonomous character.  
 
 Dormant  membership,  lack  of  active  participation  of  the  
members  in  the management,  lack  of  professionalism  (and  
absence  of  corporate  governance), undue  political  and  
bureaucratic  intervention,  have  made  majority  of  the 
cooperatives  at  the  primary  level  almost  moribund.    
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Understandably, this has resulted in weakening of the cooperative 
edifice.  The upwardly transmission of the weaknesses of the 
primary societies have affected the capabilities of the higher level 
cooperative federations in so far as their usefulness to the former is 
concerned.   
 
 With regard to agricultural cooperative credit structure, although 
the quantitative expansion  has  been  somewhat  satisfactory,  the  
movement  continues  to  suffer from  structural  defects  and  
operational  deficiencies.    The  acknowledged operational  
deficiencies  of  the  cooperative  credit  structure have  been  (I)  
weak recycling of credit, (ii) poor resource mobilization, (iii) 
ineffective lending and (iv) poor recovery.    
 
 The  agricultural credit cooperative system in  general  has become 
rather  over dependent  on  external  support  in  terms  of  
participation  in  share  capital  by Government and refinance from 
Government owned Financial Institutions.  
  
Credit cooperatives are the oldest and most numerous of all the types of 
cooperatives in India.    The  cooperative  credit  institutions  in  the 
country may  be  broadly  classified  into  urban credit cooperatives and 
rural credit cooperatives.   There are about 2090 urban credit  
cooperatives and  these  societies together constitute for about 10 percent 
of the aggregate  banking  business  and  therefore  regarded  as  an  
important  segment  of  the banking system.   The urban credit 
cooperatives are also popularly known as Urban Cooperative Banks.   
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The rural credit cooperatives may be further divided into short-term credit 
cooperatives and long-term credit cooperatives.  With regard to short-
term credit cooperatives, at the grass-root level there are around 92,000 
Primary Agricultural Credit Societies  (PACS) dealing directly with the 
individual borrowers.  At the central level (district level) District Central 
Cooperative Banks (DCCB)  function as a link between primary societies 
and State Cooperative Apex Banks (SCB).  It may be mentioned that 
DCCB and SCB are the federal  cooperatives and  thus the objective  is  
to serve  the member  cooperatives. As against three-tier structure of 
short-term credit cooperatives, the long-term cooperative credit  structure 
has two tiers  in many  states with  Primary Cooperative Agriculture and 
Rural  Development  Banks  (PCARDB)  at  the  primary  level  and  
State  Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Bank at the state 
level.  However, some states in the country have unitary  structure with  
state  level  cooperative  operating with  through  their own  branches  and  
in  one  state  an  integrated  structure  prevails.  The  organizational 
structure of the credit cooperatives in India is illustrated in chart I.  
Interestingly, under the Banking Regulation Act 1949, only State 
Cooperative Apex Banks, District Central Cooperative Banks and select 
Urban Credit Cooperatives are qualified to be called as banks  in  the  
cooperative  sector.    In  other  words,  only  these  banks  are  licensed  
to conduct full-fledged banking business.   
 
Urban Cooperative Banks in India  
The term Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs), though not formally 
defined, refers to primary cooperative banks located in urban and semi-
urban areas. These banks, till 1996, were allowed to lend money only for 
non-agricultural purposes. This distinction does not hold today. These 
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banks were traditionally centered around communities, localities work 
place groups. They essentially lent to small borrowers and businesses. 
Today, their scope of operations has widened considerably. 
The origins of the urban cooperative banking movement in India can be 
traced to the close of nineteenth century when, inspired by the success of 
the experiments related to the cooperative movement in Britain and the 
cooperative credit movement in Germany such societies were set up in 
India. Cooperative societies are based on the principles of cooperation, - 
mutual help, democratic decision making and open membership. 
Cooperatives represented a new and alternative approach to organisaton 
as against proprietary firms, partnership firms and joint stock companies 
which represent the dominant form of commercial organisation. 
The Beginnings 
The first known mutual aid society in India was probably the ‗Anyonya 
Sahakari Mandali‘ organised in the erstwhile princely State of Baroda in 
1889 under the guidance of Vithal Laxman also known as Bhausaheb 
Kavthekar. Urban co-operative credit societies, in their formative phase 
came to be organised on a community basis to meet the consumption 
oriented credit needs of their members. Salary earners‘ societies 
inculcating habits of thrift and self help played a significant role in 
popularising the movement, especially amongst the middle class as well 
as organized labour. From its origins then to today, the thrust of UCBs, 
historically, has been to mobilise savings from the middle and low 
income urban groups and purvey credit to their members - many of which 
belonged to weaker sections. 
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The enactment of Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1904, however, gave 
the real impetus to the movement. The first urban cooperative credit 
society was registered in Canjeevaram (Kanjivaram) in the erstwhile 
Madras province in October, 1904. Amongst the prominent credit 
societies were the Pioneer Urban in Bombay (November 11, 1905), the 
No.1 Military Accounts Mutual Help Co-operative Credit Society in 
Poona (January 9, 1906). Cosmos in Poona (January 18, 1906), Gokak 
Urban (February 15, 1906) and Belgaum Pioneer (February 23, 1906) in 
the Belgaum district, the Kanakavli-Math Co-operative Credit Society 
and the Varavade Weavers‘ Urban Credit Society (March 13, 1906) in the 
South Ratnagiri (now Sindhudurg) district. The most prominent amongst 
the early credit societies was the Bombay Urban Co-operative Credit 
Society, sponsored by Vithaldas Thackersey and Lallubhai Samaldas 
established on January 23, 1906.. 
The Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1904 was amended in 1912, with a 
view to broad basing it to enable organisation of non-credit societies. The 
Maclagan Committee of 1915 was appointed to review their performance 
and suggest measures for strengthening them. The committee observed 
that such institutions were eminently suited to cater to the needs of the 
lower and middle income strata of society and would inculcate the 
principles of banking amongst the middle classes. The committee also felt 
that the urban cooperative credit movement was more viable than 
agricultural credit societies. The recommendations of the Committee 
went a long way in establishing the urban cooperative credit movement in 
its own right. 
In the present day context, it is of interest to recall that during the banking 
crisis of 1913-14, when no fewer than 57 joint stock banks collapsed, 
there was a there was a flight of deposits from joint stock banks to 
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cooperative urban banks. Maclagan Committee chronicled this event 
thus: 
―As a matter of fact, the crisis had a contrary effect, and in most 
provinces, there was a movement to withdraw deposits from non-
cooperatives and place them in cooperative institutions, the distinction 
between two classes of security being well appreciated and a preference 
being given to the latter owing partly to the local character and publicity 
of cooperative institutions but mainly, we think, to the connection of 
Government with Cooperative movement‖. 
Under State Purview 
The constitutional reforms which led to the passing of the Government of 
India Act in 1919 transferred the subject of ―Cooperation‖ from 
Government of India to the Provincial Governments. The Government of 
Bombay passed the first State Cooperative Societies Act in 1925 ―which 
not only gave the movement its size and shape but was a pace setter of 
cooperative activities and stressed the basic concept of thrift, self help 
and mutual aid.‖ Other States followed. This marked the beginning of the 
second phase in the history of Cooperative Credit Institutions. 
There was the general realization that urban banks have an important role 
to play in economic construction. This was asserted by a host of 
committees. The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee (1931) felt 
that urban banks have a duty to help the small business and middle class 
people. The Mehta-Bhansali Committee (1939), recommended that those 
societies which had fulfilled the criteria of banking should be allowed to 
work as banks and recommended an Association for these banks. The Co-
operative Planning Committee (1946) went on record to say that urban 
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banks have been the best agencies for small people in whom Joint stock 
banks are not generally interested. The Rural Banking Enquiry 
Committee (1950), impressed by the low cost of establishment and 
operations recommended the establishment of such banks even in places 
smaller than taluka towns. 
The first study of Urban Co-operative Banks was taken up by RBI in the 
year 1958-59. The Report published in 1961 acknowledged the 
widespread and financially sound framework of urban co-operative 
banks; emphasized the need to establish primary urban cooperative banks 
in new centers and suggested that State Governments lend active support 
to their development. In 1963, Varde Committee recommended that such 
banks should be organised at all Urban Centres with a population of 1 
lakh or more and not by any single community or caste. The committee 
introduced the concept of minimum capital requirement and the criteria of 
population for defining the urban centre where UCBs were incorporated. 
 
Inspired  by  the  success  of  urban  cooperative  movement  in Germany 
and  Italy,  in  the early  part  of  the  last  century,  urban  cooperative  
credit  societies  were  organized  on community basis and their lending 
operations were confined to meeting the consumption oriented  credit  
needs  of  their  members.    Many  urban  cooperative  banks,  which  
were organized initially, were essentially credit societies but later 
converted themselves into urban cooperative banks.  Interestingly, many 
urban cooperative credit societies, which were not engaged in any 
banking functions, also used the word .bank..    
 
There was no well-defined concept of urban cooperative bank till 1996, 
when banking laws (provisions of section 5(CCV) of Banking Regulation 
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Act 1949) were made applicable to cooperative banks.  Accordingly, an 
urban cooperative bank was defined as a Primary Cooperative Bank other 
than a primary agricultural credit society; (i) the primary object of which 
is the transaction of banking business, (ii) the paid up share capital and 
reserves of which are not less than Rs.1 lakh (0.1 Mn) and (iii) the by-
laws of which do not permit admission of any other cooperative society 
as a member.  The word primary is used to denote that the urban  
cooperative  banks perform  the  role  of  a  primary  unit  in a  3-tier  
cooperative credit structure.  
  
Over a century old urban co-operative credit movement today, has a 
network of 2,084 urban  co-operative  banks  with  7,368  branch  outlets  
spread  all  over  the  country.  The deposits and advances of urban 
cooperative banks constitute for about 9 and 8 percents of the aggregate 
deposits and advances of the banking system respectively.  In so far as the  
growth  and  performance  are  concerned,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  
the  urban cooperative banks were a shade better than the scheduled 
commercial banks and public sector banks till 1999 (Ramesha K, 2001).  
However, it has to be recognized that the prudential standards and 
regulatory system prescribed for urban cooperative banks were relatively 
soft in comparison with those of commercial banks.  This is partly on 
account of historical reasons and partly due to the preferential treatment 
of cooperative structure in general.  If one benchmarks the growth and 
performance of urban cooperative banks with that of the banking industry 
(which is dominated by public sector banks) after 2000 and onwards, then 
the scenario undergoes a complete change.  
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For instance, between 2001  and  2002,  although  owned  fund,  deposits  
and  advances  of  urban  cooperative banks  increased  somewhat  
impressively,  i.e.,  by  27, 15  and  14 percents  respectively, the gross 
Non Performing Assets (NPAs % to total advances) during the same 
period went  up  from  16  to  22  percent  (3).    The percentage  of  the  
profit  making  urban cooperative banks to the total stood at 87 percent as 
at the end of March 31, 2002.   On the whole,  the performance of  the 
urban cooperative banks particularly after 2000 has been on the decline, 
and a host of factors may be responsible for this which may include 
increasing  competition,  tightening  prudential  standards and  
supervision  and  regulatory standards, multiple control, etc.  Following 
are the features of urban cooperative credit  
banks in India.  
   
 
 
Urban cooperative banks are registered under Cooperative Societies Act 
of the respective state Governments.  The Reserve Bank of India (Central 
Bank of the country) is the regulatory and supervisory authority for UCBs  
for their banking related  operations.    Managerial/Administrative  
aspects  of  UCBs  continue  to remain with the state Governments.  The 
Union Government regulates the UCBs having  multi-state  presence  and  
such  banks  are  registered  under  Multi-state Cooperative Societies Act.  
Controlling of UCBs by state Government and  the Central Bank of the 
country is generally known as .duality of control. 
 
The  discernible  characteristic  feature  of  UCB  structure  is  its  
heterogeneity. Nearly 50 percent of the banks are unitary in nature (with 
single branch banking).  Heterogeneity in  their size is another  facet  of  
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the UCB structure.  The larger UCBs (scheduled UCBs) numbering just 
51 accounts for more than 40 percent of the business  from UCB sector as 
against 800 UCBs accounting  for just 6 percent.  
 
UCB structure is exemplified by its pronounced focus on the needs of 
small men and  micro  credit  sector.    The  average  size  of  the  loan  
also  works  out  to  be relatively low and an overwhelming segment of 
UCBs have been able to comply with  the  priority  sector  lending  
targets  (directive  from  central  bank  to  lend  to certain sectors like 
small enterprises, trade & business, housing etc) set by the central bank of 
the country.   
 
Urban  cooperative  credit  movement  in  general,  and  the  number  of  
UCBs  in particular is concentrated in few states.  Five states account for 
80 percent of the total UCBs in the country and one of them accounts for 
as high as 32 percent of the total UCBs.  
 
A  noticeable  feature  of  urban  banking  sector  is  its  financial  
independence. Unlike the agricultural cooperative credit structure, the 
urban cooperative banks are  not  surviving  on  external  assistance  such  
as  refinance  support.    In  fact, UCBs  have  been  supporting  federal  
units  (District  Central  Cooperative  Banks and State Cooperative 
Banks) by keeping their surplus resources in the form of deposits.  
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Table 2.1 
State Wise Financial Indications of Urban Co-Operative Banks as on 
31st March 2008 (Rs. in crores) 
 
Sr. No. State No. of 
Reporting 
bank 
Share 
Capital 
Reserves Owened 
Funds 
Deposits Loans & 
Advances 
Working 
Funds 
Oo 02 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
01 Andhra Pradesh 139 125.34 266.09 391.43 3541.50 2681.31 4781.96 
02 Assam 10 1.82 19.48 21.30 135.17 56.14 152.27 
03 Bihar 3 1.30 2.99 4.29 20.22 10.71 25.41 
04 Chhatisgarth 14 7.24 4.91 12.15 177.67 92.81 1740.42 
05 Delhi 16 31.82 43.85 75.67 734.49 293.09 920.31 
06 Goa 7 19.25 84.48 103.73 859.63 479.79 1027.61 
07 Gijarat 310 471.47 4785.51 5256.98 16667.91 12401.59 23886.83 
08 Haryana 8 7.36 12.75 20.11 121.35 75.70 166.62 
09 Himachal Pradesh 5 2.32 6.30 8.62 95.10 55.89 106.06 
10 Jammu & 
Kashmir 
4 3.20 7.35 10.55 172.17 86.46 183.61 
11 Jharkhand 2 1.22 0.01 1.23 3.26 2.85 2.54 
12 Karnataka 295 313.17 685.66 998.83 7796.86 5148.78 9288.33 
13 Kerala 60 54.63 167.20 221.83 1915.42 1244.78 2339.09 
14 Madhya Pradesh 69 88.79 45.02 133.81 882.10 493.17 1089.74 
15 Maharashtra 594 1142.04 4550.15 5492.19 53866.31 34331.11 60990.66 
16 Manipur 2 1.65 7.68 9.33 42.19 27.37 57.96 
17 Meghalaya 3 0.69 1.08 1.77 15.08 3.51 15.72 
18 Mizoram 10 0.73 0.20 0.93 9.19 10.31 13.81 
19 Nagaland 1 0.14 0 0.14 1.66 0.96 3.45 
20 Orissa 12 17.83 35.60 53.43 492.17 276.66 660.51 
21 Pondicherry 1 2.50 3.40 5.90 4.7 4.10 5.90 
22 Panjab 5 9.59 20.06 29.65 239.30 143.95 285.25 
23 Rajasthan 38 36.85 74.36 111.21 807.80 447.07 1031.46 
24 Tamilnadu 136 131.91 283.16 415.07 3275.50 2096.84 4147.05 
25 Tripura 1 0.43 0.88 1.31 9.90 13.37 10.91 
26 Uttar Pradesh 68 35.80 49.70 85.50 729.40 392.30 855.70 
27 Uttarachal 7 6.00 32.20 38.20 330.60 120.00 372.10 
28 West Bengal 43 39.12 106.41 145.53 1122.09 1079.64 1454.25 
 Total 1863 2554.21 11296.48 13650.69 94068.74 62070.26 115615.5 
 
Source:-Reading materials published by Gujarat state co-operative 
federation 12, Dec. 2008 
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It will be seen from table 2.1 that out of total 1863 reporting UCBs as on 
March 31 2008 as many as 1474 UCBs (i.e. 79.12%)UCBs are located in 
five states only. i.e.  Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karmataka, Tamil Nadu and 
Andhra pradesh. The rest of the states have only 389 UCBs (i.e. 20.88%) 
This reveals the regional imbalance in the growth of the UCBs in India. 
The comparative position of the UCBs in major states of India on March 
31st 2008 is also presented by pie chart in figures1.2.  There were 51 
scheduled UCBs as on 31st March, 2008. However there 53 scheduled 
UCBs as on 31/3/09 
 
Comparative Position of the UCBs in Major States of India on March 31st 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
From the figure it is apparent that Maharashtra stood first in development 
of the UCBs as it consists of 31.89 % of the total UCBs , followed by 
Gujarat (16.64 %) , Karnataka  ( 15.83 %), Tamil Nadu ( 07.30 % ) and 
Andhrapradesh  (07.46 % ) and other stood in development of the UCBs 
as it consists of the 20.88%  It is seen that from above figures 2.2, there 
was a regional imbalance of UCBs development in the country. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN COPEORATIVE BANKING IN INDIA : 
 
Cooperatives may still have an edge in identifying and serving consumer needs. 
 
In theory, cooperatives are better able to maximize consumer surplus. 
Hansmann, for example, notes that inefficiencies may arise from firms 
seeking to satisfy the preferences of the marginal patron (to maximize 
sales/profits) rather than those of the average patron (which would 
maximize consumer surplus). In a cooperative, the one-member one-vote 
system will lead the firm to seek to satisfy the preferences of the median 
patron, who is closer to the average patron than the marginal patron is. 
However, in part because the median voter does not necessarily reflect 
average preferences, Hart and Moore (1998) find that, for consumers, 
cooperative ownership becomes less advantageous the more competitive 
a market is and more so the more uniform the membership base is.  
 
However, these theoretical considerations are predicated on the 
assumption that all relevant decisions are made by the full membership 
base, or at least by a representative sample of members. The reality is 
very different (see section on corporate governance). Nevertheless, the 
fact that a cooperative‘s clients are also its members and are involved in 
its decision-making, should provide it with an informational advantage 
over commercial banks. While size and increasing distance between 
members and management are likely to reduce this advantage, the 
remarkably high market shares some cooperative banks have in the 
market segments they target (e.g., farmers in France) seem to indicate that 
it remains in place to a significant extent. 
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Cooperatives have a lower cost of capital 
 
Cooperative banks only need to remunerate the part of their equity that is 
represented by member shares (this part is henceforth referred to as the 
―cooperative capital‖), not the often much larger intergenerational 
endowment (which, in accounting terms, partially appears in the books as 
reserves). Moreover, cooperatives do not remunerate member shares very 
generously (see below), and need not do so because in most cases 
members do not acquire shares in the first place for investment purposes. 
This lower cost of capital should allow cooperatives to sell their products 
at below-market prices, or, putting it differently, to incorporate their 
profits into their products.  
 
Nevertheless, pressure has increased on cooperatives to raise their 
profitability to market levels. Moreover, the advantages cooperatives 
have thus far derived from their lower cost of capital are likely reduced 
by Basel II, which was introduced in the EU by the Capital Requirements 
Directive, on January 1, 2007. The reason is that Basel II reduces the 
level of capital banks need for their retail operations. As a result, the cost 
of capital will become a less important factor in the overall cost of 
providing retail financial services.  
 
Basel II is very well applicable to Urban cooperative Banks of India also. 
 
Cooperatives have entrenched retail market positions and loyal 
customers, but depend more on those customers than other banks.  
 
Cooperative banks typically have strong retail market positions, 
especially in their target market segment. Moreover, customer members 
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can be expected to be more loyal than customers of a commercial bank, 
since the relationship they have with their cooperative is one that goes 
beyond a pure bank-client relationship. However, with retail markets 
becoming increasingly competitive, this loyalty does not imply that 
members will necessarily do all their banking with their cooperative. 
They can be members and still shop around for the best deal for 
individual products. In many cases, however, the cooperatives themselves 
cannot freely shop around for customers. Many are restricted by statute or 
law to a specific market segment (e.g., a region or profession). Even in 
the absence of such restrictions, cooperatives‘ democratic nature and 
historic focus on a specific market segment may make it difficult for them 
to reach out to other market segments. Hence, cooperatives‘ fate may be 
linked rather deterministically to the fate of the market segment they were 
historically set up for, and these market segments are not always 
flourishing. Commercial banks, on the other hand, face no such 
restrictions. In particular, they have more flexibility and freedom to 
selectively target high value added customers. 
 
Extensive branch networks give cooperatives an important, albeit 
declining, comparative advantage in retail markets.  
 
Cooperatives thank their strong and entrenched retail market positions in 
part to disproportionately large branch networks. Although 
rationalizations have occurred, often these have not been as drastic as 
those of commercial banks and some cooperative banks have expansion 
strategies that are based on a further buildup of their branch networks. As 
a result, in many countries the market share of cooperatives, as measured 
in terms of branch networks, has increased in recent years. These branch 
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networks are also typically spread differently than those of commercial 
banks.  
 
In France, for example, commercial bank branches are mainly located in 
the cities, while those of cooperative banks are to a much greater extent 
located in the countryside. On the downside, extensive branch networks 
constitute a large fixed cost, which cannot easily and quickly be reduced 
during lean times, especially under continental European labor laws and 
with employees being members of the firm. In a world in which physical 
presence is becoming less relevant, branches also no longer provide the 
same degree of comparative advantage as they once did.  
 
Cooperatives tend to have loyal employees that are close to their 
customers, but they may have a lower ability to pay market prices for top 
talent.  
 
Employees who are members of the cooperative that employs them are 
likely to be relatively loyal. Involvement in decision-making (and the 
higher degree of job security that this typically entails) may also 
encourage employees to invest more in firm-specific human capital 
(Becht et al., 2002). Employees also tend to be close to the cooperative‘s 
customers. Juvin (2005) notes that a cooperative‘s employees and clients 
―speak the same language‖. They are people with similar backgrounds 
and employees often stay in their own region for their entire career. In 
return for their involvement in decision-making, job security, in many 
cases a share in the cooperative‘s profits, and the possibility to have a 
career in one‘s own region, employees may accept to work for lower 
salaries. Employee loyalty also enhances a cooperative‘s returns on 
investment in training.  
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Many cooperatives invest significantly in the training of their workforces, 
in part as a substitute to purchasing external human capital. However, the 
greater focus on retail activities and typically flatter pay scales than at 
commercial and investment banks may make it more difficult for 
cooperative banks, especially smaller ones, to attract top talent. This may 
be a handicap in developing certain lines of business, such as 
sophisticated financial market activities. This is one of the reasons why 
some cooperative groups have opted to conduct such activities through 
separate entities. 
 
A key strength of many cooperatives is their ability to mobilize and retain 
deposits.  
 
With their large branch networks, loyal customers, and overall strength in 
retail markets, cooperatives usually have a disproportionate share of retail 
deposits. This typically results in comfortable levels of liquidity, high 
deposit-to-loan ratios, and a tendency for cooperatives to be net lenders in 
interbank markets. Table 2 shows that, as of end-2004, French 
cooperative networks had lower loan-to-deposit ratios and higher ratios of 
interbank lending to interbank borrowing than large commercial banks 
and that all but one of the cooperative networks were net lenders on the 
interbank market.  
 
In many cases, cooperatives have a comparative disadvantage in 
accessing financial markets.  
 
Cooperatives not only have problems raising capital , they may also be 
less able to borrow in financial markets. Many small cooperatives lack 
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the expertise and scale to do so, and their retail lending may not always 
be suitable for securitization, syndication, or central bank refinancing.  
 
Cooperatives have a fundamental and increasingly relevant comparative 
advantage in overcoming problems of opportunistic behavior by banks.  
 
Hansmann argues that consumer ownership of firms can be efficient in 
situations characterized by problems of ―lock-in‖ (i.e., the inability to 
leave a long-term relationship at low cost), risks related to long-term 
contracting (e.g., in life insurance), information asymmetries in favor of 
the firm, or other factors that give firms significant (ex-post) market 
power (e.g., a natural monopoly). In such cases, consumer ownership has 
significant benefits because it reduces the firm‘s incentives to exploit 
these advantages. Financial products have become very complex, and 
financial institutions have enormous resource advantages over their retail 
customers. 
 
This has led to new forms of information asymmetries and ex-post market 
power of the kinds listed above. Given furthermore that consumer 
protection laws cannot always be relied upon to fully protect consumers 
and provide them with cost-effective ways to seek redress, the 
trustworthiness of institutions has become an essential criterion in 
consumers‘ choice of bank. Consumers want to be able to trust the advice 
their bank gives them and sign documents without (their lawyer) having 
to read the fine print.  
 
The facts that cooperatives are owned by their clients and state publicly 
that they do not seek to maximize profits give them an edge in portraying 
trustworthiness. Cooperatives are well aware of this, and many of them 
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point out in their marketing that they are ―different‖. As a result, 
customers may even be willing to pay a premium for financial products 
provided by a cooperative bank, because the risks and monitoring costs 
involved are (presumed) to be less. In sum, and using John Kay‘s words, 
cooperatives have a competitive advantage in establishing trust (Kay, 
2006). However, an advantage in establishing trust does not alter the fact 
that trust is easy to lose. Kay observes that when mutual financial 
institutions become large and pursue growth and diversification, they tend 
to lose their trust advantage because they start to act as commercial 
institutions. 
 
Outlook 
 
From a lifecycle perspective, most Indian  cooperative banks have 
reached an advanced level of maturity.  
 
Their original raison d’être now has a reduced relevance, because 
improved legal and institutional frameworks have alleviated the market 
failures cooperatives overcame and commercial banks now generally 
cater to a universal clientele. The distance between management and 
members has increased, in part because the increasing complexity of 
financial services provision required a professionalization of 
management. This trend has been reinforced by cooperatives‘ efforts to 
reap economies of scale and scope through mergers and through the 
creation of networks in which decisions are increasingly taken at the 
center. Some of these networks have turned into large, multistates Co-
operative Banks that have little in common with the small-scale self-help 
organizations they descend from. 
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The sector‘s entrenched market positions and comparative advantages are 
no guarantee for continued success in rapidly evolving markets that 
require adaptability.  
 
The Indian banking landscape is changing rapidly. Progressing cross-
border integration and new technologies are making markets more 
competitive and contestable. In this context, cooperatives‘ branch 
networks may lose much of their relevance going forward. Moreover, 
some of the market segments that cooperatives used to focus on are 
declining in importance, and consumer loyalty and homogeneity are only 
likely to decrease further. The challenge cooperative banks face going 
forward is to adapt to these changing circumstances while retaining as 
much as possible the comparative advantages they have. In this regard, 
the large fixed costs related to the branch networks and the traditions of 
employee involvement and job security could pose particular challenges. 
Further consolidation and integration are seen as necessary by many 
within the sector not in the least to improve cooperatives‘ ability to adopt 
new technologies. However, past experience shows that, in the process, 
important comparative advantages may be lost, in particular the closeness 
to customers that was the driving force of cooperatives‘ success in the 
past. 
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GOVERNANCE  :  INDIAN CONTEXT 
 
Governance in general is a systemic process for enhancing wealth 
generating capacity, meeting stakeholders and societal expectations. In 
this context, governance in banks and financial institutions (FIs) has been 
attracting special attention in India during the past few years for a number 
of reasons.  
 
Firstly, with liberalization and globalization, the Indian economy, while 
on the one hand is getting more and more integrated with the global 
markets, on the other hand the developments outside the country are also 
affecting the domestic market. It is well understood that vulnerable, 
unstable and opaque banking and financial systems can severely disrupt 
macro economic performance of the country. It is, therefore, necessary to 
strengthen both supervisory and regulatory framework of the banking and 
financial systems.  
 
Further, with increasing deregulation, there is need for more self 
regulation, in spite of the fact that the banking and financial systems all 
over the globe including India., are required to meet certain international 
bench marks or standards as per regulation, particularly in the areas of 
supervision, accounting and disclosures. However, the issues are complex 
and merely meeting these standards would not be sufficient by 
themselves for stability in the long run unless there are well established 
governance processes permeating throughout an organization through a 
system of proper conduct and professional management.  
 
In the context of governance, the Indian banking sector has a special role 
to play, not only because of the critical nature of the business, but 
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because it is a sector that has had large public ownership which is now in 
the process of being divested. Historically, bank has been used for 
government policy implementation. The differences and criticalities of 
the sector arise out of the following factors: 
 
(a)  In the case of banks and financial intermediaries, interests of other  
      Stakeholders, namely the depositors, appear to be more important as   
      compared to the other corporate. 
 
(b) The risks in banking institutions are many for example credit risk,  
      market  risk, counter party risk, country risk, liquidity risk etc. and  
     these have systemic implications. The East Asian crisis of the 1990s is  
     a case in point. 
 
REFORMS IN BANKING SECTOR : 
 
Under the reform process, in the post Narsimham committee scenario, 
ownership structures of nationalized banks are undergoing a change and 
the macro economic environment in which banks are required to function 
is also changing rapidly. In the light of both these internal and external 
changes, there is a need to look at governance issues in the sector on a 
continuing basis. 
 
The Indian banking system had grown rapidly even before the 
nationalization of the fourteen major banks in 1969. However, the lending 
activities of the private sector banks were not directed towards the diverse 
productive sectors of the economy, which had the potential to contribute 
to economic development and growth. Moreover, banking prior to 
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nationalization had a strong urban bias and the banking needs of the rural 
economy and the poorer sections of the society were largely ignored. 
 
The concern of the government through the 1970s and 1980s was to meet 
the national policy objectives using the banking system as a tool for 
mobilizing savings from different sections of the population and thereby 
accelerating the pace of investments for productive purposes. It was felt 
that this would be possible through nationalization of banks. Initially in 
1969 and thereafter in 1980, by directing the resources of the banking 
industry to these selected priority sectors. Nationalisation was followed 
by a vast programme of branch expansion and priority sector lending. 
 
However, over a period of time, the public sector banks which constitute 
about 80% of the banking activates both in terms of deposits and branch 
network developed certain practices which were not in conformity with 
efficient functioning of a commercial organization, particularly in a 
liberalized competitive market. The managements of these banks started 
looking more and more towards the government for direction and 
guidance not only for deciding the medium to long term action plans, but 
even in routine matters such as credit disbursement and branch opening 
etc. Even in regards to staff selection and compensation, over the years, 
decisions became centralized, with one size fits all approach. As a result 
one may say that on many occasions banks had to compromise their own 
commercial interests for meeting the wider national interests. 
 
Although, theoretically the public sector banks could compete with each 
other, the inherent uniformity in approach on various issues, including 
operational areas and credit risks, there was limited scope for open 
competition and innovation, further, with strict regulation and exchange 
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control, the banking system was, by and large insulated from the global 
markets. Activity was more rules based rather than on the basis of 
initiatives of an individual bank. Further, a mix of political expediency, 
inefficiency due to bloated size, lack of monitoring due to absence of 
technology support, also contributed to the weakening of the banking 
system. 
 
The external debt crisis, which surfaced in 1991, brought India close to 
default in meeting its international payment obligations. The balance of 
payment situation become almost unmanageable. The underlying fiscal 
crisis was acute and acceleration of rate of inflation appeared imminent. 
The cumulative impact of these factors had left many public sector banks 
under capitalized and unprofitable. 
 
The major policy thrust was to improve the operational and allocative 
efficiency of the financial system as a whole by correcting many of the 
exogenous and structural factors affecting the performance of the 
financial institutions. Easing of external constraints such as administered 
interest rate structures and reserve requirements for banks, strengthening 
the financial base of the financial institutions, facilitating the entry of new 
institutions, exploring indirect monetary policy instruments and 
strengthening prudential regulations were some of the items on the 
agenda of the financial sector reforms. 
 
Thus, the reform in the banking sector during the last decade, which is 
gathering momentum, is to enable the banks to operate more efficiently in 
market oriented competitive environment. However, the reforms process 
can be successful only through continuing efforts in strengthening the 
organizational framework of these banks. 
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A well diversified financial and banking structure that developed during 
the last three decades for meeting the banking and credit needs of the 
various sectors of the economy is facing unprecedented challenges today. 
At present, the baking sector is dominated by the public sector banks and 
unless these challenges are faced boldly by these banks and the banks 
themselves undergo a process of reforms through greater autonomy, they 
would find it difficult to survive in the competitive market; more so when 
competition is likely to increase from global sources as well, in the 
coming years. 
 
New challenges have emerged in various forms. There is a paradigm 
change in use of technology by the banks. In the past, technology was 
being used for book keeping and accounting purposes, now it 
encompasses new modes of delivery channels of various products to the 
customers. There is also a shift from traditional delivery mechanism of 
brick and mortar branches to click and phenomenon, giving the customers 
not only easier access but wider choices of products. With the integration 
of financial markets all over the globe new global banking products are 
reshaping the balance sheets of the banks. The public sector banks would, 
therefore, need to change their bureaucratic character and convert 
themselves into more market savvy and customer friendly organizations 
with better understanding of the risks, which need to be managed in a 
market oriented environment. The strengthening of the banks would 
require bringing about changes on two fronts. First, through a continuing 
process of improving the Capital Adequacy, NPA management, 
tightening the systems and procedures etc. The second but more 
important through a simultaneous process of strengthening the 
management systems starting from the Board level. 
 
 33 
The process of liberalization, globalization and privatization is leading to 
a greater integration of the markets and thereby diluting the role of the 
Government in running the organizations. Against this backdrop, there is 
no gainsaying that the banks will have to introduce a process of good 
governance which would be a precondition for sound management of 
banks. This in turn would require the primacy of the Board to be 
established. The process of good governance should emanate from the 
Board. 
 
However, in certain instances where irregularities have been detected, the 
role of nominee directors has at tracked attention. However, it is felt in 
general that these nominee directors have a duty to act in the larger public 
interest. 
 
This disclosure must be made on the assumption that value based 
governance is a dynamic concept evolving over time and constantly 
adapting itself to the developments in the economy and in particular the 
company. 
Cooperatives‘ basic governance mechanisms were designed for small 
groups of people within close-knit communities, but are now being 
applied to large conglomerates. Just like political democracy could not be 
applied in the same way in large nation-states as in Greek city-states, 
cooperatives‘ democratic governance mechanisms face problems of 
applicability at different scales. At present, it is by no means clear that 
they have been adapted to function well at the scale that many modern 
cooperative banks have achieved. In particular, collective action 
challenges appear daunting in large cooperatives. 
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Market forces play a lesser role in fostering good governance in 
cooperative banks than in joint stock corporations. Fama (1980) argues 
that a firm can be seen as a collection of factors of production, each 
facing market discipline from their own factor market. The factor 
shareholders contribute is risk-sharing, and since they can diversify their 
portfolio over many different firms, they may not be willing to engage in 
the management of individual firms.  
 
In this view, management discipline is provided primarily through the 
market for management talent and by shareholders‘ ability to express 
their views on the quality of management through the market for risk-
bearing (capital markets). In cooperatives, however, such market 
discipline functions much less freely. The market for cooperative 
managerial talent is much less active and money-driven than its 
commercial equivalent. In addition, membership typically involves little 
financial risk, a member‘s relationship with the cooperative is much 
broader and complex than a simple investment, and members may face 
conflicting interests when they are also depositors and/or borrowers.  
Significant deregulation in the financial sector along with introduction of 
prudential norms that have been made more and more stringent over a 
period of time have completely altered the life of co-operative banks in 
general and urban co-operative banks in particular. It became inescapable 
for co-operative banks also to have a serious look at their governance 
issues in their entirety.  
 
There is now a growing realization that a ―status quo‖ approach in 
dealing with complexities of fast changing banking scenario would make 
the sector irrelevant and may eventually take it to oblivion.  
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The urban co-operative banks are battling on two fronts. The first one 
concerns issues that are external, like those arising out of changing 
economic order and globalization, the long existing issue of dual control, 
highly restrictive state co-operative laws, etc. The other front concerns 
the internal issues of governance which could be said to include the 
existing structure of UCBs, which does not restrict a member from being 
elected to the board irrespective of his I her capabilities in understanding 
banking, the performance of board, professional management, role of the 
Chief Executive, competent workforce. etc.  
As for the external factors, the economic liberalization has had an all 
embracing effect on all economic and commercial entities in the Country 
and urban cooperative banks have been no exception. The various drills 
that constitute what we understand as corporate governance are in the 
process of being internalized by the co-operative banks. But certain 
factors have made the process rather different for them.  
It may be noted that till 1990, the growth rate in UCBs was not more than 
the industry average. Two factors contributed to the sudden accelerated 
growth of UCBs between 1992-93 and 1999-2000 as during this period 
their growth rate was very high.  
The first one was the acceptance of the Marathe Committee‘s 
recommendations which liberalized the rules for opening of new UCBs. 
The second was the deregulation of interest rates as a part of banking 
sector reforms ushered in by the Narasimham Committee‘s Report.  
While hundreds of new urban cooperative banks opened shop during the 
six-year period, existing UCBs also increased their branch network. 
Deregulation of interest rates tempted these new banks as well as most 
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other UCBs to offer high rates of interest to attract deposits. Thus the 
combination of a large number of new entities and the newfound freedom 
of interest rates proved to be a potent combination that invited trouble of 
significant proportions in the long run. Banks were posting excellent 
results, growth rate was much higher than the national average and for 
some years the glittering success made everyone oblivious of their serious 
shortcomings. As we all know, the first dose of prudential norms by way 
of asset classification and provisioning was very friendly and most of the 
urban banks met the requirements rather easily. But as these norms 
became more stringent progressively, going started becoming tougher and 
tougher for the urban cooperative banks. Introduction of capital adequacy 
norms highlighted the need for a bank having different avenues to raise 
capital and brought into sharp focus the limitations of co-operative 
banking system to have such avenues.  
All this time, the urban co-operative banks did not realize the importance 
of the fact that globalization will make the banking progressively more 
complex by the day demanding a very high degree of professionalism, 
transparency and good corporate governance.  
After the advent of financial sector reforms in India, many committees 
starting from Narasimham Committees I and II, the advisory committee 
on banking supervision headed by Sb. M. S. Verrna, the Ganguly 
Committee and RBI‘s advisory group on corporate governance went into 
great detail for drawing up a roadmap for corporate governance in banks 
in India to meet the requirements of Basic Committee on banking 
supervision in this regard. Essentially the Basel Committee made banking 
sector specific improvements and additions to the OECD‘s (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development) principle on corporate 
governance that require timely accurate disclosure to be made on all 
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material matters regarding a corporation including financial situation, 
performance and ownership of the corporate. The OECD principle seeks 
to address the following:  
(i) protect the shareholders rights (members‘ rights in case of co- 
operatives)  
(ii) protect rights of all shareholders and stakeholders as established by 
law and encourage active co-operation between corporation and 
shareholders in creating wealth and sustainability of enterprise; (iii) 
ensure timely and accurate disclosure.  
Basel Committee included parameters like internal code of ethics, 
delegation of clear responsibilities and. decision making authority, 
independent risk management and internal audit functions, special 
concentration on credit risk exposure, public disclosure of credit risk, etc. 
 Acceptance of Narasimham Committee‘s recommendations, made the 
banks in India, for the first time to follow prudential norms, disclose non- 
performing assets, provisioning, and crucial operating ratios in their 
balance sheets. They were fine tuned to include asset liability 
management to monitor maturity pattern of asset & liability, movement 
of NPAs and details of lending to sensitive sectors etc.  
In fact, the second Narasimham Committee emphasized on the need for 
differentiating ownership from management in order for public sector 
banks in particular, to get autonomy from the Government in their 
operations. It also emphasized the need for induction of professionals in 
the management and wanted major shareholders like depositors and pubic 
to be represented on the board.  
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The Advisory Group on Corporate Governance has strongly pitched for 
boards of banks to have 51% independent directors (other than full time 
directors and promoters). It opines that independent directors would be in 
a position to play their fiduciary role more effectively if they possess 
experience and expertise in areas related to the activities of the company. 
Referring to banks, the Group has said that the shareholders, particularly 
in public sector banks, had no say in the affairs of the banks, even in 
adoption of annual accounts and approval of dividends, and has 
recommended that RBI and Government must bring about significant 
changes in corporate governance mechanism adopted by banks. 
Recommendations of the Group are being progressively implemented.  
 
With these macro developments in the governance scenario of the 
banking industry in general, we come back to the governance aspects of 
co-operative banks.  
 
The sections 10, lOA to 1OD, 12A o Banking Regulation Act, 1949 
which essentially deal with appointment of- chairman, qualifications for 
board of directors, elections of new directors etc. in respect of banking 
companies are not applicable to the co-operative banks. They are 
governed by the co-operative societies Acts of different states on all 
aspects of management and governance, which are very different from 
those of commercial banks in terms of constitution of board and other 
fundamental aspects.  
 
First and foremost, in co1peratives the governance system is democratic 
and is, therefore, derived from membership as against that of corporate 
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system where the management is controlled by majority shareholders. 
This itself makes co-operative system more difficult than corporate 
system in terms of introduction of best practices of corporate governance.  
 
 In case of cooperatives, the commitment of the management is far more 
complex and even unclear. Members or shareholders for whose socio-
economic benefit, the co-operatives are created, by virtue of their taking 
active part in affairs of the co-operative and by necessarily utilizing the 
services of the cooperative have umbilical connection with the 
management. In co-operative banks, members are borrowers. Directors 
are elected from among them. There is no concept of independent 
directors which is an essential part of good corporate governance. So the 
question is, what does the democratic ethos of cooperative banks mean to 
corporate governance? It has been observed that although cooperative 
philosophy automatically points to transparency co-operative banks are in 
practice less transparent. Therefore, new regulations regarding 
transparency are hurting many cooperative Banks.  
 
Elections of directors from among the members of the society may never 
ensure the board to be professionally competent. A board of a bank 
wherein majority of directors do not possess adequate knowledge of 
banking, finance and management would not be able to introduce and 
sustain best corporate Governance practices.  
Another unique deviation from general governance practice that is 
prevalent in the co-operative banks is the complete absence of clarity of 
roles of the Chairman of the board and the Chief Executive of the 
organization. In fact, there is no demarcation of roles of board and the 
 40 
executive. If this aspect of governance is sorted out, adoption of best 
corporate governance practices will become much easier.  
Corporate governance in co-operative banks would greatly improve if the 
system of having a truly e audit committee is taken seriously, rather 
paying only lip service to the concept.  
In this context / the Kumaramangalam Birla Committee‘s 
recommendations for corporate- governance in companies are also 
extremely relevant in a large measure to co-operative banks. In banking 
context the co-operative banks would do well to strictly adopt and follow 
transparency and disclosure requirements, give utmost importance to 
offsite surveillance of RBI and institute prompt corrective action.  
It may be pertinent to note that the measures taken by RBI and adopted 
by commercial banks over the last four years in respect of corporate 
governance have had a very positive effect on the health of the banks. As 
stated earlier, there are certain inherent difficulties in adoption of these 
measures in co-operative banks and it may take some more time for all of 
them to fall in line. However, in case of a majority of co-operative banks, 
changes for the better are visible. Unfortunately, in the process of 
enforcement of good corporate governance processes by RBI, many of 
the non-viable banks and those with undesirable management practices 
are being forced to exit, and in the absence of streamlined non-disruptive 
exit mechanism for these banks, a large number of better managed banks 
are finding it all the more difficult to adopt the required governance 
practices and fall in line with the progressively more stringent prudential 
norms that will help them align themselves with the mainstream of 
banking industry in the Country.  
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While amalgamations and mergers are a part of corporate strategies to 
meet the competition among companies, there has been no practice for 
mergers of cooperatives. Those that have taken place are few and far 
between. However in many countries with well established history of 
healthy co-operative movement, there have been large scale mergers and 
amalgamations among cooperative banks, primarily for creation of 
stronger entities that could provide better service to their members, 
customers and other stakeholders and at the same time be in a position to 
with stand competition. Such consolidations have been significant in the 
last 15 years, as larger entities are found to be in a better position to adopt 
technologies better, to increase their efficiency and become more cost 
effective.  
 
The RBI has very recently announced guidelines for mergers among 
urban co- operative banks. These are perhaps early days and there are 
many questions to be answered and mindsets to be changed before there 
is a ready acceptance of the idea of merger being one of the routes for 
improvement of governance, strengthening of financials and for meeting 
the competition to remain in business. It is however, heartening to note 
that merger is not only being contemplated to save weak banks, but there 
are already moves by sets of two healthy banks to create a bigger, 
stronger and more competitive urban co-operative bank. As a thumb rule, 
a financially strong bank invariably follows more acceptable corporate 
governance practices than a weak bank. In the ultimate analysis, while 
extraneous factors are there as common denominator for all banks, and 
they are equally affected by them, internal factors of good I governance 
make all the difference between a strong bank and a weak bank. Good 
corporate governance is in totality, universal in its sweep and contents. 
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There may be slightly different approaches to achieve the goals of good 
corporate governance.  
After all factors like transparency, disclosure, shareholders / stakeholders 
interests, well defined demarcation between ownership and management 
are all like qualities of truth which cannot be disputed nor can anyone 
give any worthwhile excuse not to follow them. So if we advocate that 
co-operative principles of co-operatives and co-operative banks come in 
the way of good corporate governance, nobody will buy the argument. On 
the contrary, by doing so we will only be discounting the image of co-
operatives.  
 
In fact, the inherent quality of much higher corporate social responsibility 
that is seen in co-operative banks in much larger measure than in 
commercial banks will shine brightly if we can match the corporate 
governance practices of commercial banks. This is precisely the situation 
in countries like Germany. France, etc. where co-operative banks have a 
very respectable place in the industry and are considered financially 
strong and prudent entities.  
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CHALLENGES FOR  URBAN COOPERATIVE BANKS 
 
COOPERATIVES AND FINANCIAL STABILITY : 
 
Prudential authorities need to be conscious of the specific risks 
cooperative banks face, as well as of the potential impact they may have 
on the banking system as a whole. The most important of these specific 
risks are related to the combination of the governance challenges and the 
constraints cooperatives face in managing their capital.  
 
The Experience Thus Far 
 
Cooperative banks generally have lower incentives to take on risks, and 
this seems to be confirmed by experience. The lack of a need to maximize 
profits and the absence of many of the factors that lead rational managers 
in commercial banks to adopt short-term horizons  means that cooperative 
banks have lower incentives to take on risk.  
 
Much of the available evidence is consistent with this prior. During the 
US savings and loans crisis, investor-owned S&Ls fared much worse than 
mutual S&Ls, because they had tended to pursue more speculative 
investment policies (Hansmann, 1996).  It is  also found that Cooperative 
banks in France and Switzerland fared generally better than commercial 
banks during the banking problems of the early 1990s. It‘s noted that 
cooperatives typically have more riskaverse clients, who may prefer 
member shares in a cooperative over more risky assets such as stocks in 
Capital Market.  
 
Cooperative banks may be more vulnerable to certain shocks, including 
credit quality and interest rate developments, but possibilities to manage 
these vulnerabilities are increasing. Old-fashioned intermediation is 
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cooperatives‘ core business. Hence, while they may still have a bit of an 
edge in managing credit risk, cooperative banks typically have a lot of 
such risk. Moreover, the credit risks they face tend to be correlated with 
each other due to cooperatives‘ focus on a usually in at least some ways 
homogenous member base.  
 
As noted above, cooperatives‘ business model also relies more on one 
particular source of revenues (the interest margin), which is likely to 
imply higher vulnerability to interest rate.  Developments Overall, while 
cooperative banks may generally be stable, they do tend to be vulnerable 
to certain types of instability. Just few years bank many cooperative 
banks in India have had problems with nonperforming assets. However, 
developments in financial markets, in particular the increased 
opportunities to hedge against interest rate risk and securitize loan 
portfolios, should allow cooperatives to reduce and better manage the 
risks they face.  
 
In our country India also, because of very problem two large cooperative 
banks such as, Madhavpura Mercantile Bank in Gujarat and Charminar 
Bank in Andhra Pradesh failed. Both of these banks carry with them 
several other small and medium cooperative banks towards failure. 
 
Cooperative banks may have more difficulties adjusting to adverse 
circumstances and changing risks. The Swedish cooperative banking 
sector did not survive the crisis of the early 1990s in a cooperative form, 
and the need to restore capital was a major factor in the decision to 
demutualize. A cooperative‘s typical business model comes with a 
relatively high fixed cost base. With employees involved in decision-
making, it may be hard to cut these costs quickly when needed.  Strong 
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Union affiliation makes the mater worst. In many such cooperative banks 
cost of employees is more then 80% of the total administrative cost. 
 
On the positive side, employees-members may be more loyal and 
motivated, and therefore more determined to pull the firm through times 
of hardship rather than abandon it. Cooperatives‘ business and depositors 
are also more stable, allowing them to thrive with a higher (fixed) cost 
base. Beyond conjunctural developments, the risk of technological 
change rendering the cooperatives‘ branch-based strategies obsolete 
needs to be taken seriously. Risks have also materialized when 
cooperatives ventured onto unfamiliar terrain (e.g., derivatives markets).  
 
Democratic decision-making may come at the expense of the speed and 
quality of decision-making needed to thrive under rapidly changing 
circumstances. In cooperatives in which members are routinely involved 
in strategic and managerial decisions, the outcome may be indecisiveness, 
conflict, slow adaptability, and an inability to jump on business 
opportunities or take tough decisions in a timely way. 
 
Building Empires? 
 
Capital and growth dynamics. Most cooperatives are designed to 
perpetually accumulate capital, thus building an ever-larger 
intergenerational endowment. At the time they were set up, a shortage of 
funds was typically one of the most important challenges cooperatives 
faced. To remedy this, mechanisms were put in place to ensure capital 
accumulation. As discussed above, this led to the creation of an 
intergenerational endowment that in most cases constitutes the bulk of a 
cooperative‘s equity and that keeps on growing as long as the cooperative 
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remains profitable. Now, a century and a half after the cooperative 
banking movement started, in many cases the shortage of capital problem 
is no longer present, but the mechanisms that ensure capital accumulation 
remain in place. This section argues that cooperatives are caught between 
their capital-accumulating set-up, pressures to achieve similar 
profitability as commercial banks, and the already sizable equity they 
have built up throughout their history. 
 
Cooperative banks face specific challenges in managing their capital: 
 
• They have limited control over their cooperative capital, although over 
many decades this has typically been rather stable.  
 
Since in most cooperatives members can withdraw their membership and 
ask to have their shares reimbursed, cooperative capital (the part of 
capital to which members‘ shares represent a claim) is variable and 
cooperatives could theoretically face a ―run on capital‖. In practice this 
has not been an issue, given the buffer provided by the intergenerational 
endowment and considering lengthy withdrawal mechanisms and the 
unconditional rights that some cooperatives have to refuse redemption. In 
many cooperatives, there is a minimum level of capital below which 
redemption is refused.  
 
• They often face binding restrictions on their pay-out policies. 
  
At many cooperatives, there are statutory or legal restrictions that put 
limits on shareholder remuneration. For example, Swiss Raiffeisen banks 
are legally not allowed to pay more than 6 percent dividend on the 
notional value of member shares; some French cooperative banks cannot 
pay more than the government bond yield; Rabobanks do not pay 
dividends to members because membership is free of charge and the 
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Italian banking law requires that credit cooperatives add 70 percent of 
their annual profits to their reserves and three percent to a solidarity fund. 
 
As far as India is concerned, The Reserve Bank of India do not permit to 
pay more then 15% Dividend to their Share holders. 
 
• They can face severe difficulties raising capital in times of need.  
 
Provided there is a prospect of future profits, commercial banks (Private) 
can always issue new shares and sell those at market price when the need 
to shore up equity arises. Cooperatives, by contrast, can only raise new 
cooperative capital by increasing their membership or by asking existing 
members to buy more shares. They can also issue certain kinds of 
securities and, in many cases, mobilize capital from their network in 
times of need. However, both raising new capital and tapping alternative 
sources of funding come with potential problems. First, members may not 
be well placed to provide capital when needed. They typically pay very 
little for their shares and buy them to gain access to the benefits the 
cooperative offers rather than as a financial investment (with low 
dividends and no potential of appreciation). As a result, they may not 
have any incentive to buy more than the minimum number of shares 
needed (a sort of ―membership fee‖).  
 
The lack of diversification at small cooperatives and the high degree of 
overlap between their member and clients also means that in times of 
difficulties many members may not be in a position to provide significant 
amounts of fresh capital. Furthermore, in many cases there are legal 
and/or statutory restrictions on the total value of shares a member may 
hold. Second, issuing other securities is from various perspectives not as 
attractive as raising cooperative capital. Among other things, such 
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securities often require a relatively high remuneration. In both 
approaches, decision-making procedures to raise new capital may be 
cumbersome and time-consuming.  
 
• Even in the absence of restrictions, there may be few incentives to pay 
out a significant share of profits.  
 
Cooperatives are not at risk of seeing their share price traded at a discount 
because of dissatisfaction with their pay-out policies. And since 
shareholdership in a cooperative is not usually driven by investment 
considerations, members are unlikely to care enough about the level of 
dividends they receive to organize a ―member revolt,‖ which may be 
difficult to begin with.  
 
• Expansionary policies can put significant pressure on cooperatives’ 
solvency and liquidity.  
 
Unless an acquisition takes the form of a merger with another 
cooperative, it cannot be financed through the issuance of new equity. 
Acquisitions and other expansion projects therefore typically have to be 
paid through the issuance of debt or out of a cooperative‘s liquid assets, 
thus causing a deterioration in its balance sheet. In their view, 
cooperatives may have problems raising large amounts of capital quickly, 
but it is usually relatively easy to place new member shares with 
members, and this can be done at lower cost. 
 
Many cooperative banks in India have other innovative idea and that is 
the mobiliesation of low cost deposits by promoting more savings 
Accounts, more current Accounts and short term fixed deposited.  
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Given these circumstances, even in the absence of any restrictions or 
empire building aspirations, it is rational for cooperatives to accumulate 
large reserves by retaining earnings. The somewhat fickle nature of 
cooperative capital means that cooperatives‘ solvency, likelihood of 
survival (in the absence of external support), and ability to grow all 
depend on having a significant buffer of reserves. They may therefore opt 
to maintain, on average, higher levels of capital than their commercial 
bank peers. 
 
Because of large results, mergers / acquisitions, though very very few, 
becomes easy without the raising additional capital putting pressure on 
profit earning resources. 
 
Low pay-out ratios mean that highly profitable cooperatives can enjoy 
rapid growth in their capital base, and therefore fast organic growth.  
 
Capital has indeed been expanding rapidly at some Indian cooperative 
banks and banking groups. Because prudential regulations require banks 
to maintain minimum levels of capital relative to their risk-weighted 
assets, a bank‘s ability to grow depends on its ability to increase its 
capital. Organic growth (i.e., growth that does not require external 
capital) therefore requires profits and retention of some of those profits. 
The link between organic capital growth, profitability and the pay-out 
ratio is given by the formula: 
     
 
Capital = ROE * (1 – POR) 
 
Where: Capital = growth rate of capital 
ROE     = return on equity 
POR     = pay-out ratio 
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Comparing two hypothetical banks, one cooperative and one commercial, 
the equation above implies that they will have the same organic growth 
rate if and only if their relative profitability and pay-out ratios satisfy the 
following equation: 
 
ROEcoop / ROEcom = (1 – PORcom) / (1 – PORcoop) 
 
For example, if a cooperative has a pay-out ratio of 10 percent and a 
commercial bank pays out 35 percent of its profits, the former only needs 
to achieve 72.2 percent of the profitability level of the latter to realize the 
same organic growth rate. 
 
While a growing capital base may allow healthy organic growth, it can 
also lead to undesirable empire-building or forced expansion, even in the 
absence of attractive opportunities. When excess capital is accumulated 
and cannot be disposed of, over time managers are likely to be tempted or 
pressured to expand the business in line with the growing capital base. 
The temptation may originate in Board of Directors tendency to engage in 
empire-building, a tendency that is the subject of a rich literature.   
 
The risks and costs of empire-building are higher when banks have 
entrenched Management (i.e., poorly functioning external governance 
mechanisms). Beyond empire-building, Management may feel pressured 
to expand the bank‘s business when capital grows, if only to fend off 
outside forces (e.g., tax authorities, members, …) which may want to lay 
claim on the excess capital and avoid showing ROE figures that are 
excessively low.  
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Supervisory practices may play a role in this. Supervisors monitor ROE 
as an indication of the soundness of a financial institution. Moreover, as 
noted above, concern about the health of the banking system in the 
presence of non-profit-maximizing banks has led some supervisors to 
demand that cooperative banks achieve similar profitability levels as their 
commercial peers. Faced with a growing capital base and no means to 
shed excess capital, cooperative bank managers may feel they have no 
choice but to keep on expanding. As a result, cooperative groups may 
venture into businesses they are unfamiliar with, or take on challenges 
that their cooperative nature has difficulties coping with. 
 
Overall, cooperatives face fundamental challenges in managing their 
capital / Deposits.  They cannot shed excess capital, fully rely on the 
capital they have, or raise capital as needed, especially in times of crisis. 
With banking being a very capital-dependent business, this is a 
fundamental vulnerability. 
 
Asymmetric consolidation 
 
The tendency towards empire-building may be further reinforced by the 
asymmetric nature of the possibilities for consolidation between 
cooperative and commercial banks. Concern has been raised that 
cooperatives may stand in the way of the consolidation, especially those 
without regular ownership, can impede consolidation. Cooperatives can 
engage in consolidation with commercial banks, albeit mostly on an 
asymmetric basis. 
 
Mergers between cooperatives and commercial banks can only happen on 
a mutually agreed basis and may not be appealing to commercial banks. 
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Neither to cooperative banks. Hostile  takeovers of cooperatives are 
impossible. 
 
Mergers between cooperatives can face significant obstacles. As has been 
illustrated by hundreds of examples over the past decade, mergers 
between cooperatives within a same network can normally be done, 
provided members approve them. However, mergers between banks 
belonging to different networks may be much harder, because the 
networks are usually governed by different laws (and by-laws) even 
within a single country. In addition, banks‘ operations are, in many cases, 
closely integrated in the network, which may make it very difficult in 
practice for a cooperative bank to change its allegiance. This might entail 
changing brand name, IT systems, management systems and much more. 
Consolidation can in some respects be easier between networks as a 
whole. 
 
Overall, cooperatives are likely to increase their market share in any 
consolidation wave.  
 
Competition Between Cooperative and Commercial Banks 
 
Cooperatives can follow market share-based or Deposit -based growth 
strategies, both of which may lead to overcapacity that may need to be 
resolved through retrenchment of commercial banks. Competition 
between cooperative and commercial banks is likely to be beneficial to 
consumers. In the long run, however, it may affect the structure and 
stability of the financial system, the impact of which is a subject of 
debate. Market share-based growth strategies focus on selling at lower 
 53 
prices than the competition (adjusted for quality, location and everything 
else) and therefore accepting lower profitability.  
 
Deposit -based growth strategies are based on relatively high organic 
growth rates of the capital base. Such a strategy requires significant 
profits because for cooperatives profits constitute the main source of fresh 
Deposits. As a result of these expansion strategies, competing 
commercial banks may face reduced profitability and transition costs and 
risks (e.g., costs of restructuring and closing branches). may lead to 
macroeconomic inefficiency, waste and overcapacity in the banking 
system that may take a long time to work out. However, given the higher 
inherent stability of cooperative banks, they find a positive overall impact 
of cooperative presence on overall banking system stability.  
 
Other Prudential Challenges and Concerns 
 
The third pillar of Basel II is less effective in the case of cooperative 
banks. The third pillar relies on extensive disclosure to ensure that banks 
are subject to market discipline. However, as noted above, disclosure 
practices (and requirements) at cooperatives are often below standards at 
commercial banks, especially listed ones. Also, even when disclosure is 
adequate, there are rarely markets that can exert effective disciplining 
pressure in response. 
 
As discussed above, shareholder pressure cannot be relied upon, loyal - to 
some degree perhaps even captive—and insured retail depositors may not 
exert any effective market disciplining effect either at an early enough 
stage.  
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Contagion from cooperative to commercial banks is more likely to take 
the form of liquidity shocks than solvency problems.  
 
Given their typically high levels of liquidity, cooperative banks tend to be 
net lenders in the interbank market. In times of stress, they are likely to 
cut their exposures in the interbank market, which may cause liquidity 
problems for 
other banks. 
 
 Prudential authorities may face calls to apply different standards to 
cooperative banks, Cooperatives‘ not-for-profit statute, large 
membership, close involvement in local communities, retail orientation, 
and links to broader movements imply that they can often count on a 
higher level of public sympathy and political support than commercial 
banks.  
 
This is only reinforced by cooperatives‘ disproportionate market shares in 
terms of deposits and branch networks, and in rural areas where 
competition between banks is low to begin with. All of this may lead for 
pressure to ―go soft‖ on cooperative banks, in terms or regulation as well 
as supervisory enforcement, and may create particular problems in case a 
cooperative runs into financial difficulties. In Ireland, for example, the 
Irish League of Credit Unions has lobbied for, and obtained, a specific 
regulatory and supervisory framework for credit unions that takes into 
account their not-for profit orientation and the volunteer nature of much 
its human resources. 
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Though in India since last few years such soft views are not taken by 
Resvev Bank of India but measures introduced after MMCD are much 
more tougher. 
 
In some cases, risks may arise as a result of not differentiating between 
commercial and cooperative banks. The main area where this risk appears 
to exist is corporate governance. Corporate governance regulations that 
are tailor-made for commercial banks and fail to take into account the 
different nature of cooperatives may fail to address the specific risks that 
exist at the latter. 
 
 
Given the large number of small cooperative banks, supervisory 
authorities sometimes rely on the apex organization for supervision. In 
many European  countries, there are hundreds of small cooperatives, 
many of which have their headquarters far away from the big cities where 
supervisory authorities typically have most of their staff.  
 
Individually supervising all of these small cooperatives may require a 
level of resources that most supervisory agencies lack. Also, full-fledged 
supervision might not even be necessary, given that many of the 
cooperative banks are not dissimilar in terms of size from branches of 
large commercial banks, especially in the presence of strong solidarity 
mechanisms.  
 
In India many States have Apex Bank, however the entire structure needs 
to be changed. Present structure do not permit any direct supervision at 
all on member cooperative banks. Neither any reporting systems is 
designed for APEX BANK To guide or to come to rescue in case of need. 
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A well designed structure of Apex Bank can be extremely useful to small, 
medium and weak cooperative banks. 
The table will describe such possible structure. 
 
Current Policy Framework 
 
Current policy frameworks appear characterized by a lack of attention for 
the specific risks faced by, and related to, cooperative banks.  
 
governance issues discussed in the document relate mainly to internal 
control procedures within financial institutions, rather than to external 
control over management. Similarly, the Basel Committee‘s most recent 
publication on corporate governance for banking organizations (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005a) does not contain any 
cooperative-specific discussion. 
 
Recent initiatives to improve corporate governance have focused on 
corporation and large companies. Given cooperative banks‘ economic 
importance and large member and depositor bases, this lack of attention 
appears mainly the result of the absence, of corporate Governance for 
cooperative Banks. However since last few years the need has been 
recognized and now many discussions are taking place all over India.  
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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND DISCLOSURE 
PRACTICES   
 
 
Background :  
 
Financial Deregulation coupled with Technological and communication 
advancement has transformed the Indian financial sector, forcing 
paradigm shift in the way those financial industries should be managed 
and controlled. The driving force of change in the financial service 
industry, is captured by TRICKS. Which stands for 
 
(1) Technology (2) Regulation (3) Interest rate risk, Intangible Assets (4) 
Customer, Competition and Confidence (5) Capital Adequacy (German 
spell of Capital) (6) Social objectives / Speed  
 
The combination of TRICKS plus rational management of those forces 
leads to innovation. Innovation Financial Service Firms will be able to 
sustain and survive in such turbulent environment. This holds all the more 
strong and loud for the cooperative banks, which are regional and smaller 
in size then commercial banks, have primitive systems, methods and 
management skills and presently facing confidence crisis. Those banks 
for people of small means and small business of our economy have been 
playing a pivotal role in economic and social development of community. 
Thus it is inevitable to ensure the health of those banks and thus welfare 
of people.  
 
Since banking sector reforms coupled with technology prowess have set 
in motion priorities of urban banks needs to be redefined. From plentiful 
low cost funds availability and ease of financing, stable interest rates, the 
era has changed to high cost of deposits due to competition and high level 
of NPA as well. Increased level of NPA, competition from new private 
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banks, poor profitability , primitive methods of management, bank 
failures and confidence c sis, technological investment requirements, 
importance of human resource, brand and customer and other intangible 
factors, capital adequacy, interest rate volatility have shifted priorities 
form social banking to commercial banking. Profitability has become 
buzzword and prime wover for reasons of meeting capital adequacy, 
intangible and technological investment requirements.  
 
Bankers need to recognize this fact that ‗Banks and financial services 
firms now operates in the turbulent financial service industry and not 
banking sector‘ and adapt to changing environment of the Financial 
Service Industry to survive in long run.  
 
Following Weaknesses are generally found in the working of Urban 
Co-operative Banks.  
 
•  Absence of systematic approach to profit planning, risk and resources 
management.  
•  Miss match in cost, yield and maturity profile of asset and liability.  
•  Shoddy accounting practices (income and expenses recognition, 
investment valuation, depreciation, NPA provisioning etc.)  
•  Misleading Management control systems, performance measurement 
and compensation system.  
•  Increase in level of NPA‘s due to inadequate asset portfolio 
management.  
•  High deposit and lending rates.  
•  Unprofessional approach on credit and loan appraisal, product pricing 
and management of asset portfolio.  
•  Shrinking spreads, thinning margins, poor credits off take due to 
general industrial recession.  
•  Confidence crisis.  
•  Dual Regulations.  
•  High burden / cost of operations.  
•  Conflicting objectives Business V/s Societal  
•  Miss conceptions about cost of owned funds, deposits and borrowings.  
•  Inadequate technological usage and harnessing.  
•  Miniscule share of Para-banking, fee based banking.  
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•  Limited area of operation and Regional presence.  
•  Inadequate treasury operations and management.  
 
 
Performance Measurement : 
 
Appropriate Strategic Planning, implementation and controlling are 
cardinal to survival of those banks. Banks may plan well but what 
determines the future is the way plans are implemented, monitored and 
controlled. Planning and Control are two sides of the same coin and 
feedback provided by control functions ensure appropriate 
implementation and corrective action for planning. Performance 
measurement hence is a very important tool to keep plans working. The 
turbulent environmental forces captured by TRICKS have brought 
paradigm change in the banks management and performance 
measurement, hence emphasizes the need to review the planning and 
control i.e. Performance Measurement and reward system of the banks. 
Thus, the banks need to manage and measure the performance on the 
following variables not only for sustainable development but also as an 
excellent management control and planning tools.  
 
(1) Financial (2) Capital (3) Intangible assets, (customer satisfaction, 
brand equity etc) (4) Human (5) Risk and Regulatory (6) Technology (7) 
Speed (8) Society  
 
Arguably profit is the most comprehensive accounting measure of the 
performance. Prudent management of all the elements captured by 
TRICKS may lead to superior performance or profitability. Now the 
question is how the profitability is define, measured, what affects the 
profitability and does it capture the risk and thus risk adjusted return of 
bank ? Return on Investment, Return of Owned Funds, Accounting net 
profits, operating profits. All these metrics are based on accounting 
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figures, which are subject to manipulation and adjustments. Accounting 
statements barely presents the real or economic position of the bank. 
Revenue recognition, Expenses recognition1 depreciations, NPA, 
Investment, contingent liability accounting are prone to manipulations. 
Accounting measures are lagging indicators of performance and in this 
dynamic business environment the non-accounting and non-financial 
measures of performance, the leading indicators, are promising tools for 
management decisions.  
 
Apart form above profitability measures there are other important factors 
which businesses need to recognize and build its competitive strengths on 
intangible assets as well. The economic value of the bank lies in Human 
resources, Brand Power or banks image, Technological skills and 
infrastructure, Risk Management, Brach, Capital, Regulatory, Speed, 
Society Costs and the Intangible assets etc.  
When it comes to performance measurement on all those fronts‘ banks 
merely manages to know its performance on financial resource 
adequately. Profit the most comprehensive measure of financial 
performance is prone to several accounting manipulations. It ignores time 
value of money, risks, uncertainty of returns; it is defined ambiguously 
and doesn‘t facilitate comparison. Accounts manipulation takes place in 
following three ways  
 
a.   Changing accounting method  
b.   Fiddling with managers estimates of costs, and  
C. Shifting the period when expenses and revenues are included in 
results.  
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Strategies for an effective Governance & Regulations of Urban 
Cooperative Banks 
 
Gujarat state occupies the second position in the development of urban 
cooperative banks and contributes 17.76 per cent of bank offices, 19.20 
per cent of membership, 22.70 per cent of deposits and 25.92 per cent of 
loans and advances of the total urban banks in the country.  
The urban cooperative banks (UCBs) in Gujarat state have been regarded 
as main instruments for the growth and development of the urban and 
semi-urban poor. These banks are playing a vital role in the development 
of urban economy, such as financing the downtrodden class of urban 
people for the developmental activities, such as small scale industries, 
small business, retail trade, self employment, housing, consumption, etc. 
These small sectors have established the place of pride in the priority 
clientele groups of urban cooperative banks in Gujarat.  
 
This paper is based on the comprehensive study on functioning of urban 
cooperative banks in Gujarat State undertaken by me for doctoral degree. 
The major observations in my study, predominantly relating to 
performance & deficiencies of urban cooperative banks and suggested 
measures and strategies recommended for the sustainable development of 
UCBs have been summarized are as under.  
 
 
Overview of Progress of Urban Cooperative Banks in Gujarat State:  
Resource Mobilization:  
 
The urban cooperative banks in the State ire self-reliant and have 
developed all by them due to the meticulous and uphill struggle of the 
altruistic cooperators involved in their development. The UCBs are 
financially affluent due to their well-built base of owned funds. Inspite of 
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problems in urban credit sector in Gujarat, especially after failure of 
Madhavpura Mercantile Coop Bank ltd., more than 75 percent of the 
UCBs in Gujarat could make sustainable progress.  
 
Though the urban cooperative banks are small in size with limited area of 
operation, restricted and local individual clientele and have several 
boundaries to mobilize deposits, they have made a remarkable evolution 
in deposit mobilization. Despite of several problems and negative 
publicity given by the media, the growth rate of deposit mobilization 
ranged between 10 to 15 per cent per annum. The total deposit of urban 
cooperative banks in Gujarat is more than 1 2000,crores at the end of the 
year 2004-2005.  
 
•  Credit Deployment :  
 
The loan and advances granted by UCBs in the Gujatat state have also 
shown increase outstandingly in absolute terms, but the growth rate of 
credit deployment has shown declining trend. The credit deposit ratio 
(CD ratio) of urban cooperative banks in the state accounted around 60 
per cent in the year 2000-2001 and 55 % up to 2004-05. The main reason 
for declining of credit deposit ratio of urban cooperative banks was, the 
lack of proper planning of asset and liabilities management of the banks.  
 
It is revealed that the major component of the loans outstanding of urban 
cooperative banks in the state diverted to industries and trading /business 
activities. These two sectors combine constituted more than 80 per cent of 
total loans granted by UCBs. The small-scale industries accounted for 
60.54 per cent, and trading and business activities accounted 20.20 per 
cent of total loans in 2004-2005 compared to 51.34 per cent and 32.81 per 
cent, respectively in 2000-2001.  
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It is also found that the urban banks in different regions have concentrate 
their advances in particular type of business, according to the types of 
businesses exist in the particular area. For instance the urban cooperative 
banks in South Gujarat region granted more than 80 per cent of their 
loans to the small-scale industries, whereas the loans portfolio of the 
urban cooperative banks in Saurashtra region was abundantly dominated 
by trading and small business activities. It is also found that, some of the 
sectors like activities allied to agriculture, education and consumption 
etc., are almost neglected by all the urban banks in the state.  
 
Recovery Performance:  
 
The recovery management of urban cooperative banks has made 
significant improvement. It is found that the overdues of urban 
cooperative banks in the state came down from 11.30 per cent in 1998-99 
to 7.14 per cent in 2002-03. It is noteworthy that the recovery 
performance of Priority and Weaker Sector advances are better than the 
Non-Priority sector.  
 
Strategies for an Effective Governance and Regulations  
 
The urban cooperative banks in the state have registered incredible 
progress in resource mobilization, credit deployment, recovery of loans, 
and more importantly augment in faith during the  
past, but currently these bank are on the mark of suspect and turn down 
due to the environmental and regulatory factors created by global market 
forces. The failing of several UCBs including Madhavpupra Urban 
Cooperative Bank and others have shored up the mistrust and challenge 
of subsistence for the UCBs in the state. The emerging trends are both 
challenges and opportunities. The UCBs have to rise up to the occasion, 
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innovate and cope with the emerging trends and challenging 
opportunities. To cope with the emerging situation of crises and 
challenges the UCBs must formulate the appropriate strategies. Some of 
the imperative strategies are suggested as under.  
 
Environmental Scanning  
 
The UCBs should know who are there present and potential customers. 
What are they? What are their saving and spending patterns? What are 
there needs for credit and banking ;‗ services? This information input is a 
basic requirement for innovation and planning. The UCBs should make a 
survey in their area of operation and build up family profiles. These 
profiles will form the database for identifying potential lines of business 
developing appropriate new schemes and designing the required market 
strategy. At periodical intervals the family profiles should updated.  
For more transparency in MIS, urban cooperative banks should collect 
and maintain the detailed records of all their market segments ( i.e. 
depositors / borrowers, sr. citizens, women, professionals, commercial 
organizations, business houses, industries, etc). This will help the urban 
cooperative banks in designing new products/ schemes according to the 
requirements of the existing and potential customers. It will also facilitate 
them for future planning and forecasting.  
 
Membership Coverage  
 
Presently most of the UCBs are reluctant to increase their membership 
due to some extravagant reasons. However, there is no need to offer 
permanent membership to the beneficiary for availing the benefits from 
urban banks, but for strengthening the integrity of customers with urban 
banks these banks must try to increase the membership. Moreover, the 
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UCBs being cooperatives In nature should bring into their membership 
fold all families, which may need their services. This should be one of 
their thrust areas of strategic planning. 
 
Marketing Approach 
 
Even though the most the commercial banks and all the new entrants 
banks are emerging as customers center, most of the UCBs operate in 
traditional way with old and incredibly restricted schemes of deposits, 
loans and other services. The urban banks in the Gujarat State must 
realize the need for adopting marketing approach and segment their target 
markets Into specific categories according to the socioeconomic 
background of the households in their area of operation. Market 
segmentation is an integral part of the marketing strategy; it provides the 
basis for differentiating the customers‘ needs and planning to meet those 
needs satisfactorily. The pattern of banking services to be marketed 
should be need-specific, and oriented to the specific social and economic 
needs of the various categories of the customers. The urban banks should 
organize the systematic customers awareness campaigns, initiate other 
promotional activities, and make them aware about the banking services.  
 
 
Innovative Banking  
 
Analyzing the emerging needs of the households in the area of operation 
of UCBs, and the characteristics of the various market segments, novel 
schemes of loan, advances and other services may be designed for 
meeting the identified needs. The schemes may include (a) special 
schemes of deposits, advances and other specialized services for ladies, 
senior citizens, students; professionals etc. (b) value addition in existing 
schemes and services; (C) loans for agriculture and activities allied to 
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agriculture (d) dealing with foreign exchange, investment banking and 
stock exchange business. These type of term services not only assist the 
banks but also help the customers and in turn contribute to the 
development of equipment manufacturing industries, marketing and 
consumer durable industries.  
 
Portfolio Management  
 
It is another growing line of new business. in the present epoch of 
sluggish industrial sector, crises and suspicion in investment 
opportunities, the customers particularly In urban areas need proper 
advice and assistance for buying and selling their securities. The urban 
banks may undertake portfolio management for individual customers, 
charging them a fix fee for these services.  
 
Consolidation  
 
Small unitary banks may find it difficult to cope with emerging trends. 
Hence it is desirable for small urban banks in a city to merge and 
integrate into one or two big banks with branches spread over the city. It 
is also possible that the urban banks located in different places can start 
special types of services jointly like credit card, debit card, portfolio 
management, forex business etc.  
 
For balancing the imbalance of funds of urban cooperative banks, it is 
suggested that Apex urban cooperative banks at the state level in the 
state, which have a network of urban cooperative banks and an All India 
Bank of the urban cooperative banks should be set-up. This will not only 
provide the much needed organizational and financial collaboration and 
solidarity amongst the urban cooperative credit institutions but also act as 
the fund balancing center of urban cooperative bank at the national level.  
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The urban cooperative banks must expand their branch network in the 
other parts of the state, particularly in unbanked area and upgrade 
themselves with all the latest technology to render prom and efficient 
service to their clients.  
 
Professional Management  
 
Innovative banking, development of new schemes, and the management 
of new lines of business call for well educated and trained managers and 
supporting personnel. Proper recruitment , placement and working 
conditions including facilities and motivational factors help the personal 
to work effectively. Training is essential for all the personnel to update 
themselves with the latest developments in respective fields, develop 
expertise to manage the new banking services prudently and efficiently. 
The training needs and the manpower needs may be identified and the 
need based training and executive development programme may be 
identified and the need-based training and executive development 
programme may be launched by the federation of urban coop. Banks in 
collaboration with the training institutes, like VMNICOM, Pune, NICM, 
Gandhinagar etc.  
 
Monitoring and Control  
 
Every urban cooperative bank should prepare a business development 
plan through participation of its members based on its inputs, potentially 
of business and with a major thrust to the priority sector lending. While 
preparing their credit plans for their branches, the urban cooperative 
banks should make adequate and proportionate credit provisions for 
different sectors, such as allied agricultural activities, small scale 
industries, trading activities, etc.  
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There should be a strict monitoring of its performance by an independent 
committee. If any performance gap arises, then a reporting variance 
should - monitored to remove the performance gap.  
 
Regulatory Reforms  
 
The UCBs should be allowed to open deposit accounts of educational 
institutions, public undertaking, panchayats, municipal authorities etc. 
This will help the urban banks to mobilize more resource and also to the 
depositors in getting a higher rate of interest on their deposits.  
The role, responsibility and accountability of the directors of UCBs must 
be redefined in the cooperative societies act and the system should be 
introduced to monitor the role of directors.  
 
All UCBs should be permitted to deal in Foreign Exchange, to float 
Mutual Fund Schemes and Inter-bank participation certificates schemes, 
Merchant Banking and Stock Invest Scheme etc.  
 
The existing mechanism provided in the Gujarat State Cooperative 
Societies Act is not functioning effectively due to operational delays 
involved. The commercial banks enjoy the benefit of Debt. Recovery Act 
for speedy disposal of recovery cases. It is also to be noted that the 
recovery system in Maharashtra state is working effectively, where there 
is an independent quasi-judicial machinery parallel to the cooperative 
courts presided over by the officers of the Registrar of Cooperative 
Societies, who work in associate with state federation. Hence, It is 
suggested that the UCBs In Gujarat should adopt the Maharashtra Pattern 
of debt. recovery.  
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The working of the urban cooperative banks would need to be 
strengthened by undertaking legal reforms, which encompass change In 
the existing Gujarat State Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, and 
introduction of new enactments. At the national level also there is a need 
to modify the Banking Regulation Act and other related laws so that the 
UCBs can function freely as other commercial banks. The Debt. 
Recovery Tribunal should be set up at the state level especially for the 
cooperative banks. In addition to the section 159 of Gujarat State 
Cooperative Societies Act for recovery, the securitisation act also may 
strictly be followed by the UCBs so that recovery process may help the 
bank to regain the public confidence.  
 
The policy makers as well as bankers should not intensify themselves on 
target oriented lending on quantitative manner. The role of the UCBs in 
financing the priority and weaker sectors should also be evaluated as per 
cooperative principles and values followed by them.  
 
Yield Planning  
 
The urban cooperative banks in the state have to step up their non-interest 
income (Nil) and reduce their non-interest expenses (NIE). This will 
correspondingly reduce the non-interest load (NIL). So, these banks 
should develop a new package of incentive oriented and economically 
viable schemes to increase their non-interest incomes (Nil). At the same 
time, these urban cooperative banks‘ .) personnel should become cost and 
productivity conscious. For the same, each urban cooperative bank should 
evolve a time bound result oriented monitoring mechanism of controlling 
the non-interest expenses. Thus, increasing interest surplus and reducing 
the non-interest load can enhance the profitability of the urban 
cooperative banks.  
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The UCBs, particularly in South Gujarat region must try to diversify the 
lending portfolio in different sectors, whereas, the urban cooperative 
banks in Saurashtra region must reduce their non interest expenses and 
also try to recover their overdue as early as possible.  
 
The urban banks in the state must try to increase their non-fund based 
(fee based) services and generate more non-interest income. The 
composition of deposit mix should be changed are these banks must try to 
increase the share of low cost deposits (i.e. current and saving deposits). 
So as to enable them to increase interest surplus, profit margin and 
profitability.  
 
Building of Public Confidence:  
 
The bankers and Cooperative leaders should decide the strategies to re 
gain the public confidence, by organizing campaigns, seminars, workshop 
and positive publicity and highlight the achievements, values and ethics 
of the cooperative sector in general and urban cooperative banks in 
particular. This Is the most needed input for the cooperative banks than 
any others. 
 
Growth And Development Of the UCB  in Gujarat. 
 
Gujarat holds second position in the development of the UCBs in India 
and is known as the ―Mother Land‖ of the co-operative as the first co-
operative body of India was formed in 1889 in Baroda named 
―ANYONYA SAHKARI MANDLI ‖  Similarly the first registered UCBs 
of India named  ―THE SURAT PEOPLE‘S CO-OPERATIVE BANK 
LTD.‖ was established in Surat city of Gujarat on March 1922. That was 
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the dawn of Co-operative banking. Inspired by the success of this bank, 
similar UCBs developed very fast in other parts of Gujarat state By the 
year Ended 31st March 2004, out of 2105 UCBs of India 351 UCBs alone 
provided service in Gujarat having network of about 736 branches spread 
over 18 district of the state. The progress of the UCBs in Gujarat is 
shown by the following table. 
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Table 2.2 
Progress of the UCBs in Gujarat (Rs in Crores) 
 
   30/06/2002 31/03/2003 31/03/2004 31/03/2005 31/03/2006 31/03/2007 31/03/2008 
1 No of Banks 321 330 341 350 351 351 351 
 Index 100 103 107 109 110 110 110 
2 No. of Branches 615 708 728 800 762 779 736 
 Index 100 115 118 130 124 127 120 
3 Deposits 9948 13276 16703 17791 16506 16345 15894 
 Index 100 133 168 179 166 164 160 
4 Share Capital 251 304 363 418 436 451 425 
 Index 100 121 145 167 174 180 169 
5 Reserves 1486 1832 2271 2487 2968 3332 5053 
 Index 100 123 153 167 200 224 340 
6 Working Capital 13179 17218 21110 23520 21633 22833 22087 
 Index 100 131 160 178 164 173 168 
7 Advances 6623 8446 10468 11864 11004 11304 9825 
 Index 100 128 158 179 166 171 148 
8 Profit 221 238 294 273 241 213 201 
 Index 100 108 133 124 109 96 91 
9 No. of Members 2812687 2998011 3242829 3303662 3245699 3321357 3251276 
  100 107 115 117 115 118 116 
10 No.of  Depositors N.A 9746161 11009558 11634435 10998814 10641234 1028765
0 
11 No. of  orrowers N.A 926804 997619 1091005 100603 935198 804860 
12 No. of Staff  
Members 
N.A 16457 17393 17473 17190 16692 15538 
 
Source :- 
1   Gujarat-Operative Banks Federation (Seminar Books). 
2.  Base  year 1998  
 
It is apparent from the table 2.2 that UCBs in Gujarat have recorded 
commendable  achievement in the banking sectors There are 51 Schedule 
UCBs by the end of March 2007, 11 of them were registered in Gujarat it 
self having deposits of more than 100 crores. 
   
In addition 18 Mahila UCBs were worked in the year ended 31st March 
2004 and 19 Mahila UCBs are working in the year ended 31st March 2008 
by only women. 
   
But at the same time the development of the UCBs also marked regional 
imbalance in Gujarat out of 351 UCBs about 195 UCBs are located in 
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four  district and 92 UCBs are located in five district while only 64 UCBs 
are located in remaining district further more 245 UCBs are located in 
only 6 district. These are Ahmedabad, Kheda, Baroda, Mehsana, Surat 
and Panchmahal. Details are shown in the table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 
District -wise Statistical Data of Urban Co-operative Banks as on 31-3-08  
(Rs. In lakhs ) 
District 
Total 
Banks 
Paid-up 
Share 
Capital 
Deposits 
Reserve 
& Others 
Funds 
Advances Invest Working Profits No.of No.of No.of No.of N o.of Reporting 
      ments Capital  Members Depositors Borrowers Staff Branches Banks 
               
               
Ahmedabad 74 11123.5 498354.39 280636.93 377942.11 231582.12 742458.15 5059.21 583421 2447335 173112 4201 245 63 
Kheda 48 2464.65 98323.77 29851.95 61168.6 52871.52 146100.18 601.07 310679 821657 68781 1062 24 43 
Baroda 38 3688.59 115188.68 23269.92 74931.3 54124.81 138743.9 1454.73 340653 970257 85602 1437 79 33 
Mehsana 35 5129.2 147623.92 24880.46 87270.05 85765.21 199455.33 1683.03 302864 1138317 64092 1268 79 33 
Surat 30 6429.90 232327.79 44982.71 115365.53 146223.24 307250.58 4514.72 323027 1263208 70091 2276 95 28 
Panchmahal 20 1836.64 47245.21 8265.88 25470.44 28893.12 66562.33 430.85 147255 424260 45203 487 12 18 
Sabarkantha 16 802.7 33746.04 6329.43 18160.75 20577.97 44908.77 535.26 115165 382317 33692 419 9 15 
Bhavnagar 13 1488.51 42593.14 10040.46 24178.35 19079.58 65656.99 523.78 118493 428646 44956 511 14 11 
Rajkot 13 2935.34 177656.83 38962.21 96101.84 92084.7 233353.97 2212.23 392841 979400 68866 1181 60 13 
Junagadh 10 701.11 18020.28 2831.58 9981.11 10510.98 22444.67 177.1 114725 147579 18875 332 8 10 
Bharuch 10 757.81 25505.73 4737.61 14495.08 8653.04 36025.09 241.8 80188 181475 19108 414 25 8 
Banaskantha 9 428.87 15893.86 2493.33 9688.73 8797.71 22319.87 110.88 42823 185767 18418 297 17 9 
Amreli 7 379.61 7208.92 1452.32 4563.13 4487.65 10108.58 116.03 25748 52295 20010 124 0 7 
Surendranagar 6 793.41 24578.55 4376.21 13593.16 10514.89 31809.54 134.19 128783 204135 20890 410 14 6 
Jamnagar 6 599.78 27602.66 6734.8 10799.43 17711.63 37563.76 680.49 36376 156848 10826 328 17 6 
Kutch 6 1239.76 31747.48 5798.12 15344.8 19736.9 41569.14 1037.56 30459 133820 12415 235 10 6 
Valsad 5 1203.58 37501.43 7778.36 19202.08 17565.35 50342.77 437.05 109330 278429 25525 411 23 5 
Gandhinagar 5 485.92 8256.69 1817.54 4280.87 6596.17 12020.82 145.92 48446 91905 4398 145 5 5 
               
Total 351 42488.88 1589375.37 505239.82 982537.36 835776.59 2208694.44 20095.9 3251276 10287650 804860 15538 736 319 
Source:- Statistitcal hand book- 2008  No.10 and 11. 
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Role of the UCBs in the Indian Banking System:-           
 
The performance of the co-operative banking sector as a whole has attracted 
attention in recent year. Today they have become an important constituent of 
the Indian financial system and cover a large segment of society because of 
their prompt and personalized service. They take the responsibility of 
covering the unmonitored sector neglected by commercial banks and most 
priority is given by UCBS to small and medium enterprise UCBs provide 
service with no bars of caste religion etc. and thus spread the feeling of 
―Unity of diversity‖. Some UCBs operate beyond their state of registration 
and are governed by the Multi state Co-operative Act 1984. They are not 
responsible only to employees and societies. The UCBs bears some 
responsibility in the following ways. 
 
A. Service on Behalf of Customers:-    
1. Provide facility regarding opening current, saving and fixed deposit 
accounts and collect deposits. 
2. Issue draft, letter of credit and discount bill on a low rate of commission. 
3. Provide services of automatic teller machine mobile banking and 
depository participants and do immediate transfer of money.  
4. Computerized bank passbook issued to customers.   
5. Received complaint of customers and solve it as early as possible    
6. Provide self deposit vault facilities 
7. Advances are given to small scale and medium enterprise and cottage 
industries. 
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8. Advances against properties, jewelry, govt. securities, life policy and new 
or old vehicles. 
B. Service on Behalf of Employees :- 
 
1. Provide medical facilities and educational facilities. 
2. Provide various types of allowances. 
3. Maintain various types of funds like staff provident fund bonus fund etc. 
4. Conduct training programs for new employees and refresher programs 
for old employees and organize a seminar and the conferences to update 
their knowledge. 
5. Special education reward is given to employees children for highest 
percentage. 
 
C. On Behalf of Society :-  
 
1. Provide donation to educational institutions charitable institutions and 
hospitals etc. 
2. Advances to the weaker sections of the societies to be self -sufficient. 
3. Helping to the people at the time of natural calamity like earthquake, 
flood, drought. 
4. Sustain and generate gainful employment. 
5. Equal distribution of credit structure by branch expansion particularly in 
areas which are not covered by the banking system. 
 
 
Evaluation Of The Role Of The UCBS :- 
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It can be said that because of their noble objectives; functions and 
philanthropic attitude towards clients and society, the UCBs in spite of being 
a small segment of the co-operative banking sector, have proved themselves 
a vital role of the Indian banking system. The committee on co-operative 
movement appointed by the Government of Tamil Nadu in February, 1968, 
under the chairmanship of Shri K. Santhanam –has made the following 
observation: 
   
―The non agricultural credit societies have been significantly successful in 
attracting deposits and promoting thrift............This sector of the movement 
has grown voluntarily without special encouragement from the state.   The 
urban banks in the state have recorded a steady progress over the years. As 
observed by the co-operative planning committee (1946), urban banks have 
proved to be the best suited agencies for which joint stock banks are not 
generally interested.‖ 
   
Thus it can be stated that though organized on a small scale primarily to 
meet the need of the poor or weaker sections of society, the urban banks 
have proved that they occupy a key position in semi-urban and urban areas 
so far as the national banking structure is concerned.     
   
Problems & Prospccts Of UCBs :- 
 
UCBs were setup with the objective of promoting saving habits amongst the 
middle-income group of the urban population 2004 is golden jubilee of 
urban co-operative banks celebrated by govt. of Gujarat. During the 100 
years of their inception they have attracted considerable attention and large 
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number of them has shown creditable performance but fair number of them 
have simultaneously shown discernible signs of weakness too because of the 
problems they could not overcame some important factors,  
Which are barriers to the progress of the UCBs are as given below. 
 
1. Dual Control :- A major problem faced by UCBs is the duality of 
control by the State Government and the RBI. The UCBs are supervised 
by RBI and also issued for license while regarding administrations like, 
registration, administration constitution and administration and selection 
etc. This had negative impact on the functioning of the UCBs. Duality in 
command hampers effective supervision. The Narsimhan committee 
suggests removing dual control system which is affected to UCBs. High 
power Committee also. 
 
2. Limited Area of Operations :- The UCBs have to function within 
restricted framework in the context of mobilization of deposits. The need 
for heavy industrial advances and trade finance for industrial units as 
well as for commercial enterprises is here but the UCBs are not able to 
meet with it is they have to serve as per the RBI directives.  But to 
survive in the competitive world the UCBs should enhance their area of 
operation and start providing loans as per local needs. 
 
3. Violation of Prudential Financial Norms :- It is found that many UCBs 
Violate norms governing advances. Top officials of the banks receive 
loans without documents. The failure of Visangar Co-operative Bank 
(Mehsana) and Madhavpura Mercantile Co-operative Bank (A‘bad) are 
the example of violation of prudential norms. The UCBs must adopt a 
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system of internal audit and inspection of branches and department, the 
RBI should follow strict supervision and to stop such malpractices. 
 
4. Poor Management : - The necessity of the financial institution has a 
good corporate financial management and articles. The Madhavrav 
committee insisted to appoint two directors who are professional or 
experience persons. But in UCBs directors are politician or illiterate. Due 
to this reasons management of the UCBs are poor. The RBI advise to 
directors about it by letter dated 05-04-2002  
 
5. Poor Quality Services : -The services of the UCBs are not significant 
enough in terms of quality and have failed to attract deposits from 
individuals and institutions other than the co-operative sectors. Hence 
they should try to improve the quality of services by providing required 
facilities like waiting space; customer information counter,  complain 
box, banking information chart, easy accessibility  to higher  officials at 
the banking promises ect. At the same time they should maintain good 
customer relations and keep positive attitude towards customer. Besides 
this; they should start providing door to door services. 
 
6. Lack of Modernization :- In today‘s world of technological 
advancement, still manual form of work followed in some of the UCBs 
which cause delay and increase operational cost. Most of the UCBs failed 
to provide service through use of modern technology except some UCBs. 
It has become inevitable now on part of the UCBs to have computerized 
system of banking and adopt latest banking technique like ATM, Credit 
Card, Internet Banking, Branch Banking, Tele Banking etc. 
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7. Increasing Overdoes : - The UCBs suffer from dangerously. Low or 
weak quality of loans assets and highly unsatisfactory recovery of loans, 
which enhance the proportion of overdue. Due to this situation, UCBs 
must have to develop a separate recovery department for quick 
recoveries. 
 
8. Political Interference :- Political interference in affairs of the UCBs 
leads to faulty lending and poor recovery. It compels, to pressure on the 
banks to provide loan to parties whose repaying capacity is doubtful. 
Visanagar co-operative bank is a example of this situation. Though banks 
take to legal action against the defaulter it often interferes by putting an 
end or postponing such an action. Hence political interferes is damage to 
UCBs administration. 
 
9. Staff Problems and prospects :-The UCBs have not trained and 
professional staff. The UCBs do not select staff on professional basis. 
External pressures are a cause of untrained and low standard staff which 
directly affect on quality work. At least appointment of chief executive 
officer ( like Manager or Managing director) should be made on 
professional lines and provide training to untrained or fresh staff 
members or employees.  
 
10.  Some Other Problems of UCBs are as under : - 
 
I. Low capital adequacy ratio etc. 
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II.  Lack of transparency in financial statement. 
III.  The Balance sheet of most of UCBs are not finalized in time due to 
non-completion of audit purpose. 
IV.  Lack of planning and co-ordination. 
V.   Lack of standardization in data reported by ratio etc. 
UCBS – Recent Regulatory Measures : -   
 
The schedule and other similar UCBs have increased the need for a greater 
role of the RBI as a regulator of the UCBs. Hence, the RBI has announced a 
series of measures for the UCBs by day to day relating to monetary and 
credit policy statement. The salient feature of these measures of this 
regulation of UCBs is as under. 
I. Lending Stock Market : - 
 
The RBI had put restriction on lending by the UCBs against security of 
stocks. The UCBs have been advised to unwind existing lending to 
stockbrokers or direct investment in shares on contracted dates. 
II. Inter UCBs Term Deposits: - 
     
The UCBSs were advised not to increase their deposits with other UCBs and 
ordered to unwind the outstanding deposits with other UCBs as on 14th April 
2001 before ended of june 2002. However shri Anant Giti committee the 
schedule UCB accepts deposit from non schedule UCBs.  The RBI imposed 
some condition regarding it by circular date 17th 2003. 
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III. Gold Loans and Small Loans: - 
 
Gold loans and small loans up to Rs. 100000.00 given by primary Urban Co-
operative Banks will no more be exempted from the 90 day NPA norms. The 
RBI recently issued a notification for chief executive officers (CEOS) of all 
primary UCBs stating that it has been decided that 90 day loan impairment 
norm will be applicable even in case of gold loans and small loans up to 
Rs.100000.00 In May 2003 RBI said to CEOS of all primary UCBs to 
classify an assets as non-performing if the interest and/or of installment of 
principal amounts remain overdue for period of more than 90 days, with 
effect from March 31, 2004. 
IV. Maintenance of Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) :- 
 
The UCBs are required to maintain their statutory liquidity ratio equivalent 
to 25% of net Demand and Time Liabilities. (NDTL) They can maintain it in 
the form of investments in government and other approved securities or as 
deposits with State Co-operative or Central Co-operative Banks. But with 
effect from April 01,2003 all scheduled UCBs would need to maintain their 
entire SLR investment of 25% of NDTL only in government and other 
approved securities and that compliance with cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) 
requirements on par with scheduled commercial Banks would be prescribed 
in due course. 
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V. Capital Adequacy Norms: - 
   
The concept of capital to risk assets ratio (CRA) or capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) has been made applicable on urban co-operative banks wide effect 
from 31-03-2002. The RBI accepted the recommendation made by High 
power Committee (HPC) in this regard and decided to implement (CAR) 
norms to urban co-operative banks in a phased manner wide effect from 31st 
March, 2002 over a period of three years as indicated below. 
 
As on Scheduled with Co-operative 
banks 
Non – Scheduled          
Urban   Co-op. Bank 
31-03-02 8% 6% 
31-03-03 9% 7% 
31.03-04 As applicable to commercial 
banks 
9% 
31-03-05 As applicable to commercial 
banks 
As applicable to commercial 
banks 
 
 
VI. New Grades System :- 
 
The Reserve Bank of India vide its circular dated 5th April, 2003 introduced 
new system of awarding grade to UCBs  i.e. Grade I,II,III,& IV and 
dispensed with earlier nomenclature of classifying UCBs a weak and sick 
bank. These grades are to be awarded by RBI based on the review carried 
through statutory returns/ statements submitted by urban co-operative banks 
or statutory inspections scrutiny of books of accounts of UCBs conduct 
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 Future Of The UCBSS :- 
 
Looking at the progress of the UCBs it can be said that they have expended 
by leaps and Bounds and increased their business over the last few decades. 
A walk down the streets of Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Hyderbad, Surat etc. 
reveals how widely they have spread their tentacle across the nation. Every 
nook and corner displays the hoarding of the office of one or the other UCB 
. But an increasing number of failures of the UCBs have spolied the image 
of the UCBs and shaken the faith of their depositors and investors. The scam 
of Madhapura Mercantile Co-operative Bank (MMCB) of Ahmedabad, 
Krushi Co-operative Bank of Hyderbad and Visanagar Nagrik Sahkari Bank 
(Mehsana Dist.) have brought into the fact that loopholes exist within the 
banking system itself and the RBI failed to perform its duties as a banking 
regulators. In the case of Krushi bank ,it was found that the Chairman and 
the Vice Chairman got loans from the bank without any collateral and the 
funds were siphoned off for other purposes. Similarly in MMCB lending 
norms were violated and crores of rupees were given to Mr. Ketan Parekh 
violating norms of the bank. In case of Visangar Sahakari Bank, it was found 
that the chairman and his relatives got loans from bank without any proper 
documents and guarantors.  Free entry of private financial institutions has 
also led to a threat to their existence. In spite of these problems, with regard 
to the future of these banks it can be said that the UCBs will continue to be 
promoters of mass banking as distinguished form class banking usually 
practiced by commercial banks. The future of UCBs is much better due to 
their numerous distinctive such as- 
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(a) Close familiarity with the members 
(b) Local feel 
(c) Democratic management 
(d) Personalized service  
(e) Compactness in the area of operation  
(f) Close supervision over the end use of credit 
(g) Prompt recovery of dues from member borrowers. 
 
But both the RBI and the UCBs should try to maintain this distinctive 
identity of the UCBs and take care to waive scandals or scams. In order to 
achieve this goal, the RBI should take measures to strengthen the regulatory 
frame work for the co-operative sector, lay down clear cut guidelines for 
their management structure and should enforce further prudential standards 
in respect of access to uncollateralized funds and lending against volatile 
assets. Simultaneously, the UCBs should try to complete with private 
financial institutions and commercial banks within their limits. Their main 
inclination should be towards customer‘s satisfaction. They should introduce 
a ―Customer Day‖ on which customer‘s can meet and discuss with the Board 
of Directors their problems. They should also try to reach to the customers 
by providing door-to-door services. They should open a separate wing for 
publicity and advertisement of existing well as new schemes of deposits 
loans and other services provided by them. Simultaneously they should try 
to enhance their deposits and advances by providing quality services. For 
enhancing deposits, they should introduce children savings and youth 
savings centers in schools and colleges respectively and provide knowledge 
about the benefit of savings. All UCBs should introduce mobile vans for 
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handicapped and illiterate people. Similarly for enhancing advances, they 
should do market research and start loaning according to the local needs; 
keep less margin of profit on advances; provide a guideline about the 
procedure of advances to the general public so that they would not procedure 
of advancing loans; etc.. Such comprehensive attempts will help the UCBs 
in enhancing the banking business in limited areas only. 
   
In short, the UCBs must come into their own to take the future head on. It‘s 
time for them to think strategically and focus on the opportunities in terms of 
market, products and customers. It requires a vision about which their future 
customers are going to be what they will need; who their competitors will be 
and what their disadvantages mean for the UCBs; etc. They should be ready 
to make changes in their policy as per the demands and competition. They 
should consider diversification of business product and must upgrade their 
skills and technology to provide efficient and affordable services. At evolve 
a systematic approach towards human resource development in many areas 
like manpower planning, recruitment, placement and leadership 
development for motivating staff and increasing productivity. In short UCBs 
should pay attention to human resources development and evolve a 
systematic approach toward human resource development in many areas. 
They should focus on the opportunities in terms of market, products and 
customers. They also focus on need of customers should be removed 
disadvantages of management and administration.      
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Introduction 
 
Currently, the way in which companies are managed and controlled in India is 
intensely being scrutinized consequently pushing the subject of corporate 
governance to the top of the agenda. The focus on corporate governance is 
particularly crucial in financial services and, most of all, in the banking sector 
since this sector has lately become highly exposed to public scrutiny and has 
learned, in a costly manner, the risk of attracting adverse publicity through 
failings in governance and stakeholder relationships 
 
Corporate governance is a crucial issue for the management of banks which 
should be looked at from two dimensions, that is their funding and, often, 
ownership of other companies as these make them a significant stakeholder in 
their own right. Research and Markets a renowned industry and market research 
organization, observed that governance in banks is a considerably more 
complex issue than in other sectors since banks will attempt to comply with the 
same codes of good governance as other companies but, in addition, factors like 
risk management, capital adequacy and funding, internal control and 
compliance all have an impact on their matrix of governance. 
 
Literature Review: 
According to the Financial Stability Forum (2001), among the main factors the 
support the stability of any country‘s financial system include: 
 
 good corporate governance 
 effective marketing discipline, 
 strong prudential regulation and supervision, 
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 accurate and reliable accounting in financial reporting systems, 
 a sound disclosure regimes, 
 the enforcement of effective laws, 
 an appropriate savings deposit protection system. 
 
Of particular interest to this study is corporate governance. Corporate 
governance has been looked at and defined variedly by different scholars and 
practitioners, however they all have pointed to the same end hence giving more 
of a consensus in the definition. For example, the Financial Times (1997) 
defines corporate governance as the relationship of the enterprise to 
shareholders or in the wider sense as the relationship of the enterprise to society 
as a whole, however, the Financial Stability Forum (2001) offers a definition 
with a wider outlook and contends that it means the sum of the processes, 
structures and information used for the directing and overseeing the 
management of an organization. The OECD on the one hand, has defined 
corporate governance as a system on the basis of which business companies are 
directed and managed. It is upon this system that specifications are given for the 
division of competencies and responsibilities between individual included 
parties, such as the board of directors, the supervisory board, the management 
and majority and other shareholders and formulates rules and procedures for 
adopting decisions on corporate matters. 
 
In another perspective, Arun and Turner (2002f) contend that there exist a 
narrow approach to corporate governance which views the subject as the 
mechanism through which shareholders are assured that managers will act in 
their interests. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Vives (2000) and Oman 
(2001) observe that  there is a broader approach which views the subject as the 
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methods by which suppliers of finance control managers in order to ensure that 
their capital cannot be expropriated and that they earn a return on their 
investment.  There is a consensus, however that the broader view  of corporate 
governance should be adopted in the case of banking institutions because of the 
peculiar contractual form of banking which demands that corporate governance 
mechanisms for banks should encapsulate depositors as well as shareholders 
(Macey and O‘Hara (2001)). Arun and Turner (2002e) joins the consensus by 
arguing that the special nature of banking requires not only a broader view of 
corporate governance, but also government intervention in order to restrain the 
behaviour of bank management. They argue further that the unique nature of the 
banking firm, whether in the developed or developing world, requires that a 
broad view of corporate governance, which encapsulates both shareholders and 
depositors, be adopted for banks. They posit that, in particular, the nature of the 
banking firm is such that regulation is necessary to protect depositors as well as 
the overall financial system. 
 
This study therefore adopts the broader view and defines corporate governance 
(in the context of banking) as: 
 
The manner in which systems, procedures, processes 
and practices of a bank  are managed so as to allow 
positive relationships and the exercise of power in 
the management of assets and resources with an aim 
of advancing shareholder value and shareholder 
satisfaction together with improved accountability, 
resource use and transparent administration. 
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) state that from a banking 
industry perspective, corporate governance involves the manner in which the 
business and affairs of individual institutions are governed by their boards of 
directors and senior management, affecting how banks: 
 
i. set corporate objectives (including generating economic returns to 
owners); 
ii. run the day-to-day operations of the business; 
iii. consider the interest of recognised stakeholders; 
iv. align corporate activities and behaviours with the expectation that 
banks will operate in safe and sound manner, and in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations; and, 
v. protect the interests of depositors. 
 
The Committee further enumerates basic components of good corporate 
governance to include: 
a) the corporate values, codes of conduct and other standards of appropriate 
behaviour and the system used to ensure compliance with them; 
b) a well articulated corporate strategy against which the success of the 
overall enterprise and the contribution of individuals can be measured; 
c) the clear assignment of responsibilities and decision making authorities, 
incorporating hierarchy of required approvals from individuals to the 
board of directors; 
d) establishment of mechanisms for the interaction and cooperation among 
the board of directors, senior management and auditors; 
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e) strong internal control systems, including internal and external audit 
functions, risk management functions independent of business lines and 
other checks and balances; 
f) special monitoring of risk exposures where conflict of interests are likely 
to be particularly great, including business relationships with borrowers 
affiliated with the bank, large shareholders, senior management or key 
decisions makers within the firm (e.g. traders); 
g) the financial and managerial incentives to act in an appropriate manner, 
offered to senior management, business line management and employees 
in the form of compensation, promotion and other recognition; 
h) appropriate information flows internally and to the public. 
 
On a theoretical perspective corporate governance has been seen as an 
economic discipline which examines how to achieve an increase in the 
effectiveness of certain corporation with the help of organisational 
arrangements, contracts, organizational regulations and business legislation. It 
is not a disputed fact that banks are crucial element to any economy this 
therefore, demands that they have strong and good corporate governance if their 
positive effects were to be achieved. 
 
King and Levine (1993a and b) and Levine (1997) emphasize the importance of 
corporate governance of banks in developing economies and observe that the 
importance is because: 
 
 First, banks have an overwhelmingly dominant position in developing-
economy financial systems, and are extremely important engines of 
economic growth.  
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 Second, as financial markets are usually underdeveloped, banks in 
developing economies are typically the most important source of finance 
for the majority of firms.  
 Third, as well as providing a generally accepted means of payment, banks 
in developing countries are usually the main depository for the 
economy‘s savings.  
 
 Fourth, many developing economies have recently liberalized their 
banking systems through privatization/disinvestments and reducing the 
role of economic regulation. Consequently, managers of banks in these 
economies have obtained greater freedom in how they run their banks. 
 
Banking supervision cannot function if there does not exist what Hetteš (2002) 
calls ―correct corporate governance‖ since experience emphasizes the need for 
an appropriate level of responsibility, control and balance of competences in 
each bank. Hetteš  expounds further on this by observing that correct corporate 
governance simplifies the work of banking supervision and contributes towards 
corporation between the management of a bank and the banking supervision 
authority.  
 
Crespi et al (2002) contend that corporate governance of banks refers to the 
various methods by which bank owners attempt to induce managers to 
implement value-maximizing policies. They observe that these methods may be 
external to the firm, as the market for corporate control or the level of 
competition in the product and labor markets and that there are also internal 
mechanisms such as a disciplinary intervention by 
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shareholders (what they refer to as proxy fights) or intervention from the board 
of directors.  
 
Donald Brash the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand when 
addressing the Conference for Commonwealth Central Banks on Corporate 
Governance for the Banking Sector in London, June 2001 observed that: 
 
“… improving corporate governance is an important way to 
promote financial stability. The effectiveness of a bank’s 
internal governance arrangements has a very substantial 
effect on the ability of a bank to identify, monitor and control 
its risks. Although banking crises are caused by many factors, 
some of which are beyond the control of bank management, 
almost every bank failure is at least partially the result of 
poor risk management within the bank itself. And poor risk 
management is ultimately a failure of internal governance. 
Although banking supervision and the regulation of banks’ 
risk positions can go some way towards countering the effects 
of poor governance, supervision by some external official 
agency is not a substitute for sound corporate governance 
practices. Ultimately, banking system risks are most likely to 
be reduced to acceptable levels by fostering sound risk 
management practices within individual banks. Instilling 
sound corporate governance practices within banks is a 
crucial element of achieving this.”  
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David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 
observed in 2000 that: 
“Corporate governance is of course not just important for 
banks. It is something that needs to be addressed in relation 
to all companies … I do however believe that sound corporate 
governance is particularly important for banks. The rapid 
changes brought about by globalization, deregulation and 
technological advances are increasing the risks in banking 
systems. Moreover, unlike other companies, most of the funds 
used by banks to conduct their business belong to their 
creditors, in particular to their depositors. Linked to this is 
the fact that the failure of a bank affects not only its own 
stakeholders, but may have a systemic impact on the stability 
of other banks. All the more reason therefore to try to ensure 
that banks are properly managed.” 
One can find two main clusters of research related to our subject: one on 
assessment and quantification of governance quality in Russian banks, and the 
other on the interplay between governance and firm valuation. 
 
Standard & Poor‘s, the rating agency, has developed a methodology for 
appraisal and scoring of corporate governance resulting in corporate governance 
rating in two different scales – national and international [Standard & Poor‘s, 
2006]. The methodology includes the basic principles and criteria, and 
differentiates between country background and individual company analysis. 
The main 4 components of company analysis are: ownership structure and 
external influence; shareholders‘ rights and the relations with affiliated persons; 
transparency, information disclosure and audit; and Board of Directors structure 
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and effectiveness. The coverage of companies by corporate governance rating 
has remained extremely limited, and to date only one Russian bank has been 
awarded such a rating. 
 
In 2008 Standard & Poor‘s published its substantially modified methodology of 
corporate governance ratingsunder the name of GAMMA — Governance, 
Accountability, Management Metrics and Analysis [Standard & Poor‘s, 2008]. 
The approach shifts its focus away from an abstract appraisal of governance in 
the given bank against the background of ‗best practice‘ owards an analysis of 
specific risks taken by investor. GAMMA‘s main components are: influence by 
shareholders; shareholders‘ rights; transparency, audit and risk management 
system; and Board of Directors effectiveness, the process of strategizing, and 
compensation system. 
 
Since2004 the Russian Institute of Directors (RID) jointly with Expert-RA 
rating agency 
[RID & Expert-RA] have been awarding ‗national corporate governance 
ratings‘ based on 
proprietary methodology. 
 
Standard & Poor‘s also publish regular surveys of transparency and disclosure 
of Russian banks. The latest survey [Standard & Poor's, 2007] covers the top 30 
banks and aims to appraise the degree of disclosure of information relevant for 
investment community, against ‗international best practice‘. 
Thefocusisoncomprehensivenessandintegrityofpubliclyavailableinformationon 
the main operational parameters, financial soundness, ownership structure and 
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corporate governance mechanisms. Although Standard & Poor‘s explicitly warn 
that their transparency and disclosure 
score should not be used to gauge corporate governance quality, the two 
concepts have much in 
common and display a high degree of synchronization. 
 
In 2007 the International Finance Corporation published itsnew survey of 
corporate governance in Russia‘s banking sector [IFC, 2007], covering 82 
private institutions. IFC examines commitment to good corporate governance; 
practices of the Supervisory and Management Board; transparency and 
disclosure; internal control and risk management; and shareholder rights. The 
survey stops short of awarding individual ratings to banks and comparing them 
against a common scale. This survey insightfully examines the practices of both 
the Supervisory and Management Boards and their interplay, while most other 
publications tend to limit their scope to the structure and practices of the 
Supervisory Board only. 
 
The link between the quality of governance and the valuation of companies is 
sufficiently researched with regard to mature markets but much less so for 
emerging markets. Morcket al. [2005] reviews the large literature that explores 
the connection between country-level rules affecting corporate governance and 
firm behavior and the strengths of securities markets. Klapper and Love [2004] 
analyze connection between the measure of firm-level governance and share 
price on a cross-country basis. On the level of oneemerging market country 
(Korea) Choiand Hasan[2005] examine the effect of ownership and governance 
on firm performance and discover evidence that: the extent of the foreign 
ownership level has a significant positive association with the bank return and a 
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significant negative association with the bank risk; the number of outside board 
of directors does not have any significant affect on performance; the presence of 
a foreign director on that board is significantly associated with bank return and 
risk. 
 
Bernard S. Black has made a seminal contribution to the study of the impact of 
governance on firm valuation in Russia and other emerging markets [Black, 
2001; Black et al., 2006]. In order to obtain a combined index of governance in 
Russian firms, 6 indices produced by 6 different agencies for irregular periods 
are standardized and put together. Black et al. [2006] finds an economically 
important and statistically strong correlation between governance and market 
value. However, it matters a great deal how one measures governance.  
 
Staryuk usesthe value-based management concept to research how corporate 
governance has driven the stock market valuation of theRussian ‗blue chip‘ 
companies [Staryuk, 2008]; banks are not covered. 
 
In August 2008, Bokov and Vernikov made an attempt to explainthe differences 
in the valuation of Russian banks from a quality of governance point of view 
[Bokov, Vernikov, 2008]. They discovered that strategic investors appreciate 
high concentration of ownership and stability of the management team, while 
broadly neglecting the features of the Board of Directors as well as bank 
transparency. This article is a revised version of the above-referred conference 
paper. 
The topic of corporate governance is receiving heightened attention1. Although 
much of what is said applies also to banks, it is true that the banking firm has 
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significant differences with respect to corporations in other economic sectors, and 
this justifies a special interest in its governance problems; Prowse (1997), Adams 
and Mehran (2002). For example, there is a clear conflict inside the banks 
between the interests of the shareholders and the interests of the depositors, with 
the former being disposed to take high-risk projects that increase share value at 
the expense of the value of the deposits. Small deposits are insured and banks are 
regulated, to avoid crisis of confidence and bank runs, although it increases the 
moral hazard problem, as it was shown in the Savings and Loan crisis in the 
U.S. Whether regulation substitutes or complements traditional governance 
mechanisms and controls is a subject of debate, but it is generally agreed that the 
external controls coming from takeovers and product market competition turn 
out to be weaker in banks than in other firms; Prowse (1997). Good governance 
relies more on the workings of internal mechanisms, such as the supervision 
and the control exercised by the board of directors, along with the regulatory 
constraints. Our paper focuses on those governance mechanisms that are 
implemented by the board such as the replacement of managers and directors 
when a bank‘s economic performance does not meet the owners‘ expectations. 
Following previous work in this subject, we assume that internal control works 
properly if the probability of a significant board turnover, or the dismissal of a 
top executive, is inversely related to the economic performance of the bank, 
measured in terms of accounting rates of return3. We also consider a friendly 
merger of banks as an intermediate control mechanism, somewhere in between the 
internal mechanisms and the external ones. This is so because mergers must be 
approved by the governance bodies of the bank, and also because the target 
bank‘s assets are transferred to the acquiring company. For this scenario, we 
assume that good governance will predict that the likelihood that a bank merges 
 14 
(and, therefore, its assets be transferred to another bank), increases with a lower 
economic performance of the target bank. 
An important distinctive feature of our approach is that we compare the 
workings of governance mechanisms for three different forms of bank‘s 
ownership, Independent Commercial banks, Subsidiaries (or Dependent banks) 
and Savings banks, which represent a case of a lack of ownership. This 
comparison is unique in the existing literature since the previous papers consider 
only one form of ownership at a time. Independent Commercial banks are 
privately owned banks whose shares are in the hands of families, individual 
investors and institutional investors. A bank is identified as Dependent when it 
has another bank (either national or international) as a controlling shareholder. 
Finally the Savings banks, ―Cajas de Ahorros‖, can be considered as ―commercial 
non-profit organizations‖ in the sense of Hansmann (1996). 
The Cajas control about half of the Spanish retail banking market. They compete 
for loans and deposits among themselves and with Commercial banks. Unlike 
Commercial banks, however, Savings banks must either retain their earnings or 
invest them in social and cultural programs (around 25% of their net profits go 
each year to these programs). They have no formal owners and there is no market 
then for corporate control of Savings banks. Moreover, the general assembly and 
the board are both composed by representatives from four stakeholder groups: 
public authorities, depositors, employees, and founding entities. Therefore 
Spanish Savings banks display several important features. First, they are not-for-
profit organizations with a social contribution, coming from their profits as an 
extra tax. Second, they have no owners and are immune to the market for 
corporate control, with the exception of friendly takeovers or mergers by other 
Savings banks. Lastly, and quite importantly, they must respond to potential 
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conflicts of interests among their multiple stakeholders, who have ―voice‖ inside 
the governance mechanisms. This paper examines how such differences translate 
into economic performance, and it also provides comparative evidence on the 
relationship between management turnover and mergers on one side, and 
economic performance on the other. 
 
The Subsidiaries of other banks are legally independent firms that have a 
hierarchical relation with the parent bank. Some of them are subsidiaries of 
foreign banks, such as Barklays bank, and others are subsidiaries of other Spanish 
banks such as Banesto, which is now owned by Banco de Santander. These firms‘ 
managers are closely supervised by the management team of the parent bank and, 
therefore, they can be considered lower level managers of a holding company. 
Within Commercial banks, we are able to compare the role of accounting 
measures of performance in personnel administration decisions, such as the 
dismissal of lower level managers, those in charge of the subsidiaries, and of top 
level managers, like the chairman and CEO of the Independent banks. 
 
Elements of corporate governance 
 
Different authors and management specialists have argued that corporate 
governance requires laid down procedures, processes, systems and codes of 
regulation and ethics that ensures its implementation in organizations.  Some  
suggestions that have been underscored in this respect include the need for 
banks to set strategies – which have been commonly referred to as corporate 
strategies - for their operations and establish accountability for executing these 
strategies.  El-Kharouf (2000) while examining strategy, corporate governance 
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and the future of the Arab banking industry, points out that corporate strategy is 
a deliberate search for a plan of action that will develop the corporate‘s 
competitive advantage and compounds it.  
 
In addition to this, the BCBS (1999) contends that transparency of information 
related to existing conditions, decisions and actions is integrally related to 
accountability in that it gives market participants sufficient information with 
which to judge the management of a bank. The Committee advances further that 
various corporate governance structures exist in different countries hence there 
is no universally correct answer to structural issues and that laws do not need to 
be consistent from one country to another. Sound governance therefore, can be 
practiced regardless of the form used by a banking organization. The 
Committee therefore suggest four important forms of oversight that should be 
included in the organizational structure of any bank in order to ensure the 
appropriate checks and balances and these include: 
 
1) oversight by the board of directors or supervisory board; 
2) oversight by individuals not involved in the day-to-day running of the  
various business areas; 
3) direct line supervision of different business areas, and; 
4) independent risk management and audit functions. 
 
In summary, they demonstrate the importance of key personnel being fit and 
proper for their jobs and the potentiality of government ownership of a bank to 
alter the strategies and objectives of the bank as well as the internal structure of 
governance hence the general principles of sound corporate governance are also 
beneficial to government-owned banks.  
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The concept of good governance in banking industry empirically implies total 
quality management which includes six performance areas (Khatoon, 2002). 
These performance areas include capital adequacy, assets quality, management, 
earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity risk. Khatoon argues that the degree of 
adherence to these parameters determines the quality rating of an organization. 
 
According to Tsui and Gul (2000), corporate governance mechanisms including 
accounting and auditing standards are designed to monitor managers and 
improve corporate transparency. A number of corporate governance 
mechanisms have been identified analytically and empirically. These, according 
to Agrawal and Knoeber, (1996), may be broadly classified as internal and 
external mechanisms as summarized in figure 31.1 
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Figure 3.1 : Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
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Corporate governance in Indian Banking Sector 
 
Impact of corporate governance (cg) policies of financial markets and 
institutions including bank specific governance policies, and impact of other 
governance related macro economic policies on the financial performance of 
banks are yet to come in literature. All the bank specific governance policies are 
likely to have direct bearing on the financial performance of banks. Similarly, 
many other policies which directly affect the principal functions of the banks 
and consequently their governance are also supposed to have some 
relationships. Most of the studies in the arena of cg are found to be conceptual 
in nature and few of them are in banking. Further, empirical evidences for 
banking are not distinctly visible in the financial literature. A study on the 
developing economies, Arun and Turner (2003), while suggesting for more 
foreign entry opined that it is imperative that governance should be in place to 
have more reform. Political interference and state ownership are identified as 
the major impediments in the bank governance of these economies. 
 
 It is established that in many countries the controlling share holders are 
dominating the interest of minority share holders of banks and govt. ownership 
is associated with lower financial development (La Porta et al. 1999 and 2002), 
thus bringing governance in to fore front. Bies (2002) observed that quality of 
accounting and auditing practices is sine qua non for maintaining confidence of 
financial markets and good cg can help in managing risk in a better way.  
 
In India Das and Ghosh (2004) tried to establish a linkage between CEO 
compensation and bank performance and concluded that CEOs of poorly 
performing banks are likely to face higher turnover than the CEOs of well-
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performing banks. As there is a dearth of impact studies of cg policy 
implementation on financial performance of banks, more particularly in Indian 
context, this study is an attempt to fill the gap. 
 
Several policy measures undertaken by Indian regulators in both the segments 
of the market are expected to be visible in the indicators of important financial 
institutions. Banking being the most crucial segment in our economy most of 
these exercises could have impacted their important financial parameters. The 
need is thus arises to assess the cg policy impact on some these variables, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. The former is attempted with the help of a 
survey method by analysing the status of cg as on 2001, various 
recommendations of the committees set up by RBI and the action taken by RBI 
on these recommendations. The latter is tried with by establishing a relationship 
between the financial performance parameters of banking with the sector 
specific cg policies. The period of the study is taken from 1998-99 to 2004-05. 
The analysis of the impact of other macro economic policies on the two basic 
functions of banking viz. deposit taking and loan disbursement, which 
ultimately bring cg into picture, are also tried. The analysis is made to test the 
hypothesis that cg policies do not have any impact on the performance of Indian 
banking. 
 
The schematic arrangement of this paper is made in five sections. The first 
section tries to identify the linkage between cg and the financial sector, with a 
special emphasis on banking. The second devotes to the policy developments in 
this field in India. Third section, with the help of statistical analysis establishes 
the relation between cg and bank performance parameters over last seven years. 
The next section details two major macro economic policy decisions and their 
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possible linkage with bank governance and performance. The last, brings some 
random observations and concluding remarks. 
 
Corporate governance in search of a suitable definition 
 
The discussion on governance has absorbed most of the economies for more 
than a decade. Traveling through the pre-1992 American discussions on 
disassociation of power and money (emanated from the Watergate scandal), 
post-1992 Cadbury Report on governance codes and OECD principles 
(1998&1999), cg has not yet settled at any universal accepted definition. 
Because there are so many varying views on what cg is as a definitive product, 
there is no globally applicable definition of cg (Barnier, 2001). In fact, the very 
definition of cg stems from its organic link with the entire gamut of activities 
having direct or indirect influence on the financial health of corporate entities 
(Kamesam, 2002). Cadbury Report (1992) simply described cg as ―the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled‖. It can be confined to the ‗ 
Corporate Governance Tripod‘ , that is, the relationship between shareholders, 
directors and management, an increasing number of definitions refer to the fact 
that many other groups have an interest in the company (Van den Berghe, De 
Ridder, 1999). It is ―…an umbrella term that includes specific issues arising 
from interactions among senior management, shareholders, boards of directors, 
and other corporate stakeholders‖ (Cochran and Wartick, 1988). It is ―the 
system by which business entities are monitored, managed and controlled‖ 
(RBI, 2001). It is ―a set of relationships between a company‘ s management, its 
board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders. Cg also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good cg should 
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provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives 
that are in the interests of the company and shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use resources more 
efficiently‖(OECD, 1999). In its broadest sense, governance refers to the "range 
of institutions and practices by which authority is exercised to satisfy the 
interest of all the stake holders including the society" and its meaning is shaped 
by the specific value system prevalent in the country. 
 
Significance of Corporate governance 
 
No matter what view of the corporate objective is taken, effective governance 
ensures that boards and managers are accountable for pursuing it. The role of 
effective cg is of immense significance for the society as whole. At first place it 
promotes the efficient use of scarce resources both within the organisation and 
the larger economy. Secondly, it makes the resources flow to those sectors or 
entities where there are efficient production of goods and services and the return 
is adequate enough to satisfy the demands of stake holders. Thirdly, it provides 
a broad mechanism of choosing the best managers to administer the scarce 
resources. Fourthly, it helps the mangers to remain focused on improving 
performance, making sure that they are replaced when they fail to do so. Fifthly, 
it pressurises the organisation to comply with the laws, regulations and 
expectations of society and last but not the least it assists the supervisors to 
regulate the entire economic sector without partiality and nepotism. 
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Table – 3.2 
 
Dimensions Impact on Cost of capital Impact on Risk Profile 
The Corporation Greater       realization       of      
Business opportunities. 
More investor and creditor 
confidence provides 
additional resistance to 
adverse market conditions. 
The Economy Higher profitability. Greater 
realization of   growth    
opportunities    because   of 
impact     on     domestic     
and     foreign investment. 
Affects resistance to internal 
and external shocks 
influencing threshold of 
capital flight. 
 
Source: Dufey (2003) 
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When institutions in any economy, be it public or private, mis-manage 
themselves it is said that they are not properly governed. The problems of poor 
governance are matter of concern in most of the developing and 
underdeveloped countries and so also in India. Tabel-1 depicts the dimensional 
significance of cg for corporations as well as for the economy. The 
improvement in overall governance culture in the entire economic system helps 
the sub systems to function efficiently. By providing an appropriate structure in 
any system, cg sets right objective and devises the means of attaining them. In 
this process it helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the 
proper functioning of a market economy. It also boosts the confidence of 
investors, which encourages them to remain with the economic system. It 
reduces the risk of capital flight from an economy and increases the flow and 
variety of capital in the economy, as a result, the cost of capital becomes lower 
for the firms/corporations. The degree of adherence to the basic principles of 
governance at the corporate level enhances the confidence of the investors, both 
domestic and international, and ultimately they get capital at better term. 
Shareholders and potential investors require access to regular, reliable and 
comparable information in sufficient detail for them to assess the stewardship of 
management, and make informed decisions about the valuation, ownership and 
other important aspects of the corporations. An adequate and strong disclosure 
therefore helps to attract capital and maintain confidence of investors. High-
quality communications reduce investors‘ uncertainty about the accuracy and 
adequacy of information being disseminated and thereby help the firms to raise 
adequate capital at a competitive cost. 
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Corporate governance and financial sector 
Ensuring effective governance in financial sector is sine qua non for any 
economy‘ s growth and development. It assumes more significance because of 
its greater dominance as well as the magnitude of repercussions on the 
economy, in case of their failure. Special emphasis is given to this sector 
because of the unique character of financial intermediaries and the added 
complexity of standard governance problems among financial institutions. For 
example, questions of transparency, incentive conflicts, and agency conflicts in 
the corporate sector are compounded by greater opacity, government 
ownership, and regulation of financial institutions, banks in particular. In 
addition, the costs of poor governance in the financial sector are much more 
widespread than are those of individual corporations. Because financial 
intermediaries are the repositories of household wealth, their losses or failures 
can lead to large systemic and social costs. 
 
Financial sector governance is important for several clear and obvious reasons. 
One critical reason is to avoid financial crises—the failures of large numbers of 
financial institutions or the sudden and sharp collapse of prices of financial 
instruments traded on capital markets. As emphasised by Litan, Pomerliano and 
Sunderrajan (2002) financial institutions must function effectively, because they 
operate the payments system and store much of the wealth in any society. 
Likewise, capital markets are also instrumental in enabling companies to raise 
funds and investors to hold or access their wealth. In a very real sense, 
therefore, financial sectors are the functional equivalent of circulatory systems 
in human beings. 
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Governance in financial sector encompasses the governance of its constituent 
markets and their stake holders. Banking sector being the dominant and vital 
segment deserves utmost attention. Banking is the systemic institution not only 
possesses the potential of a great catalyst of growth but also on the other hand 
has the capability of causing catastrophe to an economy. When banks efficiently 
mobilize and allocate funds, this lowers the cost of capital to firms, boosts 
capital formation, and stimulates productivity growth. Governance affects 
banks‘ valuation and their cost of capital thereby affects the cost of capital of 
the firms and households they lend to. Thus, weak governance of banks 
reverberates throughout the economy with negative ramifications for economic 
development (Levine, 2003). Research finds that banks are critically important 
for industrial expansion, the cg of firms, and capital allocation. However, the 
importance of banks to national economies is underscored by the fact that 
banking is virtually universally a regulated industry and that banks have access 
to government safety nets. 
 
Corporate governance and Banking: The Linkage 
No type of country has been free of costly banking crisis in the last quarter 
century. The prevalence of banking system failure has been at least as great in 
developing and transition countries as in the industrial world (Honohon and 
Daniela, 2000). The developments of new technologies, major industry 
consolidation, globalization, and deregulation have placed the banking industry 
at a strategic crossroads. Therefore, banks face a more competitive, volatile 
global environment than other types of corporations. They provide financing for 
commercial enterprises, basic financial services to a broad segment of the 
population and access to payments systems. In addition, some banks are 
expected to make credit and liquidity available in difficult market conditions. 
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The banking sector in general, is highly sensitized to public scrutiny and is 
more vulnerable to the risk of attracting adverse publicity through failings in 
governance and stakeholder relationships. It is a special sub-set of cg with much 
of its management obligations enshrined in law or regulatory codes. In the light 
of the above statement governance issues in banks, more particularly in PSBs 
assume immense significance, but unfortunately these are less discussed and 
deliberated. Although the primary reason identified to it is the prevalent of govt. 
ownership across the institutions, another important reason can be attributed to 
the multiplicity of regulatory and supervisory legislations. For instance in India 
there are 5 legislations e.g. RBI Act, SBI Act, Bank Nationalization Act, 
Banking Regulation Act and Companies Act, govern the banking sector. 
Because of this multiplicity of Acts and their enforcing agencies i.e. RBI and 
GoI, any concrete form of principles on bank governance is yet to emerge. 
 
Why banks pose a special governance problem that is different from ordinary 
corporations? First, banks‘ activities are less transparent and thus more difficult 
for shareholders and creditors to monitor. It becomes more opaque when the 
largest chunk of share capital is with government. Second, because 
governments heavily regulate banks, ownership may be dispersed by mandate 
and thus takeovers may be impeded, directly or through prohibitions on bank 
ownership. Third, the protection of bank deposits by government can undercut 
incentives for depositors to monitor management, thus shifting responsibility 
for governance of banks to other parties or institutions. Fourthly, banks also 
differ from most other companies in terms of the complexity and range of their 
business risks, and the consequences if these risks are poorly managed. 
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Thus governance of banks is quite distinct from the rest of players of financial 
sector. Because of the complexity of its business, driven by government 
holdings, opacity of books of accounts and plethora of regulations of financial 
institutions, this constituent brings serious questions into the transparency, 
disclosure and agency relationship. Depositors do not know the true value of a 
bank‘ s loan portfolio as such information is incommunicable and very costly to 
reveal, implying that a bank‘ s loan portfolio is highly fungible (Bhattacharya et 
al, 1998). The opaqueness of banks also makes it very costly for depositors to 
constrain managerial discretion through debt covenants and for the diffuse 
equity holders to write and enforce effective incentive contracts or to use their 
voting rights as a vehicle for influencing firm decisions (Caprio and Levine, 
2002). Information asymmetries are also larger with banks (Furfine, 2001). A 
further issue is that the interests of bank shareholders may oppose those of 
governmental regulators, who have their own agendas, which may not 
necessarily coincide with maximising bank value. Shareholders may want 
managers to take more risk than is socially optimal, whereas regulators have a 
preference for managers to take substantially less risk due to their concerns 
about system-wide financial stability. The Indian experience so far does suggest 
that government ownership, with its relatively muted emphasis on wealth 
maximization, might conduce to a trade-off between efficiency and stability in 
banking (Ram Mohan, 2002). 
 
Due to this special nature of problem the broader view of cg, which views the 
subject as the methods by which suppliers of finance control managers in order 
to ensure that their capital cannot be expropriated and that they earn a return on 
their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) can be extended to this sector. 
Tracing the special problems with banking organisations, Macey and O‘ Hara 
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(2003) argue that because of the peculiar contractual form of banking, a broader 
view of cg should be adopted and the cg mechanisms for banks should 
encapsulate depositors as well as shareholders. They emphasised that the scope 
of the duties and obligations of bank directors and officers should be expanded 
to ensure the safety and soundness of banks. The view of Basel committee 
(1999) on cg is holistic and details how banks a) set corporate objectives 
(including generating economic returns to owners); b) run the day-to-day 
operations of the business; c) consider the interests of recognised stakeholders; 
d) align corporate activities and behaviours with the expectation that banks will 
operate in a safe and sound manner, and in compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations; and e) protect the interests of depositors. 
 
Distinctions on cg orientations are found in most of the developing countries, 
but particularly they are quite prominent where there is a dominance of public 
sector in banking industry, like India. This dominance ultimately breeds the 
weak cg arrangements in banking systems (Mortlock, 2002), which include: i) 
inadequately qualified and experienced bank directors, and directors with 
significant conflicts of interest; ii) insufficient understanding of the nature of 
banking risks by a bank‘ s directors and senior management; iii) inadequate 
representation of non-executive and independent directors on the board ( i.e 
directors unconnected to parties related to the bank); iv) inadequate risk 
management systems, internal controls and internal audit arrangements; v) 
insufficient structures for ensuring appropriate scrutiny and management of 
conflicts of interest, including those arising in business dealings between banks 
and related parties; vi) insufficient accountability of directors for the 
stewardship of their bank; vii) inadequate oversight of senior managers by 
boards of directors, and poor quality financial and risk-related reporting to the 
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board; and viii) insufficient rights for shareholders, including in respect of 
access to information and the ability to hold the board of directors to account. 
All these weaknesses can be traced distinctly to the functioning of PSBs in 
India. Although PSBs attempt to comply with the same codes of board 
governance as other companies but, in addition, factors like risk management, 
capital adequacy and funding, internal control and compliance all have an 
impact on their matrix of governance. It has been observed that 63 percent of 
PSBs have potentials for profitability increase through efficiency improvement 
(Kumar & Verma, 2003), which ultimately depends on the quality of 
governance. 
 
The reality that various cg structures for banks exist in different countries 
reflects that there are no universally correct answers to structural issues and that 
law need not be consistent from country to country. Recognizing the diversity 
in structure of governance mechanism across the countries the Basel Committee 
(1999) recommended four important forms of oversight that should be included 
in the organisational structure of any bank in order to ensure the appropriate 
checks and balances: (i) oversight by the board of directors or supervisory 
board; (ii) oversight by individuals not involved in the day-to-day running of 
the various business areas; (iii) direct line supervision of different business 
areas; and (iv) independent risk management and audit functions. In addition, 
the committee also emphasizes on the importance of key personnel being fit and 
proper for their jobs. 
 
It is also found that in most of the countries cg is inadequate in banks, more 
specifically in developing economies. One of the more common underlying 
causes of this is insufficiently developed governance law, including inadequate 
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specification of directors‘ duties, insufficient clarity of the rights of 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and insufficient specification of the 
obligations for dealing with conflicts of interest. In addition, inadequate 
enforcement of cg law possibly as a result of poorly resourced judiciary and 
government authorities also impedes the effectiveness of cg. Besides, 
inadequate development and promotion of a cg culture by the relevant 
professional associations (such as banking associations), absence of cultural 
empathy towards the observance of governance principles, and excessive 
intrusive financial sector regulation (as prevailed in pre-liberalization phase of 
India) and supervision are some of the contributing factors. Similarly, poorly 
developed financial disclosure arrangements in these countries also weaken the 
incentives for the directors and senior management of banks to maintain sound 
cg and risk management practices. 
 
Tracing the importance of cg in Indian banks quite a few facts are discerned. 
First, banks have an overwhelmingly dominant position in financial systems, 
and are extremely important engines of economic growth (King and Levine, 
1993; and Levine, 1997). Second, as financial markets are usually 
underdeveloped, banks are typically the most important source of external 
finance for the majority of firms. Third, the economy is dominated by many 
small scale firms and most of them depend on banks. The governance of banks 
thus affects their governance structure. Fourth, as well as providing a generally 
accepted means of payment, banks also function as the main depositories for the 
economy‘ s savings. Fifth, India has recently liberalized its banking systems 
through privatization/disinvestments and hence reducing the role of economic 
regulation. Economic regulations are getting replaced by prudential regulations, 
like capital adequacy norms, supervisory norms and many others. However, the 
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prudential reforms already implemented in developing countries including India 
have not been effective in preventing banking crises (e.g. the recent Global 
Trust Bank and other cooperative banks failures) and the reasons can be traced 
to many, like poor legal structure, dominance of a docile share holder i.e. 
Government, and asymmetry in information flow across the stake holders. 
Although in comparison to many developing countries India is better placed 
with respect to taping the capital market for fulfilling necessary capital 
requirement, the need arises here to make the regulations strengthened and the 
governance to more effective. 
 
The concern for good governance from the state can be visualized from its 
oversight functions. In India the oversight function of Govt. is conditioned by 
three reasons (Leeladhar 2004). Firstly, it is believed that the depositors, 
particularly retail depositors, are not able to effectively protect themselves as 
they do not have adequate information, nor are they in a position to coordinate 
with each other. Secondly, bank assets are unusually opaque, and lack 
transparency as well as liquidity. This condition arises due to the fact that most 
bank loans, unlike other products and services, are usually customized and 
privately negotiated. Thirdly, it is believed that that there could be a contagion 
effect resulting from the instability of one bank, which would affect a class of 
banks or even the entire financial system and the economy. As one bank 
becomes unstable, there may be a heightened perception of risk among 
depositors for the entire class of such banks, resulting in a run on the deposits 
and putting the entire financial system in jeopardy. Despite of such concerns 
from govt. side, the dominance of the latter and its central bank casts several 
doubts over their intentions. 
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Another area of concern in Indian banking is the dominance of state owned 
banks. Government ownership thwarts competitive forces, limits the 
effectiveness of government supervision in the financial sector, and tends to 
increase the opacity of banks‘ operations. Governments use their state-owned 
institutions to support excessive government spending and favor less-than-
creditworthy borrowers. All of these tendencies dampen overall economic 
growth (Litan et al, 2002). Even for other categories banking institutions not 
owned by Government, the former Governor of RBI observed that ―Old private 
sector banks also have very poor auditing and accounting systems. New private 
banks – generally good on accounting, but poor on accountability. More 
modern and computerized, but less risk conscious. One thing which is common 
to all is that cg is highly centralized with very little real check on the CEO, who 
is generally also closely linked to the largest owner groups. Boards or auditing 
systems are not very effective.‖ (Jalan 2002).The enormous consequences of 
poor governance of banks come to limelight only in case of banking 
crises/failures. It is of crucial importance therefore that banks have stronger cg 
than other corporate entities. 
 
Policy Framework of Corporate Governance in Indian Banking: 
Committee Recommendations and Implementation 
The global policy formulation on this issue can be traced to the industrialized 
countries. Blue Ribbon Commission of US, Cadbury Committee from UK, and 
many stock exchanges around the world started flouting governance principles 
and the World Bank and OECD tried to give all the principles in a 
comprehensive framework. India started its ground work for cg principle 
implementation after many years of the implementation of Codes of Best 
Practices developed the Cadbury Committee, 1991. Considerable attention has 
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been given to cg in India in recent years. In addition to the Advisory Group 
chaired by Dr. R.H. Patil (RBI, 2001) and Consultative Group of Directors of 
Banks/ Financial Institutions (Ganguly Group, RBI, 2002), several official 
Committees have already gone into the issues relating to cg and have given 
their Reports. These include the Committee chaired by Shri Kumar Mangalam 
Birla (SEBI, 1999), the Task Force on Corporate Excellence through 
Governance (GOI, 2000), Naresh Chandra Committee on Corporate Audit and 
Governance (SEBI, 2002), Naresh Chandra Committee-II on Regulation of 
Private Companies and Partnership (GOI, 2003) and Narayana Murthy 
Committee on Corporate Governance (SEBI, 2003). Recently, Malegam 
Committee has gone into disclosure norms for offer documents (SEBI, 2004) 
that would also contribute towards improving cg in the country. Preceding these 
official committees, the industry association, CII, had itself provided a Code in 
1998 (RBI, 2004). 
 
Governance principle formulation exclusively for banking came little late. 
Although some regulations were issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) way back in 1988, these were not considered as exclusive 
cg principles. The Basel banking regulations issued in 1999, however, brought 
an array of principles over a broad spectrum of banking activities. The OECD 
principles also tried to fulfill some of the requirements of banking industry. 
Keeping in view the widely accepted Basel recommendations in the background 
many countries framed their own set of governance principles for their banking 
industries. For Indian banking the RBI has taken the sole responsibility of 
framing policy in this regard. The Standing Committee on International 
Financial Standards and Codes which was set up in 1999 to bring common 
financial standards in line with international practices constituted an advisory 
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committee on cg under the chairmanship of R.H.Patil. The sub-committee 
submitted its report in 2001 after reviewing the governance models of East 
Asian countries, U.S., U.K., and other European countries. The Report has 
observed that since most of the Indian companies belong to the ―insider‖ model 
of East Asia i.e. dominance of family/promoter ownership and control, it is 
essential to bring quick reforms in the corporates/banks/financial 
institutions/public sector enterprises to make them more autonomous and 
professional (RBI,2001). The Group looked into public sectors banks and noted 
that the first important step to improve governance mechanism in these units is 
to transfer the actual governance functions from the concerned administrative 
ministries to the boards and also strengthen them by streamlining the 
appointment process of directors. Furthermore, as a part of strengthening the 
functioning of their boards, banks should appoint a risk management committee 
of the board in addition to the three other board committees viz., audit, 
remuneration and appointment committees. Taking this move further, the 
Reserve Bank constituted a Consultative Group of Directors of Banks and 
Financial Institutions (Chairman: Dr. A.S. Ganguly) to review the supervisory 
role of Boards of banks and FIs. The Ganguly Consultative Group looked into 
the functioning of the Boards vis-à-vis compliance, transparency, disclosures, 
audit committees and suggested measures for making the role of the Board of 
Directors more effective (Gopinath, 2004). 
 
Governance codes for banking are drawn from various committee reports as 
mentioned in the above paragraph. Besides, Reserve Bank of India has taken 
various steps furthering cg in the Indian Banking System. These can broadly be 
classified into the following three categories viz. a) Transparency b) Off-site 
surveillance and c) Prompt corrective action. Transparency and disclosure 
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standards are also important constituents of a sound cg mechanism. 
Transparency and accounting standards in India have been enhan ced to align 
with in ternational best practices. However, there are many gaps in the 
disclosures in India vis-à-vis the international standards, particularly in the area 
of risk management strategies and risk parameters, risk concentrations, 
performance measures, component of capital structure, etc. The off-site 
surveillance mechanism is also active in monitoring the movement of assets, its 
impact on capital adequacy and overall efficiency and adequacy of managerial 
practices in banks. RBI also brings out the periodic data on ―Peer Group 
Comparison‖ on critical ratios to maintain peer pressure for better performance 
and governance. Prompt corrective action has been adopted by RBI as a part of 
core principles for effective banking supervision. As against a single trigger 
point based on capita adequacy normally adopted by many countries, Reserve 
Bank in keeping with Indian conditions have set two more trigger points namely 
Non-Performing Assets (NPA) and Return on Assets (ROA) as proxies for asset 
quality and profitability. 
 
Corporate governance policy implementation in India 
Looking at the developments of governance practices and its implementations 
in India it is found that till the year 2002 most of them were at recommendatory 
stage. Most of the suggestions given by the Advisory Group (2001) and 
Ganguly Committee (2002) were implemented during and after the year 2002. 
The following paragraphs highlight the status of bank governance as envisaged 
by the Advisory Group (2001), their recommendations, and the action taken by 
RBI for their implementation. 
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Table - 3.3 
Governance status in Indian Banking 
 
Governance 
variables 
Governance   
Status, 2001 
Committee 
recommendation 
Action Taken by 
RBI Between 2002 
and 2004 
1.Responsibility      
of      the Board 
Board   members   
are not      effective      
as ideally       
envisaged. This is 
more visible in PSU 
banks. 
Boards      to      align      
their responsibilities   in   
line  with international   
best   practices. Boards are 
to play very active role in 
providing oversight to 
senior level management 
for managing     different     
risks. Limits  for  
individual voting rights 
are 1 per cent in PSBs, but  
10  per  cent  for  private 
sector banks. 
Recommendations of 
the Ganguly Group 
have been forwarded 
for implementation. 
Directors to execute 
the deed of covenants 
to discharge their 
responsibilities to the 
best of their abilities, 
individually and 
collectively. 
2.Accountability     
of     the Board          
to shareholders/ 
stakeholders 
Boards of majority of 
the    banks    do   not 
fulfill clear  lines of 
responsibility       and 
accountability       for 
themselves. 
The     board     should     
be accountable to the 
owners of the  bank.  The  
bank  should also keep in 
view the interests of main 
stakeholders, such as, 
depositors,              
employees, creditors, 
customers, etc. 
The Chairman of the 
Audit Committee 
should be present at 
AGMs to answer 
shareholder queries. 
Banks have also been 
advised to form 
committees under the 
chairmanship of a 
nonexecutive director 
to look into the 
redressal of 
complaints. 
3.Election    to 
the board 
PSU Boards      
formed   by the 
Government         and 
through  nomination. 
In     private     sector 
banks    
appointments are      
governed     by 
Banking Regulations 
Act,        and        the 
companies Act. One 
director      each      is 
 the process of 
selection with clear 
and transparent 
criteria. Such   
criteria   for   
choosing non-
executive directors 
should be  disclosed  
in   the  Annual 
Report.     They     
should     be 
independent and 
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nominated     to    the 
boards     of     
private sector banks 
by RBI. 
elected and have    
different    tenures    
to ensure continuity. 
and proper‘ criteria 
for appointments/ 
renewal of 
appointments to 
Board. They should 
undertake a process 
of due diligence in 
regard to the 
suitability for the 
appointment of 
directors. The Boards 
of banks should form 
nomination 
committees to 
scrutinize 
declarations of 
candidates. 
4.Size   of   the 
Board 
The    sizes    of          
the l Boards of PSU 
banks are stipulated 
by their respective 
statues. 
All     banks     should     
have minimum      of     10      
board members. 
Increasing number of 
professionals on Boards 
by specifying proportion 
of nonexecutive members 
on Boards as in case of 
other companies. 
Apprised GOI on this 
issue and the matter 
is being followed up 
by the concerned 
agencies. RBI 
directions on ‗ fit and 
proper‘ criteria for 
board appointments 
have been issued. 
5.Compositio n       
of       the Board 
Not less than one 
half of the total 
number of directors    
of    banks shall      
consist      of persons    
who    have special 
knowledge or 
practical experience. 
Banks should have a 
specified proportion   as   
non-executive independent   
directors   as   in case    of    
other    companies. 
Representation     of     
private shareholders   is   
required   in case of mixed 
ownership. 
The Ganguly 
Committee 
recommendations are 
communicated to 
banks. 
6.Independence 
of directors 
Disclosure               
The director‘ s 
interest is mandatory, 
in case of conflict    
of   interest arising,  
the  director has to 
abstain  from the 
decision making 
The recommendation of 
Blue ribbon   commission   
shall   be applicable.      
The     directors nominated 
by the government on the 
boards of PSBs and all 
nominees   of   the   
regulators should not be 
Issued circular 
annexing the 
mandatory 
recommendations of 
the SEBI Committee 
on Corporate 
Governance. It 
implies that in case a 
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process   relating    to 
that case. 
considered as independent.   
A   majority  of non-
executive directors should 
be  identified  in  the 
Annual Report. 
company has a non-
executive Chairman, 
at least half of the 
Board should be 
independent. 
7.Tenure    for 
Directors and 
Age 
No             
mandatory provisons. 
Tenure      for       
independent Directors  
may preferably be up to 
ten years at a stretch. The  
age  limit   should  be  a 
maximum   of   65   years   
for whole-time Directors 
and 75 years for part-time 
Directors. The liability of 
non-executive directors 
should be limited. 
Whole-time 
Directors should 
have sufficiently 
long tenure. As per 
Banking Regulation 
Act, maximum 
tenure of non-
executive Directors 
is eight years. 
Stipulated age limit 
of 35-65 years for 
non-executive 
Directors. The upper 
age limit has since 
been revised to 70 
years. 
8.Multiple 
Board seats 
A person cannot be 
on the boards of two 
banking     
companies 
simultaneously. 
One Director should not 
serve on more than 10 
Boards or be member   of   
more   than   5-6 
committees. 
RBI has issued 
circular in June 2002 
directing that a 
Director should not 
be in more than 10 
committees or act as 
a Chairman on more 
than 5 committees. 
9.Chairman and 
CEO: 
The        Government 
controls                 the 
appointment. 
Chairman and CEO should 
be separated positions 
Requested GOI for 
legislative changes as 
the per Ganguly 
Group 
recommendation. 
10.Board 
Meetings 
Nationalised banks to 
have to hold at least 
six meetings in a 
year and at least once 
in a quarter. . 
At least six meetings in a 
year keeping   aside   the   
quarterly restrictions. 
Made mandatory that 
Board meetings be 
held at least 4 times a 
year with a 
maximum gap of 4 
months. 
11.Disclosure of       
Director 
Biographical 
Information 
No                  
specific provision. 
Details about the new 
director should be given in 
the general meeting of 
shareholders and also in 
the Annual Report. 
Prescribed 
appropriate 
procedures for 
nomination. 
Disclosure for key 
management 
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personnel in 
accordance with 
Accounting 
Standards 18. 
12.Disclosure 
of 
remuneration 
A  number  of banks 
do  not  disclose  the 
entire   compensation 
package of their full 
time directors. 
Remuneration package of 
the directors should be 
disclosed in the Annual 
Report and they should      
be      reported      to 
shareholders and audited. 
 
13.Audit 
Committee 
Banks are yet to set 
up   audit   
committee with                    
right composition   
various directors. 
Audit Committees should 
be formed               as               
per recommendations of 
the Blue Ribbon 
Committee. 
Audit Committee 
should have 
independent non-
executive Directors 
and Executive 
Director should only 
be a permanent 
invitee. 
14.Remunerat 
ion 
Committee 
No provision. Boards      should      set      
up Remuneration       
Committees made up 
exclusively of non-
executive    Board    
members. Remuneration      
should      be decided by 
the remuneration 
committee. 
Written to GOI for 
making necessary 
legislative changes. 
15.Financial 
reporting, 
Disclosure 
and 
Transparency 
Standard   of   bank‘ 
s disclosure  fall  
short of           
international 
standard.           Some 
disclosures are made 
mandatory by RBI. 
Financial reporting, 
disclosure and   
transparency   of   banks 
need    further    
improvement. Disclosures 
as per accounting 
standards       should       
cover subsidiaries, 
especially where 26     per     
cent     or     more 
shareholding                  
exists. Disaggregated          
segmental information   
should   also   be provided. 
Asked banks to 
include separate 
section on cg in their 
Annual Reports. 
Made mandatory for 
banks to adopt all 
accounting standards 
that are required to 
be followed, though 
certain flexibility 
required by banks 
has been provided 
for. 
 
 
Source : Report of the Advisory Group, 2001, RBI and Report of the  
Consultative Group of Directors of banks and financial institutions, RBI, 2004. 
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The Assessment 
A cursory look at the preceding table reveals that before the financial year 2001, 
i.e. when the advisory group submitted its governance report the banking in 
India was devoid of most of the governance mechanisms or was operating with 
a weak framework of governance. Most of the recommendations were 
communicated during or after the year 2002 to the banks and GOI (for 
necessary legislative changes) for implementation either in tote or with some 
modifications. The post implementation scenario of Indian banking has of a 
mixed experience. While there is a handsome profit by most of the banks, 
particularly the public sector banks have shown very good results, at the same 
time the failure of Global Trust Bank brings the darker side of the governance 
and role of RBI. However, qualitative changes have been observed in disclosure 
practices by banks. Many of them have brought a separate section on cg in their 
annual reports and shown better accounting practices. 
 
THE MODEL POLICY FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN BANK : 
 
Speedy services in the matter of lending. 
 
(1) Not to discriminate on  
 
(2) To be fair and honest in advertisement 
 
(3)  To provide assistance or advice to customers applying for loans, 
 
(4)  Grievance redressal mechanism  
 
(5) To comply with all the regulatory requirements in good faith. 
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The customer would be informed the procedure involved in servicing and 
closure of the loan taken. 
 
The loan agreement would clearly stipulate that credit facilities are solely at 
banks discretion.  
 
Bank would notify clearly about the penal interest rates applicable to 
prospective clients like rate of penal interest and circumstances under which 
they are payable etc. 
 
Any revision modification in these charges would be notified in advance to 
customers through banks website; delivery points like branches and other 
media. 
 
Before taking a decision to recall accelerate payment or performance under the 
agreement or seeking additional securities. Bank would give notice to 
borrowers, as specified in the loan agreement or a reasonable period, if no such 
condition exists in the loan agreement. 
 
If such right of set off is to be exercised, borrowers shall be given notice about 
the same with full particulars about the remaining claims and the documents 
under which bank is entitled to retain the securities till the relevant claim is 
settled paid. 
 
In case of receipt of request for transfer of borrower account, either from the 
borrower or from a bank / financial institution, which proposes to take over the 
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account, the consent or otherwise i.e., objection of the Bank, if any, shall be 
conveyed within 21 days from the date of receipt of request. 
 
 If required under law 
 If it is in the public interest to reveal the information 
 If the interests of our bank require such disclosure 
 
Financial distress: 
 
 Bank would encourage borrowers to inform about their financial distress 
as soon as possible. 
  Bank would adequately train the operational staff to give patient 
hearing customers in financial distress. 
 Bank would look into cases of customers‘ financial distress and consider 
on merits. 
 
They do, however, have the responsibility to set the tone regarding their 
institutions risk taking and to oversee the internal will be followed. They also 
have the responsibility to hire individuals who they believe have integrity and 
can exercise high level of judgment and competence. 
 
The management of Banks will need to adopt better systems and practices, and 
to provide necessary information and material to their boards for making sound 
decisions. 
 
Important fact that they are the backbone of the national payment system. 
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Regulatory purview of the Central Bank of the country not only in India. 
 
Interest of the depositors is of paramount importance  
 
In times of distress, banks are generally given access to the safety net 
arrangements by the Reserve Bank of India or the Government of India. 
 
Fact that banks are highly leveraged entities. 
 
Governance systems and procedures are required to be much tighter in the 
banks and financial institutions. 
 
Particularly to the rural and weaker sectors, cannot be lost sight of. It is in this 
context that the banks and FIS will continue to play a major role in meeting the 
broader expectations of the society and to this extent the regulator will be 
required to direct resources to these vulnerable segments. 
 
GOVERNACE RATING METHODOLOGY : 
 
A system has been devised by which governance practices of companies are 
rated on the basis of following criteria. 
  
Management :  
 
Leadership and Strategy, Competence, Decision Making and organizational 
climate. 
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Ethics :  
 
Written Code, Corporate Social Responsibility, Good Business Practices. 
 
Customers :  
 
Good Manufacturing / Services Practices and Customer satisfaction 
 
Creativity and Innovation :  
 
New product / Services, R & D Initiatives and other innovations  
 
Financial Performance :  
 
Wealth Creation, wealth Management and Wealth Distribution. 
 
Disclosure Standards :  
 
Adequacy and Compliances and Better Standards. 
 
The process is in evolutionary stage and encourages Banks to get them rated 
from an independent agency. 
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GOVERNANCE  COOPERATIVE  BANKING  VISION      : 
 
SHAPE THE BANK OF THE FUTURE    : 
 
The bank of the future will be shaped largely by the changes in the 
environment, economy, demography, regulatory, technological, and the systems 
and markets through which it operators. The Institute for Business Value, a 
research unit of IBM, has identified five key trends that will determine market 
success in 2015, viz (i) customers taking control, (ii) niche competitors, (iii) a 
new workforce, (iv) regulatory transparency, and (v) focus on technology. 
 
In the last few years, no other industry has benefited from the advancement of 
technology as the banking industry. The widespread application of technology 
has helped banks cut costs, become faster, smarter, broader, overcome 
geographical barriers and become universal banks. Banking is more dependent 
upon technology than ever before, with annual global expenditure on 
technology running over $ 30 billion. 
 
Draft Vision Document for Urban Co-operative Banks 
 
Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs) are an important part of the financial system 
in India. It is, therefore, necessary that the UCBs emerge as a sound and healthy 
network of jointly owned, democratically controlled, and ethically managed 
banking institutions providing need based quality banking services, essentially 
to the middle and lower middle classes and marginalized sections of the society.  
 
This document sets out the broad approach and strategies that need to be 
adopted to actualize this vision to remain in competition. 
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The bright spot of year 2006 came in the fag end of the year when Maharashtra 
Government signed an MOU with the RBI, thus bringing nearly 85% of the urban 
banks in the country under the ensuring that a consultative machinery was put in place 
that would minimize, if not eliminate, the negative effects of dual control and provide a 
forum where the Federations also have a voice, the National Federation would like to 
work with all the  
NAFCUB would also be in continuous interaction with the RBI for moving 
towards providing a genuine level playing filed to urban cooperative banks that 
had hitherto been generally denied to them on account of, with RBI puts it as 
‗lack of regulatory comfort‘. 
 
 NAFCB, as the apex federation, is committed to ensure that: The 
directors of urban cooperative banks are supported to equip themselves to 
oversee the working of their banks in a manner that would make the 
banks financially sound, socially responsible, and compliant with all the 
regulatory norms. 
 
 The urban banks are able to leverage their unique position of grass roots 
level banking organizations with the help of technology up gradation, 
better HRD policies and professional outlook in management. 
 
 The urban banks have an efficient aggregator of their resources, in the 
form of an apex banking institution, that can help the urban cooperative 
banks access the capital / money markets, participate in consortium 
advances, and help them get networked. 
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 Creation of such an institution has been contemplated by the working 
group on alternative avenues for capital, which felt that, like in many 
countries, where cooperative credit structure is well developed, the Indian 
context. It has recommended for another working Group to go into 
modalities of formation of such a bank. 
 
 There is a new found confidence in urban cooperative banks. It is 
expected to improve in 2007. The sector, learning from past mistakes, is 
poised to take on the challenges of competition. If the regulators are 
supportive and permit them more avenues of doing business and 
earnings, the coming years would see that the urban cooperative banks 
regain their market share of 6.6% achieved in 1999-2000, from the 
present figure of 4.8%. Urban cooperative banks understand the 
importance of regulatory compliance and are striving to operate as per the 
norms. We are sure that the RBI is getting back the regulatory comfort, 
and will play a more development role, in addition to its regulatory 
functions. 
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TABLE  3:4 
 
 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
with the State Governments 
 
The MoUs contain the following commitments by the State Government and the 
Reserve Bank. 
The State Governments, through the MoU, agree to: 
 
• Introduce long form audit report for statutory audit and modify their audit 
rating models to bring them in alignment with the gradation system adopted by 
the Reserve Bank for UCBs.  
 
• Provide for statutory audit by Chartered Accountants(CAs) for UCBs with 
deposits over Rs.25 crore and special audit by CAs, if required by the Reserve 
Bank, for any UCB. • Put in place ‘fit and proper’ criteria for Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs), based on guidelines of the Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank,  as a 
signatory to the MoU, is committed: 
 
• To constitute a State Level Task Force for Urban Co-operative Banks 
(TAFCUB), comprising Regional Director of the Reserve Bank, Registrar of Co-
operative Societies (RCS) of the State, a representative of Central Box IV.2: 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the State Governments Office of 
Urban Banks Department of the Reserve Bank, a representative of the State 
Government and a representative each from the State and National Federation of 
UCBs. TAFCUBs would identify and draw up time bound action plans for the 
revival of potentially viable UCBs and recommend non-disruptive exit for non-
viable ones. 
 
• To facilitate human resources development and IT initiatives in UCBs. MoUs 
signed between the Reserve Bank and the respective State Governments also 
envisage the signing of another MoU between the Registrars of Co-operative 
Societies of the States and respective Regional Directors of the Reserve Bank. This 
MoU stipulates the broad measures to be taken by the signatories for 
implementing the recommendations of the TAFCUB for each of the potentially 
viable/non-viable UCBs that are placed for consideration of  AFCUB. 
 
The MoU, inter alia, also provides that the Reserve Bank would consult RCS 
before canceling or refusing licence under the BR Act, 1949, of a UCB covered by 
the MoU, i.e., in States with which MoUs have been signed. The RCS would 
comply without delay any requisition by the Reserve Bank for supersession of the 
Board or for winding up of any UCB. stakeholders towards creation of a climate of 
stability that would, in turn, help in progressive restoration of public confidence in 
urban cooperative banking system.  
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TABLE 3 : 5 
Mergers/Amalgamations for Urban Co-operative Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With a view to encouraging and facilitating consolidation and emergence of strong 
entities and as well as for providing an avenue for non-disruptive exit of Weak/unviable 
entities in the co-operative banking sector, guidelines were issued to facilitate 
merger/amalgamation in the sector. The Reserve Bank, while considering proposals for 
merger/amalgamation, will confine its approval to the financial aspects of the merger 
taking into consideration the interests of depositors and financial stability. The Reserve 
Bank would consider proposals subject to the post-merger entity meeting the prescribed 
following prudential norms: When the net worth of the acquired bank is positive and 
Box IV.3: Mergers/Amalgamations for Urban Co-operative Banks the acquirer bank 
assures to protect entire deposits all the depositors of the acquired bank. 
 
• When the net worth of acquired bank is negative but acquirer bank, on its own, 
assures to protect deposits all the depositors of the acquired bank. 
 
 • When the net worth of the acquired bank is negative and acquirer bank assures to 
protect the deposits of all depositors with financial support from the State Government 
extended upfront as part of the process of merger. 
  
The Reserve Bank had conveyed its no objection to five merger proposals up to August 
27, 2005. 
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2. Objective  
 In the light of above, the broad objectives of the document can be set out 
as under: -  
i. To rationalize the existing regulatory and supervisory approach keeping 
in view the heterogeneous character of entities in the sector  
ii. To facilitate a focused and continuous system of supervision through 
enhanced use of technology.  
iii. To enhance professionalism and improve the quality of governance in 
UCBs by providing training for skill up-gradation as also by including 
large depositors in the decision making process / management of banks.  
iv. To put in place a mechanism that addresses the problems of dual control, 
given the present legal framework, and the time consuming process in 
bringing requisite legislative changes  
v. To put in place a consultative arrangement for identifying weak but 
potentially viable entities in the sector and provide a framework for their 
being nurtured back to health including, if necessary, through a process 
of consolidation  
vi. To identify the unviable entities in the sector and provide an exit path for 
such entities.  
3. The Operating Environment  
 Urban cooperative banks form a heterogeneous group in terms of 
geographical spread, area of operation, size or even in terms of individual 
performance. As such, development of the urban cooperative banking 
institutions into safe and vibrant entities requires the small banks in the 
group to be insulated from systemic shocks by emphasizing their 
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cooperative character. Further, the weak banks may have to be 
strengthened as a group, through a process of consolidation that may 
entail mergers/ amalgamations of viable entities and exit of the unviable 
ones, if there are no other options available. It is also felt that it is 
necessary to set up a supervisory system that is based on an in-depth 
analysis of the heterogeneous character of the urban cooperative banks 
and one that is in tandem with the policy of strengthening the sector.  
4. Regulatory Environment 
 The urban co-operative banks are regulated and supervised by State 
Registrars by of Co-Operative Societies, Central Registrar of Co-
Operative Societies in case of Multi state cooperative banks and by 
Reserve Bank. The Registrars of Co operative Societies of the States 
exercise powers under the respective co-operative societies Act of the 
States in regard to incorporation, registration, management,  
amalgamation, reconstruction of liquidation. In case of the urban co-
operative banks having multi-state presence, the central Registrar of Co-
operative Societies, New Delhi, exercises such powers. The banking 
related functions, such as issue of license to start new banks / branches, 
matters relating to interest rates, loan policies, investments, prudential 
exposure norms etc. are regulated and supervised by the Reserve Bank of 
India under the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (AACS). 
Various Committees in the past, which went into working of the UCBs, 
have found that the multiplicity of command centers and the absence of 
clear-cut demarcation between the functions of State Governments and 
the Reserve Bank have been the most vexatious problems of urban 
cooperative banking movement. This duality of command is largely 
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responsible for most of the difficulties in implementing regulatory 
measures with the required speed and urgency and impedes effective 
supervision. 
 
Regulatory Initiatives for UCBs   
 
UCBs have grown rapidly since the early 1990s. During the phase of rapid 
expansion, however, the sector showed certain weaknesses arising out of lack of 
sound corporate governance, unethical lending, comparatively high  level of 
loan  defaults, inability to operate in a liberalised and competitive environment. 
The Reserve Bank, therefore, has been striving to harness the growth of UCBs 
with appropriate application of prudential regulation and supervision to 
safeguard the interests of depositors. The Reserve Bank initiated several 
regulatory measures during 2004-05 to ensure the growth of UCBs along sound 
lines. 
 
Regulation and Supervision of UCBs 
 
The Reserve Bank is entrusted with the responsibility of regulation and 
supervision of the banking related activities of primary co-operative banks 
under the Banking Regulation  (B.R.) Act, 1949 As Applicable to Co-operative 
Societies (AACS). Other aspects such as incorporation, registration, 
administration, management and winding-up of UCBs are supervised and 
regulated by the respective State Governments through Registrars of Co-
operative Societies (RCS) under the Co-operative Societies Acts of the 
respective States. UCBs with a multi state presence are registered under the 
Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 and are regulated and supervised 
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jointly by the Central Government through Central Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies and the Reserve Bank.  
 
The current legislative framework provides for dual control over UCBs. For 
resolving problems arising out of dual control regime, a draft legislative bill 
proposing certain amendments to the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (AACS), 
based on the recommendations of the High Powered Committee on UCBs, was 
forwarded to the Government. Pendingthe amendment to the Act, the Reserve 
Bank is entering into a regulatory arrangement with the State Governments 
through Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to facilitate proper and 
coordinated regulation and supervision of UCBs. MoUs have already been 
signed between the Reserve Bank and three States that have a large network of 
UCBs, viz., Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Karnataka. As a follow-up to the 
signing of MoUs, the Reserve Bank has constituted TAFCUBs in these States 
(Box IV.2). Efforts are being made to enter into MoUs with other States having 
a large number of UCBs. 
 
Licensing of New Banks/Branches 
 
Consequent upon the easing of licensing norms in May 1993, more than 800 
licenses were issued (up to June 2001) for setting up urban cooperative banks. 
However, close to one-third of these newly licensed UCBs became financially 
weak within a short period (Appendix Table IV.2 and Appendix Table IV.3). 
There was, thus, a need to moderate the pace of growth of this sector, 
particularly given the vexatious issue of dual control over UCBs. The Reserve 
Bank proposed certain amendments to the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 
(AACS) to overcome the difficulties arising out of dual control. Pending 
enactment of these amendments, it was announced in the Annual Policy 
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Statement for 2004-05 that issuance  of fresh licenses would be considered only 
after a comprehensive policy on UCBs, including an appropriate legal and 
regulatory framework for the sector, is put in place and a policy for improving 
the financial health of the urban cooperative banking sector is formulated. 
Accordingly, at present, applications for banking license, including license for 
opening of new branches, are not considered. 
 
Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning Norms 
  
In line with the international best practice and extant practices in commercial 
banks in India, it was decided to reduce the time period for reckoning an 
advance as non-performing from the existing 180 days to 90 days with effect 
from March 31, 2004. However, subsequently keeping in view the 
representations received from co-operative federations/banks, small loans up to 
Rs.1 lakh, including gold loans, were exempted from the purview of the 90 days 
norm and continue to be governed by 180 days norm. This  exemption has been 
granted only up to March 31, 2006. It was also decided to grant additional time 
of two years, in comparison with commercial banks, to meet the 100 per cent 
provisioning required for advances identified as doubtful for more than three 
years. 
 
Further, taking into consideration representations received from UCBs, it was 
decided to permit certain categories of UCBs to classify loan accounts as NPAs 
based on 180 days delinquency norm instead of 90 days norm. These included 
unit banks, i.e., banks having a single branch/HO and banks having multiple 
branches within a single district with deposits up to Rs.100 crore. The 
relaxation has been given up to the financial year ending March 2007 and banks 
 56 
should build up adequate provisions to comply with the 90 days delinquency 
norm after the stipulated date.  
 
 It was decided to delink the asset classification and provisioning requirements 
in respect of State Government guaranteed  advances and investments from the 
invocation of the State Government guarantee.  
 
Accordingly, asset classification and provisioning norms on State Government 
guaranteed advances would be applicable in the same manner as exposures not 
guaranteed by the State Governments from the year ending March 31, 2006.  
 
Exposure Norms 
 
With a view to avoiding concentration of credit risk, UCBs were advised to fix 
the prudential exposure limits at 15 per cent and 40 per cent of the ‗capital 
funds‘ in the case of a single borrower and a group of borrowers, respectively. 
Banks were also advised that ‗capital funds‘ for the purpose of prudential 
exposure norms would be in relation to bank‘s total capital funds (both Tier-I 
and Tier-II capital) and the exposure for the purpose includes both credit and 
investment exposure (non-SLR). 
 
Know Your Customer (KYC) Guidelines 
 
Know Your Customer (KYC) guidelines were revisited in the context of the  
recommendations made by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) standards and Combating Financing of Terrorism 
(CFT). Detailed guidelines based on the recommendations of the FATF and the 
paper on Customer Due Diligence (CDD) for banks by the Basel Committee on 
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Banking Supervision, with indicative suggestions wherever considered 
necessary, were issued to UCBs. They were advised to ensure that a proper 
policy framework on KYC and also AML measures is formulated and put in 
place with the approval of their Boards. Banks were also advised to ensure full 
compliance with the provisions of these guidelines before December 31, 2005. 
 
Investment Portfolios of UCBs - Relaxations 
 
UCBs were given some relaxation in the prudential norms for their investment 
portfolio in September 2004. They were allowed to exceed the limit of 25 per 
cent of total investment under ‗HTM‘, held till maturity category provided (a) 
the excess comprises only SLR securities, and (b) total SLR securities held in 
‗HTM‘ category are not more than 25 per cent of their NDTL as on the last 
Friday of the second preceding fortnight. Taking into account the difficulties 
faced by UCBs in meeting the provisioning requirements, it was further 
decided, as a special case, to consider relaxing the provisioning requirements 
both for scheduled UCBs and nonscheduled UCBs. Accordingly, scheduled 
UCBs were advised that they may crystallise the provisioning requirement 
arising on account of shifting of securities from ‗HFT‘/‘AFS‘ categories to 
‗HTM‘ category consequent to the issue of guidelines dated September 2, 2004 
and amortise the same over a maximum period of five years commencing from 
the accounting year ended March 31, 2005, with a minimum of 20 per cent of 
such amount each year.  
 
As regards non-scheduled UCBs, they were allowed to shift securities from 
‗HFT‘/‘AFS‘categories to ‗HTM‘ category at book value, subject to the 
following conditions. First, in case the book value is higher than the face value, 
the difference between the book value and the face value, i.e., the premium may 
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be amortised in equal instalment over the remaining period to maturity. If the 
security was obtained at a discount to face value, the difference should be 
booked as profit only at the time of maturity of the security.  
 
Second, the securities transferred under this special dispensation should be kept 
separately under ‗HTM‘ category and should not be transferred back to the 
‗HFT‘/‘AFS‘ category in future in terms of the existing instruction of transfer of 
securities from ‗HTM‘ category.  
 
Third, in normal course, such securities under ‗HTM‘ category should not be 
sold in the market and redeemed on maturity only. However, in exceptional 
circumstances, if such securities are to be sold, profit on sale of investments in 
this category should be first taken to the ‗profit and loss account‘ and thereafter 
be appropriated to the ‗capital reserve‘. Loss on sale will be recognised in the 
‗profit and loss‘ account in the year of sale. 
 
Disclosure Norms 
 
In consonance with the best practices and in the interest of the members and 
depositors, it was decided that disclosure of the details of the levy of penalty on 
a bank would be put in public domain though a Press Release by the Reserve 
Bank. The UCBs were also advised that the penalty should be disclosed in the 
‗Notes on Accounts‘ to their balance sheets in their next Annual Reports.  
 
With a view to indicating the exact status of co-operative banks as also to avoid 
confusion among members of public, all UCBs were advised to display their 
full name on stationery item, publicity material and name board in the form in 
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which it appears in the Certificate of Registration issued by the Registrar of Co-
operative Societies and the licence granted by the Reserve Bank.  
 
Housing Loans under the Priority Sector 
 
In order to improve flow of credit to the housing sector, it was decided that 
UCBs with the approval of their Boards may extend direct finance to the 
housing sector up to Rs.15 lakh per beneficiary of a dwelling unit, irrespective 
of location, against the earlier limit of Rs.10 lakh, as part of their priority sector 
lending.  
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Implementing  Governance in Urban Co-operative Banks  
 
Urban Cooperative Banking is an important constituent of Multi-agency 
banking system operating in the country. These institutions play an important 
role in the economic upliftment of lower and middle-income group of persons. 
In recent years, the functioning of UCBs has come into sharp focus of the 
Government of India and the regulatory and supervisory authorities‘ viz. 
Reserve Bank of India. The weaknesses which have crept into rise urban co-
operative banking system, over the years, leading to failure of some of them, 
have posed systemic threat and shaken the confidence of the general public in 
the system. The problems faced by urban cooperative banks are 
mismanagement, financial impropriety and poor credit and investment 
decisions. The Reserve Bank of India is concerned with the deteriorating health 
of the system and is now focusing lb supervisory attention more closely for 
consolidation of the system. 
 
Defining  Governance 
 
We are hearing day in and day out the need for corporate governance n every 
sphere of business and -, financial activities. Even the State Governments are 
talking of good governance. Corporate governance has become a buzzword in 
today‘s context. There are various definitions of corporate governance by 
different proponents of this concept Let us try to understand the simple 
definition of Corporate Governance. In common parlance, corporate means any 
entity, which is legally binding as a united body and governance means 
direction, control and management. In other words, corporate governance 
means running the affairs of a corporate body by giving appropriate directions 
and with proper management and control. Banking institutions, which are, 
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legally constituted bodies under various statutes, are corporate bodies and they 
have to be run with proper management and control to ensure their profitability 
and financial viability.  
 
Pre-requisites of good Governance  
 
In any banking institution, whether it is a commercial bank or a Co-operative 
bank, its financial performance largely depends upon the efficient functioning 
of Board of management, chief executive officer, senior management, interest, 
shown by the operating staff and shareholders who constitute four pillars of the 
organization. Each of these entities has to act in unison for successful 
operations of the bank. Let us try to understand the role and responsibilities of 
each of these pillars in the effective governance of the organization). 
  
 Depoliticisation of Co-operative banking system  
 
Proper governance in UCBs has not been possible due to political interference. 
In order to depoliticise the system, there should be legal prohibition on the 
MLAs/ MLCs / MPs and other political leaders holding office of profit in state I 
central public sector undertakings to become directors of co-operative banks.  
 
RBI I NABARD should prevail Upon government of India / state government 
to bring suitable amendments to State Co-operative Societies Act / B. R. Act, 
1949 (AACS).  
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1. Need for Cohesive Leadership  
 
2. Formulation of loan and Investment  Policy  
 
3. Investment Policy  
 
4. Business Strategy, Corporate Vision 
 
5. Strengthening of credit appraisal and monitoring system  
 
6. Delegation of Powers  
 
7. Human Resources Development  
 
8. Supervisory role of the Board  
 
Organisation ‘s Philosophy  
 
Every Unit of the Cooperative Credit and Banking Sector should adopt a 
philosophy as a tool for protecting the. interest of its members and stakeholders 
with co-operative principles as the means for implementing the said philosophy. 
This section of the reporting should also spell out the Corporate objectives and 
goals t1Ø be achieved in the form of vision and mission- statement.  
 
Adherence to Cooperative Principles Identity  
 
Cooperatives are distinct from corporate entities as they follow certain basic 
philosophy, principles and values like self-help, mutual help, democratic 
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management, one member one vote, universality of membership, faith in 
cooperative federalism, limited returns on capital, helping the, poor, 
collectivism, cooperative education, training and publicity, member-welfare, 
social obligation and service to community. This philosophy, principles and 
values should be upheld to maintain distinct identity of the cooperatives. How 
these have been practiced and realised should be stated clearly. Corporate 
Governance in cooperatives mean adhering to these principles and practice.  
 
Compliance with provision of Cooperative Law  
 
Cooperatives are governed by Cooperative Law and every cooperative is 
required to follow the law and rules framed there under in letter and spirit. 
Conducting business, maintaining accounts, audit of accounts, holding Board 
and AGM Meetings conduct of elections, etc. should be strictly as per law and 
bye-laws.  
 
Compliance with other Laws and ‘Regulations  
 
Besides cooperative laws there are also other laws like B.R. Act and RBI Act 
applicable to the Cooperatives which are to be complied with. RBI‘s regulations 
like cash ratio & SLR and prudential norms, Asset liability management and 
risk management are other important areas which require effective oversight by 
the Management. These details should be given in the report and reflected in, 
the accounts in a transparent manner. 
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OTHER  ISSUES  
 
Prudential authorities are important stakeholders and play a significant role in 
corporate governance. To some extent, prudential supervision can compensate 
for deficiencies in the corporate governance mechanisms of banks. However, 
this risks creating a circular problem, in the sense that bank shareholders or 
members may rely on supervisors to monitor managers and become complacent 
about corporate governance issues, while supervisors increasingly rely on 
market discipline (exerted by a bank‘s owners). The third pillar under Basel II 
formalizes this reliance on market discipline. 
 
Boards may have limited democratic legitimacy and be biased in favor of 
specific constituencies.  
 
Consistent with their democratic principles, boards in cooperatives are elected 
on a one-member/one-vote basis. This implies that, in mature and large 
cooperatives, members have few incentives to vote. Voting may require a 
degree of effort (e.g., physical presence at the annual meeting) that is 
disproportionate to the influence a single vote buys. The same problem affects 
small shareholders in commercial companies. However, large shareholders in 
commercial companies can aspire to having some influence and have more 
incentives to exert that influence. Small shareholders may free-ride on their 
efforts, calculating that the interests of all shareholders (maximization of 
shareholder value) are aligned anyway. In cooperatives, different constituencies 
of members have different interests, depending on the nature of their 
relationship with the cooperative.  
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Hence, although all members have an equal vote at the annual meeting, 
members with special or disproportionate interests in the policies of the 
cooperative have more incentives to put up the efforts needed to attend - and 
vote at—the annual meetings. Member-employees are one such special interest 
group. If employees tend to be disproportionately present at annual meetings, a 
cooperative bank may start to resemble a worker cooperative rather than a 
consumer cooperative. Large borrowers constitute another such interest group, 
raising the possibility that limited attendance at annual meetings may result in 
borrower interests weighing  is proportionately on the cooperative‘s policies. In 
small communities, local politicians can often use their connections and ability 
to influence large numbers of people to obtain disproportionate power in local 
cooperatives, turning them into semi-public financial institutions. Finally, there 
is a possibility that groups with specific ideological or other objectives may be 
overrepresented at annual meetings. 
 
Member participation and attendance at annual meetings varies significantly, 
depending on the efforts undertaken by managers and boards. Many cooperative 
banks have vibrant member participation and well-attended annual meetings. 
This is especially the case for smaller cooperatives that are still closely 
connected to their base. However, there is also evidence that member 
participation in cooperatives (financial or other) is often very limited, with 
larger and older organizations tending to have lower participation levels. find 
average member participation of two percent in the annual meetings of . 
According to representatives of the cooperative banking sector, typical 
participation rates for Indian cooperative banks are in the five to eight percent 
range, which implies large absolute numbers of participants. 
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It may be difficult for members to influence decisions at the annual meetings. 
Information asymmetries, procedures, and practical difficulties for members to 
organize themselves without the cooperation of management may make it 
difficult for them to challenge management. When applicable, proxy votes tend 
to be given overwhelmingly to the chairperson (Spear, 2004). As a result, 
uncontested board elections are often the norm. While similar problems exist in 
commercial companies, they are likely to be more daunting in cooperatives, in 
part because of the absence of large shareholders. 
 
Adverse selection problems not only affect attendance at annual meetings, but 
also the (self-)selection of candidates for board membership. The factors that 
determine the incentives members face in deciding whether to attend the annual 
meeting also affect their incentives in deciding whether to volunteer for a 
position on the board. Moreover, just as in commercial companies, management 
often has the ability to propose candidates of their own choosing . In many 
cooperatives, members simply vote on a board 
composition that is proposed to them by management . 
 
 
Lay board members may lack the ability to effectively supervise senior 
managers. Whereas board members in commercial companies tend to be 
selected from within the business community and thus have extensive business 
experience, knowledge, and networks, in cooperatives many board members are 
laypeople without the necessary background to effectively support and question 
management. As a result, boards tend to 
become passive receivers of information and the organization tends to become 
management driven . The increasingly complex activities cooperative banks are 
engaging in exacerbate this problem. 
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The cooperative may lack scope to pursue certain objectives through board 
member selection. The constraints on the selection of board members (who 
must typically come from within the membership) imply that cooperatives have 
less ability to use their boards as a tool to create external links with other 
organizations (Cornforth, 2004). In some cooperatives this effect is mitigated by 
the board‘s ability to co-opt external members. 
 
Management performance is harder to measure and monitor. Because 
cooperatives tend to pursue a diversity of goals and managers have to look after 
the interests of different constituencies, there is no simple quantitative gauge of 
management performance (such as profits) in cooperatives. As a result, boards 
may have difficulties accurately assessing and monitoring this performance. 
 
Cooperatives, especially smaller ones, may have problems attracting sufficient 
managerial talent. Small cooperatives in which democratic processes work well 
and personal involvement of members is high may end up with crucial 
management jobs being undertaken by non-professionals. Cooperatives that hire 
professional managers may have difficulties attracting good quality managers if 
their remuneration policies do not allow them to pay market rates. The fact that 
cooperatives cannot offer stock-based compensation plans may be a handicap in 
this regard. Cooperatives frequently seek to overcome these challenges by 
offering training and education to managers, both as a means to raise the quality 
of management and as an incentive. 
 
The market for corporate control cannot function in the case of cooperatives. 
The non-transferability of cooperative shares precludes the possibility of a 
hostile takeover bid and therefore the disciplining effect this possibility may 
exert. Joint-stock subsidiaries of  cooperatives could in theory be subject to 
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hostile takeover bids, but in practice this possibility is typically precluded by 
the cooperative parent(s) holding a majority stake. However, Bechtel (2002) 
note that the market for corporate control often does not work and may in any 
case be undesirably disruptive. Adams and Mehran (2003) note that the 
market for corporate control rarely works for banks. 
 
Block holders do not exist. In many countries, block holders are the dominant 
form of corporate governance arrangement in commercial companies. 
Blockholders are large shareholders, who have the resources, incentives and 
voting power to actively and continuously monitor managers. Small 
shareholders may choose to rely on these blockholders to defend the interest of 
all shareholders. However, blockholders are often primarily concerned with 
their own interests. If they pursue these interests at the expense of those of 
smaller shareholders, the governance challenge is simply transformed rather 
than resolved. 
 
Delegated monitoring can work, but is often absent. Delegated monitoring 
refers to the monitoring of managerial performance by third parties such as 
institutional investors and large creditors. While there is no reason why this 
could not work for cooperatives, in practice there is often no abundance of 
potential delegated monitors (abstracting from prudential authorities, see 
above). Many cooperatives are highly liquid and therefore do not need to 
borrow from third parties, and the membership/investor base typically does not 
include institutional investors. On the other hand, as noted above, quite a few 
European cooperatives have sought financial market exposure and accepted the 
delegated monitoring that this implied. 
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Executive compensation contracts may be more difficult to bring in line with 
member interests. Executive compensation contracts that are designed to align 
managers‘ interests with those of shareholders have long been used as a 
corporate governance mechanism in commercial enterprises, with results that 
have not always generated universal enthusiasm (for a critical assessment, see 
Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker, 2001).  
 
For cooperatives, however, designing such contracts faces a number of 
difficulties. Stock-based compensation plans are generally not possible, and the 
cooperative ideals and culture are unlikely to tolerate monetary incentives at 
anything near the scale of what has become customary in the commercial 
sector. More fundamentally, the breadth, diversity and 
measurement challenges of ―member interests‖ make the design of such 
contracts difficult. 
 
Nonetheless, it should be possible to design compensation contracts that include 
variable compensation in function of managers‘ success in realizing well-
defined and measurable objectives considered crucial for the success of the 
cooperative. 
 
Member lawsuits are unlikely to serve as a disciplining mechanism. The 
combination of clearly defined fiduciary duties and the threat of lawsuits to 
enforce them is an important governance mechanism in the US context (Becht 
et al., 2002), albeit one that is not without disadvantages and is of questionable 
net benefit to shareholders. However, it is generally less applicable in Europe 
and would have to overcome daunting collective action problems in the context 
of a cooperative. For a typical member, joining a lawsuit is not a cost-effective 
undertaking, given the limited financial investment that is at stake, the costs 
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involved, and the low expected value of any compensation that might be 
granted. Only members with special interests may have sufficient incentives to 
engage in a lawsuit, and in doing so they may not seek to let the general interest 
of members prevail. 
 
A Cost-benefit Perspective 
 
Another way of investigating corporate governance challenges is to look at the 
incentives the different actors face. It should be particularly enlightening to 
investigate what incentives principals face in their oversight of agents. This 
section attempts to do so by looking at governance through the prism of a cost-
benefit analysis, as seen from the perspective of members. 
 
Governance costs come in various forms. Hansmann (1996) identifies three 
broad categories of ownership/governance costs: agency costs, which consist of 
costs related to monitoring management and the costs of managerial 
opportunism; costs of collective decision-making; and costs of risk-bearing. In 
the long run, he argues that successful organizations are those that manage to 
minimize these costs. The discussion below applies Hansmann‘s conceptual 
framework, but regroups the cost categories under two headings: 
costs of making governance mechanisms work effectively (costs of monitoring 
management and costs of collective decision-making) and costs that may 
materialize when they do not work effectively (costs of managerial opportunism 
and costs of risk-bearing). The discussion also explicitly considers some 
negative costs (benefits).  
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Costs and benefits related to effective governance mechanisms 
 
Monitoring costs 
 
The dispersed ownership that characterizes cooperatives increases monitoring 
costs, thus reducing incentives for members to engage in effective monitoring. 
For a given level of effectiveness, monitoring costs increase due to duplication, 
as compared to commercial companies with more concentrated ownership. 
Moreover, because efforts by an individual owner have the character of a public 
good for others and because the effectiveness of an individual member‘s efforts 
is likely to be very limited, it is rational for members of large cooperatives to 
refrain from undertaking thorough monitoring. 
 
Costs and benefits of collective decision-making 
 
Hansmann defines costs of collective decision-making as those that result from 
heterogeneity of interests among the owners. He identifies four forms: 
 
• Costly decisions: are decisions that are inefficient in the sense of not 
maximizing the welfare of members as a group. In cooperatives, such 
inefficient decisions can arise because the median member, whose preferences 
tend to determine the outcome of a vote, has different preferences from the 
weighted average member (with the weights being the interest each member has 
in the decision). For example, in a cooperative in 
which 60 percent of members are depositors and 40 percent are borrowers, the 
depositors could systematically vote for policies that maximize their gains, 
rather than for policies that would maximize the combined gains of both 
depositors and borrowers. Costly decisions can also be the result of a minority 
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gaining control over  the political process and pursuing its own interests rather 
than the interests of members as a group. As discussed above, this is a genuine 
risk in cooperatives, given the low incentives for members to get involved in 
their governance. 
 
• Costly process: among the costs of the collective choice process, Hansmann 
identifies the time and effort required from owners to make decisions and the 
possibility of voting cycles. One could add to that the opportunity costs that 
may be generated by lengthy decision-making processes: business opportunities 
may be lost or problems that are damaging the firm or threatening its survival 
may be left unaddressed. In cooperatives, such costs may be substantial, 
especially when the annual meeting takes place only once per year. On the other 
hand, the costs of decision-making processes is contained to a significant extent 
by the degree to which powers are delegated to the board and management. In 
large networks of 
cooperatives, the situation for the network as a whole becomes more difficult 
and processes may be even more costly, though.  
 
• Resolving conflicts: the resolution of conflicts among different (constituencies 
of) members can take a long time or even be impossible, unless there are very 
specific rules for doing so. 
 
Benefits of participation: collective decision-making also has important 
benefits. In many situations, it can produce better and better informed decisions 
that will be implemented with more zeal by everyone involved. In cooperative 
banks, consumer participation in decision-making can be a great strength if it 
assures that the cooperative‘s policies and products are kept in tune with the 
(perhaps rapidly evolving) needs of members. As discussed above, the 
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involvement of member-employees in decision-making also provides 
significant benefits. 
 
Costs that may materialize when governance is not effective 
 
Costs of managerial opportunism 
 
The costs of managerial opportunism can come in various forms, some of which 
are especially relevant in cooperatives. In Hansmann‘s conceptual framework, 
the costs of managerial opportunism are those that result from failure to monitor 
managers with perfect effectiveness. Such costs can range from outright theft to 
the foregone benefits that would have been possible with a more competent or 
harder working management team. While the risk of criminal prosecution is 
likely to put limits on managerial opportunism, a wide range of possibilities 
exist for managers to take advantage of their position without significant risk of 
prosecution. The nature of cooperatives, and in particular the existence of their 
owner-less endowment, renders a number of risks especially relevant: 
 
• Managers could pursue interests other than the general interest of members. 
Such interests could be those of a particular constituency of members, public 
policy interests, or the interests of outside parties that are in one way or another 
connected to the managers. In hybrid groups, there is a risk that managers may 
favor the interests of listed subsidiaries of the group over those of the group as a 
whole and its membership. 
 
• A growing endowment gives management the temptation and resources to 
engage in empire-building. Hansmann points out that one form of managerial 
opportunism is the risk of excessive retention of earnings, which is encouraged 
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by managers‘ desire to retain or build their empire. As noted above, most 
cooperatives have a built-in tendency to retain the bulk of their earnings. 
Managers do not normally have an incentive to change this. Instead, they are 
more likely to seek to expand the cooperative‘s business beyond what is in the 
best interest of members. In doing so, they may engage the cooperative into 
ventures that are undesirably risky from the membership‘s point of view. The 
risks related to empire-building are discussed more in detail in the next section, 
on financial stability. 
 
• Managers may seek, or fail to prevent, appropriation of (part of) the 
cooperative‘s intergenerational endowment. Enjolras (2000) notes that the main 
source of inefficiency in non-profit organizations appears to stem from the 
private appropriation of collective resources by a minority of stakeholders. 
There are various ways in which managers can appropriate the collective 
resources of a cooperative, in particular (the fruits of) its intergenerational 
endowment. A particular risk in hybrid cooperative groups is that the 
endowment is put at the disproportionate disposal of outside investors. 
However, above all, there is a risk that managers may seek or support 
demutualization, regardless of whether this is in the best interest of members. 
 
Costs and benefits of risk-bearing 
 
Members of a cooperative typically bear little risk, which has upsides and 
downsides. Hansmann points out that the costs of ownership also include costs 
related to the right to residual earnings, in particular the costs of bearing risks 
associated with the enterprise. In this area, cooperatives are in a very particular 
situation, because these risks are borne in the first instance by the cooperative‘s 
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intergenerational endowment. Members of cooperatives often also do not 
receive high rates of remuneration on their investment, as 
profits are in part added to the endowment. In sum, members do not face much 
risk— downside or upside—because of the buffer function provided by the 
endowment. 
 
In some countries, members carry risks beyond their membership contribution. 
In Switzerland and Germany, members of cooperative banks are personally 
liable for losses, subject to a limit that exceeds the value of their member 
shares. It is not clear, though, that this liability can be called upon in practice. 
 
Balance of Governance Considerations 
 
On balance, the incentives for management to take advantage of governance 
weaknesses do not seem matched by incentives for members to make 
governance mechanisms work. With no ownership rights over the cooperative‘s 
intergenerational endowment and low costs of risk-bearing, members face few 
incentives to undertake costly efforts to participate in governance mechanisms 
that are in many cases ineffective and 
characterized by a public-good nature. For managers, though, the presence of 
this endowment provides incentives to exploit corporate governance 
weaknesses in order to build empires or appropriate part of the endowment.  
 
Competitive markets exert a disciplining effect on a cooperative but also reduce 
the incentives for members to participate in its governance. The more 
competitive a market is, the less consumer surplus there is likely to be gained 
from participating in the governance mechanisms of a cooperative. It is often 
simply much more cost-effective to go buy from the competition. Although 
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banking tends to be an oligopolistic market that is at times characterized by 
rather high profit margins, in many cases there is not enough to be gained for a 
member of a cooperative from seeking active involvement in its governance.  
 
Governance challenges have led to the demise of quite a few cooperatives, 
although many others have prospered. The governance challenges discussed 
above have manifested themselves throughout the history of cooperative banks 
in Europe (see, for example, Pedelty, 1999).11 However, the success and 
longevity of many cooperative banks indicates clearly that these challenges are 
not insurmountable. 
 
Even more than is the case for commercial organizations, the success or failure 
of cooperatives may depend on the people who run them. Many cooperatives 
are run by managers who genuinely want the best for their firm and derive 
satisfaction from generating benefits for members and employees. Such non-
monetary drivers of motivation are usually not captured in theoretical models 
based on the assumption that people seek to maximize their own 
income/consumption. In this regard, Hansmann (1996) notes that pride and 
moral suasion provide important motivation to managers to work for the best 
interest of their firm, and that many organizations have thrived without 
(effective oversight by) owners. Given this, difficulties for owners to exercise 
direct control may ―only result in a modest amount of organizational slack, at 
least when compared with any realistic alternative.‖  (2005) 
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Conclusions  
 
In conclusion, it is essential that the cooperative banking sector adopts 
Cooperative Governance Practices on the lines of Corporate Governance‘ 
Practices adopted by the corporate sector including commercial banks. While 
the corporate governance practices are legally binding on corporate, there is no 
such compulsion for cooperative banks today except that they have to follow 
the cooperative principles, cooperative and other laws and regulatory norms 
prescribed by RBI / NABARD, etc. Even these governance practices they 
follow are not reported and there is hardly any transparency. The management 
has to demonstrate its accountability and responsibility to the members and 
other stakeholders. Truthful and accurate disclosure in a transparent manner is 
the essence of corporate governance which the cooperative banking sector 
should follow voluntarily. This will contribute significantly to enhance the 
image and credibility of the sector. 
 
 
Step for Strengthening Through Corporate Governance in Co-operative 
Banks In India: 
 
 The literature on corporate governance in its wider connotation covers a 
range of issues such as protection of shareholders‘ rights, enhancing 
shareholders‘ value, Board issues including its composition and role, 
disclosure requirements, integrity of accounting practices, the control 
systems, in particular internal control systems. Corporate governance 
especially in the co-operative sector has come into sharp focus because 
more and more co-operative banks in India, both in urban and rural areas, 
have experienced grave problems in recent times which has in a way 
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threatened the profile and identity of the entire co-operative system. 
These problems include mismanagement, financial impropriety, poor 
investment decisions and the growing distance between members and 
their co-operative society. 
 
 The purpose and objectives of cooperatives provide the framework for 
cooperative corporate governance. Co-operatives are organised groups of 
people and jointly managed and democratically controlled enterprises. 
They exist to serve their members and depositors and produce benefits 
for them. Co-operative corporate governance is therefore about ensuring 
co-operative relevance and performance by connecting members, 
management and the employees to the policy, strategy and decision-
making processes. 
 
 In fact, the very definition of corporate governance stems from its 
organic link with the entire gamut of activities having direct or indirect 
influence on the financial health of corporate entities. For the Nobel 
Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman, who was one of the first to 
attempt a definition, corporate governance is to conduct business in 
accordance with owner or shareholders‘ desires which generally will be 
to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules 
of the society embodied in law and local customs. In subsequent 
definitions, the scope of corporate governance has got expanded. While 
some experts say corporate governance means doing everything better, to 
improve relations between companies and their shareholders, to 
encourage people to think long-term, to ensure that information needs of 
all shareholders are met and to ensure that executive management is 
monitored properly in the interest of shareholders, the Former President 
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of World Bank, Mr. James Wolfensohn had said that corporate 
governance is about promoting corporate fairness, transparency and 
accountability. A more comprehensive definition has come from the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
which identifies corporate governance as the system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled. Here the corporate governance 
structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation, such as the Board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and 
procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, not 
only does it provide the structure through which the company objectives 
are set, it also provides the means of attaining these objectives and 
monitoring performance. 
 
 It will certainly not be out of place here to recount how issues relating to 
corporate governance and corporate control have come to the fore the 
world over in the recent past. The seeds of modern corporate governance 
were probably sown by the Watergate scandal in the USA. Subsequent 
investigations by US regulatory and legislative bodies highlighted control 
failures that had allowed several major corporations to make illegal 
political contributions and bribe government officials. 
 
 While these developments in the US stimulated debate in the UK, a spate 
of scandals and collapses in that country in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
led shareholders and banks to worry about their investments. Several 
companies in UK which saw explosive growth in earnings in the ’80s ended the 
decade in a memorably disastrous manner. Importantly, such spectacular 
corporate failures arose primarily out of poorly managed business practices. 
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 This debate was driven partly by the subsequent enquiries into corporate 
governance (most notably the Cadbury Report) and partly by extensive 
changes in corporate structure. In May 1991, the London Stock Exchange 
set up a Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Arian Cadbury to help 
raise the standards of corporate governance and the level of confidence in 
financial reporting and auditing by setting out clearly what it sees as the 
respective responsibilities of those involved and what it believes is 
expected of them. The Committee investigated accountability of the 
Board of Directors to shareholders and to the society. It submitted its 
report and associated ‗code of best practices‘ in December 1992 wherein 
it spelt out the methods of governance needed to achieve a balance 
between the essential powers of the Board of Directors and their proper 
accountability. Being a pioneering report on corporate governance, it 
would perhaps be in order to make a brief reference to its 
recommendations which are in the nature of guidelines relating to, among 
other things, the Board of Directors and Reporting and Control. 
 
 The Cadbury Report stipulated that the Board of Directors should meet 
regularly, retain full and effective control over the company and monitor 
the executive management. There should be a clearly accepted division of 
responsibilities at the head of the company which will ensure balance of 
power and authority so that no individual has unfettered powers of 
decision. The Board should have a formal schedule of matters 
specifically reserved to it for decisions to ensure that the direction and 
control of the company is firmly in its hands. There should also be an 
agreed procedure for Directors in the furtherance of their duties to take 
independent professional advice. 
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 On Reporting and Control, the Cadbury Report recommended that the 
Board should ensure that an objective and professional relationship is 
maintained with the auditors. It is the Board‘s duty to present a balanced 
and understandable assessment of the company‘s position, the report said. 
The Board should establish an Audit Committee with written terms of 
reference which deal clearly with its authority and duties. The Directors 
should explain their responsibility for preparing the accounts next to a 
statement by the auditors about their reporting responsibilities. The 
Directors should also report on the effectiveness of the company‘s system 
of internal control. The report also stipulated that the Directors should 
report that the business is a going concern with supporting assumptions 
or qualifications as necessary. 
 
 The Cadbury Report generated a lot of interest in India. The issue of 
corporate governance was studied in depth and dealt with by the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Associated Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM) and Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI). These studies reinforced the Cadbury Report‘s 
focus on the crucial role of the Board and the need for it to observe a 
Code of Best Practices. Co-operative banks as corporate entities possess 
certain unique characteristics. Paradoxical as it may sound, evolution of 
co-operatives in India as peoples‘ organisations rather than business 
enterprises adopting professional managerial systems has hindered 
growth of professionalism in cooperatives and proved to be a neglected 
area in their evolution. 
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 Professionalism reflects the co-existence of high level of skills and 
standards in performing duties entrusted to an individual. The absence of 
a proper system of placement and skill upgradation inputs constrain 
professional management in co-operative banks. Though there is a 
system of training in place in many co-operative banks, attempts are 
seldom made to match them with the current and future staff 
requirements. It is desirable that the training programmes encompass skill 
upgradation and aptitude development in full measure. It is also 
necessary to keep the staff sufficiently motivated through periodic job 
rotation, job enrichment and recognition of performance. The co-
operative banks should indeed work like professional organisations on 
sound managerial systems in tune with the needs of the time taking care 
of future projections of requirements to retain and improve their market 
share and identity in the long run. It is in this context that professionalism 
and accountability of the banks‘ boards assume such critical significance. 
 
 Regulators are external pressure points for good corporate governance. 
Mere compliance with regulatory requirements is not however an ideal 
situation in itself. In fact, mere compliance with regulatory pressures is a 
minimum requirement of good corporate governance and what are 
required are internal pressures, peer pressures and market pressures to 
reach higher than minimum standards prescribed by regulatory agencies. 
RBI‘s approach to regulation in recent times has some features that 
would enhance the need for and usefulness of good corporate governance 
in the co-operative sector. The transparency aspect has been emphasised 
by expanding the coverage of information and timeliness of such 
information and analytical content. Importantly, deregulation and 
operational freedom must go hand in hand with operational transparency. 
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In fact, the Reserve Bank Governor‘s April 2002 Monetary and Credit 
Policy announcements have made it clear that with the abolition of 
minimum lending rates for co-operative banks, it will be incumbent on 
these banks to make the interest rates charged by them transparent and 
known to all customers. Banks have therefore been asked to publish the 
minimum and maximum interest rates charged by them and display this 
information in every branch. Disclosure and transparency are thus key 
pillars of a corporate governance framework because they provide all the 
stakeholders with the information necessary to judge whether their 
interests are being taken care of. We in the Reserve Bank see 
transparency and disclosure as an important adjunct to the supervisory 
process as they facilitate market discipline of banks. 
 
 Another area which requires focused attention is greater transparency in 
the balance sheets of co-operative banks. The commercial banks in India 
are now required to disclose accounting ratios relating to operating profit, 
return on assets, business per employee, NPAs, etc. as also maturity 
profile of loans, advances, investments, borrowings and deposits. The 
issue before us now is how to adapt similar disclosures suitably to be 
captured in the audit reports of co-operative banks. The Reserve Bank 
had advised Registrars of Co-operative Societies of the State 
Governments in 1996 that the balance sheet and profit & loss account 
should be prepared based on prudential norms introduced as a sequel to 
Financial Sector Reforms and that the statutory/departmental auditors of 
cooperative banks should look into the compliance with these norms. 
Auditors are therefore expected to be well-versed with all aspects of the 
new guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank and ensure that the profit & 
loss account and balance sheet of co-operative banks are prepared in a 
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transparent manner and reflect the true state of affairs. Auditors should 
also ensure that other necessary statutory provisions and appropriations 
out of profits are made as required in terms of Cooperative Societies 
Act/Rules of the state concerned and the bye-laws of the respective 
institutions. 
 
 Appropriate internal control systems become even more critical in the 
context of the growing emphasis on diversification of business products 
as the prime need at all levels in co-operative credit institutions. It is 
indeed necessary for co-operative banks to devote adequate attention to 
maximising their returns on every unit of resources through an effective 
funds management strategy and mechanism. One prime component of the 
investment portfolio of the co-operative banks which has attracted a lot of 
attention -unfortunately for all the wrong reasons - is their transaction in 
government securities. So much so that it has even triggered the holding 
of today‘s Convention. 
 
 The financial sector reforms in India have sought to achieve, among other 
things, improvement in the financial health and competitive capabilities 
by means of prescription of prudential norms. The cooperative banks 
have also thus been put under the prudential norms regime to bring about 
the desirable level of transparency in their balance sheets. While urban 
co-operative banks (UCBs) have been subjected to income recognition, 
asset classification, provisioning and other related norms in a phased 
manner beginning April 1992, these prudential norms including asset 
classification and provisioning (excluding the capital adequacy ratio) 
were made applicable to the State Co-operative Banks (SCBs) and 
District Central Co-operative Banks (DCCBs) from the year 1996-97 and 
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extended to Agriculture and Rural Development Banks (ARDBs) from 
1997-98. 
 
 The Reserve Bank had also issued comprehensive guidelines transactions 
in securities to all co-operative banks - both urban and rural - as early as 
in September 1992. Detailed guidelines have been given therein on 
transactions through brokers, Subsidiary General Ledger (SGL) facility, 
issue of Bankers Receipts, internal control systems, audit and review 
systems, etc. As per the guidelines in force, each bank is required to 
formulate an investment policy, with the approval of its Board. Banks 
have been advised that all transactions in Government Securities for 
which SGL facility is available should be put through SGL accounts 
only. Certain discipline has also been introduced for transactions through 
SGL accounts for minimising settlement risks through a framework for 
penal action against bouncing of SGL transfer forms for want of 
sufficient balance in the SGL account or current account. 
 
 Banks were advised that only brokers registered with National Stock 
Exchange (NSE) or Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) or Over the Counter 
Exchange of India (OTCEI) should be utilised for acting as intermediary. 
If the deal is put through a broker, the role of the broker should be 
restricted to that of bringing the two parties to the transaction together. 
The settlement of the transaction, namely, both funds settlement and 
security settlement should be made directly between the counter parties. 
With a view to ensuring that a disproportionate volume of transactions is 
not routed through one or a few broker, a prudential ceiling of 5 per cent 
of the total transactions (both purchases and sales) has been prescribed 
for routing transactions through an individual broker. In case any bank is 
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required to exceed the prudential ceiling of 5 per cent for any broker, the 
bank is required to inform the Board indicating the reasons therefor post-
facto. Banks have also been advised to have proper internal control 
measures for monitoring the transactions in government securities. 
 
 Regulatory policy can however only set the broad contours of an 
appropriate investment strategy. It is no guarantee for articulation and 
implementation of commercially sound investment decisions by lending 
institution(s). Even the most comprehensive regulatory framework and 
effective supervisory system need not be a foolproof mechanism against 
a pliant management acting in collusion with unscrupulous clients. 
Supervision is only periodic and therefore it cannot be a substitute for 
effective and continuous internal control backed by an independent and 
efficacious audit system. Towards this, it is imperative to have in place 
Audit Committees of the Board independent of the management in 
cooperative banks. It may well be recalled that with the extension of the 
Banking Regulations (BR) Act to the UCBs in 1966 and deposit 
insurance in 1971, people‘s confidence in the co-operative sector had 
taken a big leap forward. So much so that today the non-member deposits 
in urban banks far exceed member deposits. Nothing would be more 
tragic if we fritter away these advantages and allow indiscipline and lack 
of commitment in these banks make people‘s trust in the cooperative 
sector a casualty. 
 
 One important issue that has engaged much attention in the recent past is 
the duality of control over co-operative banks. In terms of the Co-
operative Societies Acts of respective States, the Registrar of Co-
operative Societies was the sole regulator and supervisor of all the 
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societies registered in his State including societies carrying on banking 
business. With the application of BR Act, 1949 (AACS) to cooperative 
banks, this position has since changed. While the Reserve Bank now 
regulates and supervises banking activities carried on by urban co-
operative societies, supervision of State Co-operative Banks and District 
Central Co-operative Banks is carried out by National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). The core principles of 
supervision in relation to co-operative banks have thus to be formulated 
and implemented by the Reserve Bank in respect of UCBs and by 
NABARD in respect of SCBs and DCCBs and there is an emergent need 
to constantly beef up the supervisory system through proper on-site 
monitoring and adequate off-site surveillance. We also need to analyse 
and pick up early warning signals, if any, in respect of any such 
irregularities in the investment portfolio of these banks from the periodic 
review reports on such transactions which are received from them. There 
is also an urgent need for clarity in defining the roles of various control 
institutions by streamlining processes, procedures, etc. for removing 
overlapping of controls over cooperative banks presently vested with 
State Governments, the Reserve Bank and NABARD, as the may be. It is 
in this context that the Governor‘s Monetary and Credit Policy 
announcement in April 2001 had stressed the need for a separate 
regulatory agency for the co-operative banks. This issue is being debated 
in various quarters. 
 
 Credit institutions are linked to each other through a complex chain of 
inter-bank relationships which - as recent instances have showed - in any 
event of difficulty become mechanisms for spread of the contagion effect. 
Signs of financial mismanagement in an institution or a group of 
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institutions regardless of the reasons is liable to set off similar problems 
in other institutions and open serious risks in the financial system. It is in 
this context that good corporate governance assumes critical importance. 
Power and decision-making in co-operative banks are all too often 
concentrated at the top in too few hands. Cooperative performance has 
therefore been for a long time characterised by lack of participation and 
sense of involvement. Active members who feel that they are part of an 
organisation that has goals in harmony with their own and clear roles for 
constructively engaged, competent governing bodies and management 
would be a powerful force to build co-operative identity and excellence. 
It is perhaps time that the State Governments refashioned management in 
co-operative banks by picking up threads of good corporate governance. 
 
 Success of economic decisions depends after all on the human resources 
at the disposal of any organisation. A change is needed today in the co-
operative banks which is built on confidence in human capital - the most 
important of all resources - in commitment, creativity and innovation 
brought about by proactive management, membership and employees. 
Strong corporate governance that takes its obligations seriously can truly 
be a source of strength to the management. The ability to capture 
knowledge and wisdom gives co-operative banks their competitive 
advantage. A prerequisite is that participants from all parts of a co-
operative organisation know and understand its purpose, core values and 
visions. 
 
 In the years to come, the Indian financial system will grow not only in 
size but also in complexity as the forces of competition gain further 
momentum and financial markets acquire greater depth. The real success 
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of our financial sector reforms will however depend primarily on the 
organisational effectiveness of the banks, including co-operative banks, 
for which initiatives will have to come from the banks themselves. It is 
for the co-operative banks themselves to build on the synergy inherent in 
the co-operative structure and stand up for their unique qualities. With 
elements of good corporate governance, sound investment policy, 
appropriate internal control systems, better credit risk management, focus 
on newly-emerging business areas like micro finance, commitment to 
better customer service, adequate mechanisation and proactive policies 
on house-keeping issues, co-operative banks will definitely be able to 
grapple with these challenges and convert them into opportunities.  
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Rationale of the Study 
 
The surfacing of the co-operative banks scam has once again, the financial 
sector and its markets fell victim to the regulator’s failure to check malpractices 
within the system. The new scam involving the co-operative sector points to a 
crying need to have a speedier and better coordinated process for dealing with 
financial frauds as well as an effective governance structure and settlement 
system for efficient functioning of financial institutions. 
 
The RBI found 25 urban co-operative banks – spread across Gujarat, 
Maharashtra and West Bengal to be in violation of the RBI norms. In all, these 
banks are suspected to have run up losses of around Rs. 500 crores. As more 
than one co-operative bank is involved, it is feared that this could be only the tip 
of the iceberg. In November 2001, the RBI found that these banks had flouted 
banking norms stipulated by it.  
 
The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) is the 
supervising body for all rural co-operative banks with the RBI as a regulator 
making the rules for these banks. However, the day-to-day administration of 
these banks is supervised by the RCS that come under State governments. 
Urban co-operative banks are monitored by the RBI and the RCS. 
 
The RBI appointed Madhav Rao Committee on Urban Co-operative Banks, the 
Jagdish Capoor Report on Co-operative Credit and the Expert Committee on 
Legal aspects of Bank Frauds 2001 were unanimous on the need for a 
restructuring of co-operative banks and abolition of its dual management.  
 
Eventhough the RBI made its representation to the Government on dual 
management; the Union Government does not want to take a view on this. In the 
Credit and Monetary Policy 2002-03, the RBI noted, “The events in the last two 
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years have made it abundantly clear that the present system of dual/triple 
regulatory and supervisory control (involving Centre, States and the RBI) is not 
conducive to efficient functioning of the co-operative banks in the interest of 
their depositors. Several committees in the past have also recommended 
elimination of multiple layers of supervision and regulation of this sector. 
 
In view of the local interest involved, it is also clear that there is no consensus at 
present in favour of removing supervisory and regulatory responsibilities at 
Central/State government levels and for entrusting it exclusively to the RBI. As 
a result, the managements and boards of several co-operative institutions 
continue to reflect political interests rather than genuine co-operative spirit, and 
are not always amenable to normal banking discipline in their operations. In 
view of this, it would be best, in the interest of the public depositors, it the 
situation is faced squarely and a separate supervisory authority is set up, with 
representatives of Centre, State and other interested elements. Such a body can 
then be exclusively made responsible for efficient functioning of the co-
operative institutions and also take responsibility for ensuring the safety of 
public deposits.” 
 
While the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is pointing fingers at political 
interference and lack of professionalism in the state UCBs, the co-operative 
banking sector feels a mixture of dual control between the RBI and the State 
government is as much to blame, and has demanded more teeth on the recovery 
front. 
 
The State Government, for once, is playing it out in a rather subdued manner, 
going easy on the rhetoric that one saw during the days of the Madhavpura 
Mercantile Co-operative Bank (MMCB) debacle. Instead, it is taking out a 
delegation this week to meet the RBI brass in Mumbai. Being conveniently 
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swept under the carpet by all and sundry is that everybody saw it coming and no 
evasive action was taken. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Problem of the Study : 
 
The Statement of the problem is “A STUDY ON GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES IN CO-OPERATIVE BANKS.” 
 
Objectives of the Study : 
 
The main aim of the study is to analyze the present status of Governance in 
Urban Cooperative Banks (UCBs). The specific objectives of the study are: 
 
1. To study and understand the concept and genesis of Cooperative Banks 
in India in general and Gujarat in particular. 
 
2. To understand and analyze the importance of Governance in Banks in 
general and Cooperative banks in particular. 
 
3. To evaluate the Compliance level of Governance in Urban Cooperative 
banks and to evaluate their performance.  
 
4. To identify and discuss various challenges faced by UCBs to implement 
governance mechanism. 
 
5. To suggest various means through which Governance practices can be 
improved so as to increase the efficiency of Cooperative Banks. 
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Universe of the study: 
 
The study is carried out in among the various urban co-operative banks of 
western part of India especially Gujarat. This includes some of the major UCBs 
banks of Gujarat.  
 
Period of Study, Data Collection, Sample for the Study and Analysis: 
 
The present study is made on the basis of data collected from primary and 
secondary sources. The primary data are collected through structured 
questionnaire from different managers, Board of Directors of UCBs. Researcher 
has sent the questionnaire to all the urban co-operatives chairman. From the 
received questionnaire 22 questionnaire were filled up according to the 
requirement of present research. The list of such bank presented in the 
annexure. The structured interview method was employed for knowing the 
governance practices adopted by their respective banks. The secondary data 
collected from the journals, magazines, government publications and annual 
reports of UCBs. The data collected were recorded, edited, classified and 
analysed using relevant statistical techniques and employing appropriated test. 
The data are presented through simple classification and with the help of 
percentage, average, correlation and association. 
 
Contribution from the Study: 
 
The present study is intended to study the governance practices in Co-operative 
Banks and identify the model of governance, which overall will allow UCBs to 
respond to solicitations of the competitive environment. The elements of sound 
governance and values of cooperative sectors UCBs should grapple the 
challenges and convert them in opportunities.   
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Overview of Chapter Plan 
 
Chapter 1 - Overview of Banking Industry  in India 
 
This chapter will highlight the status of Indian Banking Sector in India. Which 
includes current scenario of Indian Banking Industry, Aggregate performance of 
Indian Banking Industry, Challenges faces by Indian Banking Industry, Bank 
marketing in Indian Perspective, Challenges to Indian Banking Industry and 
banking Industry vision 2020. 
 
Chapter 2 - Overview of Co-operative Banks in India 
 
This chapter will cover the Growth and Structure of the Indian Co-operative, 
Urban Co-operative Banks - The Concept, Growth and Development of the 
UCBs in India ,Growth and Development of the UCBs in Gujarat, Role of the 
UCBs in Indian Banking System, Evaluation of the Role of UCBs, UCBs – 
Problems and Prospects, UCBS – Recent Regulatory Measures, Future of 
UCBs, Recent Developments and Facts about Cooperative banks in India  
 
Chapter 3 – Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
 
This chapter will include the review of existing literature available from several 
journals, magazines, website and published data from several research agencies. 
This chapter has highlights the status of Corporate Governance in Indian Banks 
and the various recommendations required to comply by Cooperative Banks so 
as to strengthen the governance mechanism.  
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Chapter 4 - Research Methodology 
 
The chapter will include comprehensive objectives of the study. The objectives 
will be defined based on present status and future possible recommendations 
given by the committees and central bank of India.  
This chapter will include the methodology adopted for the research – it will 
include the universe of the study – sampling design – sampling unit - 
Classification of samples – period of study – Data collection and analysis tolls 
adopted for the study etc. 
 
Chapter 5 - Analysis & Interpretation of Governance practices 
 
The various statistical tools will be adopted for the data analysis and findings 
will be represented in form of charts and graphs. 
 
Chapter 6 - Summary of findings & Suggestions 
 
The detailed findings of the research will be presented in this chapter and 
appropriate suggestion would be made for implementing good governance 
mechanism in UCBs 
 
Limitation of the Study 
 
All efforts have been made to ensure that the research is design and conducted 
to optimize the ability to achieve the research objective. However there are 
some constrains that do not validate the research but made to be acknowledge.  
1. This study is restricted to the state of Gujarat only. 
2. This evaluation is based on primary data generated through questionnaire 
and collected from the respondents and as such its findings depend on 
accuracy of data. 
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3. The sample consists of more than 500 urban Indian consumers from 
different cities of Gujarat State. The sample is selected conveniently and 
in single phase so as the opinion suggested by the executives is situation 
based. Also study is limited to the consumers who come to Malls and 
does not delve the respondents who do not come to mall.  
4. As the primary data and observational method of research has its own 
limitations and based on the respondent the study is limited to Gujarat 
state only and it cannot be applicable to the consumers of the other states 
of India or at International Level. 
5. The study is based on the response of the customer who is highly 
subjective in nature and hence generalization made may not be totally 
true. 
6. During the course of personal interview the subjective nature of 
interviewers might also have influence upon the response-received for the 
present study. 
7. Certain issues in the study concentrate on both perceptions and attitude of 
respondents. 
8. The major tool which is used for evolution, is 5 point, scale known as 
liker scale and nominal scale and thus it has its own limitations.  
9. Consistent data from secondary sources was available for last six years 
only, moreover the data were processed to four years on an average basis 
wherever required.  
10. Researcher being an outsider, external analyst obviously has no access to 
the internal information therefore it is hard to characterize inside view of 
the Banks in the study.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Analysis and Interpretation of Governance Practices  
 
Empirical Analysis of Data 
 
 Age of the Bank: 
 No. of Branches 
 Board Members: 
 Board Accountability 
 Responsibilities of the Board 
 No. of Directors 
 Appointment of Board Members: 
 Professional Qualifications of Board Members 
 The powers of the Board 
 Duties & Responsibilities of the Board 
 Board’s Effectiveness 
 Board meetings 
 Assessment of Performance and Effectiveness 
 Board Committees 
 Internal Audit 
 Concurrent Audit: 
 Appointment of Auditors: 
 Established Practices for Auditors: 
 Compliance with IFRS: 
 Induction and training 
 Conflict of interest 
 Appointment and tenure of office 
 Succession plans  
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 Shareholding 
 Strategy, values, performance and compliance 
 Reports to Regulators: 
 Risk Management 
 Corporate Social responsibility 
 Legal framework 
 Governance Effectiveness: 
 Role of Apex Bank in effective governance: 
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Empirical Analysis of Data: 
 
Age of the Bank: 
 
There are 351 co-operative banks in Gujarat and out of 22 banks were 
sampled for the survey. The banks have been in Gujarat for a period ranging 
from 15 to 81 years.  36% banks have been more than 50 years old. 18% 
banks are in the range of 31-40 years. In the 21-30 years range 14% banks 
covered. 23% banks have age range between 16-20 years. Only 9% banks 
have age less than 16 years.  
 
Table – 5.1 
Age of the Bank 
 
Years of 
Establishment >16 16-20 21-30 31-40 50> Total 
No. of Banks 2 5 3 4 8 22 
Percentage 9 23 14 18 36 100 
 
Figure 5.1 
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All the banks under study were run under the cooperative sector. The 
services offered by the banks include commercial retail banking and 
corporate banking.  
 
No. of Branches 
 
 
Table –  5.2 
 
No. of Branches of Sample Banks 
 
No. of 
Branches >5 6-10 11-15 15-20 20> Total 
No. of Banks 8 8 2 1 3 22 
Percentage 36 36 9 5 14 100 
 
Figure 5.2 
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The number of branches of sample banks ranged from 1 to 38. 36% of 
sample banks have less than 5 branches. 36% banks have 6 to 10 branches. 
9% banks have branches of 11 to 15. 5% banks have branches of 15 to 20. 
14% banks have branches more than 20. 
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Board Members: 
 
The board of directors or commissioners is the key internal corporate gov-
ernance mechanism of a bank, and its role and effectiveness determine the 
quality of corporate governance to a large extent. The results of the factual 
information surveys about the board of directors, complemented by the opin-
ion surveys of board members, provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the 
boards at banks in these sample banks. The salient board characteristics 
include board accountability, overall responsibilities, composition and meet-
ings, the roles of the CEO and independent directors, board committees, and 
related-party transactions. 
 
Board Accountability 
Respondents in all four countries indicated that the board was accountable to 
the shareholders, depositors, and creditors. Except in Indonesian banks, 
where respondents believed that the board was mainly accountable to the 
depositors, board members felt that they were mainly accountable first to the 
shareholders and then to the depositors and creditors in terms of their impor-
tance. 
 
It appears, however, that when making corporate decisions the board was 
highly concerned about the controlling shareholder. Except for in Thailand, 
the board members ranked the controlling shareholder as the most important 
person and the minority shareholders and depositors as the second-most-
important persons they are responsible to. Interestingly, the opinion survey 
also indicated that the financial supervisory agency was at the lowest rank of 
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the pecking order in terms of importance to which the board is accountable 
to. This was true in all four countries. 
 
Responsibilities of the Board 
 
The banking laws and regulations of all four countries defined the role and 
responsibilities of the board of directors quite clearly. As specified by the 
banking laws and regulations, the board was involved in all major tasks in 
the banks, namely: 
 
 nominating, replacing, and monitoring the CEO and key executives, 
 formulating, reviewing and guiding corporate strategies, 
 approving and reviewing risk management and the internal control 
system, 
 setting performance objectives and monitoring business operations, 
 monitoring disclosures, related-party transactions, and self-dealings, 
 monitoring the financial reporting system, and 
 reviewing the compensation of executive and non-executive directors. 
 
The degree of board involvement in overseeing and implementing major 
corporate policies varies across the banks.  
 
No. of Directors 
 
 The number of Board members ranged from 10 to 29 with 2 banks having 
less than 11 members followed by another 16 banks with members’ size of 
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11-15. 3 banks have board member range 16-20. One bank has board size of 
29 members.   
 
Table – 5. 3 
 
No. of Directors in Sample Banks 
 
No. of Directors >11 11 - 15 16 - 20 21> Total 
Banks 2 16 3 1 22 
Percentage 9 72 14 5 100 
 
 
Figure 5.3 
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Appointment of Board Members: 
86% of the banks appointed their Board Members by vote of majority 
shareholders and 9% of the banks appoint their board member by election 
and appointment by the board.  
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Table – 5.4 
 
Appointment of Board Members 
 
Appointment of 
Directors Election 
Election & 
Appointment 
Other 
Process 
Total 
No. of Banks 19 2 1 22 
Percentage 86 9 5 100 
 
 
Figure 5.4 
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* The other processes taking 5% include:  
 Nomination by the Board and the approval of appointment is done by 
the Shareholders. 
 Appointment by the Registrar of Co-operative Banks. 
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In all the cases except one, the numbers of executive non-executive directors 
were always more than that of executive directors. The average number of 
Executive Directors being 2 (with a range of 0 to 6) and Non- Executive 
being 5 (with a range of  0 to 9) respectively for every bank.  
Professional Qualifications of Board Members 
 
Regarding the composition of the Boards in terms of professional 
qualifications, there exists a professional mix which includes Lawyers, 
Banking and finance specialists, Chartered Accountants, Engineers, 
Architects, Economists, and Business Men. Figure 5.4 details this 
breakdown in proportions. 
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Table – 5.5 
 
Professional Qualifications of Board Members 
 
Professional 
Qualifications 
of Board 
Members Lawyers 
Banking & 
Finance CA Economist Engineers 
Business 
Men Others Total 
Percentage 26 8 6 6 4 18 32 100 
No. of 
Directors 82 25 20 18 14 55 99 313 
 
Figure 5.5 
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From figure 5.4 it is noted that majority of Board members of various banks 
are professionals in the areas of Law and followed by Business Men. 26% 
directors were lawyer, 18% directors were business men, 8% directors were 
from the field of banking & finance, 6% directors were Chartered 
Accountant as well as Economist. 32% directors were from other area which 
includes Architects, Management and Insurance specialists. 
 
Men form the majority of Board members of most banks. The number of 
male Board members range from 9 to 14 while female members range from 
0 to 3 with 70% of the banks have no female Board members at all. 
The powers of the Board 
The powers of the Board that were mentioned included: 
 Policy making and decisions. 
 Regulation of issuance and management of shares. 
 Performance reviews 
 Compliance audits 
 Corporate governance 
 
Duties & Responsibilities of the Board 
 Policy formulation in accordance with the relevant Acts. 
 Keeping proper books of accounts. 
 Prepare financial statement while: 
o Selecting suitable accounting policies and then apply them 
consistently. 
o Making judgement and estimates that are reasonable and 
prudent. 
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o Stating whether applicable accounting standards have been 
followed 
o Preparing the financial statements on the going concern basis. 
 Provision of leadership. 
 Formulate strategies. 
 Receive and approve reports of committees. 
 Approve key financial objectives, budgets and business reports. 
 Good corporate governance 
 Approval of loans 
 Approval of expenditures. 
 Ensuring compliance to Statutory and regulatory frameworks. 
 Banking projections. 
 Safeguarding the assets of the bank. 
 
All the banks under the study reported that the responsibilities of the Board 
are clear to both the Directors and the management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
Figure 5.6 
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At least 1 of the banks reported that there are areas of conflict or overlap 
between the responsibilities of the board and management. 
 
These areas of conflict include: 
 All the Board Members being managers 
 The Chairman of the Board being the General Manager. 
 
 
Board’s Effectiveness 
 
Regarding the Board’s effectiveness in terms of leadership, integrity, 
enterprise, judgement and decision making, majority rated their Boards to be 
very effective as shown in table 5.6: 
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Table 5.7 
Board’s Effectiveness 
 
Quality Very 
Effective 
Not very 
Effective 
Effective Total 
Leadership 9 0 1 10 
Integrity 8 0 2 10 
Enterprise 7 1 2 10 
Judgement 8 0 2 10 
Decision 
making 
7 0 3 10 
 
From the table it is noted that most Board’s show very effective leadership 
qualities compared to enterprising and decision making. 
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Board meetings 
 
Table – 5.8 
 
Board Meeting Frequency 
 
Board 
Meetings Fortnight Monthly 
Two 
Monthly Total 
No. of Banks 13 7 2 22 
Percentage 59 32 9 100 
 
Figure 5.8 
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Most Boards (59% ) have 2 meetings in a month. 32% banks have regular 
monthly board meeting. 9% banks have average 6 board meeting in a year.   
In all the cases, the directors receive board papers at least 1 week before 
Board meetings. In 7 banks, the directors receive the papers 1 week in 
advance while in the remaining 3 they receive the papers 2 weeks before the 
meetings. Several ways through which the Board’s deliberations are 
communicated to shareholders and stakeholders were indicated. These 
include: 
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 Circulation of minutes 
 At the Annual General Meetings 
 Quarterly publications 
 
The most commonly used mode of decision making by the Boards is 
consensus (70%) followed by a combination of both consensus and vote 
depending on the magnitude of the matter (30%). In all the banks except 
one, the Board acts as a freely independent decision making organ without 
interference from any individual.  
Assessment of Performance and Effectiveness 
 
Figure 4.4. summarises the extent of the assessment of performance and 
effectiveness of the Boards, individual board members and the Chief 
Executive officers.  
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Table – 5.9 
 
Assessment of Performance and Effectiveness 
 
Assessment of Performance and 
Effectiveness Board Itself Members CEO 
Yes 80 70 80 
No 20 30 20 
Total Percentage 100 100 100 
 
 
Figure 5.9 
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These assessments are normally done annually except for two banks which 
do them quarterly. Only 40% of the banks do make reports from these 
assessments 80% of which are discussed at the Board meetings and the other 
20% at the Annual Genera Meetings. 
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Board Committees 
More than one half (80%) of the Banks have various Committees.  The 
following Committees were recorded: 
 
 Audit 
 Credit and Advances. 
 Human Resources. 
 Investment. 
 External Relations. 
 Asset and Liabilities. 
 Nominations. 
 Tender. 
 Management. 
In terms of membership composition, each Committee is headed by a 
different director. 
Each Committee has at least one Board member and senior management of 
the bank. 
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Table – 5.10 
 
Board Committee 
 
Board Committee % of Sample Banks 
No. of 
Banks 
Audit 59 13 
Investment 23 5 
Credit 100 22 
Deposit 50 11 
Advances 27 6 
Asset Liabilities 77 17 
Settlement 23 5 
Staff 86 19 
 
Figure 5.10 
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It is clear from the above banks all samples bank have credit committee. 
86% of sample banks have staff committee. 77% of sample banks have asset 
liabilities committee. 59% of sample banks have audit committee. 50% 
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banks have deposit committee. Advances committee have 27% of sample 
banks. Investment and settlement committee have 23% of sample bank. 
 
 
Internal Audit 
Table – 5.11 
 
Internal Audit System in Sample Banks 
 
Internal Audit No. Banks % 
Yes 18 82 
No 4 18 
 
Figure 5.11 
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Looking to the above figure it is clear that majority banks (82%) have 
internal audit system, which is done by the qualified auditors. 18% banks do 
not have any internal audit system. 
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Concurrent Audit: 
 
Table – 5.12 
 
Concurrent Audit System in Sample Banks 
 
Concurrent Audit 
No. of 
Banks % 
Yes 22 100 
No 0 0 
 
Figure 5.12 
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All the sample banks (22) have adopted concurrent audit system.  
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Appointment of Auditors: 
 
Table – 5.13 
 
Appointment Procedure of Auditors 
 
Appointment of Auditor No. of Banks % 
Board of Directors 19 86.00 
Registrar of Co-op. Bank 3 14.00 
 
 
Figure 5.13 
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It is revealed from the above graph that in 86% of sample banks board of 
directors appoints their auditor and in 14% of sample banks auditors’ 
appointment is done by registrar of co-operative banks. 
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Established Practices for Auditors: 
 
Table – 5.14 
 
Established Practices for Auditors 
 
Established Practices for Auditors No. of Banks % 
Yes 72 16 
No 18 6 
 
 
Figure 5.14 
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It is evident from the above graph that 72% of sample banks have its 
established practices for auditors and 18% banks have not any established 
practices for its auditor. 
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Compliance with IFRS: 
 
Table – 5.15 
 
Compliance with IFRS of Sample Banks 
 
Compliance with IFRS No. of Banks % 
Yes 32 7 
No 68 15 
 
Figure 5.15 
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It has been observed from the questionnaire that 7 banks were making its 
financial statements with IFRS and 15 banks have not any system for 
compliance of its financial statements with IFRS. 
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Induction and training 
 Only 40% of the banks have induction programmes for new Board 
members.  
 70% have training or development programmes for directors. 
 80% have training or development programmes for  executive 
management. 
 
Conflict of interest 
 
Of all the banks, 20% conceded that there exists conflict of interest among 
the directors. 
The most striking one being that some board members provide contractual 
services to the bank. The solution prescribed being that they disqualify 
themselves from deliberations of the tender awards. 
 
In all the cases, the directors receive compensation for their services on the 
board. These compensations include: 
 Directors fees (basic pay.) 
 Bonus at the end of term. 
 Sitting allowance 
 Loans at subsidised rates. 
 Car mileage. 
 Housing. 
 Entertainment allowances. 
 Transport allowances. 
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In all cases except in two banks (where the allowances are determined by the 
board itself), these allowances are determined by the shareholders at the 
Annual General Meetings. 
 
Appointment and tenure of office 
 
In one bank majority shareholders in conjunction with the Chairman appoint 
the Chief Executive Officer. For state co-operative bank, the government 
does the appointment while for all the rest the appointment is done by the 
Board. Only 3 banks out of 10 have fixed tenure of office for the directors 
and the chairman. 
 
In 80% of the banks, the position of the Chairman and CEO are occupied by 
separate persons. In the other 20% the positions are held by one person. In 
all the cases, the CEO is a member of the board. In all the banks except two, 
there is a clear distinction of the responsibilities of the Chairperson of the 
Board and the CEO.  
 
 
Succession plans  
 
The succession plans for the Board, CEO and Senior management do exist in 
varied scenarios in different banks as shown in figure 5.15. 
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Figure 5.17 
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It is apparent that Most banks have succession plans for senior management 
compared to that of the Board and the CEO. 
 
some of the secession plans recorded include: 
 External and internal training for management 
 An arrangement where every head of a department has a deputy 
 Existing executive under the CEO. 
 In one bank, the succession plan for the Board is that the next of kin 
of each member is nominated by the member in readiness to take 
over. 
 
Shareholding 
In two banks, one which is a state co-operative bank, the share holders are 
not able to exercise the authority to ensure that only competent and reliable 
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persons are elected or appointed to the board of directors. Neither do they 
have the power to ensure that the board is held accountable for the effective 
running of the bank, so as to achieve its objectives nor to change the 
composition of the board that does not perform to expectations or in 
accordance with the mandate of the bank. In terms of accountability to 
shareholders, there exist board committees (in most cases the audit 
committee) to ensure this.  
 
 30% of the banks reported that the customers are “very satisfied”. 
Another 40% reported that the customers are “satisfied”. 
 50% of the banks reported that they have policies which guide how 
the banks operate with both internal and external stakeholders. 
 60% of the banks reported that some of their directors are 
shareholders in the bank. 
 
Strategy, values, performance and compliance 
 
In all cases, the Board of Directors in 60% of the banks determine the 
purpose and values of the banks and also the strategies of the banks. Table 
5.13 gives a summary of this. 
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Table – 5.18 
Strategy, value, performance and compliance 
 
Indicator In all cases Sometimes Not at all Total 
The purpose and values 
 
6 2 1 9 
The strategy 
 
6 3 0 9 
Implementation of the 
strategy 
5 4 0 9 
 
 
In ensuring that the procedures and values that protect the assets and 
reputation of the bank are put in place, 67% of the banks reported that this is 
the responsibility of everybody in the management position including the 
board and the CEO, 22% said it is the CEO while 11% said it is the Board. 
For the responsibility of monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of 
the bank’s strategies,  policy and  management performance, another 67% 
reported it is everybody in the management position including the board and 
the CEO, 22% said it is the Board while 11% said it is the CEO. 
Regarding who reviews the viability and financial sustainability of the 
banks, 56% reported that is the responsibility of everybody in the 
management position including the board and the CEO and 22% each for the 
board and the Chief Executive. 
All the banks reported that they have measures in place to ensure that the 
bank complies with all relevant laws, regulations, governance practices, 
accounting and auditing standards. Some of these measures include Annual 
Audit, Registrar of Co-operative  inspections and governance and control 
committee functions. Less than one half (44%) of the banks reported that 
these measures are enforced by everybody in the management position 
including the board and the CEO. The board (22%), all departmental heads 
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(22%) and the Chief Executive (11%).  All the banks reported that their 
boards have risk management on the agenda. Again in all the cases the 
directors are allowed to seek professional advice. These include legal, 
regulation and audit advice. 
 
Reports to Regulators: 
Table – 5.19 
 
Frequency of Reports to Regulators 
 
Reports to Regulators % 
No. of 
Banks 
Weekly 37 8 
Fortnight 9 2 
Monthly 41 9 
2 Monthly 4 1 
3 monthly 9 2 
Total 100 22 
 
Figure 5.19 
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It is clear from the above graph that 41% banks send their internal reports 
monthly to the regulators, 37% banks send their internal reports weekly to 
the regulators. 9% of sample banks send their internal reports fortnightly to 
the regulators. 4% of sample banks send their internal reports quarterly to 
the regulators. 
 
As per the Reserve Bank of India all the co-operative banks has to 
followings reports regularly. 
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RBI RETURNS                            TABLE   5 . 20   
Types Statements and Forms Submission to RBI  
ALM Statement of Interest Rate Sensitivity QUARTERLY ANNEXTURE -1 
  Statement of Structural Liquidity QUARTERLY   
    
Directives Advances against Security of Shares / Debentures QUARTERLY ANNEXTURE -2 
  Annual NPA     Audited / Unaudited                                 MARCH   
  Daily Call and Notice Money FORTNIGHT   
  Loan and Advances to the Bank's Directors QUARTERLY   
    
Frauds FMR1 - Actual Report DATE OF FRAUD ANNEXTURE -3 
  FMR2 - Quarterly Report on Frauds outstanding QUARTERLY   
  
FMR3 - Quarterly Progress Report on Large Value 
Frauds QUARTERLY   
  
FMR4 - Report on Dacoities / Robberies / Theft/ 
Burglaries QUARTERLY   
    
Licensing FORM VI  - Statement of Offices in India QUARTERLY ANNEXTURE -4 
    
Simplified  
OSS Statement on Assets and Liabilities QRTY/March Audit ANNEXTURE -5 
  Statement on Earnings QRTY/March Audit   
  Statement on Asset Quality QRTY/March Audit   
  
Statement on NPA , Large Exposures, Segment wise 
Adv. 
QRTY/March Audit 
  
  NDTL / NOF Ratio   
  Statement on Bank Profile   Audited / Unaudited                         MARCH   
    
Planning 
Loan and Advances to Priority Sector / Weaker 
Section MARCH ANNEXTURE -6 
  
Priority Sector Advances - Credit Flow to Minority 
Communities September / March   
  UCB's Investment in other UCB's / Institutions QUARTERLY   
    
Rehabilitation Annual Financial Review MARCH ANNEXTURE -7 
  Quarterly Progress Report QUARTERLY   
    
Returns Balance Sheet Items MARCH ANNEXTURE -8 
  FORM I -Statement of compliance with CRR & SLR MONTHLY   
  
FORM II - Statement of Unsecured Loans and 
Advance to Directors / Firms in which they have 
interest MONTHLY   
  
FORM VIII - Statement of Unclaimed Deposit 
Accounts not operated more than 10 years DECEMBER   
  FORM IX Assets & Liabilities Last Friday MONTHLY   
  
Special FORM IX Assets & Liabilities  as on 31st 
March MARCH   
  Monetary Aggregates MONTHLY   
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As per the personal interview with the chairman and CEO of various co-
operatives banks researcher has finds that all the banks still today above 
reports are not submitting regularly due to non availability of  senior and 
skill staff. All the above reports forms are attached in the annexure shown in 
the column no. 4 of the table. 
 
Risk Management 
 
In general, co-operative banks’ risk management practices conform for the 
most part to national accepted standards under the current supervisory 
framework. The overall risk management performance of banks surveyed is 
relatively good. Most banks have many personnel assigned to risk 
measurement - more than 10% of employees - and risk exposure, market risk 
exposure in particular, is reported to management very frequently, at least 
once a month at all banks. The most responsible entity for approving the 
strategy and major policies of banks for measuring and managing risk is the 
board committee, not the board of directors. 
 
Looking into bank’s risk management by specific area, banks performed 
well in the credit and market risk area, but relatively poorly in the opera-
tional risk area. In the case of the credit risk area, most banks have written 
credit policies and procedures about the key items recommended by the 
Basel Committee, especially with regard to the structure of limits, approval 
authorities, and price and non-price terms. In granting credit, all banks 
require an assessment of all of the relevant elements. Most banks also 
adopted robust requirements for establishing new credit relationships. All 
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banks perform regular checks on key indicators on the condition of individ-
ual borrowers and single obligors. 
 
Considering the market risk area, top management directly handles or main-
tains risk management standards, reporting and management processes, 
systems and internal controls, and standards for valuing positions and mea-
suring performance in most of the banks. Most banks have clearly defined 
policies and procedures for limiting and controlling market risk and maintain 
robust requirements for the introduction of a new product, hedging, or 
position-taking strategy. With respect to market risk measurement, half of 
the banks surveyed are still using the basic standardized approach to calcu-
late market risk capital. The remaining banks are using the more advanced 
internal models approach. 
 
Examination of the management practices for credit and market risk sug-
gests that those for operational risk seem relatively underdeveloped at 
sample banks. One-fourth of the banks surveyed responded that they do not 
report operational risk internally as a distinct risk category. 
 
Corporate Social responsibility 
 
Only three of the banks have corporate social responsibility programmes 
which include: 
Support of charitable events, Community service and Conservation 
programmes. 
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Legal framework 
 
All the banks operate under the following legal frameworks: 
 
 The Banking Regulation Act. 
 The State Co-operative Act 
 Reserve bank of India regulations 
 Securities and Exchange Board of India 
 The Companies Act. 
 Finance Act 
 Capital Market Regulations (Corporate Governance Guidelines, 
Securities, Public offers and disclosures, Collective Investment 
Scheme, Takeovers and Mergers, Rating Agency Approval 
Guidelines). 
 Income Tax Act. 
 
All the banks have regulatory and supervisory systems under which they 
operate. 
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Governance Effectiveness: 
Table – 5. 21 
 
Effectiveness of Governance in Sample Banks 
 
Governance Effectiveness % 
No. of 
Banks 
Sufficient 59 13 
Partially Sufficient 27 6 
Not Sufficient 14 3 
Total 100 22 
 
Figure 5.21 
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It is observed from the questionnaire analysis that 72% of respondent banks 
believe that present governance mechanism for the banks are sufficient. 27% 
of respondent banks believe that present governance mechanisms for the 
banks are partially sufficient. Only 14% of respondent banks believe that 
present governance mechanisms of banks are not sufficient.  
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Role of Apex Bank in effective governance: 
Table – 5.22 
 
Role of Apex Bank in effective governance 
 
Role of Apex Bank in Effective Governance % 
No. of 
Banks 
Highly Effective 0 0 
Effective 9 2 
Average 27 6 
Not so Effective 55 12 
Highly Ineffective 9 2 
Total 100 22 
 
Figure 5.22 
 
 
 
The results of the questionnaire analysis indicates that 9% of respondent 
banks believes that apex bank have effective governance mechanism. 27% 
of respondent banks believes that apex bank have average effective 
governance mechanism. 55% of respondent banks believes that apex bank 
have not so effective governance mechanism. 9% of respondent banks 
believes that apex bank have highly ineffective governance mechanism. 
Role of Apex bank in Effective Governance 
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Discussion of findings  
The corporate governance procedures applied in the banking sector 
 
In the pursuit of good corporate governance in India, the implementation of 
corporate governance practices is directly linked with Security Exchange 
Board India (SEBI) under clause 49 listing agreement. According to SEBI, 
the corporate governance practices applicable only to banks that are listed in 
the Indian stock exchanges. In the present study researcher has selected co-
operative banks and they are not listed with stock exchanges. But to bring 
transparency in the management of banks they also present report of 
corporate governance in its annual report. On the bases of this report 
researcher has tried to analyze corporate governance practices in the co-
operative banks. 
The Board 
Every bank should be headed by an effective board to offer strategic 
guidance, lead and control the company and be accountable to its 
shareholders. The study has established that in terms of leadership, integrity, 
enterprise, judgement and decision making, majority the Boards in the study 
were reported to be effective. 
 
Appointments to the Board 
 
It is expected that a formal and transparent procedure in the appointment 
of directors to the board and all persons offering themselves for 
appointment, as directors should disclose any potential area of conflict that 
may undermine their position or service as director. The appointment 
procedures recorded include: 
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 Vote of majority shareholders, 
 Nomination by the old Board, 
 Vote of all share holders, 
 Nomination by the Board and the approval of appointment is done by 
the Shareholders, and; 
 Appointment by the Government in the case of Government Banks. 
 
Of all the banks, 20% conceded that there exist conflict of interest  among 
the directors. 
The most striking one being that some board members provide contractual 
services to the bank. The solution prescribed being that they disqualify 
themselves from deliberations of the tender awards. 
 
Tenure of office  
 
It is recommended that Executive directors should have a fixed service 
contract not exceeding five years with a provision to renew subject t regular 
performance appraisal; and shareholders approval. The study has established 
that in one bank majority shareholders in conjunction with the Chairman 
appoint the Chief Executive Officer. For state owned banks, the government 
does the appointment while for all the rest the appointment is done by the 
Board. Only 3 banks out of 10 have fixed tenure of office for the directors 
and the chairman. 
 
The succession plans for the Board, CEO and Senior management do exist in 
varied scenarios in different banks. It is apparent that Most banks have 
succession plans for senior management compared to that of the Board and 
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the CEO. Some of the secession plans recorded include, external and internal 
training for management, an arrangement where every head of a department 
has a deputy, existing executive under the CEO. In one bank, however, the 
succession plan for the Board is that the next of kin of each member is 
nominated by the member in readiness to take over. 
 
Roles and responsibilities of the Board 
 
According to the CMA corporate governance regulations, the board of directors 
are expected to assume a primary responsibility of fostering the long-term 
business of the banks consistent with their fiduciary responsibility to the 
shareholders.  The study has established that the core responsibilities of the 
Boards in the banks in the study include: 
 Policy formulation in accordance with the relevant Acts. 
 Keeping proper books of accounts. 
 Prepare financial statement while: 
 Selecting suitable accounting policies and then apply them 
consistently. 
 Making judgement and estimates that are reasonable and 
prudent. 
 Stating whether applicable accounting standards have been 
followed 
 Preparing the financial statements on the going concern basis. 
 Provision of leadership. 
 Formulate strategies. 
 Receive and approve reports of committees. 
 Approve key financial objectives, budgets and business reports. 
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 Good corporate governance 
 Approval of loans 
 Approval of expenditures. 
 Ensuring compliance to Statutory and regulatory frameworks. 
 Banking projections. 
 Safeguarding the assets of the bank. 
In all cases, the Board of Directors in 60% of the  banks determine the 
purpose and values of the banks and also the strategies of the banks. In 
ensuring that the procedures and values that protect the assets and reputation 
of the bank are put in place, 67% of the banks reported that this is the  
responsibility of everybody in the management position including the board 
and the CEO, 22% said it is the CEO while 11% said it is the Board. 
 
For the responsibility of monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of 
the bank‟s strategies,  policy and  management performance, another 67% 
reported it is everybody in the management position including the board and 
the CEO, 22% said it is the Board while 11% said it is the CEO. Regarding 
who reviews the viability and financial sustainability of the banks, 56% 
reported that is the responsibility of everybody in the management position 
including the board and the CEO and 22%  each for the board and the Chief 
Executive. All the banks reported that they have measures in place to ensure 
that the bank complies with all relevant laws, regulations, governance 
practices, accounting and auditing standards. Some of these measures 
include Annual Audit, Reserve Bank of India Audit, Registrar of Co-
operative inspections and governance and control committee functions. Less 
than one half (44%) of the banks reported that these measures are enforced 
by everybody in the management position including the board and the CEO. 
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The board (22%), all departmental heads (22%) and the Chief Executive 
(11%).  All the banks reported that their boards have risk management on 
the agenda. Again in all the cases the directors are allowed to seek 
professional advise. These include legal, regulation and audit advice. 
 
These responsibilities as stated relate well to those which are stipulated by the 
CMA guidelines which include:  
 Defining the bank‟s mission, its strategy, goals, risk policy plans and 
objectives including approval of its annual budgets; 
 Overseeing the corporate management and operations, management 
accounts, major capital expenditures and review corporate 
performance and strategies at least on a quarterly basis; 
 Identifying the corporate business opportunities as well as principal 
risks in its operating environment including the implementation of 
appropriate measures to manage such risks or anticipated changes 
impacting on the corporate business; 
 Developing appropriate staffing and remuneration policy including 
the appointment of chief executive and the senior staff, particularly 
the finance director, operations director and the company secretary as 
may be applicable; 
 Reviewing on a regular basis the adequacy and integrity of the bank‟s 
internal control, acquisition and divestitures and management 
information systems including compliance with applicable laws, 
regulations, rules and guidelines; and  
 Establishing and implementing a system that provides necessary 
information to the shareholders including shareholder communication 
policy for the bank. 
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 Monitoring the effectiveness of the corporate governance practices 
under which the bank operates and propose revisions as may be 
required from time to time. 
 Taking into consideration the interests of the bank‟s stakeholders in 
its decision making process.  
 
Committees of the Board 
 
In a good corporate governance scenario, the boards are expected establish 
relevant committees and delegate specific mandates to such committees as 
may be necessary. The study found out that 13 banks out of 22 have board 
committees which include Audit, Credit and Advances, Human Resources, 
Investment, External Relations, Asset and Liabilities, Nominations,  Tender 
and Management Committees. These committees have various delegated 
responsibilities from the boards as per their specific functions. 
 
Remuneration 
 
The banks are expected to establish a formal and transparent procedure for 
remuneration of directors, which should be approved by the shareholders. In 
all the banks, the directors receive compensation for their services on the 
board. These compensations include, Directors fees (basic pay), Bonuses at 
the end of term, Sitting allowances, Loans at subsidised rates, Car mileage, 
Housing, Entertainment allowances and Transport allowances.  
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Note : In 8 banks these remunerations are determined by the shareholders at 
the Annual General Meetings as the regulations stipulate, but in two banks 
the remunerations are determined and approved by the board itself, whereas 
the board should only suggest and the Shareholders approve. 
 
Supply and disclosure of information 
 
In all the banks the boards are supplied with relevant, accurate and timely 
information to enable them discharge their duties. The study established that 
the directors receive board papers at least 1 week before Board meetings. In 
7 banks, the directors receive the papers 1 week in advance while in the 
remaining 3 they receive the papers 2 weeks before the meetings.  The 
information is relevant and given the timeframe of 2 to 1 week, the study 
considers it to be timely. However the study was not able to establish the 
accuracy of this information. There are also several ways through which the 
Board‟s deliberations are communicated to shareholders and stakeholders 
which include, Circulation of minutes, at the Annual General Meetings and 
Quarterly publications. 
 
Within the legal frame work which the banks operate, every board is 
expected to annually disclose in its annual report, its policies for 
remuneration including incentives for the board and senior management, 
particularly the quantum and component of remuneration for directors 
including non executive directors on a consolidated basis in the categories of  
executive directors fees, executive directors emoluments, non executive 
directors fees, non executive directors emoluments. When all the annual 
reports were perused, none of the banks has complied to this governance 
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practice. Most banks simply state: director‟s remuneration or staff cost, but 
they do not give a break down as required, others do not state it at all. 
 
Only one bank was transparent enough to give – in the annual report - a list of 
the major shareholders, share options and other forms of executive 
compensation that have to be made or have been made during the course of the 
financial. None of the banks gave aggregates of directors‟ loans – which is 
considered a standard transparency and an indicator of good corporate 
governance. 
 
Board Balance 
 
According to the corporate governance guidelines by the Capital Markets 
Authority, the board should compose of a balance of executive directors and 
non-executive directors of diverse skills or expertise in order to ensure that 
no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the boards’ 
decision-making processes. The study has established that the number of 
Board members ranged from 6 to 13 with 4 banks having 6 members 
followed by another 3 banks with 7 members. The average number of 
Executive Directors being 2 (with a range of 0 to 6) and Non- Executive 
being 5 (with a range of  0 to 9) respectively for every bank. In the 
composition of the Boards in terms of professional qualifications, there 
exists a professional mix which includes Lawyers, Banking and finance 
specialists, Certified Public Accountants, Engineers, Architects, Economists, 
Management and Insurance specialists.  The study also establishes that 
majority of Board members of various banks are professionals in the areas 
of banking and Finance followed by Law. 
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Role of Chairman and Chief Executive 
 
It expected that there exists a clear separation of the role and responsibilities of 
the chairman and chief executive, ensures a balance of power of authority and 
provide for checks and balances such that no one individual has unfettered 
powers of decision making.  In the case that such roles are combined, clear 
justification should be provided to the shareholders in the annual report of the 
Company.  The study has established that in 80% of the banks, the position of 
the Chairman and CEO are occupied by separate persons. In the other 20% the 
positions are held by one person. In all the cases, the CEO is a member of the 
board. In all the banks except two, there is a clear distinction of the 
responsibilities of the Chairperson of the Board and the CEO. 
 
Shareholders 
Approval of Major Decisions by Shareholders  
 
It is expected that there should be shareholders‟ participation in major 
decisions of the Company. The board should provide the shareholders with 
information on matters that include but are not limited to major disposal of 
the Company‟s assets, restructuring, takeovers, mergers, acquisitions or 
reorganization. 
 
According to the findings of this study, in two banks, one which is a 
government owned, the share holders are not able to exercise the authority to 
ensure that only competent and reliable persons are elected or appointed to 
the board of directors. Neither do they have the power to ensure that the 
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board is held accountable for the effective running of the bank, so as to 
achieve its objectives nor to change the composition of the board that does 
not perform to expectations or in accordance with the mandate of the bank. 
In terms of accountability to shareholders, there exist board committees (in 
most cases the audit committee) to ensure this. At leas 70% of the banks 
reported that the customers are satisfied with the accountability system of 
the bank. At least 50% of the banks reported that they have policies which 
guide how the banks operate with both internal and external stakeholders 
with another 60% reporting that some of their directors are shareholders in 
the bank. 
 
Corporate Social responsibility 
 
Only three of the banks have Corporate social responsibility programmes 
which include: 
Support of charitable events, Community service and  Conservation 
programmes. 
 
 Existing legal framework 
 
The existing legal framework include: 
 
 The Banking Regulation Act. 
 The State Co-operative Act 
 Reserve bank of India regulations 
 Securities and Exchange Board of India 
 The Companies Act. 
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 Finance Act 
 Capital Market Regulations (Corporate Governance Guidelines, 
Securities, Public offers and disclosures, Collective Investment 
Scheme, Takeovers and Mergers, Rating Agency Approval 
Guidelines). 
 Income Tax Act. 
 
All the banks have regulatory and supervisory systems under which they 
operate. 
 
Strengths 
 
 Ensures good accounting systems. 
 Provides for efficient and sustainable banking systems and 
procedures. 
 Ensure efficiency and supervision. 
 As measure to ensure prudent fiduciary management  
  
Weaknesses 
 
 Promotes delays in decision making. 
 Enhances duplication of supervisory and regulatory procedures. 
 Promotes bureaucracy. 
 Enforcement is not streamlined  
 Some are confusing. 
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Existing corporate governance procedures 
 
The existing corporate governance procedures within the banks as 
established by this study are: 
 Responsibility of the boards that exists in a framework which ensures 
the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of 
management by the board, and the board‟s accountability to the 
company and the shareholders. 
 Enhancement of accountability and integrity systems. 
 Promoting and protecting the rights of shareholders. 
 Equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and 
foreign shareholders.  
 Recognition of the positive role of stakeholders. 
 Disclosure and transparency- ensuring that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the banks, 
including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and 
governance of the bank. 
 
Effectiveness of the regulatory and supervisory systems 
 
The regulatory and supervision systems have been issued by the Reserve 
bank of India. Some banks have also developed own in-house systems to 
ensure this. 
 
These systems have effectively promoted a sound and stable market based 
banking system in Gujarat by: 
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 Fostering liquidity and solvency of banking institutions,  
 Ensuring efficiency in banking operations, and: 
 Encouraging high standards of customer service. 
 
This has been achieved through the enforcement of the Banking Regulation 
Act and the prudential regulations by the Reserve Bank of India. 
 
Summary of findings and suggestions 
 
Summary of findings 
 
There are 223 banks in Gujarat. The banks have been in Gujarat for a period 
ranging from 15 to 81 years. The number of Board members range between 
10 and 29. 86% of the banks appoint their Board Members by vote of 
majority shareholders, 9% of banks appoint their director through selection, 
and 5% banks appoints their director by other process which includes 
through nomination by the Board and the approval of appointment is done 
by the Shareholders and appointment by the Government. In all the cases 
except one, the numbers of non-executive directors were always more than 
that of executive directors. Regarding the composition of the Boards in 
terms of professional qualifications, there exists a professional mix which 
includes Lawyers, Banking and finance specialists, Chartered Accountants, 
Engineers, Architects, Economists, Business Men, Management and 
Insurance specialists. It is noted that majority of Board members of various 
banks are professionals in the areas of Law and followed by business men.  
Men form the majority of Board members of most banks with 70% of the 
banks having no female Board members at all. 
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The powers of the Board that were mentioned include, policy making and 
decisions, regulation of issuance and management of shares, performance 
reviews, compliance audits and corporate governance. Responsibilities of 
the Board include policy formulation in accordance with the relevant Acts, 
keeping proper books of accounts, preparation of financial statements, 
provision of leadership, formulation of strategies, receiving and approving 
reports of committees, approval of  key financial objectives, budgets and 
business reports, good corporate governance, approval of loans and 
expenditures, ensuring compliance to statutory and regulatory frameworks, 
banking projections and safeguarding the assets of the bank. In all the banks 
under the study, the responsibilities of the Board are clear to both the 
Directors and the management. 
 
Only 10% of the boards have Board charter, 40% have board manual,  50% 
have work plans, 60% have codes of ethics and 5o% have codes of conduct. 
At least 1 of the banks reported that there are areas of conflict or overlap 
between the responsibilities of the board and management. With the areas of 
conflict being all the Board Members being managers and  the Chairman of 
the Board being the General Manager. Regarding the Board‟s effectiveness 
in terms of leadership, integrity, enterprise, judgement and decision making, 
it was found out that majority of the Boards were effective. Most Boards 
have 24 meetings in a year. 32% bank have monthly meeting. In all the 
cases, the directors receive board papers at least 1 week before Board 
meetings. The Board‟s deliberations are communicated to shareholders and 
stakeholders through circulation of minutes, at the Annual General 
Meetings, quarterly publications. The most commonly used mode of 
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decision making by Boards is consensus. In all the banks except one, the 
Board acts as a freely independent decision making organ without 
interference from any individual.   
 
It was found out that 80% of the boards do self performance and 
effectiveness assessment, 70% do assess the performance and effectiveness 
of its individual members while 80% conduct the performance and 
effectiveness assessment of the Chief Executive Officer. These assessments 
are normally done annually except for two banks which do them quarterly. 
Only 40% of the banks do make reports from these assessments 80% of 
which are discussed at the Board meetings and the other 20% at the Annual 
Genera Meetings. More than one half (80%) of the Banks have various 
Committees which include audit, credit and advances, human Resources, 
investment, external relations, asset and liabilities, nominations, tender and 
management committees. 
 
Regarding induction and training, only 40% of the banks have induction 
programmes for new Board members, another 70% have training or 
development programmes for directors and 80% have training or 
development programmes for executive management. Of all the banks, 20% 
conceded that there exists conflict of interest among the directors. 
The most striking one being that some board members provide contractual 
services to the bank. The solution prescribed being that they disqualify 
themselves from deliberations of the tender awards. In all the cases, the 
directors receive compensation for their services on the board In all cases 
except in two banks (where the allowances are determined by the board 
itself), these allowances are determined by the shareholders at the Annual 
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General Meetings. In one bank majority shareholders in conjunction with the 
Chairman appoint the Chief Executive Officer. For state co-operative bank, 
the government does the appointment while for all the rest the appointment 
is done by the Board. Only 6 banks out of 22 have fixed tenure of office for 
the directors and the chairman. In 80% of the banks, the position of the 
Chairman and CEO are occupied by separate persons. In the other 20% the 
positions are held by one person. In all the cases, the CEO is a member of 
the board. In all the banks except two, there is a clear distinction of the 
responsibilities of the Chairperson of the Board and the CEO.  The 
succession plans for the Board, CEO and Senior management do exist and it 
is apparent that Most banks have succession plans for senior management 
compared to that of the Board and the CEO. 
 
Most banks share holder that only competent and reliable persons are elected 
or appointed to the board of directors. They have the power to ensure that 
the board is held accountable for the effective running of the bank, so as to 
achieve its objectives to change the composition of the board that perform to 
expectations or in accordance with the mandate of the bank. In terms of 
accountability to shareholders, there exist board committees (in most cases 
the audit committee) to ensure this.  In 30% of the banks the customers are 
“very satisfied” while in a another 40% the customers are “satisfied”. In 
50% of the banks there exist policies which guide how the banks operate 
with both internal and external stakeholders. Some of the directors in 60% of 
the banks are shareholders in the bank. 
 
The Board of Directors in 60% of the  banks determine the purpose and 
values of the banks and also the strategies of the banks. In 67% of the banks, 
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everybody in the management position including the board and the CEO 
ensures that the procedures and values that protect the assets and reputation 
of the bank are put in place. The case is the same with the responsibility of 
monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the bank‟s strategies,  
policy and  management performance. Regarding who reviews the viability 
and financial sustainability of the banks, it is the responsibility of everybody 
in the management position including the board and the CEO in 56% of the 
banks. All the banks reported that they have measures in place to ensure that 
the banks comply with all relevant laws, regulations, governance practices, 
accounting and auditing standards. All the banks reported that their boards 
have risk management on the agenda. Again in all the cases the directors are 
allowed to seek professional advise. These include legal, regulation and 
audit advice. Only three of the banks have Corporate social responsibility 
programmes which include support of charitable events, community service 
and  conservation programmes. 
 
All the banks operate under the following legal framework, the Banking 
Regulation Act, the Reserve Bank of India Regulation, Securities and 
Exchange Board of India, State Co-operative Act, Capital Markets Authority 
Act, Finance Act, Central Depository System Act, Capital Market 
Regulations (Corporate Governance Guidelines, Securities, Public offers and 
disclosures, Collective Investment Scheme, Takeovers and Mergers, Rating 
Agency Approval Guidelines) and Income Tax Act.  
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Suggestions 
The study has found out that: 
 
(1)  The corporate governance procedures applied in the banking sector in 
India have been effective to some extent in achieving the goals and 
objectives upon which they were set, but it is still in its infancy.  On a 
scale of 1 to 5, this study has graded the general corporate governance 
of banks in India at 3 and that of non listed together with state owned 
banks at 1.   
 
 It is therefore recommended that strategic training for board 
members and senior bank managers be intensified by 
stakeholders in corporate governance to promote good 
corporate governance in these institutions. They should be 
guided to understand that  “to remain competitive in a changing 
world, banks must innovate and adapt their corporate 
governance practices so that they can meet new demands and 
grasp new opportunities and the government has an important 
responsibility for shaping an effective regulatory framework 
that provides for sufficient flexibility to allow markets to 
function effectively and to respond to expectations of 
shareholders and other stakeholders” – OECD. 
 
 Banks should be assisted to develop principles of corporate 
governance that cut across all the functions of the banks. 
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(2)   The strengths of the existing legal framework overweigh the 
weaknesses, however the following recommendations are provided: 
 
 Expedient solution to the stalemate on the Reserve Bank of 
India regulation which was declared retrospective and 
inconsistent with the Constitution of India. Following this 
ruling, various conflicting legal interpretations have been 
published which most banks find confusing. 
 Issues of delays in decision making due to the existing legal 
framework should be addressed. 
 Duplication of supervisory and regulatory procedures arising 
from the same should also be addressed. 
 
(3)  The existing corporate governance procedures within the banks as 
established by this study are still not effectively implemented. There 
is need for stakeholders to play an effective role in assisting the banks 
with necessary professional and technical assistance towards the 
implementation of these. 
 
(4) The regulatory and supervision systems have been issued by the 
Reserve Bank of India. Some banks have also developed own in-
house systems to ensure this. More in-house systems are further 
recommended so that those systems that have been introduced through 
statutes can be supplemented by the in-house systems and 
enforcement. 
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(5)  It is well said “there is no other way of conducting banking than the 
way it ought to be conducted professionally”. There is a need of more 
private oversight than government. The Board for Financial 
Supervision of RBI should get a complete autonomous status with the 
representations from whole industry to ensure effective governance. 
Banks should be subject to normal market discipline and market 
should decide their fate. 
 
(6)  Sector specific policy reform will only be more effective when the 
entire system is well functional and efficient. „Introducing new laws 
and institutions alone is not enough. Reform can succeed only when 
institutional changes are accompanied by changes in people‟s attitude. 
This is the real test‟. Improving overall public governance in the 
society is thus sin-qua-non for better governance in its institutions. 
Giving the right to information to the public as fundamental right, 
bringing political reform, ensuring a strong media, bringing legal 
reform and above all tackling corruption would boost the overall 
governance in the system and in banking. 
 
(7)  To sum up, corporate governance policy implementation in right 
spirit is very crucial for banks. RBI should speed up the 
implementation of various committees‟ recommendations with a post 
implementation scrutiny of governance scenario. Govt. ownership 
does put some obstacles in this process. Banks are yet to face the real 
competition. Once freed from the State‟s protection banks will 
definitely face the real challenge. The findings indicate a difficult road 
ahead. The growth of other channels of savings, possible growth of 
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capital market and capital account convertibility will put banks in a 
different platform by affecting their deposits and loans. Corporate 
governance in banks will need a different orientation in years to come. 
Since this work establishes a relationship between governance and 
performance, the strength of the former can ensure a better future for 
banks. 
 
SOUND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 
 
Banking organisations do sometimes face problems with regard to corporate 
governance. Supervisory experience suggests that certain practices when 
adopted by these organisations are quite helpful. These practices should be 
viewed as critical elements of any corporate governance process. 
 
The practices I am referring to are: 
 
 Establishing strategic objectives and a set of corporate values that are 
communicated throughout the banking organisation. 
 Setting and enforcing clear lines of responsibility and accountability 
throughout the organisation. 
 Ensuring that board members are qualified for their positions, have a 
clear understanding of their role in corporate governance and are not 
subject to undue influence from management or outside concerns. 
 Ensuring that there is appropriate oversight by senior management. 
 Effectively utilising the work conducted by internal and external auditors, 
in recognition of the important control functions they provide. 
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 Ensuring that compensation approaches are consistent with the bank‟s 
ethical values, objectives, strategy and control environment. 
 Conducting corporate governance in a transparent manner. 
 Ensuring an environment supportive of sound corporate governance. 
 
Transparency can reinforce sound corporate governance. Therefore, public 
disclosure is desirable in the following areas: 
 
 Board structure with regard to size, membership, qualifications and 
committees; 
 Senior management structure -regarding responsibilities, reporting lines, 
qualifications and experience; 
 Basic organisational structure- in respect of line of business structure, 
legal entity structure; 
 Information about the incentive structure of the bank - in relation to 
remuneration policies, executive compensation, bonuses, stock options;  
 Nature and extent of transactions with affiliates and related parties. 
 
In the last it is the practice of ensuring an environment supportive of sound 
corporate governance. The Committee recognises that primary responsibility 
for good corporate governance rests with the boards of directors and senior 
management of banks; however, there are many other ways that corporate 
governance can be promoted: 
 
 Governments can do so by enacting appropriate laws and enforcing them; 
 Securities Regulators, Stock Exchanges – through disclosure and listing 
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requirements; 
 Auditors – through audit standards on communications to boards of 
directors, senior management and supervisors; and 
 banking industry associations–through initiatives related to voluntary 
industry principles and agreement on and publication of sound practices. 
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SUMMARY OF RBI RETURNS
Circular UBD.PCB.cir.No. 13 /12.05.001/2007-08 dated September 17 , 2008
Name of the bank : THE XYZ BANK LTD. - CITY ABCDEFGH.
Liabilities upto 3 over 3 over 6 over 1 over 3 over 5 Non- Total
 months months & months & year & year & years sensitive
 upto 6 months upto 1 year upto 3 year upto 5 year  
 
1 1. Capital 0 0.00
2 2. Reserves & Surplus 0 0.00
3 3. Deposits 1.10 1.41 1.75 1.95 0.70 0.01 0.00 6.92
i) Current Deposits 0.00
ii) Savings Bank Deposits  0.65 0.65 1.30 0.65 3.25
iii) Term Deposits, Long Term Deposits
(Tier II)  1.10 0.76 1.10 0.65 0.05 0.01 3.67
iv) Certificates of Deposit 0.00
4 4. Borrowings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
i) Call and Short Notice 0.00
ii) Inter-Bank (Term) 0.00
iii) Refinances 0.00
iv) Others (specify) 0.00
5 5. Other Liabilities & Provisions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
i) Bills Payable 0.00
ii) Branch Adjustments 0 0.00
iii) Provisions* 0.00
iv) Others 0 0.00
6 6. Repos 0.00
7 7. Bills Rediscounted (DUPN) 0.00
8 8. Swaps (Sell / Buy) 0.00
9 9. Others (specify) 0.00
A. Total Liabilities 1.10 1.41 1.75 1.95 0.70 0.01 0.00 6.92
Annexure-1AStatement of Interest Rate Sensitivity as on : 31/12/2010
Interest Rate Sensitivity
* Excluding provisions for NPAs and investments.
(Amounts in Crores of Rupees)
Page 1
Assets upto 3 over 3 over 6 over 1 over 3 over 5 Non- Total
 months months & months & year & year & years sensitive
 upto 6 months upto 1 year upto 3 year upto 5 year  
 
1 1. Cash  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00
2 2. Balances with RBI 0 0 0.00
3 3. Balances with other Banks  0.85 0.52 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.09
i) Current Account 0 0 0.00
ii) Money at Call and Short Notice, Term
Deposits, Long Term Deposits (Tier II) and
other placements and balances with other
banks including DCCBs and SCBs 0.85 0.52 0.72 0 0.00 2.09
4
4. Investments (including those under
Repos but excluding Reverse Repos 0.65 0.65 1.31 2.55 2.18 1.92 9.26
5 5. Advances (Performing)  1.17 1.20 2.38 4.16 0.54 0.00 0.00 9.45
i) Bills Purchased and Discounted
(including bills under DUPN) 0.00
ii) Cash Credits, Overdrafts and Loans
repayable on demand 1.04 1.06 2.11 3.62 7.83
iii) Term Loans 0.13 0.14 0.27 0.54 0.54 1.62
6 6. NPAs (Advances and Investments)* 0.00
7 7. Fixed Assets 0.00
8 8. Other Assets  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
i) Branch Adjustments 0.00
ii) Leased Assets 0.00
iii) Others 0 0.00
9 9. Reverse Repos 0.00
10 10. Swaps (Buy / Sell) 0.00
11 11. Bills Rediscounted (DUPN) 0.00
12 12. Others (specify) 0.00
B. Total Assets 2.67 2.37 4.41 6.71 2.72 1.92 0.00 20.80
C. GAP (B-A) 1.57 0.96 2.66 4.76 2.02 1.91 0.00 13.88
Annexure-1AStatement of Interest Rate Sensitivity
Page 2
Circular UBD.PCB.cir.No.13 /12.05.001/2008-09 dated September 17, 2008
Name of the bank : THE XYZ BANK LTD. - CITY ABCDEFGH.
 
Outflows 1 to 15 to 29 days & over 3 over 6 over 1 over 3 over 5 Total
14 days 28 days upto 3 months & months & year & year & years
28 months upto 6 months upto 1 year upto 3 year upto 5 year  
 
1 1. Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.83 1.83
2 2. Reserves & Surplus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24.95 24.95
3 3. Deposits 14.23 1.67 8.49 10.01 18.45 34.34 27.56 0.07 114.82
i) Current Deposits 3.36 0 0 0 0 9.51 9.51 0 22.38
ii) Savings Bank Deposits 3.95 17.78 17.78 39.51
iii) Term Deposits, Lon Term Deposits (Tier
II).
6.92 1.67 8.49 10.01 18.45 7.05 0.27 0.07 52.93
iv) Certificates of Deposit 0.00
4 4. Borrowings 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70
i) Call and Short Notice 0.00
ii) Inter-Bank (Term) 0.70 0.70
iii) Refinances 0.00
iv) Others (specify) 0.00
5 5. Other Liabilities & Provisions 1.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01
i) Bills Payable 0.00
ii) Branch Adjustments 0.01 0.01
iii) Provisions 0.00
iv) Others 1.00 1.00
6
6. Unavailed portion of Cash Credit /
Overdraft / Demand Loan component of 0.75 0.75
7 7. Letters of Credit / Guarantees 0.00
8 8. Repos 0.00
9 9. Bills Rediscounted (DUPN) 0.00
10 10. Swaps (Sell / Buy / maturing forwards 0.00
11 11. Interest payable 0.06 0.06
12 12. Others (specify) 0.00
A. Total Outflows 16.75 1.67 8.49 10.01 18.45 34.34 27.56 26.85 144.12
Statement of Structural Liquidity as on : 31/12/2010.
Residual Maturity
Annexure-1B
(Amounts in Crores of Rupees)
Page 1
Inflows 1 to 15 to 29 days & over 3 over 6 over 1 over 3 over 5 Total
14 days 28 days upto 3 months & months & year & year & years
28 months upto 6 months upto 1 year upto 3 year upto 5 year  
 
1 1. Cash 0.39 0.04 0.20 0.23 0.43 0.80 0.65 0.63 3.37
2 2. Balances with RBI 0.00
3 3. Balances with other Banks 5.90 6.00 17.51 8.92 19.39 0.03 0.02 0.02 57.79
i) Current Account 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 1.01
ii) Money at Call and Short Notice, Term
Deposits. Long Term Deposits (Tier II) and
other placements and balances with other
banks including DCCDs and SCBs 5.00 6.00 17.50 8.91 19.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 56.78
4
4. Investments (including those under Repos
but excluding Reveres Repos) 12.90 0.30 1.55 1.83 3.36 6.26 5.02 4.89 36.11
5 5. Advances (Performing) 4.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.72 28.32 4.25 0.00 42.07
i) Bills Purchased and Discounted (including 0.06 0.06
ii) Cash Credits, Overdrafts and Loans
repayable on demand
4.72 4.72 28.32 37.76
iii) Term L ans 4.25 4.25
6 6. NPAs (Advances and Investments)* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 1.45 1.89
7 7. Fixed Assets 1.52 1.52
8 8. Other Assets 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43
i) Branch Adjustments 0.00
ii) Leased Assets 0.00
iii) Others 0.43 0.43
9 9. Reverse Repos 0.00
10 10. Swaps (Buy / Sell) /maturing forwords 0.00
11 11. Bills Rediscounted (DUPN) 0.00
12 12. Interest receivable 0.00
13 13. Export Refinance from RBI 0.00
14 14. Others (specify) 0.00
 B. Total Inflows 24.40 6.34 19.26 10.98 27.90 35.41 10.38 8.51 143.18
C. Mismatch (B-A) 7.65 4.67 10.77 0.97 9.45 1.07 -17.18 -18.34 -0.94
D. Cumulative Mismatch
E. C as % to A 45.67 279.64 126.86 9.69 51.22 3.12 -62.34 -68.31 -0.65
Statement of Structural Liquidity as on : 31/12/2010.
* Net of provisions, interest suspense and claims received from ECGC / DICGC.
Annexure-1B
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XYZ  BANK                           Statement of Advances against shares and debentures          QUARTERLY 
 
Annexure-2A 
(Private & Confidential) 
Statement of Advances against shares and debentures 
Bank Name XYZ  Bank : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
10/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
Printed on: Page 1 of 2 07/03/2011  14:24 
 
 
XYZ  BANK                           Statement of Advances against shares and debentures          QUARTERLY Annexure-2A Rs. in lakhs 
Date of 
Advance 
Amount 
Sanctioned 
Outstanding 
Balance as at 
the end of 
Reporting 
Quarter  
Sr. No. Name of 
Borrower 
Status Type of 
Security 
Nature of 
Credit Facility 
granted 
Market Value of 
Shares 
Debentures etc. 
held as Security  
Whether Shares 
/ Debentures are 
in Demat or 
Physical form 
Due Date 
Repayment 
of Advance 
Total Amount Sanctioned  0.00  0.00 Total Outstanding Balance 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 10/01/2011 10/01/2011 
Printed on: Page 2 of 2 07/03/2011  14:24 
XYZ  BANK                                                        Annual NPA statement               MARCH AUDIT/UNAUDITED 
 
Annexure-2B 
 (Private & Confidential) 
Annual NPA statement 
Bank Name XYZ  Bank : 
999999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/03/2010 Year End Date 
20/09/2010 : Reporting Date 
Y Audit Flag : 
Validation Status : Validated 
07/03/2011  14:30 Page 1 of 3 Printed on: 
XYZ  BANK                                                        Annual NPA statement               MARCH AUDIT/UNAUDITED Annexure-2B 
Particular No. of Acs. 
Principal Interest 
Amount Outstanding 
 
% of Col 3 
to Loans & 
Advances 
% Amount 
Provision required to be 
made 
Existing 
Provision at the 
begining of the 
year (including 
BDDR) 
Provisioning 
made this year 
Total Provision 
at the end of the 
year (including 
BDDR) 
Shortfall / 
Excess of 
BDR 
provision 
Remarks 
Rs in lakhs 
 100.00  0.00  62.48  846.64  27.37  874.01 -811.53 Total Loans and 
Advance 
    1,582  3,876.40  0.00 
Of Which 
 96.86  0.25  9.39  32.00  7.00  39.00 -29.61 A. Standard 
Assets 
    1,510  3,754.73  0.00 
B. Non-performing 
Assets 
 1.13  0.00  4.37  74.03  1.85  75.88 -71.51 1. Sub-Standard       10  43.70  0.00 
 1.13  10.00  4.37  74.03  1.85  75.88 -71.51 a) Secured       10  43.70  0.00 
 0.00  10.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 b) Unsecured        0  0.00  0.00 
2. Doubtful 
 0.02  0.00  0.18  2.48  0.06  2.54 -2.36 i) Upto 1 year        3  0.74  0.00 
 0.02  20.00  0.14  1.90  0.05  1.95 -1.81 a) Secured        2  0.70  0.00 
 0.00  100.00  0.04  0.58  0.01  0.59 -0.55 b) Unsecured        1  0.04  0.00 
 0.17  0.00  1.96  28.62  0.72  29.34 -27.38 ii) Above 1 year 
and upto 3 years 
       3  6.55  0.00 
 0.17  30.00  1.96  28.62  0.72  29.34 -27.38 a) Secured        3  6.55  0.00 
 0.00  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 b) Unsecured        0  0.00  0.00 
 1.27  0.00  25.27  420.26  10.51  430.77 -405.50 iii) Above 3 years       33  49.37  0.00 
 1.24  50.00  24.10  404.39  10.11  414.50 -390.40 a) Secured       28  48.20  0.00 
 0.03  100.00  1.17  15.87  0.40  16.27 -15.10 b) Unsecured        5  1.17  0.00 
 1.46  0.00  27.41  451.36  11.29  462.65 -435.24 Total doubtful 
assets (i + ii + iii) 
      39  56.66  0.00 
 1.43  0.00  26.20  434.91  10.88  445.79 -419.59 a) Secured       33  55.45  0.00 
 0.03  0.00  1.21  16.45  0.41  16.86 -15.65 b) Unsecured        6  1.21  0.00 
 0.55  100.00  21.31  289.25  7.23  296.48 -275.17 3. Loss assets       23  21.31  0.00 
 3.14  0.00  53.09  814.64  20.37  835.01 -781.92 Gross NPAs (B1 + 
B2 + B3) 
      72  121.67  0.00 
07/03/2011  14:30 Page 2 of 3 Printed on: 
 
XYZ  BANK                  Annual NPA statement               MARCH AUDIT/UNAUDITED Annexure-2B 
31/03/2009 31/03/2010 
Rs in lakhs 
Particular 
 3,876.40  3,730.61 1. Gross Advances 
 121.67  129.80 2. Gross NPAs 
 3.14  3.48 3. Gross NPAs as percentage to Gross Advances 
 0.00  0.00 4. Deductions 
 9.84  13.78 a) Balance in Interest Suspense Account / OIR* 
 0.00  0.00 b) DICGC / ECGC Claim received and held pending Adjustment 
 0.00  0.00 c) NP1: Part Payment on NPA Account received and kept in Suspense Account 
 9.84  13.78 Total Deduction 
 835.02  804.64 5. Total NPA provisions held (BDDR Special BDDR Balance after Appropriation 
 3,031.54  2,912.19 6. Net Advances (1) - (4) - (5) 
-723.19 -688.62 7. Net NPAs (2) - (4) - (5) 
-23.86 -23.65 8. Net NPAs as percentage of Net Advances 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER JUNIOR OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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XYZ  BANK                            Daily call and notice money operations         FORT-NIGHTLY 
 
Annexure-2C 
 (Private & Confidential) 
Daily call and notice money operations 
Bank Name XYZ  Bank : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Fortnight End Date 
07/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
07/03/2011  14:08 Page 1 of 3 Printed on: 
XYZ  BANK                            Daily call and notice money operations         FORT-NIGHTLY Annexure-2C Rs. in crores 
Sr 
No. 
Date Borrowed Amount Borrowed Range of 
Interest Rate ( % p.a) 
Min 
Borrowed Range of 
Interest Rate ( % p.a) 
Max 
Lent Amount Lent Range of Interest 
Rate ( % p.a) Min  
Lent Range of Interest 
Rate ( % p.a) Max 
 1 18/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 2 19/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 3 20/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  3.00  6.10  0.00 
 4 21/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  6.10  0.00 
 5 22/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  2.00  6.10  0.00 
 6 23/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  6.10  0.00 
 7 24/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  6.10  0.00 
 8 25/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  6.10  0.00 
 9 26/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  6.10  0.00 
 10 27/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 11 28/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  6.10  0.00 
 12 29/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  6.00  0.00 
 13 30/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 14 31/12/2010 
 12:00:00A
M 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 12.00  0.00 Total Borrowed Amount Total Lent Amount 
Rs. in crores 
Borrowed Lent 
Average Rate of Interest  0.00  3.00 
Maximum Rate during the above fortnight  0.00  0.00 
Minimum Rate during the above fortnight  0.00  6.00 
Daily Average during the above fortnight  0.00  0.86 
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XYZ  BANK                            Daily call and notice money operations         FORT-NIGHTLY Annexure-2C 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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XYZ  BANK                           Quarterly Statement on Advances to Directors relatives             QUARTERLY 
 
Annexure-2D 
 (Private & Confidential) 
Quarterly Statement on Advances to Directors relatives 
Bank Name XYZ  Bank : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
05/02/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
07/03/2011  14:33 Page 1 of 4 Printed on: 
XYZ  BANK                           Quarterly Statement on Advances to Directors relatives             QUARTERLY Annexure-2D 
Proforma-I 
Rs. in lakhs 
Limits Sanctioned 
Sr  
No. Name of Director Name of Borrower Relationship 
Type of Facility 
 Funded 
Type of Facility  
Non-Funded 
Date of 
 Sanction Secured Unsecured 
Total: 
Note: Different type of facilities sanctioned to a borrower should be indicated separately against Column 4 and 5      
(contd...) 
Proforma-I (contd...) Rs. in lakhs 
Limits Sanctioned 
Action initiated 
in case of  NPA 
A/Cs 
Exposure 
norms  
stipulated 
by RBI 
have been 
violated 
(Y/N) 
Exposure (100% 
funded & 50% 
non funded 
limits) 
Sanctioned 
Total Outstanding Outstanding 
Secured 
Due date Outstanding 
Unsecured 
Value of  
Security 
Nature of 
 Security 
Sr 
No. Amt 
Type 
 Total: 
07/03/2011  14:33 Page 2 of 4 Printed on: 
XYZ  BANK                           Quarterly Statement on Advances to Directors relatives             QUARTERLY Annexure-2D Rs. in lakhs 
Proforma-II Sr.
No. 
Particulars Directive Violated 
(Y/N) 
31/12/2010   
1) Total Demand && Time Liabilities ( as defined in section 18 read with Section 56 of the BR Act, 1949 )  11,525.02      1 
2) Total Paid Up Share Capital and Reserves  2,570.99      2 
3) Total Capital Funds  1,452.80      3 
4) 75% of Item (2)  1,928.24      4 
5) Total of Item 1 && 4  13,453.26      5 
6 a) Individual exposure limit (as % of Item 3)  217.92      6 
  b) Group exposure limit (as % of Item 3)  581.12      7 
7) i) UnSecured Advances including Clean Bills Purchased / Discounted and Cheques Purchased  6.16      8 
ii) Percentage of Item 7(i) to Item 5  0.05      9 
iii) Total Loans / Advances including bills Purchased outstanding against Directors including relatives) and the concerns 
in which they are interested 
 0.00     10 
a) Secured  0.00     11 
b) Un-secured  0.00     12 
c) 50% of Total Non- Funded Facilities to all Directors(including relatives)  0.00     13 
8) Percentage of Total of Items 7(iii)(a) and (b) and (c)  to Total Item 5  0.00     14 
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XYZ  BANK                           Quarterly Statement on Advances to Directors relatives             QUARTERLY Annexure-2D 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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XYZ  BANK              FMR - 1 Report on Actual or Suspected Frauds in Banks                      DATE-OF-FRAUD 
 
Annexure-3A 
 (Private & Confidential) 
FMR - 1 Report on Actual or Suspected Frauds in Banks 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
9999999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 01/01/2011 Fraud Date 
03/03/2011 : Reporting Date 
 1 : Sr. No. 
Validation Status : Entered 
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XYZ  BANK              FMR - 1 Report on Actual or Suspected Frauds in Banks                      DATE-OF-FRAUD Annexure-3A 
1.  Name of the bank 
2.  Fraud number 
3.  Details of the branch 
Name of branch (a) 
Branch type (b) 
Place (c) 
District (d) 
State (e) 
4.     (a) Name of the Principle party/account 
(b)  Whether account is under 
(c)  If under Consortium arrangement name of the leader of Consortium 
(d)  In case of Multiple banking, names of other lending banks 
5. (a) i.  Area of operation where  the fraud has occurred 
ii. if more than one account involved, total number of accounts 
(b) Method of fraud (multiple choice to be allowed) 
(i) fictitious accounts/operations/bills 
(ii) fraudulent withdrawal from genuine a/c 
(iii) fraudulent encashment of instruments 
(iv) manipulation in a/c -·  
by staff  
by outsource agency  
by using unauthorised computer id  
(v) Forged / fake cheques/DDs/FDRs/advices/ etc.  
(vi) Operations by POA holder 
(vii) Diversion / misappropriation of funds 
(viii) fake / forged title deeds 
(ix) Impersonation  
07/03/2011  14:51 Page 2 of 9 Printed on: 
XYZ  BANK              FMR - 1 Report on Actual or Suspected Frauds in Banks                      DATE-OF-FRAUD Annexure-3A 
(x) wrong / overvaluation of assets 
(xi) multiple finance against same security 
(xii) forged / fake documents (other than title deeds) 
(xiii) submission of fabricated books of a/cs  
(xiv) removal of stocks 
(xv) kite flying / accommodative operations 
(xvi) sanction irregularities (including exceeding discretionary powers for disbursements) 
(xvii) skimming  
(xviii) Phishing 
(xix) Others 
If others specify (d) 
Whether fraud has occured in a borrowal account (d) 
(e) Whether recipient of loan is third party 
If yes  a. Name in favour of whom instrument issued 
 b. Bank particulars 
Nature of fraud (a) 6. 
Misappropriation and criminal breach of trust (1) 
Fraudulent encashment through forged instruments / manipulation of books of account or through fictitious 
accounts and conversion of property 
(2) 
Unauthorised credit facilities extended for reward or for illegal gratification (3) 
Negligence and cash shortages (4) 
Cheating and forgery (5) 
Irregularities in foreign exchange transactions (6) 
Others (7) 
Whether computer is used in committing the fraud? (b) 
If yes, details (c) 
7.   Total amount involved (Rs. Lakh) 
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Date of occurrence 8. (a) 
Date of detection (b) 
Reasons for delay, if any, in detecting the fraud (c) 
Date on which reported to RBI (d) 
(e) Date of flash report, if any (frauds involving Rs.100 lakhs & above) 
(f) Position regarding placing frauds of Rs. 100 lakhs & above before the special Committee of the Board 
Reason for delay, if any, in reporting fraud to RBI (g) 
Brief history of account 9. (a) 
Modus operandi (how fraud was perpetrated) (b) 
10.   Fraud Committed by (multiple choice to be allowed) 
Staff (a) 
Customers (b) 
Outsiders (c) 
(d) Staff in collusion with customers 
(e) Staff in collusion with outsiders 
(f) Customers in collusion with outsiders 
(g) Staff, customers, outsiders all in collusion 
(a)  Whether Controlling Office (Regional/Zonal) could detect the fraud by a scrutiny of control returns submitted by the 
branch 
 
11. 
(b) Whether there is need to improve the information system 
 Whether internal inspection/audit (including concurrent audit) was conducted at the branch/es during the period 
between the date of first occurrence of the fraud and its detection? 
12. (a)  
Type of Inspection / Audit (multiple choice to be allowed) (b) 
i. Internal Inspection / audit 
ii. Concurrent Audit 
Internal audit  
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External audit  
iii. Snap Audit 
iv. Special Audit 
v. IS Audit 
vi. Statutory Audit  
vii. Control visits 
viii. Others (specify) 
Fraud detected by (c) 
i. Internal Inspection / audit 
ii. Concurrent Audit 
Internal audit  
 External audit 
iii. Snap Audit 
iv. Special Audit 
v. IS Audit 
vi. Statutory Audit  
vii. Control visits 
viii. Others (specify) 
ix. None of the above 
if 12(c)9Ix), then how was it detected (d) 
why the fraud could not be detected by control measures (e) 
Whether inspector / auditor pointed out systemic deficiencies in the areas where fraud occurred (f) 
(h ) What action taken has been taken for non-detection of fraud during such inspection/audit 
13. Action taken/proposed to be taken: 
(a) Complaint with Police / CBI 
1. (i) Whether any complaint has been lodged with the Police/CBI 
(ii) If yes, name of office/branch of CBI/Police 
2. Date of reference 
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3. Present position of the case 
4. Date of completion of Police/CBI Investigation 
5. Date of submission of investigation report by Police / CBI 
(iii) If not reported to Police / CBI reasons therefore 
(b) Recovery suit with DRT / Court 
(i) Date of filing  
(ii) Present position  
(c) Insurance Claim 
(i) Whether Insurance Claim has been lodged 
(ii) If not, reasons therefore 
(d) Details of staff-side action 
(i) Whether any internal investigation has been/is proposed to be conducted 
(ii) If yes, date of completion 
(iii) Whether any departmental enquiry has been/is proposed to be conducted 
(iv) If yes, give details as per format given below: 
Sr. 
No. 
Name Designation Whether 
Suspend
ed 
Date of 
issue of 
charge 
sheet 
Date of 
commencement 
of domestic 
Date of 
completion 
of enquiry 
Date of 
issue of 
final orders 
Punishment 
awarded 
Details of 
prosecution 
conviction/ 
acquittal, etc. 
Date of 
issue of 
suspensio
n 
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(v) If not, reasons there for 
(e) Steps taken / proposed to be taken to avoid such incidents 
14.  (a) Total amount recovered 
 i) Amount recovered from party/ies 
 ii) From insurance 
 ii) Amount that the bank expects to recover from sale of security 
a) Primary 
b) Collateral 
c) Others 
(b) Extent of loss to the bank 
(c) Provision held 
(d) Amount written off 
15. Suggestions if any for consideration of RBI  
16. Status of fraud 
Part B Additional information on Frauds in borrowal accounts 
(This part is required to be completed in respect of frauds in all borrowal accounts involving an amount of 
Rs. 5 lakh and above) 
Sr. No. Type of Party Party Address Name of Party / Account Constitution of party 
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Borrowal accounts details  : (New) 
Party 
Sr.  No. 
 Nature Of Account  Date of 
Sanction 
 Sanctioned 
Limit 
Balance Outstanding Name of party/Account Borrowal 
Account 
Sr.  No. 
Borrowal account Director / Properietor Details : (New) 
Sr. No.  Name of Directors / Proprietor Details  Address Name of party / Account 
Associate concerns  : (New) 
Name of party/Account 
Sr.  No. 
Associated 
Concern 
Name of director  Address  
Associate concerns Director/proprietor details : (New) 
Name of party/Account 
Sr.  No. 
Associated 
Concern 
Name of director  Address  
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Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-3B 
 (Private & Confidential) 
FMR - 2 Quarterly Report on Frauds Outstanding 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
08/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Area of 
Operation where 
Fraud has 
Occurred 
Cases Outstanding 
as at the end of the 
Previous Quarter 
Number of New 
Cases Reported 
during the Quarter 
Cases Closed during 
the Quarter 
Amount 
Recovered 
during the 
Quarter 
Cases Outstanding at 
the end of the Quarter 
Provisions 
held for cases 
outstanding 
as at the end 
of the Qtr. 
Total 
Amount 
Recovered 
Amount  
Written off 
during the 
Quarter 
No Amount Amount No Amount No Amount No Amount Amount Amount Amount 
Cash  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Deposits  1  0.65  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  1  0.65  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(i) SB  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(ii) Current  1  0.65  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  1  0.65  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iii) Term  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
NRI  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Advances  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(i) CC  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(ii) TL  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iii) Bills  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iv) Others  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Area of 
Operation where 
Fraud has 
Occurred 
Cases Outstanding 
as at the end of the 
Previous Quarter 
Number of New 
Cases Reported 
during the Quarter 
Cases Closed during 
the Quarter 
Amount 
Recovered 
during the 
Quarter 
Cases Outstanding at 
the end of the Quarter 
Provisions 
held for cases 
outstanding 
as at the end 
of the Qtr. 
Total 
Amount 
Recovered 
Amount  
Written off 
during the 
Quarter 
No Amount Amount No Amount No Amount No Amount Amount Amount Amount 
Forex Transactions  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Inter Branch 
accounts 
 0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Cheques / DDs  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Clearing accounts  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Off Balance sheet 
items 
 0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(i) LC  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(ii) Guarantee  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iii) Co-acceptance  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iv) Others  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Card/Internet  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(i)Credit Cards  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(ii)ATM/Debit Card  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Area of 
Operation where 
Fraud has 
Occurred 
Cases Outstanding 
as at the end of the 
Previous Quarter 
Number of New 
Cases Reported 
during the Quarter 
Cases Closed during 
the Quarter 
Amount 
Recovered 
during the 
Quarter 
Cases Outstanding at 
the end of the Quarter Provisions 
held for cases 
outstanding 
as at the end 
of the Qtr. 
Total 
Amount 
Recovered 
Amount  
Written off 
during the 
Quarter 
No Amount Amount No Amount No Amount No Amount Amount Amount Amount 
(iii)Internet banking  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iv)Others  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total  1  0.65  0  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  1  0.65  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Part-B : Category-wise Classification of Frauds reported during the quarter  Rs. in lakhs 
 Misappropriation & Criminal Breach                                                                                   Unauthorised Credit Facility 
extended for Illegal Gratification 
Category 
Negligence & Cash Shortages Fraudulent Encashment / Manipulation of 
Books of A/cs / Conversion of property of Trust 
No. Amount No. Amount No. No. Amount Amount 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Less than Rs. 1 lakh     0     0     0     0 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Rs. 1 lakh and above 
but less than Rs.100 
lakh 
    0     0     0     0 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Rs.100 lakh and 
above 
    0     0     0     0 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Total     0     0     0     0 
(contd...) 
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(contd...) 
Rs. in lakhs 
 Irregularities in Forex Txns Total 
Category 
 Others  Cheating & Forgery 
No. Amount No. No. No. Amount Amount Amount 
Less than Rs. 1 lakh  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0     0     0     0 
Rs. 1 lakh and above 
but less than Rs.100 
lakh 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0     0     0     0 
Rs.100 lakh and above  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0     0     0     0 
Total  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0     0     0     0 
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Part-C : Perpetrator-wise Classification of Frauds reported during the quarter Rs. in lakhs 
Staff Outsiders 
Category 
Staff and Customers Customers 
No. Amount No. Amount No. No. Amount Amount 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0     0     0 Total     0 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0     0     0 Rs.100 lakh and 
above 
    0 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0     0     0 Rs. 1 lakh and above 
but less than Rs.100 
lakh 
    0 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     0     0     0 Less than Rs. 1 lakh     0 
(contd...) 
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(contd...) Rs. in lakhs 
Customers and Outsiders Total 
Category 
Staff, Customers and Outsiders Staff and Outsiders 
No. Amount No. No. No. Amount Amount Amount 
Less than Rs. 1 lakh     0     0     0     0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Rs. 1 lakh and above 
but less than Rs.100 
lakh 
    0     0     0     0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Rs.100 lakh and above     0     0     0     0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total     0     0     0     0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-3C 
 (Private & Confidential) 
FMR - 3 Quarterly Progress Report on Large Value Frauds 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
08/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Case Outstanding 
CasesWhere there is no Progress ( Furnishcase - wise 
details as per format at part B below) 
CasesWhere there is Progress ( Furnishcase - wise 
details as per format at part C below) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
 0 
 0 
 1 
Part A: Summary Information 
Part B : Details of Cases where there is no Progress 
SR  NAME OF BRANCH  FRAUD NO NAME OF PARTY/ACCOUNT AMOUNT 
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Part C : Case - Wise Details of progress  
Fraud No 
Amount involved 
Name of branch / office 
Name of party / account 
1. Date of first reporting 
2. (a)  Date of filling recovery suit with DRT / Court 
(b)  Present position 
3. Recoveries made up to the end of the last quarter 
4. Recoveries made during the quarter 
(a)  From party / parties concerned 
(b)  From insurance 
(c)  From other sources 
5. Total Recoveries (3 + 4) 
6. Loss to the Bank 
7. Provision held 
8. Amount written off 
9. (a)  Date of reporting case to Police / CBI 
(b)  Date of completion of Police / CBI Investigation 
(c)  Date of submission of investigation report by Police / CBI 
Rs in Lakhs 
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Name Sr. 
No. 
Designation Whether 
Suspended 
Date of 
issue of 
charge 
sheet 
Date of 
commencemen
t of domestic 
Date of 
completion 
of enquiry 
Date of issue 
of final 
orders 
Punishment 
awarded 
Details of 
prosecution 
conviction/ 
acquittal, etc. 
Date of issue 
of 
suspention 
11 Other developments 
12. Whether case closed during the quarter 
13. Date of Closure 
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Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-3D 
 (Private & Confidential) 
FMR - 4 Report on Dacoities / Robberies / Theft / Burglaries 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
08/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Rs. in lakhs 
Sr. 
No. 
Name of Branch  Address Date and 
Time of Occurrence 
Amount 
Involved 
Type of 
Case 
Amount 
Recovered 
District Type of 
Branch 
Risk 
Classificati
on 
Whether a 
currency 
chest  
State 
(contd...) 
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Rs. in lakhs 
Sr. 
No. Compensation Paid Convicted 
Staff Others Robbers Staff 
Injured 
Staff Others Others 
Killed 
Robbers Staff Robbers 
Arrested 
Staff 
Insurance 
Claim Settled 
Name of Branch  
(contd...) 
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Rs. in lakhs 
Sr. 
No. 
Name of Branch  Action Taken Crime No. and Name of 
Police Station at which 
Offence has been 
Registered 
Remarks(No of Armed 
Guards on Duty) 
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Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-4A 
 (Private & Confidential) 
Form VI - Statement Of Offices in India 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFG RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
03/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Sr. 
No. 
Branch  Address of Branches Opened District Block State Opening Date 
of Office 
Taluk Population Office Type 
Sr. 
No. 
Branch  Address of Branches Closed District Block State Opening 
Date of 
Office 
Taluk Population Office Type Closing Date 
of Office 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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 (Private & Confidential) 
SOSS - 1 Statement on Assets and Liabilities 
Bank Name XYZ  Bank : 
9999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
24/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Rs. in lakhs 
 183.17 
 0.00 
 1,492.99 
 1,074.32 
 120.39 
 74.91 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 223.37 
-93.99 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 93.99 
 1,582.17 
 0.00 
 11,482.39 
 11,482.39 
 11,482.39 
 5,293.23 
 3,952.24 
 2,236.92 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 183.17 
 0.00 
Liabilities 
1. Paid-up Capital 
2. Reserve Fund and other Reserves 
3.  Profit/Excess of income over expenditure 
4.  Total Capital And Reserves 
5.  Subordinated Debt (Tier II Capital) 
6.  Deposits and other Accounts  
Customer Deposits -  
A. Resident Deposits 
i. Term Deposits (including recurring deposits, cash certificates, staff provident funds,  
security deposits and matured term deposits) 
ii. Savings Bank Deposits 
iii. Current Deposits 
ii.  State Government 
i. FCNR Deposits 
ii. NRE Deposits 
2. NRO Deposits 
B. Non Resident Deposits 
1. NRI Deposits (Other than deposits in NRO Accounts) 
i.   Individuals 
iii. Others 
i.  Statutory Reserve Fund 
ii.  Building Fund 
iii. Dividend Equalization Fund 
iv. Revaluation Reserve 
v.  Provision for Standard Assets 
vi. General Provisions (other than provision for standard advances) 
vii. Other Funds and Reserves not in the nature of outside liability-(Refer Annexure I) 
i.   Surplus Unallocated and Carried over 
ii.   Accumulated Losses of Previous years 
iii.  Operating Surplus in Current year 
iv. Operating Deficit in Current year 
Total No of Depositors 
No. of Term Depositors 
No of Savings Depositors 
No of Current Depositers 
No of FCNR Depositors 
No of NRE Depositors 
 38094  
 6,835.00 
 25781  
 5478  
 0  
 0  
 0  No of NRO Depositer 
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Rs. in lakhs 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
C. Deposit of Banks 
i. Commercial Banks 
ii. Scheduled Cooperative Banks 
iii. Other Cooperative Banks 
 144.62 
 0.00 
 144.62 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 144.62 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 3.96 
 0.55 
 13.21 
 5.87 
 5.87 
7. Borrowings from 
8. Bills for collection being bills receivable as per contra 
9. Branch Adjustments 
10. Overdue Interest Reserve 
11. Interest Payable on 
i. RBI / NABARD 
ii. State/Central Coop. Bank of the State/ District 
a. Short-term loans 
b. Medium-term loans 
c. Cash credits and overdrafts 
iii. Other banks (exclude borrowings from call money market) 
iv. Call money market 
v. Others 
i. Deposits 
ii. Borrowings  0.00 
 1,028.23 
 167.28 
 847.10 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 13.85 
 61.34 
 10.17 
 11.33 
12. Risk Provisions Other than netted off assets (BDDR, Spl BDDR, Depreciation on 
fixed assets etc.,) 
 
i.  For investments (Investment Depreciation Reserve) 
ii. BDDR, Spl BDDR 
iii. Depreciation on fixed assets 
iv. For other impaired assets 
v. For contingent / non-funded exposures 
 0.00 
 39.84 
13. Other Liabilities 
i.  Bills payable 
ii. Unclaimed dividends 
iii.Provident fund payable to Regional Provident Fund Commissioner 
iv.Others - 
14. Total Outside Liabilities 
15. Total Liabilities 
16. Contingent Liabilities 
i.  Claims against the bank not acknowledged as debt 
ii.  Liabilities for partly paid investments 
v. Guarantees- Others (Indemnity/ Tender/ Bid Bonds) 
iii. Letter of Credit Documentary 
iv. Guarantees  - Financial 
 12,740.17 
 14,322.34 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
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Rs. in lakhs 
vi. Sale and Repurchase Agreement /Asset sales with recourse 
vii. Liability on account of outstanding forward exchange contracts 
viii. Acceptances, endorsements and other obligations 
ix.  Others 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
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Rs. in lakhs 
 337.50 
 5,521.57 
 4,402.75 
 3,372.60 
 6.10 
 0.00 
 3,366.50 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 1,030.15 
 92.98 
 0.01 
 937.16 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 1,118.82 
 2.18 
 0.00 
 1,116.64 
 3,936.05 
 3,610.75 
 0.00 
 2,245.31 
 1,365.44 
 0.00 
 325.30 
 325.00 
 0.00 
 325.00 
 0.30 
 0.30 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
Assets 
1. Cash in Hand 
2. Due from Banks 
A. Balances with Banks 
B. Loans and Advances to Banks (including bills) 
iv.Loans and advances to Non scheduled Cooperative Banks 
a. Current 
b. Savings 
i. State/ Central/ Cooperative Bank of the State/District concerned in 
c. Fixed 
ii. RBI : 
a. Current 
b. Others 
iii. SBI and other notified banks :  
a. Current 
b. Savings 
c. Fixed 
i.  Call and Short Notice Money to Cooperative Banks 
ii. Call and Short Notice Money to Other Banks 
iii. Loans and Advances to Scheduled Cooperative Banks 
v. Loans and Advances to Other Banks 
C. Due from Other institutions (including post office / treasuries / others) 
a. Current 
b. Fixed 
c. Others 
3. Investments 
A. SLR Investments in Government and Other Approved Central and State Govt Securities 
i.   GOI T. Bills 
ii.  GOI (dated) Securities 
iii. State Government Securities 
iv. Other Trustee/approved securities including Land Development Bank debentures 
B. Non - SLR Investments 
B1. Other Debt Securities 
i. Other State Government Securities 
ii. Bonds of PSUs / All India Financial Institutions 
B2. Equities / Units of Mutual Funds 
i. Shares in Cooperative Institutions 
ii. Shares of All India Financial Institutions 
iii. Units of UTI 
B3. Investment in Subsidiaries / Equity Participations 
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Rs. in lakhs 
 0.00 
 4,328.99 
 238.69 
 238.69 
 0.00 
 3,876.29 
 3,876.29 
 0.00 
 88.86 
 88.86 
 0.00 
 118.99 
 118.99 
 0.00 
 6.16 
 6.16 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 4,328.99 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 3.96 
 68.36 
 83.16 
 0.00 
 42.75 
 12.34 
 0.00 
 0.00 
B4. Other Investments 
4. Loans and Advances 
A. Gross Loans and Advances: (Other than banks) 
i. Short term loans 
a. Secured 
b. Unsecured 
ii. Cash credits and overdrafts 
a. Secured 
b. Unsecured 
iii. Medium - term loans 
a. Secured 
b. Unsecured 
iv. Long - term loans 
a. Secured 
b. Unsecured 
v. Bills/hundies purchased/discounted 
a. Documentary 
b. Clean 
B. Netting items on Loans and Advances 
i.  Unrealised Interest in Suspense 
ii. Credit Recoveries in Suspense 
iii. Provisions for Credit Losses ( funded credits) 
C. Loans and Advances (Net) 
5. Interest Receivable on 
i. Investments 
ii.Loans and Advances 
(Of 5 (ii) above, overdues) 
6. Bills Receivable being bills for collection as per contra 
7. Premises (less depreciation) 
8. Furniture and Fixtures (less depreciation) 
9. Branch Adjustments * 
10. Other Assets 
i.  Advance Tax Paid and TDS (net) 
ii. Amounts due from RBI 
iii. Sundry Debtors 
Total No of Borrowers 
No of Borrowers 
No of Borrowers 
No of Borrowers 
No of Borrowers 
No of Borrowers 
 1560  
 570  
 738  
 163  
 88  
 1  
07/03/2011  12:57 Page 6 of 10 Printed on : 
XYZ  BANK                   SOSS - 1 Statement on Assets and Liabilities                          QUARTERLY Annexure-5A 
Rs. in lakhs 
 9.88 
 20.53 
 0.00 
 14,322.34 
iv. Intangible Assets 
v. All Other 
11. Non-banking Assets acquired in satisfaction of claims 
12. Total Assets (1 to 11) 
Note : * Branch adjustments: Net position to be shown as an item of liability / assets, as the case  may be. 
ANNEX I 
1. Break-up of Other Funds and Reserves 
i.  Gratuity Fund 
ii. Staff Welfare Fund 
iii. Silver Jubilee Fund 
iv. Development Fund 
v. Charity Fund 
vi. Any Other Fund/ Disclosed reserves 
vii. Undisclosed Reserves created out of PAT and included in B/S under heads like other 
liabilities and provisions 
 0.00 
 0.29 
 0.00 
 40.82 
 27.80 
 154.46 
 0.00 
 223.37 Total 
Rs. in lakhs 
Rs. in lakhs 
Period In 
Days Months Years 
Rate of 
interest 
(%) 
Date of 
receipt 
Sr. 
No Name of Bank / Institution 
Amount of 
deposit 
Maturity
Date 
2. Particulars of top 10 deposits accepted from other banks / and institutions as on the date of review  
Time Period 
No. of Debit 
Entries 
No. of Credit 
Entries 
Amt. of Debit 
Entries 
Amt. of Credit 
Entries 
3. Age-wise analysis of Inter Branch Adjustment Account - Position as on:  31/12/2010 
Rs. in lakhs 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 3 months to 6 months 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Above 6 months to 1 year 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Above 1 year to 2 years 
 0.00  0.00  0.40  1.00 Above 2 years 
 0.00  0.00  0.40  1.00 Total 
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Time Period 
No. of Debit 
Entries 
No. of Credit 
Entries 
Amt. of Debit 
Entries 
Amt. of Credit 
Entries 
4. Age-wise analysis of Inter Bank Reconciliation Account - Position as on: 31/12/2010 
Rs. in lakhs 
3 months to 6 months  0.00  0.00  21.00  16.34 
Above 6 months to 1 year  1.00  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Above 1 year to 2 years  3.00  0.02  14.00  0.18 
Above 2 years  0.00  0.00  6.00  0.06 
Total  4.00  0.03  41.00  16.58 
5. Unsecured guarantees issued by the bank 
Sr. No Name of borrower Name of beneficiary* 
Amount 
Outstanding as on 
quarter end  
Rs. in lakhs 
* Give name if borrower / beneficiary is director / top management / related entity. 
  Other guarantees may be consolidated and reported against Others 
Total 
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Sr. No Due From Name Amount Due Provision Made 
Sundry Debtors Account -1 
Long Outstanding Large Amounts - Outstanding for over 6 months but less than 1 year* 
 ANNEX II Rs. in lakhs 
* Large Amounts: Rs. 2 lakhs for banks having total assets of Rs. 100 lakhs and over Rs. 50,000 for other banks 
Sr. No Due From Name Amount Due Provision Made 
Sundry Debtors Account -2 
Long Outstanding Large Amounts - Outstanding for over 1 year but less than 3 years* 
Rs. in lakhs 
* Large Amounts: Rs. 2 lakhs for banks having total assets of Rs. 100 lakhs and over Rs. 50,000 for other banks 
Sr. No Due From Name Amount Due Provision Made 
Sundry Debtors Account -3 
Long Outstanding Large Amounts - Outstanding for over 3 years* 
Rs. in lakhs 
* Large Amounts: Rs. 2 lakhs for banks having total assets of Rs. 100 lakhs and over Rs. 50,000 for other banks 
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2.Total No of Borrowers  1560  
    ii) Of which total Deposit Amount  1,507.16 
b. i) Of which Total No. of Depositors with Deposits Between Rs 1 Lakh to Rs. 2 Lakh  1220  
   ii) Of which total Deposit Amount  4,233.65 
a. i) Of which Total No. of Depositors with Deposits less than Rs. 1 Lakh  35418  
   Total Customer Deposits  11,482.39 
1.Total No of Depositors  38094  
 Details of Depositors & Borrowers 
 Total Loans and Advances (Other than Banks)  4,328.99 
a. i) Of which Total No. of Borrowers with  Loans and Advances less than Rs. 1 Lakh  776  
    ii) Of which total  Loans and Advances Amount  289.89 
b. i) Of which Total No. of Borrowers with  Loans and Advances Between Rs 1 Lakh  to 
Rs. 2 Lakh 
 174  
   ii) Of which total  Loans and Advances Amount  206.33 
 0  
 0  
 0  
 0  
 0  e)     No. of complaints outstanding for over 2 quarters 
d)     No. of complaints outstanding at the end of the quarter 
c)     No. of  complaints addressed during the quarter 
b)     No. Of complaints received during the quarter 
a)     No. Of complaints outstanding at the beginning of the quarter 
Complaints Received from public 
Rs. in lakhs 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER JUNIOR OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
 Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-5B 
 (Private & Confidential) 
SOSS - 2 Statement on Earnings 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
27/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Rs. in lakhs 
1. Interest/discount received (2+3+4+5) 
2. Interest/discount received on loans and advances (other than from banks) 
i) Actually received 
ii) Accrued interest on Standard advances 
3. Interest on market lending ( to banks, if any)  
4. Interest on investments 
i) Interest Accrued (not yet received) on Standard Investments 
5. Interest on additional balance with RBI, inter-bank deposits, placements and credits 
6. Other Operating income 
i) Fee, Commission, Exchange and Brokerage 
ii) Dividend Income 
iii) Misc Income(excld Profit on Forex Operations & Profit on Trading & Sale of Securities) 
7. Total Operating Income [1 + 6 + 14 (if positive)] 
8. Non Operating Income (Capital gains) 
i) Profit on sale of fixed assets  
ii) Profit on sale of other assets  
iii) Other Non-operating Income  
9. Total income [7 + 8] (Excluding item 14) 
10. Interest paid 
i) On Customer deposits 
ii) On Inter-bank deposits 
iii) On Inter-bank borrowings (including from RBI/FIs) 
iv) Others 
11. Operating Expenses 
i) Staff expenses 
ii) Directors fees 
iii) Auditors' fees 
12. Other Operating expenses 
i) Rent, taxes, insurance and lighting 
ii) Law charges 
iii) Postage, telegrams and stamps 
iv) Stationery, printing and advertising 
v) Depreciation on and repairs to bank's property 
13. Total operating expenses [10 + 11 + 12] 
14. Profit / Loss - Other Operations 
 i) Profit/(Loss) on forex operations 
ii) Profit/(Loss) on trading and sale of securities 
 668.27 
 345.83 
 345.83 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 121.77 
 0.00 
 200.67 
 56.11 
 16.21 
 0.18 
 39.72 
 724.38 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 724.38 
 371.63 
 370.92 
 0.71 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 328.00 
 327.72 
 0.28 
 0.00 
 118.74 
 27.23 
 2.78 
 1.89 
 5.10 
 0.27 
 818.37 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
vi) Others  81.47 
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Annexure-5B 
Rs. in lakhs 
15. Operating Profit/Loss [7 - 13 + 14 (if negative)] 
16. Value adjustment of Securities (HFT) 
17. Write off 
i) Bad Debts written off 
ii) Other assets written off 
iii) Capitalised expenditure written off 
18. Provision against risks/ contingencies 
i) Provision for loan losses (BDDR, Spl. BDDR, etc.) 
ii) Provision for depreciation in investments including AFS 
iii) Other risk provisions towards losses on account of frauds, misappropriations,  
robberies, claims against the bank, etc. 
iv) Other provisions  
19.  Net Operating Profit (+)/Loss (-) [15 - 16 - 17 - 18] 
20. Profit (+) on sale of assets (other than investments) 
21. Loss (-) on sale of assets (other than investments) 
22. Net Profit (+)/ Loss (-) before taxes - (EBT) [ 19 + 8 - 20 - 21] 
23. Provisions for taxes (if any) 
24. Net Profit (+)/ Loss (-) after taxes [ 22 - 23] 
25. Balance of previous year’s profit (+) / Accumulated losses (-) 
26. Net distributable profit (+) / Accumulated losses (-) 
27. Appropriation of profits 
i) Appropriation towards Statutory Reserves 
ii) Appropriation towards Building Fund 
iii) Appropriation towards Dividend Equalisation Fund 
iv) Appropriation towards Other Reserves/ Provisions 
v) Dividend 
28. Net interest income 
29. Non-interest income 
30. Non-interest expenditure 
31. Earning Assets 
32. Average Earning Assets 
33. Working Fund 
34. Actual  Number of  Employee 
-93.99 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
-93.99 
 0.00 
 0.00 
-93.99 
 0.00 
-93.99 
 0.00 
-93.99 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 296.64 
 56.11 
 446.74 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 99 
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Include provisions which are to be made by the bank as per any law 
irrespective of the position whether the bank is showing profit in its working 
results or not, provision made to meet any item of deferred payments which 
is to be charged to 'P & L a/c', etc. 
Net Profit/ Net Assets* as per balance sheet *[Net Assets = Total Assets (-) 
Contra items (-) Revaluation Reserve (-) Overdue interest receivable on 
NPAs] 
Includes loans and advances, investments of all types, interest earning 
deposits with banks/ others and market lending to banks 
Total no of employees including officers 
Monthly average to be taken wherever “average” is indicated in  
Total of Liabilities (Total Assets) (-) contra items (-) Overdue Interest 
Receivable on NPAs (-) Revaluation Reserves (-) Accumulated Losses- 
Intangible assets 
(vi) Other provisions (item no.18 - IV) 
(v) Return on Assets 
(iv) Earning Assets 
(iii)No of Employees 
(ii)Average 
(i) Working Capital (working funds) 
Earnings Before Profit and Tax from April to Date 
Total Write offs 
Provision for loan losses ( BDDR, Spl. BDDR etc.) 
Provision for depreciation in investments 
 Provision for Non-Performing Loans and Advances 
Provision for standard advances 
Provision For contingent credit exposures 
Other Risk Provisions 
Net Operating Profit / (loss) during the year 
Profit on sale of assets (other than investments) 
Loss on sale of assets ( other than investments) 
Provision for taxes 
Net Profit Loss After Tax during the year 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
Rs. in lakhs 
*(Memorandum Item) 
Interest receivable on NPAs not recognized as income From April till date 31/12/2010 
Rs. in lakhs 
 0.00  0.00 i. Interest receivable not recognized during the quarter / year 
 0.00  0.00 ii. Balance at the beginning of the quarter / year 
 0.00  0.00 iii. Interest received and reversed to income from (i) in the quarter / year on 
NPAs upgraded to Performing / accrual basis 
 0.00  0.00 Balance at the end of the quarter (i)+(ii)-(iii) 
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Ratio Analysis 
(a) Net Margin 
(b) Interest expenses / total income x 100 
(c) Interest paid on deposits / total income x 100 
(d) Interest paid on borrowings / total income x 100 
(e) Staff costs / total income x 100 
(f) Other overheads / total income x 100 
(g) Interest received on loans and advances and discount / total income x 100 
(h) Interest / dividend received on investments to total income x 100 
(i) Risk provisions / total income x 100 
(j) Total income / Working capital x 100 
(k) Return on Average Assets (Net Profit ) 
(l) Bad debts written off/ Total NPAs x 100 
(m) Interest income/ Average Earning Assets x 100 
(n) Total income/ Total Assets x 100 
(i) Deposits per employee 
(ii) Advances per employee 
(iii) Coverage ratio 
(iv) Borrowings per employee 
(v) Profit per employee 
(o) Employee productivity (Average business/ Number of employees) 
-12.98 
 51.30 
 51.30 
 0.00 
 45.24 
 67.73 
 47.74 
 16.84 
 0.00 
 0.00 
-0.66 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 5.06 
 7,985.55 
 11,598.37 
 4,372.72 
 15.75 
 146.08 
-94.94 
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Other Operating Expenses  
Sr.No Particulars Amount 
Rs. in lakhs 
 1.00 MISC EXP.  7.69 
 2.00 SUBSCRIPTION  0.33 
 3.00 COMPUTER EXPENSES  1.67 
 4.00 A.M.C. EXP.  1.04 
 5.00 TRAVELLING EXP.  1.07 
 6.00 CO.OP. TRAINING EXP.  0.16 
 7.00 ADVISOR FEES EXP.  0.09 
 8.00 STAFF GROUP GRATUITY  50.90 
 9.00 ENTERTAINMENT EXP.  0.26 
 10.00 SANITARY EXP.  0.52 
 11.00 SECURITY EXP.  2.03 
 12.00 GOVT.SEC. EXP.  2.45 
 13.00 INCOME TAX EXP.  9.13 
 14.00 CASH REMITTANCE EXP.  1.94 
 15.00 STAFF EXP.  0.88 
 16.00 LEASE LINE EXP.  1.31 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
XYZ CITY XYZ CITY Place 
Date 
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Annexure-5C 
 (Private & Confidential) 
SOSS - 3 Statement on Asset Quality 
Bank Name XYZ  Bank : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
24/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS  
Total Loan 
Assets 
Bills Purchased 
and Discounted 
Overdrafts & Cash 
Credits Loans Period of Delinquency 
Rs. in lakhs Loans and Advances 
A. PERFORMING ( i + ii )  437.91  3,712.95  6.16  4,157.02 
i) Current  425.34  3,003.38  6.16  3,434.88 
ii) Overdue less than one quarter  12.57  709.57  0.00  722.14 
iia) of which overdue less than 2 months  0.00  153.82  0.00  153.82 
B.NON-PERFORMING@ (iii + iv)  8.64  163.33  0.00  171.97 
iii) Less than 18 months  0.00  83.21  0.00  83.21 
iv)18 months and above  8.64  80.12  0.00  88.76 
TOTAL (A+B)  446.55  3,876.28  6.16  4,328.99 
Current quarter End of last quarter 
(i.e. interest suspended / not recognized as income)   
Interest in arrears on Non Performing loans and advances 
Memorandum Item  
 @ Non Performing Advances as defined in RBI (UBD) Circular issued from time to time and in force at time of review 
 0.00  0.00 
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Lease 
receivables + Inter- Bank Assets 
Notes & 
bonds of 
corporates @ 
Commercial 
Paper Period of Delinquency 
Rs. in lakhs 
# Others 
including SLR 
Investments Total OIBA* 
Portfolio Analysis-Other Interest bearing assets (OIBA) 
A.    PERFORMING  0.00  325.00  2,053.80  0.00  6,977.25  9,356.05 
1) Current  0.00  325.00  2,053.80  0.00  6,977.25  9,356.05 
2) Overdue less than one quarter  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2a) Of which Overdue less than two 
months 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
B.NON-PERFORMING  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
3) Less than 18 months  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
4) 18 months and above  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C. TOTAL(A+B)  0.00  325.00  2,053.80  0.00  6,977.25  9,356.05 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
Total  
(c) State Govt. securities 
(b) GOI Securities(Bonds) 
(a) Treasury bills 
# Of which grouped Under 
+ if not included in Portfolio Analysis for loans and Advances 
@ including those of PSUs (owned by central and state governments) 
Consolidated data from columns of previous two tables taken directly   ie. Total Loan Assets  & Total OIBA* 
Other Interest Bearing 
Assets(OIBA) Loans & Advances Period of deliquency 
Rs. in lakhs 
A. PERFORMING ( i + ii )  4,157.02  9,356.05 
i) Current  3,434.88  9,356.05 
ii) Overdue less than one quarter  722.14  0.00 
iia) of which overdue less than 2 months  153.82  0.00 
B.NON-PERFORMING@ (iii + iv)  171.97  0.00 
iii) Less than 18 months  83.21  0.00 
iv)18 months and above  88.76  0.00 
TOTAL (A+B)  4,328.99  9,356.05 
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CLASSIFICATION OF LOANS AND ADVANCES (including Bill Credit) Part - A 
Provisions/ 
Deductions 
Gross Outstanding 
Amount 
Risk Category 
Rs. in lakhs 
Net Outstanding 
Amount 
1. Standard  4,157.02  0.00  4,157.02 
2. Of which Restructured Standard  0.00  0.00  0.00 
3. Sub-standard*  83.21  0.00  83.21 
4. Of which restructured Sub-standard  0.00  0.00  0.00 
5. Doubtful* upto 1 year  13.66  0.00  13.66 
6. Doubtful* more than 1 year and upto 3 years  4.33  0.00  4.33 
7. Doubtful* more than 3 years  49.46  0.00  49.46 
8. Loss*  21.31  0.00  21.31 
TOTAL  4,328.99  0.00  4,328.99 
 171.97 Net Non Performing Advances 
 171.97 Gross Non Performing Advances 
Net Non Performing Advances Ratio(%) 
Gross Non Performing Advances Ratio(%) 
 3.97 
 3.97 
c) More than 3 years  0.00 
Rs. in lakhs 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
b) More than 1 year and upto 3 years 
a) Upto 1 year 
guaranteed loans  
Amount of interest not recognized on the above govt and govt. 
or carrying government guarantee which are non-performing  
* Of which total NPAs in  loans and advances to government  
Memorandum Item 
Loss Doubtful Sub-Standard Standard Item 
Rs. in lakhs 
Total 
Part B - Other risk assets and exposures 
ON BALANCE SHEET 
1. Inter-bank assets 
 Amount  5,745.30  0.00  0.00  0.00  5,745.30 
 (Loss provision)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2. SLR Securities 
 Amount  3,610.75  0.00  0.00  0.00  3,610.75 
 (Loss provision)  227.28  0.00  0.00  0.00  227.28 
3. Receivables 
 Amount  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 (Loss provision)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sub-total (Amount) (1+2+3)  9,356.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  9,356.05 
Sub-total (Loss Provision) (1+2+3)  227.28  0.00  0.00  0.00  227.28 
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Annexure-5C 
Loss Sub-Standard 
& Doubtful  
Standard Not Invoked Item 
Rs. in lakhs 
Total 
OFF BALANCE SHEET 
Invoked 
4. Guarantee outstanding 
 Amount  4.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 (Loss provision)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
5. Letters of credit outstanding 
 Amount  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 (Loss provision)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
6. Other contingent credit exposures 
Amount  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 (Loss provision)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sub-total (Amount) (4+5+6)  4.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sub-total (Loss provision) (4+5+6)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Grand-total (Amount) (1+2+3+4+5+6)  9,360.31  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Grand-total (Loss provision) (1+2+3+4+5+6)  227.28  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Annexure 5C 
Available for 
Sale 
Held for 
Trading 
Available for 
Sale 
Held to 
Maturity Item 
Rs. in lakhs 
Held for 
Trading 
Quality of Investment Portfolio 
Book Value Market Value 
QUALITY OF SECURITY PORTFOLIO 
A. SLR Investments - Total (i+ii+iii+iv)  3,610.75  0.00  985.00  0.00  884.62 
(i) GOI Treasury bills  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(ii) GOI Securities(Dated)  2,245.31  0.00  985.00  0.00  884.62 
(iii) State Govt. Securities(Dated)  1,365.44  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iv) Other approved Securities  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
B. Debt Securities - Total (Ba + Bb)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Ba. Debt Securities - Quoted - Total (i+ii+iii+iv)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(i) PSU bonds  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(ii) Mutual funds (debt oriented)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iii) Bank Certificate of Deposits  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iv) All others excluding equities  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Bb. Debt Securities - Unquoted-Total 
(i+ii+iii+iv) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(i) PSU bonds  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(ii) Mutual funds (debt oriented)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iii) Bank Certificate of Deposits  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(iv) All others excluding equities  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C. Equities - Total (i+ii)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(i) Quoted  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
(ii) Unquoted  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Out of C Equities -Total - investments in equity 
- oriented mutual funds 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total Investments (A+B+C)  3,610.75  0.00  985.00  0.00  884.62 
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Rated 
Category of Securities 
Rs. in lakhs 
Unrated Borrowers 
Non 
Borrowers Rated Unrated 
Total 
NPAs 
Total 
Provision 
Rating wise details of 
Total Holdings 
Category wise details of 
Total Holdings 
Amount Acquired 
through Private 
Placement 
Item 
Other Details of Non-SLR Securities 
Total Quoted - I  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1. PSU Bonds  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2. Mutual funds (Including 
Units) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
3. Others  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total Unquoted - II  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1. Mutual funds (Including 
Units) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2. Others  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Equities of AIFIs: - III  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1. Quoted  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2. Unquoted  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Grand Total (I+II+III)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure – 5D 
(Private & Confidential) 
SOSS - 4 Statement on Non Performing Assets,Large Exposures,Segmentwise Advances & NDTL/NOF Ratio 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
27/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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PART -  A 
 171.97 I) Gross Non Performing Assets 
 83.21 i. Sub standard assets 
 67.45 ii. Doubtful assets  
 13.66    a. upto one year 
 4.33    b. one to three years 
 49.46    c. above three years 
 21.31 iii. Loss Assets 
 860.31 II) Deductions 
i. Balance in interest suspense account/OIR in respect of unrealized interest capitalized 
   and included in loans and advances shown as outstanding  13.21 
 0.00 ii. DICGC/ECGC claims received and pending adjustment 
 0.00 iii. Part payment of NPA amounts received and pending adjustment  
 847.10 iv. Total NPA provisions held (under BDDR, special BDDR,etc.) 
-688.34 III) Net Non Performing Assets(I-II) 
1. Non Performing Assets (Gross & Net) Rs. in lakhs 
2. Movement of NPAs during the past three quarters Rs. in lakhs 
-5.12 
 1.20 IV) Gross Non Performing Assets Ratio(%) 
V) Net Non Performing Assets Ratio(%) 
Quarter (1) Amount of NPAs as  at the beginning of  
the Quarter (2) 
Recoveries effected   
out of NPAs during  
the Quarter (3) 
Additions to  
NPAs during the  
the Quarter (4) 
Amount of NPAs  
as at the end of 
the Quarter (5) = (2-3+4)  
30/06/2010  133.26  7.47  15.28  141.07 
30/09/2010  141.07  15.42  48.89  174.54 
31/12/2010  174.54  2.60  0.03  171.97 
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Annexure – 5D 
PART -  B 
1. Extensions granted 
During current quarter From April till date Total Extensions granted - 
of which still outstanding 
No. of accounts Amount  
involved 
Amount  
involved 
No. of accounts No. of accounts Amount  
involved 
 0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00 
2. Waiver of Debts/Written offs (Other than Compromise Settlement) 
During current quarter From April till date 
No. of accounts Amount involved No. of accounts 
 0  0.00  0  0.00 
Amount involved 
3. Compromise Settlements   
During current quarter From April till date 
  No. of 
accounts 
 Amount   
involved 
 Amount   
recovered 
 Amount   
outstanding 
 Amount    
written off 
  No. of 
accounts 
 Amount   
involved 
 Amount   
recovered 
 Amount   
outstanding 
 Amount   
written off 
 1  1.89  1.89  0.00  0.00  1  1.89  1.89  0.00  0.00 
Rs. in lakhs 
Rs. in lakhs 
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4. Top Fifty Impaired Credit or more than Rs.100 lakhs  
Sr. 
No 
Name of 
borrower  
Loans & 
Advances  
Sector  Contingent  
Credits 
(L/Cs, 
Guarantees) 
Total Credit Exposure 
Funded  Non -funded  
% to 
total  
advances 
Capital 
funds of 
the bank 
% to 
Capital 
funds of 
the bank 
Risk 
Class 
ification 
Loss 
Provision 
held 
Interest in 
Arrear 
Borrowe
rs Head 
Office 
Pincode 
Totals 
Total Exposure : 
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PART- C 1. STATEMENT ON LARGE EXPOSURE - SINGLE BORROWER  
Sr. 
No 
Name of borrower  Type of facility 
Funded  Non -funded  
Limit 
sanctioned 
% to total 
advance 
Outstanding 
balance 
Capital 
fund 
% to 
 Capital 
fund 
Asset 
classification 
Borrowers 
Head Office 
Pincode  
In excess of 15% of banks capital funds or a minimum of 20 large credits  
 1 ABC & bROS 25 0  25.00  0.00  16.23  0.00  0.00 Standard  361001 
 2 XYZ OIL MILL 25 0  25.00  0.00  17.61  0.00  0.00 Standard  361001 
 3 OPQ MEDICAL 
STORES 
50.00 0  50.00  0.00  46.56  46.23  108.15 Standard  361001 
 4 CDE TRADERS 25 0  25.00  0.00  0.00  8.14  307.13 Standard  361001 
 5 FGK KUMAR 37. 0  37.00  0.00  31.05  0.00  0.00 Standard  361001 
 6 MNO OIL TRADERS 22 0  22.00  0.00  1.22  6.21  354.27 Standard  361001 
 7 PQR INTERNATIONAL 37 0  37.00  0.00  36.72  31.63  116.98 Standard  361001 
 8 STU MACHINES PVT. 
LTD. 
60 0  60.00  0.00  42.94  27.99  214.36 Standard  361004 
 9 WXY PRODUCTS 8 0  8.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Doubtful 
Secured Above 
3 yrs. 
 361001 
 10 ABC TRADING CO. 10 0  10.00  0.00  9.26  8.43  118.62 Doubtful 
Secured Above 
1 Upto 3 yrs. 
 361001 
 11 DEF TRADING CO. 40 0  40.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Standard  361001 
 12 GHI & SONS 40.00 0  40.00  0.00  36.35  27.85  143.63 Standard  361001 
 13 JKL TRADERS 25 0  25.00  0.00  3.54  0.07  35,714.2
9 
Standard  361001 
 14 MNO. XYZI 20 0  20.00  0.00  17.64  18.66  107.18 Standard  361001 
 15 PQRI MEDICAL 
STORES 
22 0  22.00  0.00  20.73  9.65  227.98 Standard  361001 
 16 STU AUTO PVT.LTD. 80 0  80.00  0.00  60.62  80.61  99.24 Standard  361120 
 17 WXY EQIPMENTS 30 0  30.00  0.00  29.31  30.19  99.37 Standard  361120 
 18 STM OIL MILL 40 0.  40.00  0.00  15.16  0.00  0.00 Standard  361150 
 19 VYZ BROS. 20 0  20.00  0.00  13.01  13.20  151.52 Standard  361001 
 20 BHY SOAPS 30 0  30.00  0.00  19.40  15.38  195.06 Standard  361001 
 21  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Annexure – 5D 2. STATEMENT ON LARGE EXPOSURE - GROUP BORROWER 
Sr. 
No 
Name Group of 
borrower  
Type of facility 
Funded  
Limit 
sanctioned 
% to total 
advance 
Outstanding
balance 
Capital 
fund 
Asset 
classification 
Borrowers 
Head Office 
Pincode  Non -funded  
% to 
 Capital 
fund 
In excess of 40% of banks capital funds or a minimum of 20 large credits  
 1 ABC XYZ WORKS 8  8.00  0.00  6.97  6.97  114.78 Doubtful 
Secured Above 
3 yrs. 
 361008 
 2 DEF FABRICATIONS 5  5.00  0.00  3.46  3.46  144.51 Doubtful 
Secured Above 
3 yrs. 
 361008 
 3 GHI STEEL ABC. 8  8.00  0.00  6.78  6.78  117.99 Doubtful 
Secured Above 
3 yrs. 
 361008 
 4 FMN MAHILA UDYOG 10  10.00  0.00  4.89  4.89  204.50 Doubtful 
Secured Above 
3 yrs. 
 361008 
 5 LOP PRODUCTS 8  8.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Doubtful 
Secured Above 
3 yrs. 
 361004 
 6 RTY TRADING CO. 10  10.00  0.00  8.46  8.46  118.20 Doubtful 
Secured Above 
3 yrs. 
 361004 
3. Top Ten Credit Exposure to Banks 
Counterparty Bank # Funded Exposure Non Funded Exposure @ Total Credit Exposure Sr. 
No 
@ Confirmation of LCs opened by other banks 
# Due from (other) banks 
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PART - D A.Segment-wise analysis of Advances Rs. in lakhs 
No. of A/cs Amount % to Total Amount %  to Total 
NPA Outstanding 
PRIORITY SECTOR 
Loss Provision 
 0.00  38.34  68.03  25.43  1,100.87  300.00 i. Retail Trade 
 0.00  4.32  7.66  2.23  96.52  19.00 ii. Small Business 
 0.00  24.02  42.63  22.45  972.00  141.00 iii. Small scale industries 
 0.26  1.92  3.41  2.42  104.81  89.00 iv. Construction and / or repairs to    buildings etc., (housing 
upto Rs. 15 lakhs) 
 0.00  1.32  2.34  1.66  71.71  20.00 v. Agricultural & Allied activities 
 0.00  2.67  4.73  0.12  5.40  2.00 vi. Small Road Transport Operators 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.75  6.00 vii. Professsional and Self Employed artisans and craftsmen 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.10  47.53  145.00 viii. Education 
 5.06  3.70  6.57  15.47  669.75  399.00 ix. Other Priority Sectors 
 5.32  135.37  3,069.34  1,121.00 TOTAL PRIORITY SECTOR 
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A.Segment-wise analysis of Advances Rs. in lakhs 
No. of A/cs Amount % to Total Amount %  to Total 
NPA Outstanding 
NON PRIORITY SECTOR 
Loss Provision 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 I. Medium and Large Industries 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii. Export Trade 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 iii. Banks 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 iv. Non-Bank Financial Institution 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 v. Governments (Central / States) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 vi. Food Credit (FCI consortium) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 vii. Real Estate 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 viii. Other PSUs 
 0.00  23.72  42.09  29.10  1,259.65  439.00 ix. All Other 
 0.00  42.09  1,259.65  439.00 TOTAL NON-PRIORITY SECTOR 
 1560 TOTAL (Priority Sector + Non-Priority Sector)  4,328.99  177.46  5.32 
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 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
1. Individuals 
2. Market Makers 
3. All other borrowers against Security of Shares 
4.Total 
A1. Fund Based 
A. Advances to Capital Market 
 D. Exposure to Sensitive Sector 
3.Total 
1.  Financial Guarantees issued 
2. Other Guarantees 
A2. Non Fund Based 
Retail Loans 
SME 
 C. SME and   Retail Rs. in lakhs 
 0.00 
 0.00 
PART - E 
4. Total Investment in Capital Market 
3. Units of UTI 
2. Equities of AIFI 
1.  Convertible Bonds and Debentures 
B. Investment in Capital Markets 
Total Capital Market Exposure (a1 + a2 + b) 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
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d. Amount of Refinance obtained from National Housing Bank / funds obtained (for               
housing loans) from higher financing agencies. 
c. All other loans for purchase of residential property (including for land) Amount of                   
Refinance obtained from National Housing Bank /funds obtained (for housing loans)           
from higher financing agencies. 
b. Other loans under finance for housing schemes not covered under (a) above* 
a. Loans to individuals / cooperative / group housing societies, housing boards                      
undertaking housing projects or schemes for Economically Weaker Sections, Low              
Income Group and Middle Income Group and to Owners of houses / flats for extension       
up-gradation  major repairs for eligible housing schemes* 
C. Real Estate Sector  
*(As per Master Circular  on Finance For Housing Schemes) 
A. Residential Mortgage * 
Rs. in lakhs 
I. Exposure to Real Estate:  
B. Commercial Real Estate 
(Office buildings, retail space, multi-purpose commercial premises, multi-family residential 
buildings, multi-tenanted commercial premises, industrial or warehouse space, hotels, 
land acquisition, development and construction, etc) 
 a. Advances for acquiring / developing commercial Real Estate 
 b. Non Fund Based Limits for above purposes 
C. Any Other 
i)  Exposures in bonds of National Housing Bank / HUDCO only for financing of housing 
and included under Priority Sector Lending  
ii)  Other Fund Based and Non Fund Based Exposures on NHB / HUDCO and Housing           
Finance Companies, if any 
 118.47 
 118.47 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
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iii) Investments in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and other securitized exposures 
 a.    Residential 
 b.    Commercial Real Estate. 
iv) Advances to builders / contractors (other than for commercial Real Estate). 
v) Others 
D. TOTAL (A+B+C) 
Out of above, the total exposure taken after obtaining pari passu (2nd mortgage) 
Fund Based 
Of which loan given after obtaining pari passu (2nd mortgage) 
Non Fund Based 
Of which facility given after obtaining pari passu (2nd mortgage) 
II. Other Exposures to Real Estate 
(Facilities given for purposes other than for acquisition / development etc. of Real Estate 
against collateral of Real Estate) 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 118.47 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
III.  Prudential Exposure Norms Top 5 Individual Exposures 
Sr. No. Amount Funded Name of Borrower Amount Non Funded Capital Fund Percentage Asset classification 
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Top 5 Group Exposures 
Sr. No. Amount Funded Name of Borrower Amount Non Funded Capital Fund Percentage Asset classification 
Rs. in lakhs 
(i) Loan upto Rs.15 lakhs for construction of houses by Individuals 
(ii) Other Housing Loans to individuals for repairs / additions / alterations etc classified under Priority Sector 
Lending) 
(iii) All other housing related exposures under Priority Sector 
Total Housing Finance Under Priority Sector 
IV. Housing Finance under Priority Sector 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
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Rs. in lakhs 
1.Paid-up Capital 
2. (+) Reserves and Provisions not in the nature of outside liabilities (excluding Revaluation Reserves) 
3. (+) Surplus in Profit && Loss Account 
 OR  
4. (-)  Accumulated Losses 
5.Net Worth (Book Value) [Net Owned Fund (NOF)] 
6.Fortnightly Average of Net Demand Time Liabilities (NDTL) (Previous Year) 
7.NDTL / NOF Ratio. 
(ii) Capital Fund and Risk Assets Ratio (CRAR) 
1.Tier I Capital Elements 
2.Tier II Capital Elements 
3.Total Capital Funds 
4. Risk Assets 
(a) Adjusted value of funded risk assets i.e.on Balance Sheet items 
(b) Adjusted value of non-funded and off-Balance Sheet items 
(c) Total Risk-Weighted Assets (a+b) 
5. Percentage of Capital Funds to Risk-Weighted Assets 3/4(c)x100 
(i) NDTL / NOF Ratio   183.47 
 2,481.81 
 0.00 
 93.99 
 2,571.29 
 10,848.51 
 4.22 
 1,283.90 
 128.94 
 1,412.84 
 5,514.88 
 0.00 
 5,514.88 
 25.62 
PART - F 
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Name of the Directors & Qualifications: 
PART - G 
Sr. No. Qualifications Name 
 1 ABCDEFGHI - 1 MSc, LLB, MBA 
, LLB, MBA. 
 2 ABCDEFGHI - 2 
AR S. SHAH 
MSc, LLB 
 3 ABCDEFGHI - 3 MSc, LLB 
 4 ABCDEFGHI - 4 B. Com 
 5 ABCDEFGHI - 5 UNDER GRADUATE 
 6 ABCDEFGHI - 6 MSc, LLB 
 7 ABCDEFGHI - 7 SSC 
 8 ABCDEFGHI - 8 B. A. 
 9 ABCDEFGHI - 9 B. A. 
 10 ABCDEFGHI - 10 BSc, LLB 
 11 ABCDEFGHI - 11 SSC 
 12 ABCDEFGHI - 12 UNDER GRADUATE 
 13 ABCDEFGHI - 13 SSC 
 14 ABCDEFGHI – A  PROFESSIONAL 
  - PROFESSIONAL 
B. Com, LLB, DISA(ICAI), FCA. 
 15 ABCDEFGHI – B -PROFESSIONAL B. Com, DISA(ICAI), FCA. 
Date of formation / constitution of Audit Committtee: 20-09-2010 
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Members of Audit Committee and their qualifications: 
Sr. No. Qualifications Name 
 1 ASDFGHKL M. Com, LLB, MBA 
 2 QWERTYUIOP M. Com, LLB  
 3 ZXCVBNM UNDER GRADUATE 
 4 POIUYTREWQ B. Com 
 5 LKJHGFDSA M. Com, LLB  
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-5E 
(Private & Confidential) 
SOSS - 5 Statement on Bank Profile 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
9999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/03/2010 Quarter End Date 
30/04/2010 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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XYZ  Bank Bank Name 
XYZ AREA Registered Office Address 
Registered Office Pincode 
Head Office Address ABC HOUS 
Date of last insepection 
Licence number 
Date of license 
Unit Bank/Single District Bank/Multi District in same State/Multi 
State Bank 
Sub Category (Salary Earners/Mahila/SC-ST/Least Developed/ 
Less Developed/General) 
Bank Category (Licensed/Unlicensed) 
Head Office Pincode 
NonScheduled 
General 
12/01/1977 
UBD XX97 P 
31/03/2007 
20/06/2010 Date of Last Annual General Body Meeting 
Scheduled / Non scheduled 
Licensed 
Total No. of Regular Members 
Total No. of Nominal Members 
     4444 
   900900 
No. of Paras Outstanding 
No. of Paras Fully  
No. of minor Irregularities 
No. of Major Irregularities 
Date of Last Internal Audit 31/12/2009 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
Name Designation Residential Address Pincode Email Term Since Term Upto 
Management 
QWERTYUIOP CHAIRMAN ADDRESS1     
ADDRESS2 
9999999 09/05/2008 30/08/2009 
ASDFGHJKL VICE 
CHAIRMAN 
ADDRESS1     
ADDRESS2 
9999999 22/05/2009 30/08/2010 
ZXCVBNM MANAGING 
DIRECTOR 
ADDRESS1     
ADDRESS2 
9999999 09/05/2008 30/08/2010 
POIUYTREWQ JT. MANAGING 
DIRECTOR 
ADDRESS1     
ADDRESS2 
9999999 10/05/2003 30/08/2010 
No. of Total Staff of the Bank 
No. of Officers of the Bank 
No. of Other Staff of the Bank 
Bank Employees 
      99 
       22 
       77 
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 161.04 
 14,615.47 
 161.04 
 2,424.68 
 1,034.01 
 0.00 
 80.57 
 7.44 
 2,666.29 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 1,470.07 
Paid Up Capital 
Total Assets/Working Funds 
Paid up Capital 
Reserves (of which -) 
Statutory Reserve Fund 
Revaluation Reserves 
Unappropriated profit/(Accumulated loss) 
Intangible Assets 
Net Worth 
General loss 
Provisions 
Owned Funds (Book Value) 
Financials 
Section A 
Equity Profile 
Rs. in lakhs 
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 0.00 
 1,487.47 
 94.17 
 895.53 
 158.20 
 2,388.93 
 0.00 
 3,876.40 
Section B 
Financial/Portfolio Structure 
Loan & Advances (Gross) 
Food Credit 
Priority Sector Credit 
Agriculture 
Small scale industries 
Weaker section credit 
Other priority sector 
Real Estate 
Other 
Rs. in lakhs 
 0.00 
Ratios - 
Credit / deposits (%) 
Deposits / assets (%) 
Investments / assets (%) 
Net loan / assets (%) 
Contingents / Assets (%) 
Term / total deposits (%) 
C.D.s / Total deposits (%) 
SLR securities / Investments (%) 
Growth of deposits (%) (Excluding C.D.s  & interbank) 
Credit Expansion (%) 
PORTFOLIO GROWTH  Year on Year 
Increase in investments (%) 
Increase in contingents (%) 
Policy related lending 
Priority sector / Total credit (%) 
Agriculture / Total credit (%) 
SSI / Total credit (%) 
Export credit / Total credit (%) 
Weaker section / Total credit (%) 
 8.80 
 0.00 
 11.95 
 3.91 
 89.37 
 21.79 
 45.28 
 0.03 
 26.52 
 65.46 
 56.73 
 0.32 
 0.00 
 23.10 
 2.93 
 80.38 
 33.00 
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 580.66 
 683.38 
 73.66 
 1,337.70 
 415.53 
 1,264.04 
 192.79 
 148.72 
 0.00 
 11.15 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 148.72 
 50.00 
 80.57 
 19.08 
 0.00 
 4.92 
 4.92 
 12.56 
 7.38 
 8.50 
 5.51 
 14.41 
 31.06 
 1.02 
 1.02 
 0.55 
 50.03 
 50.03 
 154.70 
 0.80 
Section C - 
Financial/Performance Structure 
Interest Income 
Interest Expense 
Net Interest Income 
Non-Interest Income 
Total Income 
Staff / Establishment expenses 
Other operating expenses 
Net operating income / (loss) (operating or gross profit) 
Write-offs (of assets & losses) 
Provisions for credit losses 
Value adjustments / provisions for other (financial) assets 
Capital gains / (losses) on sale of assets 
Profit Before Tax (PBT) 
Provisions for taxes 
NET INCOME (PAT) / (loss) 
Dividends declared 
Retained earnings 
Average cost of deposits (%) 
PERFORMANCE RATIOS (p.a.) 
Average cost of funds (%) 
Average yield on advances (%) 
Average yield on investments (%) 
Average yield on funds (%) 
Interest margin / spread (%) 
Non-interest income / total income (%)  
Cost-Revenue ratio (%) 
Staff costs / total income (%) 
Operating profit / average working funds (%) 
Risk provisions and write-offs / Operating profit (%) 
Return on assets (ROA) (%) 
Return on equity (ROE) (%) 
Earnings per share(EPS) (Rs.) 
Business per employee (Rs. Lakhs) 
Net income per staff (Rs. Lakhs) 
Rs. in lakhs 
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Section D 
Name of branch Area of operation Profit/Loss 
(+/-) after tax 
Metro / 
Urban / 
Semi urban/ 
Rural 
Fully 
Computer
ised (Y-
(Yes)/N-
(No)) 
Sr. 
No. 
State District 
Organisational Profile 
Branch Address Pincode 
HEAD OFFICE X-STATE Urban Y 1  81.59 XYZ-CITY ADDRESS1 
ADDRESS2 
 999999 
BRANCH -1 X-STATE Urban Y 2  8.54 XYZ-CITY ADDRESS1 
ADDRESS2 
 999999 
BRANCH -2 X-STATE Urban Y 3  14.25 XYZ-CITY ADDRESS1 
ADDRESS2 
 999999 
BRANCH -3 X-STATE Urban Y 4  4.69 XYZ-CITY ADDRESS1 
ADDRESS2 
 999999 
BRANCH -4. X-STATE Urban Y 5  5.66 XYZ-CITY ADDRESS1 
ADDRESS2 
 999999 
BRANCH -5 X-STATE Urban Y 6  24.55 XYZ-CITY ADDRESS1 
ADDRESS2 
 999999 
BRANCH -6 X-STATE Urban Y 7  9.44 XYZ-CITY ADDRESS1 
ADDRESS2 
 999999 
Section E 
ATM Profile 
SR No. NAME OF ATM  ATM ADDRESS STATE DISTRICT LOCATION TYPE ONSITE/OFFSITE 
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Rs. in lakhs Section F 
N.P. ratio (loans to capital market) 
N.P. ratio (loans to real estate)  
N.P. ratio (loans to NBFCs)  
N.P. ratio (loans to medium/large industries) 
N.P. ratio (loans to PSUs)  
N.P. ratio (loans to SSI) 
N.P. ratio (loans to export sector) 
N.P. ratio (loans to agriculture)  
N.P. ratio (loans to priority sector)  
Sectoral asset quality 
Loss provisions cover ratio (Loss provisions to "classified") 
Loan loss ratio ("Loss provisions" to "gross loans") 
Intt. in suspense / "gross" loans  
Gross N.P.Loan ratio (Gross NPLs to Gross Loans and Advances) 
ASSET QUALITY - RATIOS - % 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 4.53 
 4.94 
 0.00 
 0.55 
 0.00 
 3.14 
 0.00 
Net N.P.Loan ratio (Net NPLs to  Net Loans and Advances) 
Section G - Ratio Denominators 
Field Note Value 
Average total assets  17,312.71 Fortnightly Average of Total Assets 
 0.00 Net Bank Credit As per Rural Planning and Credit Department circular 
for the purpose  of verifying the compliance to priority 
sector lending 
 10,916.96 Average Deposits Fortnightly Average of (Customer deposits + CDs 
+Bank deposits) 
 0.00 Average Borrowings Fortnightly average of borrowings 
 10,916.96 Average funds mobilized Fortnightly Average of (Customer deposits + CDs 
+Bank deposits + Borrowings) 
 3,836.90 Average Advances Fortnightly average of gross loans and advances 
 8,906.93 Average Investments Fortnightly average of investments 
 12,743.83 Average funds deployed Fortnightly average of (Loans and Advances + 
Investments) 
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Annexure-5 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER JUNIOR OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-6A 
 (Private & Confidential) 
Priority Sector and Weaker Section Advances 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
9999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFG RO Name : 
: 31/03/2010 Year End Date 
30/04/2010 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Annexure-6 
 3.94 
 2.43 
 94.18 
 61.63 
 2,388.93 
 3,876.40 
Rs. in lakhs Part - I ( 1 ) 
% of WS to PS 
% of WS to Total Advances 
Total Weaker Section Advances 
% of PS to Total Advances 
Total Priority Sectors Advances 
Total Advances of the Bank Outstanding 
Of which Advances to Weaker Sections Priority Sectors 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units  
3 
Balance 
Outstanding  
6 
Amount 
Advanced   
5 
Limit 
Sanctioned  
4 
Priority Sector Items      
2 
Amount 
Overdue under 
Balance 
Outstanding  
7 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units  
8 
Amount 
Advanced  
10 
Limit Sanctioned  
9 
Amount Overdue 
under Balance 
Outstanding 12 
Balance 
Outstanding 11 
Sr. 
No.    
1 
 
1. Advances for Agriculture 
and activities allied to 
Agriculture 
 1 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 i) Direct finance to Agriculture  2 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Indirect finance to 
Agriculture 
 3 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 a) Lending by scheduled 
PCBs to NBFC for on lending 
to agriculture 
 4 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 b) Drip  irrigation / sprinkler / 
agricultural machinery 
 5 
 21.10       174       109  301.72  301.72  158.20  0.00  21.69  21.69  0.00 iii) Advances to individuals for 
activities allied to agriculture 
 6 
 21.10       174       109  301.72  301.72  158.20  0.00  21.69  21.69  0.00 Total of 1  7 
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Annexure-6 Of which Advances to Weaker Sections Priority Sectors 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units  
3 
Balance 
Outstanding  
6 
Amount 
Advanced   
5 
Limit 
Sanctioned  
4 
Priority Sector Items      
2 
Amount 
Overdue under 
Balance 
Outstanding  
7 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units  
8 
Amount 
Advanced  
10 
Limit Sanctioned  
9 
Amount Overdue 
under Balance 
Outstanding 12 
Balance 
Outstanding 11 
Sr. 
No.    
1 
 
 2.21       173         3  1,532.21  1,532.21  895.53  45.61  3.56  3.56  0.00 2 (i) Direct Loans and 
advances to cottage / small 
scale industries and 
equipment / systems for 
development of new and 
renewable sources of energy, 
etc. 
 8 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 (ii) Loans & Advances through 
NBFC for on lending to tiny 
sector 
 9 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 (iii) Indirect Loans & 
Advances through HUDCO to 
artisans / hand looms 
workers, etc. under tiny sector 
 10 
 2.21       173         3  1,532.21  1,532.21  895.53  45.61  3.56  3.56  0.00 Total of 2  11 
 0.23         3         1  8.59  8.59  5.64  4.75  0.50  0.50  0.02 3 i) Advances to Road and 
Water Transport Operators for 
purchase of vehicles 
 12 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Loans & Advances to 
NBFCs for financing of trucks 
for on lending to SRWTO by 
Sch PCBs. 
 13 
 0.23         3         1  8.59  8.59  5.64  4.75  0.50  0.50  0.02 Total of 3  14 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 4 i) Private Retail Traders 
dealing in essential 
commodities (fair price shops) 
 15 
 4.26       450         2  2,090.12  2,090.12  1,119.76  60.20  7.00  7.00  0.00 ii) Other private retail traders 
with credit limits not 
exceeding Rs.10 lakh 
 16 
 4.26       450         2  2,090.12  2,090.12  1,119.76  60.20  7.00  7.00  0.00 Total of 4  17 
 48.14       297       192  169.43  169.43  131.76  3.43  56.27  56.27  0.57 5. Small Business Enterprises  18 
 0.00         1         0  0.27  0.27  0.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 6. Professional and Self 
employed persons 
 19 
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-6 Of which Advances to Weaker Sections Priority Sectors 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units  
3 
Balance 
Outstanding  
6 
Amount 
Advanced   
5 
Limit 
Sanctioned  
4 
Priority Sector Items      
2 
Amount 
Overdue under 
Balance 
Outstanding  
7 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units  
8 
Amount 
Advanced  
10 
Limit Sanctioned  
9 
Amount Overdue 
under Balance 
Outstanding 12 
Balance 
Outstanding 11 
Sr. 
No.    
1 
 
 0.00        13         0  9.04  9.04  2.61  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 7. Educational Loans  20 
 18.24       135        81  102.88  102.88  75.17  0.79  20.47  20.47  0.05 8. Housing Loans  21 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 9. Consumption Loans  22 
 0.00         0         0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 10. Software industry 
excluding loans upto Rs.10 
lakh given to software 
professionals 
 23 
 94.18      1,246       388  4,214.26  4,214.26  2,388.93  114.78  109.49  109.49  0.64 11. Total  24 
Part - II (2) Rs in lakhs 
Balance 
Outstanding 11 
Amount 
Advanced  
10 
Limit Sanctioned  
9 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units  
8 
Amount 
Overdue under 
Balance 
Outstanding  
7 
Balance 
Outstanding  
6 
Amount 
Advanced  
5 
Limit 
Sanctioned  
4 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units 
3 
Amount 
Overdue 
under 
Balance 
Outstanding 
12 
Scheduled Tribes Scheduled Castes 
Nature of Activity 
2 
 
Sr.  
No. 
1 
 
1. Advances for Agriculture 
and activities allied to 
Agriculture 
 0.00  1 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 i) Direct finance to Agriculture  0.00  2 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Indirect finance to 
Agriculture 
 0.00  3 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 a) Lending by scheduled PCBs 
to NBFC for on lending to 
agriculture 
 0.00  4 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 b) Drip  irrigation / sprinkler / 
agricultural machinery 
 0.00  5 
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Annexure-6 
Balance 
Outstanding 11 
Amount 
Advanced  
10 
Limit Sanctioned  
9 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units  
8 
Amount 
Overdue under 
Balance 
Outstanding  
7 
Balance 
Outstanding  
6 
Amount 
Advanced  
5 
Limit 
Sanctioned  
4 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units 
3 
Amount 
Overdue 
under 
Balance 
Outstanding 
12 
Scheduled Tribes Scheduled Castes 
Nature of Activity 
2 
 
Sr.  
No. 
1 
 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 iii) Advances to individuals for 
activities allied to agriculture 
 0.00  6 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 Total of 1  0.00  7 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 2 (i) Direct Loans and 
advances to cottage / small 
scale industries and equipment 
/ systems for development of 
new and renewable sources of 
energy, etc. 
 0.00  8 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 (ii) Loans & Advances through NBFC for on lending to tiny 
sector 
 0.00  9 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 (iii) Indirect Loans & Advances 
through HUDCO to artisans / 
hand looms workers, etc. 
under tiny sector 
 0.00  10 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 Total of 2  0.00  11 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 3 i) Advances to Road and 
Water Transport Operators for 
purchase of vehicles 
 0.00  12 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Loans & Advances to 
NBFCs for financing of trucks 
for on lending to SRWTO by 
Sch PCBs. 
 0.00  13 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 Total of 3  0.00  14 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 4 i) Private Retail Traders 
dealing in essential 
commodities (fair price shops) 
 0.00  15 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Other private retail traders 
with credit limits not exceeding 
Rs.10 lakh 
 0.00  16 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 Total of 4  0.00  17 
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Balance 
Outstanding 11 
Amount 
Advanced  
10 
Limit Sanctioned  
9 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units  
8 
Amount 
Overdue under 
Balance 
Outstanding  
7 
Balance 
Outstanding  
6 
Amount 
Advanced  
5 
Limit 
Sanctioned  
4 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units 
3 
Amount 
Overdue 
under 
Balance 
Outstanding 
12 
Scheduled Tribes Scheduled Castes 
Nature of Activity 
2 
 
Sr.  
No. 
1 
 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 5. Small Business Enterprises  0.00  18 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 6. Professional and Self 
employed persons 
 0.00  19 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 7. Educational Loans  0.00  20 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 8. Housing Loans  0.00  21 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 9. Consumption Loans  0.00  22 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 10. Software industry excluding 
loans upto Rs.10 lakh given to 
software professionals 
 0.00  23 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00 11. Total  0.00  24 
Part - II (2) Rs in lakhs 
Others Categorized under Weaker Sections on the basis of amount of  Women 
Balance 
Outstanding 
21 
Amount 
Advanced 
20 
Limit 
Sanctioned 
19 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units 
18 
Amount 
Overdue under 
Balance 
Outstanding 
17 
Balance 
Outstanding 
16 
Amount 
Advanced 
15 
Limit 
Sanctioned 
14 
Number of 
Borrowing Units  
13 
Amount 
overdue under 
Balance  
Outstanding 
22 
 
Nature of Activity 
2 
 
Sr.  
No. 
1 
1. Advances for Agriculture 
and activities allied to 
Agriculture 
 1 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 i) Direct finance to Agriculture  2 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Indirect finance to 
Agriculture 
 3 
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Others Categorized under Weaker Sections on the basis of amount of  Women 
Balance 
Outstanding 
21 
Amount 
Advanced 
20 
Limit 
Sanctioned 
19 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units 
18 
Amount 
Overdue under 
Balance 
Outstanding 
17 
Balance 
Outstanding 
16 
Amount 
Advanced 
15 
Limit 
Sanctioned 
14 
Number of 
Borrowing Units  
13 
Amount 
overdue under 
Balance  
Outstanding 
22 
 
Nature of Activity 
2 
 
Sr.  
No. 
1 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 a) Lending by scheduled PCBs 
to NBFC for on lending to 
agriculture 
 4 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 b) Drip  irrigation / sprinkler / 
agricultural machinery 
 5 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  109  21.69  21.69  21.10  0.00 iii) Advances to individuals for 
activities allied to agriculture 
 6 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  109  21.69  21.69  21.10  0.00 Total of 1  7 
 1  3.00  3.00  2.02  0.00  2  0.56  0.56  0.19  0.00 2 (i) Direct Loans and 
advances to cottage / small 
scale industries and equipment 
/ systems for development of 
new and renewable sources of 
energy, etc. 
 8 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 (ii) Loans & Advances through 
NBFC for on lending to tiny 
sector 
 9 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 (iii) Indirect Loans & Advances 
through HUDCO to artisans / 
hand looms workers, etc. 
under tiny sector 
 10 
 1  3.00  3.00  2.02  0.00  2  0.56  0.56  0.19  0.00 Total of 2  11 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1  0.50  0.50  0.23  0.02 3 i) Advances to Road and 
Water Transport Operators for 
purchase of vehicles 
 12 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Loans & Advances to 
NBFCs for financing of trucks 
for on lending to SRWTO by 
Sch PCBs. 
 13 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1  0.50  0.50  0.23  0.02 Total of 3  14 
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Others Categorized under Weaker Sections on the basis of amount of  Women 
Balance 
Outstanding 
21 
Amount 
Advanced 
20 
Limit 
Sanctioned 
19 
Number of 
Borrowing 
Units 
18 
Amount 
Overdue under 
Balance 
Outstanding 
17 
Balance 
Outstanding 
16 
Amount 
Advanced 
15 
Limit 
Sanctioned 
14 
Number of 
Borrowing Units  
13 
Amount 
overdue under 
Balance  
Outstanding 
22 
 
Nature of Activity 
2 
 
Sr.  
No. 
1 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 4 i) Private Retail Traders 
dealing in essential 
commodities (fair price shops) 
 15 
 2  7.00  7.00  4.26  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Other private retail traders 
with credit limits not exceeding 
Rs.10 lakh 
 16 
 2  7.00  7.00  4.26  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Total of 4  17 
 1  8.00  8.00  5.15  0.00  191  48.27  48.27  42.99  0.57 5. Small Business Enterprises  18 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 6. Professional and Self 
employed persons 
 19 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 7. Educational Loans  20 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  81  20.47  20.47  18.24  0.05 8. Housing Loans  21 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 9. Consumption Loans  22 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 10. Software industry excluding 
loans upto Rs.10 lakh given to 
software professionals 
 23 
 4  18.00  18.00  11.43  0.00  384  91.49  91.49  82.75  0.64 11. Total  24 
Part - II (2) Rs in lakhs 
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Net Position to be reported in PART-I 
Balance 
Outstanding  
26 
Amount Advanced  
25 
Limit Sanctioned  
24 
Number of 
Borrowing Units 
23 
Amount Overdue 
under Balance 
Outstanding  
27 
Nature of Activity 
2 
 
Sr.  
No. 
1 
1. Advances for Agriculture and activities 
allied to Agriculture 
 1 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 i) Direct finance to Agriculture  2 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Indirect finance to Agriculture  3 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 a) Lending by scheduled PCBs to NBFC 
for on lending to agriculture 
 4 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 b) Drip  irrigation / sprinkler / agricultural 
machinery 
 5 
 109  21.69  21.69  21.10  0.00 iii) Advances to individuals for activities 
allied to agriculture 
 6 
 109  21.69  21.69  21.10  0.00 Total of 1  7 
 3  3.56  3.56  2.21  0.00 2 (i) Direct Loans and advances to 
cottage / small scale industries and 
equipment / systems for development of 
new and renewable sources of energy, 
etc. 
 8 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 (ii) Loans & Advances through NBFC for 
on lending to tiny sector 
 9 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 (iii) Indirect Loans & Advances through 
HUDCO to artisans / hand looms 
workers, etc. under tiny sector 
 10 
 3  3.56  3.56  2.21  0.00 Total of 2  11 
 1  0.50  0.50  0.23  0.02 3 i) Advances to Road and Water 
Transport Operators for purchase of 
vehicles 
 12 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Loans & Advances to NBFCs for 
financing of trucks for on lending to 
SRWTO by Sch PCBs. 
 13 
 1  0.50  0.50  0.23  0.02 Total of 3  14 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 4 i) Private Retail Traders dealing in 
essential commodities (fair price shops) 
 15 
 2  7.00  7.00  4.26  0.00 ii) Other private retail traders with credit 
limits not exceeding Rs.10 lakh 
 16 
 2  7.00  7.00  4.26  0.00 Total of 4  17 
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Net Position to be reported in PART-I 
Balance 
Outstanding  
26 
Amount Advanced  
25 
Limit Sanctioned  
24 
Number of 
Borrowing Units 
23 
Amount Overdue 
under Balance 
Outstanding  
27 
Nature of Activity 
2 
 
Sr.  
No. 
1 
 192  56.27  56.27  48.14  0.57 5. Small Business Enterprises  18 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 6. Professional and Self employed 
persons 
 19 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 7. Educational Loans  20 
 81  20.47  20.47  18.24  0.05 8. Housing Loans  21 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 9. Consumption Loans  22 
 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 10. Software industry excluding loans 
upto Rs.10 lakh given to software 
professionals 
 23 
 388  109.49  109.49  94.18  0.64 11. Total  24 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER JUNIOR OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-6B 
 (Private & Confidential) 
Credit Flow to Minority Communities 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
9999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFG RO Name : 
: 30/09/2010 Period End Date 
28/10/2010 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Annexure-6B 
6 Total Advance Outstanding  0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 % of Advances under PS to 
Minority Communities Total Advance to PS 
September 2010 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Sr. No. 
Rs. in lakhs 
Amount 
Sanctioned 
Amount 
Disbursed 
Amount  No. of 
Borrowers 
No. of 
Borrowers Amount 
No. of 
Borrowers 
Amount Outstanding at the 
end of half year under report    
Fresh Loans Disbursed during the Half 
Year under Report 
Amount Outstanding as at the end 
of Previous Half Year  
Category 
Sikhs  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00        1        0        0  1 
Muslims  33.95  4.84  4.94  40.76       29       41       13  2 
Christians  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.42        2        2        0  3 
Zorastrians  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00        0        0        0  4 
Buddhists  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00        0        0        0  5 
Total  34.87  4.84  4.94  41.18       32       43       13  6 
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Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER JUNIOR OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-6C 
 (Private & Confidential) 
UCB's Investment in other UCB's / Institutions 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
9999999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Quarter End Date 
12/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Annexure-6 
Name of 
Deposits / 
Investments 
Date of 
Deposit 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr. 
No. 
Rate of 
Interest 
No. 
Remarks 
Date 
 RCS Permissions Date of 
Maturity 
Amount Category of 
Institution  
Invested Place / 
Name of Bank /  
Non SLR 04/11/2011  7.25  75.00 Deposit Natioonalise 
Bank 
BANK OF XYZ        1 04/11/2010 
        II 04/11/2011  7.25  75.00       II             II             II        2 04/11/2010 
       II 04/11/2011  7.25  75.00        II              II              II        3 04/11/2010 
        II 23/12/2011  9.50  100.00        II              II ABC BANK        4 23/12/2010 
        II 24/12/2011  9.35  200.00         II              II           II        5 24/12/2010 
         II 22/12/2011  9.10  105.00         II              II ABC & XYZ BANK        6 22/12/2010 
Non SLR 19/01/2011  7.50  100.00 Deposit Investment XXMF-SDFS 90DAYS 
SER.35 
       7 15/11/2010 
         II 19/11/2011  8.20  100.00       II        II XXMF-SDFS 370 DAYS 
SER.8 
       8 15/11/2010 
         II 23/06/2011  9.00  100.00        II        II XXMF-SDFS 180 DAYS 
SER.14 
       9 27/12/2010 
 930.00 Total Amount : 
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Annexure-6 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-7A 
a 
(Private & Confidential) 
Annual Financial Review 
Bank Name XYZ  Bank : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/03/2010 Year End Date 
18/10/2010 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Entered 
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Annexure-7A 
Proforma of "Annual Financial Review" to be submitted by Urban Co-op Banks as on  31/03/2010 
999999999 Bank's Code No.: XYZ  Bank Name of the bank: 
Address of the bank: Fax No.: 
Telephone Nos. with STD Codes 
Registration No. 
Registration date 
Whether RBI Licence is received? 
If yes, give number 
Licence date 
No. of branches  0 
Name of the office bearers 
Managing Director / CEO 
General Manager 
Chief Accountant 
Chairman / Chairperson 
Administrator 
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Annexure-7 
Rs. In lakhs 
Items 31/03/2009 As on As on 31/03/2010 
1. Paid-up Share Capital  0.00  0.00 
2. Reserves and Provisions not in the nature of Outside liabilities 
(excluding BDDR ,OIR ,Revaluation Reserve) 
 0.00  0.00 
3. Bad && Doubtful Debt Reserve  0.00  0.00 
4. Overdue Interest Reserve  0.00  0.00 
5. Owned Funds (1 + 2)  0.00  0.00 
6. Net Profit (+) / Net Loss (-)  0.00  0.00 
7. Total [ 5 (+) / (-) 6]  0.00  0.00 
8. Deposits  0.00  0.00 
9. Total Loans and Advances  0.00  0.00 
10. Gross NPAs  0.00  0.00 
11. % of Gross NPAs to Loans and Advances  0.00  0.00 
12. Net NPAs  0.00  0.00 
13. Net Loans and Advances (9 - 3)  0.00  0.00 
14. % of Net NPAs to Net Loans and Advances  0.00  0.00 
15. Provision required to be made for NPAs  0.00  0.00 
16. Provision for NPAs actually made by the bank  0.00  0.00 
17. Amount of Depreciation in Investments  0.00  0.00 
18. Erosion of Other Assets  0.00  0.00 
19. Profit(+) / Loss(-) 
     (i) Frauds  0.00  0.00 
    (ii) Guarantees Invoked  0.00  0.00 
    (iii) Others  0.00  0.00 
    (iv) Total ( i + ii + iii )  0.00  0.00 
20. Interest Receivable  0.00  0.00 
21. Net Loss during the Year  0.00  0.00 
22. Accumulated Losses  0.00  0.00 
23. Working Capital (Total liabilities - contra items)  0.00  0.00 
24. Membership Nos  0.00  0.00 
25. Population of the Town / City as per last Census (in lakhs)  0.00  0.00 
26. Total Borrowings  0.00  0.00 
27. Loss / Accumulated Losses (whichever is more)  0.00  0.00 
28. Net Worth as per last RBI Inspection Report  0.00  0.00 
29. CRAR %  0.00  0.00 
Note: If there is Net Loss entry may be made at Sr.No 21 
Net operating PROFIT (+) / LOSS (-) for the last 3 years Rs. In lakhs 
As on 31/03/2008 31/03/2009 As on 31/03/2010 As on 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Annexure-7 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-7B 
(Private & Confidential) 
Quarterly Progress Report 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
999999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFG RO Name : 
: 30/06/2010 Quarter End Date 
03/03/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Entered 
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Annexure-7 
1. Comparative Financial Progress during last 4 quarters Rs. in lakhs 
Particulars  30/06/2010 30/03/2010 30/12/2009 30/09/2009 
    0     0     0     0 1. Regular Members 
    0     0     0     0 2. Nominal Members 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 3. Paid-up Share Capital 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 4. Reserves and Provisions not in the nature of Outside Liabilities 
(excluding BDDR , OIR, Revaluation Reserve) 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 5. Bad & Doubtful Debt Reserve 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 6. Overdue Interest Reserve 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 7. Owned Funds (3 + 4) 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 8. BDDR + OIR (5 + 6) 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 9. Net Owned Funds ( 7 - 8 ) 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 10. Investment Reserve Fund 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 11.  Deposits 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 12. % Rise(+) / Fall(-) in Deposits 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 13. Borrowings excluding Overdrafts 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 14. % of Borrowing to Working Capital (13 / 28)*100 
15. Investments 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 i) Investment in Government Securities & other Approved Securities 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 ii) Net Demand and Time Liability 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 iii) % of Investment in Government Securities to NDTL [(i) / (ii) * 100] 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 iv) Non - SLR Investments 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 v) Investments in FDs 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 16. Total [(i) + (iv) + (v)] 
17. Loans & Advances 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 A) Unsecured 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 B) Secured 
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Annexure-7 
Rs. in lakhs 
Particulars  
30/06/2010 30/03/2010 30/12/2009 30/09/2009 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 18. Total 17(A + B) 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 19. % of Unsecured Loans to Total Loans and Advances [(17A / 18) 
* 100] 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 20. Gross NPAs 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 21. % of Gross NPAs to Total Loans and Advances [(20 / 18) * 100] 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 22. Net NPAs (20 - 5) 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 23. Net Loans & Advances (18 - 5) 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 24. % of Net NPAs to Net Advances [(22 / 23) * 100] 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 25. Overdue Interest Reserve (Provision made against) 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 26. Advances to Priority Sector 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 27.% of Priority Sector Advances to Loans [(26 / 18) * 100) 
  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 28. Working Capital (Total Liabilities - Contra items) 
Rs. in lakhs 
Particulars   30/06/2010 30/03/2010 30/12/2009 30/09/2009 
29. Audit Class ('A', 'B', 'C' & 'D') 
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Annexure-7 
Rs. in lakhs 
Particulars  30/06/2010 30/03/2010 30/12/2009 30/09/2009 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 30. NPA provisions made (against Principal Amount) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 31. Dividend Declared (%) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 32. Bad Debts ( Provisions required against NPAs) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 33. Net Profit(+) / Net Loss(-) during the year 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 34. Accumulated Losses 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 35. Loss / Accumulated Losses (whichever is more ) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 36. Other Assets 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 37. Interest Receivables (Overdue against NPAs) 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 38. Loanable Funds 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 39. Overtrading 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 40. M.T / L.T Resources 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 41. M.T / L.T Loans & Advances 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 42. Excess M.T / L.T Loans Outstanding 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 43. Net Worth 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 44. CRAR % 
2. Net Operating PROFIT (+) / LOSS (-) for last 3 years 
Rs. in lakhs 
31/03/2009 31/03/2008 31/03/2007 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 
3. Periodicity of Big Defaults 
Rs. in lakhs 
Period  
Defaults of Rs. 5001/- to Rs.   25000/- Defaults above Rs.   25000/- 
No. of Defaulters Amount No. of Defaulters Amount 
 0.00  0.00 Three years and less       0       0 
 0.00  0.00 More than three years       0       0 
07/03/2011  15:19 Page 4 of 8 Printed on: 
XYZ  BANK                  Quarterly Progress Report              QUARTERLY Annexure-7B 
Annexure-7 4. Action for Recovery of Overdues Rs. in lakhs 
Particulars  30/06/2010 30/03/2010 
No. of Defaulters Amount No. of Defaulters Amount 
Notices Served - Ordinary      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Notices Served - Legal      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Notices Served under State co-op. Act / Multi-state co-op Act      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Board Resolution passed for filling Arbitration Cases but which are yet to be 
filed in Court 
     0  0.00        0  0.00 
Cases lodged but hearing yet to be started      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Cases under hearing      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Cases Awarded but Execution Certificates not received      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Execution certificates received but not yet executed      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Awards with SRO pending for Execution      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Awards with Civil Courts / Collector for execution      0  0.00        0  0.00 
No Action taken      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Grand Total      0  0.00        0  0.00 
Rs. in lakhs 
Assets Loans and Advances 
 Principal Interest 
a. Extent of Advances considered as Bad & Doubtful of recovery  0.00  0.00  0.00 
b. Recoveries during the Quarter out of estimated Bad-Doubtful Debts  0.00  0.00  0.00 
c. Recoveries during the Quarter out of Overdue Loans, other than item 
mentioned at b. above 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 
d. Provision made for the debts considered as Bad-Doubtful of Recovery  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   5. Details of Cases 
Rs. in lakhs 
Cases Arbitration Cases Execution Petition  
No. of cases Amount No. of cases Amount 
Filed during the Quarter       0  0.00        0  0.00 
Disposed of during the Quarter       0  0.00        0  0.00 
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Annexure-7 
   6. Period of defaults under Notices served (item 1) & no action taken Rs. in lakhs 
Period Notices Served No Action 
No. of Defaulters Amount Amount No. of Defaulters 
Three years  and less         0  0.00        0  0.00 
More than Three years         0  0.00        0  0.00 
   7. Mobilization of Resources 
Rs. in lakhs 
Particulars As on Date on which the Bank was found, not 
complying Section 11(I) 30/06/2010 01/04/2010 
Paid-up Share Capital  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Reserve and  Other Funds  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total Deposits  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  8. Loans and Advances (including Bills Purchased and Discounted) 
Rs. in lakhs 
Type of Advances As on Date on which the Bank was taken up for 
Rehabilitation 30/06/2010 01/04/2010 
Secured  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Unsecured  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Annexure-7 
   9. Quarterly targets (by breaking Annual target into quarterly targets) Rs. in lakhs 
Targets Achievement during 
Quarter 
Shortfall ( - ) / Excess ( + ) Target for the Quarter  
Share Capital  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Reserves  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Deposits  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Borrowings  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Loans & Advances  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Recoveries From NPA  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Gross NPAs  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Accumulated Losses  0.00  0.00  0.00 
CRAR (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 10. S.L.R.R.C. Meetings 
 (List of Important decisions and follow up action taken / initiated) 
 11. Management of Resources 
(Details of the deficits, if any,in the maintenance of Cash Reserve and Liquid Assets in terms of section 18 and 24 of the Banking Regulation Act,1949) ( As Applicable to 
Co-operative Societies) may be stated in brief giving the number of occasions and range of defaults in the case of heavy excesses in the maintenance of Cash 
Reserves.Steps taken for investing the excess in Government Securities etc. may be indicated.If there are heavy Surpluses in Liquid Assets, reasons therefor and the 
steps taken for augmenting the Loan Business of the bank may be furnished) 
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Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-8A 
(Private & Confidential) 
Information on Balance Sheet Items 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
999999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/03/2010 Year End Date 
22/09/2010 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Annexure-8 
Rs. in lakhs 
1. Paid Up Capital  161.04 
2. Total Reserves  1,636.07 
 1,034.01 a) Statutory Reserves 
 39.00 b) Cont Prov on Standard Assets 
 60.00 c) Investment Fluctuation Fund 
 503.06 d) Other Reserves 
 795.61 3. Bad & Doubtful Debt Reserves 
 9.84 4. Overdue Interest Reserves 
5. Deposits  11,747.95 
6. Borrowings  0.00 
7. Investments  9,467.75 
  i) In Govt. and Other Trustee Securities  3,180.28 
 ii) In Share of Co-operative Institutions  0.30 
iii) Other Investment  6,287.17 
8. Working Capital (Total Assets minus Contra items and Loss, if any)  14,601.81 
9. Total Assets  14,615.47 
10. Loans and Advances  3,876.40 
11. Rate of Dividend (%)  12.00 
12. Expenditure  1,257.13 
a) Interest on Deposits  578.27 
b) Interest on Borrowings  2.39 
c) Salary & Allowances  363.20 
d) Rent, Tax, Insurance  27.02 
 1.95 e) Advertisement Expenditure including Stationery etc. 
 2.17  f) Repairs & Maintenance 
g) Other Misc. Expenditure  213.98 
 68.15 h) Provisions for Reserves 
  i) B.D.D.R  0.00 
 ii) O.I.R.  0.00 
iii) Other Reserves  68.15 
13. Income  1,337.70 
a) Interest & Discount  1,264.04 
b) Commission & Exchange  25.52 
c) Other Misc. Income  48.14 
14. Proposed Appropriation of the current year’s Net Profit (Income - Expenditure)  80.57 
  i) Transfer to Statutory Reserve Fund  0.00 
 0.00  ii) Bad & Doubtful Debt Reserve 
iii) Other Funds  0.00 
15. Net Loss (Income - Expenditure)  0.00 
16. Gross Profit   148.72 
17. Gross Loss  0.00 
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Annexure-8 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
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DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER JUNIOR OFFICER Designation 
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Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-8B 
(Private & Confidential) 
Form I - Statement of compliance with CRR & SLR 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Period End Date 
09/02/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Entered 
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Annexure-8 
Rs. in lakhs 
Part A 03/12/2010 17/12/2010 31/12/2010 
I. Liabilities in India to the Banking System 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 a) Demand Liabilities 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  i) Total Credit Balances in Current a/cs maintained with Co-operative bank by SBI, SUB, banks and 
New banks  0.00  0.00  0.00  ii) Total of Other Demand Liabilities to the Banking System 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 b) Time Liabilities of the Banking System 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 Total of (I) 
II. Liabilities in India to Others 
 2,254.99  2,252.39  2,377.13 a) Demand Liabilities 
 9,407.77  8,912.09  9,221.15 b) Time Liabilities 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 c) Others 
 11,662.76  11,164.48  11,598.28 Total of (II) 
III. Assets in India with the Banking system 
 162.57  111.61  92.98 a) Total of Credit Balances in current a/cs maintained with SBI & corresponding new banks 
 5.27  17.17  2.18 b) Total of Other Assets with Banking system, viz. 
 5.27  17.17  2.18 i) Balance on all Accounts 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 ii) Money at Call & Short Notice 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 iii) Advances 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 iv) Any Other Assets 
 167.84  128.78  95.16 Total of (III) 
 11,662.76  11,164.48  11,598.28 IV. Total (Net) Demand and Time Liabilities for the purpose of section 18 & 24 
 283.97  360.21  337.50 V. Cash in hand 
VI. Balances in Current A/c with 
 0.00  0.00  0.00 a) Reserve Bank of India 
 11.71  3.06  3.06 b) State Co-op bank of the State 
 1.79  32.26  3.04 c) District Central Co-op Bank 
 13.50  35.32  6.10 Total of (VI) 
VII. Balances of all other types with 
 2,816.50  2,716.50  2,716.50 a) State Co-op bank of the State 
 350.00  150.00  80.00 b) District Central Co-op bank 
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 3,166.50  2,866.50  2,796.50 Total of (VII) 
 162.57  111.61  92.98 VIII. Net Balance in Current Accounts (III.a - I.a.i) 
Rs. in lakhs 
Part B AND C 03/12/2010 17/12/2010 31/12/2010 
IX. CRR required to be maintained (prescribed % of IV as on Last Friday of the Second Preceding 
fortnight) 
 335.13  346.28  349.88 
X. Cash Reserve actually maintained  460.04  507.14  436.58 
XI. SLR required to be maintained (prescribed% of IV as on Last Friday of the Second Preceding 
fortnight) 
 2,792.74  2,885.68  2,915.69 
XII. Actually Maintained 
 a) Cash and Other balances maintained in India (X - IX + VII)  3,291.41  3,027.36  2,883.20 
 b) Gold  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 c) Unencumbered Approved Securities 
 3,610.75  3,610.75  3,610.75 
Total of (XII)  6,902.16  6,638.11  6,493.95 
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Rs. in lakhs 
Sr.
No. 
Date Net Demand and Time Liabilities 
Cash Reserve Ratio 
Amount 
Required to be 
maintained 
Actually maintained Deficit(Required - 
Actual) 
Surplus(Actual - 
Required) 
CRR Interest (Rs) 
01/12/2010  11,170.95  335.13  460.73  0.00  125.60  0.00     1 
02/12/2010  11,170.95  335.13  441.12  0.00  105.99  0.00     2 
03/12/2010  11,170.95  335.13  460.04  0.00  124.91  0.00     3 
04/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  380.68  0.00  34.40  0.00     4 
05/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  380.68  0.00  34.40  0.00     5 
06/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  467.92  0.00  121.64  0.00     6 
07/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  451.71  0.00  105.43  0.00     7 
08/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  392.25  0.00  45.97  0.00     8 
09/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  403.18  0.00  56.90  0.00     9 
10/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  518.36  0.00  172.08  0.00    10 
11/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  472.17  0.00  125.89  0.00    11 
12/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  472.17  0.00  125.89  0.00    12 
13/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  585.93  0.00  239.65  0.00    13 
14/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  525.88  0.00  179.60  0.00    14 
15/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  519.33  0.00  173.05  0.00    15 
16/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  507.14  0.00  160.86  0.00    16 
17/12/2010  11,542.73  346.28  507.14  0.00  160.86  0.00    17 
18/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  597.77  0.00  247.89  0.00    18 
19/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  597.77  0.00  247.89  0.00    19 
20/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  794.48  0.00  444.60  0.00    20 
21/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  960.80  0.00  610.92  0.00    21 
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Rs. in lakhs 
Sr.
No. 
Date Net Demand and Time Liabilities 
Cash Reserve Ratio 
Amount 
Required to be 
maintained 
Actually maintained Deficit(Required - 
Actual) 
Surplus(Actual - 
Required) 
CRR Interest (Rs) 
22/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  451.01  0.00  101.13  0.00    22 
23/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  433.21  0.00  83.33  0.00    23 
24/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  445.00  0.00  95.12  0.00    24 
25/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  445.00  0.00  95.12  0.00    25 
26/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  445.00  0.00  95.12  0.00    26 
27/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  536.93  0.00  187.05  0.00    27 
28/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  474.47  0.00  124.59  0.00    28 
29/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  397.36  0.00  47.48  0.00    29 
30/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  395.31  0.00  45.43  0.00    30 
31/12/2010  11,662.76  349.88  436.58  0.00  86.70  0.00    31 
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Rs. in lakhs Sr.
No. 
Date Net Demand and Time Liabilities 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
Amount 
Required to be 
maintained 
Actually maintained Deficit(Required - 
Actual) 
Surplus(Actual - 
Required) 
SLR Interest (Rs) Remarks 
01/12/2010  11,170.95  2,792.74  7,402.85  0.00  4,610.11  0.00     1 
02/12/2010  11,170.95  2,792.74  7,383.24  0.00  4,590.50  0.00     2 
03/12/2010  11,170.95  2,792.74  6,902.16  0.00  4,109.42  0.00     3 
04/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,191.65  0.00  4,305.97  0.00     4 
05/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,191.65  0.00  4,305.97  0.00     5 
06/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,128.89  0.00  4,243.21  0.00     6 
07/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,112.68  0.00  4,227.00  0.00     7 
08/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,053.22  0.00  4,167.54  0.00     8 
09/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,064.15  0.00  4,178.47  0.00     9 
10/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,129.33  0.00  4,243.65  0.00    10 
11/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,133.14  0.00  4,247.46  0.00    11 
12/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,133.15  0.00  4,247.47  0.00    12 
13/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,216.90  0.00  4,331.22  0.00    13 
14/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,156.85  0.00  4,271.17  0.00    14 
15/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  7,150.30  0.00  4,264.62  0.00    15 
16/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  6,638.11  0.00  3,752.43  0.00    16 
17/12/2010  11,542.73  2,885.68  6,638.11  0.00  3,752.43  0.00    17 
18/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,225.14  0.00  4,309.45  0.00    18 
19/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,225.14  0.00  4,309.45  0.00    19 
20/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,421.85  0.00  4,506.16  0.00    20 
21/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,588.17  0.00  4,672.48  0.00    21 
22/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,078.38  0.00  4,162.69  0.00    22 
23/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,060.58  0.00  4,144.89  0.00    23 
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Rs. in lakhs Sr.
No. 
Date Net Demand and Time Liabilities 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
Amount 
Required to be 
maintained 
Actually maintained Deficit(Required - 
Actual) 
Surplus(Actual - 
Required) 
SLR Interest (Rs) 
Remarks 
24/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,072.37  0.00  4,156.68  0.00    24 
25/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,072.37  0.00  4,156.68  0.00    25 
26/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,072.37  0.00  4,156.68  0.00    26 
27/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,164.30  0.00  4,248.61  0.00    27 
28/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,101.84  0.00  4,186.15  0.00    28 
29/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,024.73  0.00  4,109.04  0.00    29 
30/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  7,022.68  0.00  4,106.99  0.00    30 
31/12/2010  11,662.76  2,915.69  6,493.95  0.00  3,578.26  0.00    31 
Rs.  in lakhs Part A II. Liabilities in India c) Others-(Specify) 
Sr.No. Particulars 
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Annexure-8 
Part C Compliance with Section 24 XII. c) Unencumbered Approved Securities -(Specify) Rs.  in lakhs 
Face Value 
(1) as on 
03/12/2010 
Face Value 
(1) as on 
17/12/2010 
Face Value (1) 
as on 
31/12/2010 
Book Value 
(2) as on 
03/12/2010 
Book Value 
(2) as on 
17/12/2010 
Book Value 
(2) as on 
31/12/2010 
Depreciation 
Held (3) as on 
03/12/2010 
Depreciation 
Held (3) as on 
17/12/2010 
Depreciation 
Held (3) as on 
31/12/2010 
Net Value for 
SLR 
purpose(2-3) 
as on 
03/12/2010 
Net Value for 
SLR 
purpose(2-3) 
as on 
17/12/2010 
Net Value for 
SLR 
purpose(2-3) 
as on 
31/12/2010 
Part - I (Goverment Securities) 
Opening Balance  3,650.44  3,610.75  0.00  3,610.75  3,650.44  3,610.75  0.00  3,610.75  3,650.44  3,610.75  0.00  3,610.75 
Addition during the fortnights (+)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Deduction during the fortnights (-)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Closing Balance (a)  3,650.44  3,610.75  0.00  3,610.75  3,650.44  3,610.75  0.00  3,610.75  3,650.44  3,610.75  0.00  3,610.75 
Part - II (Other Approved Securities) 
Opening Balance  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Addition during the fortnights (+)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Deduction during the fortnights (-)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Closing Balance (b)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Closing Balance (a+b)  3,650.44  3,610.75  0.00  3,610.75  3,650.44  3,610.75  0.00  3,610.75  3,650.44  3,610.75  0.00  3,610.75 
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Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
07/03/2011  15:37 Page 9 of 9 Printed on: 
XYZ  BANK  Form II - Statement of Unsecured Loans and Advance to Directors / Firms in which they have interest   MONTHLY 
 
Annexure-8C 
(Private & Confidential) 
Form II - Statement of Unsecured Loans and Advance to Directors / Firms in which they have interest 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFG RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Period End Date 
05/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Annexure-8 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr.  
No. 
Name of Director Name of the company to 
which advance has 
Relation of the 
Director of the 
Cooperative Bank 
Date of Advance Purpose of 
Advance 
Limit 
Sanctioned 
(contd...) 
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Annexure-8 
Rs. in lakhs 
(contd...) Remarks Rate of Interest Lowest OS 
during the 
Month 
Nature of 
Advance 
Amt OS on 
the last day 
of the Month Date of Repayment 
Sr. 
No. 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-8D 
 (Private & Confidential) 
Form VIII - Statement of Unclaimed Deposit Accounts not operated more than 10 years 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
99999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFGH RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Year End Date 
29/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Annexure-8 
Rs in thousands 
Particulars Current Accounts Savings Bank Accounts Fixed Deposit Accounts Other Deposit Accounts Total 
No. of 
Accounts 
No. of 
Accounts 
No. of 
Accounts 
No. of 
Accounts 
Balance 
Outstanding 
Balance 
Outstanding 
Balance 
Outstanding 
Balance 
Outstanding 
Balance 
Outstanding 
No. of 
Accounts 
 0.00  0.00  5.56  0.00  5.56 Add Balance brought forward 
from the Previous Return 
               0                0              139                0              139 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Add Accounts, if any 
inadvertantly omitted in the 
Previous Returns 
               0                0                0                0                0 
 0.00  0.00  2.85  0.00  2.85 Add - During the year                0                0               56                0               56 
 0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.06 Less - Accounts which have 
become Operative or were 
Closed during the year 
               0                0                2                0                2 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Add - Interest Credited to the 
Accounts during the year 
               0                0                0                0                0 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 Less - Incidental Charges 
levied to the Accounts during 
the year 
               0                0                0                0                0 
 0.00  0.00  8.35  0.00  8.35 Total                0                0              193                0              193 
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Annexure-8E 
(Private & Confidential) 
FORM IX - Assets and Liabilities as on last Friday of the month 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
999999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFG RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Period End Date 
05/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Annexure-8 
Rs. in lakhs 
A. Liabilities in India 
1. Paid Up capital 
a) Individuals  183.17 
b) Co-operative Socieities  0.00 
c) State Government  0.00 
d) Others  0.00 
Sum of Paid Up Capital  183.17 
2. Reserve Fund etc. 
a) Statutory Reserves  1,074.32 
b) Agricultural Credit (stabilisation) Fund  0.00 
c) Dividend Equalisation Fund  74.91 
d) Special Bad Debt  0.00 
e) Bad and Doubtful Debt Reserve  807.69 
f ) Investment Depreciation Reserve  167.28 
g) Other Funds and Reserves  370.82 
Sum of Reserve Fund  2,495.02 
3. Principal/Subsidiary State Partnership Fund for Share Capital of 
a) Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 
b) Primary Agricultural Credit Societies  0.00 
c) Other Socieities  0.00 
Sum of Share Capital  0.00 
4. Demand Liabilities 
a) Current Deposits 
From Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 i) 
From Primary Co-operative Banks  0.00 ii) 
From Other Societies  17.78 iii) 
From Individuals, Firms, Associations etc.  2,749.00 iv) 
Reserve Fund Deposits maintained by Societies within the                  
Bank's Area of Operation 
 0.00 v) 
Sum of Current Deposits  2,766.78 
b) Savings Deposits (Demand Liability portion only) 
From Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 i) 
From Primary Co-operative Banks  0.00 ii) 
From Other Societies  0.00 iii) 
From Individual, Firms, Association etc.  0.00 iv) 
Reserve Fund Deposits maintained by Societies within the Bank's 
Area of Operation 
 0.00 v) 
Sum of Savings Deposit  0.00 
c) Borrowings from Banks 
From the Reserve Bank of India  0.00 i) 
From the State Bank of India  0.00 ii) 
From the Development Bank  0.00 iii) 
From the National Bank  0.00 iv) 
From the EXIM Bank  0.00 v) 
From the National Cooperative Development Corporation  0.00 vi) 
From the State Co-operative Bank  0.00 vii) 
From the Central Co-operative Bank  70.00 viii) 
Others  0.00 ix) 
Sum of Borrowings from Banks  70.00 
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 Annexure-
8E 
nnexure-8 
Rs. in lakhs 
A. Liabilities in India 
d) Other Demand liabilities  181.24 
Sum of Demand Liabilities  3,018.02 
5. Time Liabilities 
a) Fixed Deposits 
From Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 i) 
From Primary Co-operative Banks  0.00 ii) 
From Other Societies  37.75 iii) 
From Individuals, Firms, Associations etc.  4,675.93 iv) 
Reserve Fund Deposits maintained by Societies within the Bank's 
Area of Operation 
 0.00 v) 
Sum of Fixed Deposits  4,713.68 
b) Savings Deposits (Time Liability portion only) 
From Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 i) 
From Primary Co-operative Banks  0.00 ii) 
From Other Societies  4.41 iii) 
From Idividuals, Firms, Associations etc.  3,947.83 iv) 
Reserve Fund Deposits maintained by Societies within the Bank's 
Area of Operation 
 0.00 v) 
Sum of Savings Deposits  3,952.24 
c) Borrowings from Banks 
From the Reserve Bank of India  0.00 i) 
From the State Bank of India  0.00 ii) 
From the Development Bank  0.00 iii) 
From the National Bank  0.00 iv) 
From the EXIM Bank  0.00 v) 
From the National Cooperative Development Corporation  0.00 vi) 
From the State Co-operative Bank  0.00 vii) 
From the Central Co-operative Bank  0.00 viii) 
Others  0.00 ix) 
Sum of Borrowings from Banks  0.00 
d) Cash Certificates, Recurring Deposits etc.  25.79 
e) Other Time Liabilities  0.00 
Sum of Time Liabilities  8,691.71 
6. Branch Adjustments  0.55 
 0.00 7. Overdue Interest Reserve 
 11,710.28 8. Total Demand and Time liabilities (A4, A5 and A6) 
 0.00 9. Balance of Profit 
Total Liabilities  14,388.47 
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Annexure-8 
Rs. in lakhs 
B.Assets in india 
1. Cash in Hand  337.50 
Total Saving Current 2. Balance with Banks 
a) With the Reserve Bank  0.00  0.00  0.00 
b) With the State Bank of India and its Subsidiaries  88.87  0.01  88.88 
c) With Banking System  6.29  0.00  6.29 
d) With the State Co-operative Bank of the State concerned  3.06  0.00  3.06 
e) With the Central Co-operative Bank of the District 
concerned 
 3.04  0.00  3.04 
f) With other Co-operative Banks  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sum of Balance with Banks  101.26  0.01  101.27 
3. Money at Call and Short notice: 
a) With the State Bank of India and its Subsidiaries  0.00 
b) With Banking System  0.00 
c) With the State Co-operative Bank of the State concerned  0.00 
d) With the Central Co-operative Bank of the District concerned  0.00 
e) With other Co-operative Banks  0.00 
Sum of Money at Call and Short Notice  0.00 
4. Investments 
a) In Central and State Government Securities (including Treasury Bills) 
Central Government  2,245.31 i) 
State Government  1,365.44 ii) 
Sum of Central & State Government Securities  3,610.75 
b) Debentures of Land Mortgage Banks  0.00 
c) Other Trustee Securities  0.00 
d) Shares of the State Co-operative Banks  0.00 
e) Shares of the Central Co-operative Banks  0.30 
 f) Shares of other Co-operative Institutions  0.00 
g) Fixed Deposits 
With the State Bank of India and its Subsidiaries  32.16 i) 
With Banking System  905.00 ii) 
 2,716.50 iii) With the State Co-operative Bank of the State concerned 
 650.00 iv) With the Central Co-operative Bank of the District concerned 
With other Co-operative Banks  1,116.64 v) 
Sum of Fixed Deposits  5,420.30 
h) Other Investments  325.00 
Sum of Investments  9,356.35 
5. Investments out of the Principal / Subsidiary State Partnership Fund in the shares of 
a) Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 
b) Primary Agricultural Credit Societies  0.00 
c) Other Societies  0.00 
Sum of Investments out of the Principal / Subsidiary State Partnership fund in 
the shares 
 0.00 
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6. Loans and Advances 
Loans, Cash Credits and Overdrafts 
a) For Seasonal Agricultural Operations 
b) For Marketing of Crops 
 i) Secured 
ii) Unsecured 
Sum of Marketing Crops 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
c) For Medium Term Agricultural purposes  0.00 
d) For Weavers Societies  0.00 
e) For other Industrial purposes Secured Unsecured Total 
 i) Short Term  3,196.54  0.00  3,196.54 
ii) Medium Term  196.44  0.00  196.44 
f) For Other purposes Secured Unsecured Total 
 i) Short Term  894.53  0.00  894.53 
ii) Medium Term  11.42  0.00  11.42 
Sum of Loans and Advances  4,298.93 
g) Explanation of the above Advances 
i) Those which are Overdue  804.21 
Percentage of Overdues to Total Loans and Advances 
a) Demand %  0.00 
b) Outstanding %  18.71 
 2,388.93 a) Advances Oustanding in respect of Priority Sector ii) 
b) Their percentage to Total Loans Outstanding  55.57 
7. Bills Purchased and Discounted  6.16 
8. Interest Receivable (of which Overdue)  0.00 
9. Premises, Furnitures, Fixtures and Other Fixed Assets  151.52 
10.Branch Adjustments  0.00 
11.Other Assets 
Tangible Assets  40.86 i) 
Intangible Assets  1.89 ii) 
 42.75 
Sum of Tangible and Intangible Assets 
12. Balance of Loss  93.99 
Total Assets  14,388.47 
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Other Funds And Reserves - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
    1 BUILDING FUND  120.40 
    2 GEATUITY FUND  0.06 
    3 STAFF WELFARE FUND  0.29 
    4 DEVELOPMENT FUND  40.82 
    5 PROVISION ON OVERDUE INTEREST  13.21 
    6 CHARITABLE FUND  27.80 
    7 MEMBER BENEFIT FUND  24.76 
    8 SAHAKARI PRACHAR FUND  16.67 
    9 CONT. PROV. ON STD  39.00 
   10 UR. BANK CREDIT EQU. FUND  13.96 
   11 INVESTMENT DEP. FUND  60.00 
   12 CONTIGENCY FUND  13.85 
Demand Liabilities Others Borrowing From Banks - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
Other Demand Liabilities  - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
T.D.S.  1.76     1 
DRAFT PAYABLE  0.83     2 
SUNDRY CREDITORS  5.03     3 
DIVIDEND  11.32     4 
INTEREST PAYABLE  5.87     5 
PAY ORDER ISSUED  10.17     6 
VALUATION FEES  0.15     7 
MAR. HELD AG. BP LIMIT  0.62     8 
DEP. AG. LOCKER  0.02     9 
CASH SURPLUS  0.39    10 
SHARE SUSPENSES  0.53    11 
PROVISION FOR EXPENSES  0.47    12 
EPAY/FDR SUNDRY CREDITORS  0.01    13 
SER. TAX PAYABLE  0.26    14 
INTEREST PAYABLE  22.26    15 
UNPAID CHQ/DD ISSUED  7.23    16 
CONT. BED & DO. DEBTS  39.41    17 
NOMINAL/ENTRY FEES  0.29    18 
CHEQUE ISSUED BUT NOT REALISED  74.62    19 
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 Time Liabilities Others Borrowing From Banks - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
  Other Time Liabilities - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
Others Investments - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
XXXMF SDFS SER.99  25.00     1 
XXXMF SDFS SER.98  100.00     2 
XXXMF SDFS SER.97  100.00     3 
XXXMF SDFS SER.96  100.00     4 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-8F 
 (Private & Confidential) 
Special return Form IX - Annual Statement of Assets and Liabilities 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
999999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFG RO Name : 
: 31/03/2010 Year End Date 
10/04/2010 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Rs. in lakhs 
A. Liabilities in India 
1. Paid Up capital 
a) Individuals  161.04 
b) Co-operative Socieities  0.00 
c) State Government  0.00 
d) Others  0.00 
Sum of Paid Up Capital  161.04 
2. Reserve Fund etc. 
a) Statutory Reserves  1,034.01 
b) Agricultural Credit (stabilisation) Fund  0.00 
c) Dividend Equalisation Fund  74.62 
d) Special Bad Debt  0.00 
e) Bad and Doubtful Debt Reserve  795.61 
f ) Investment Depreciation Reserve  166.71 
g) Other Funds and Reserves  363.57 
Sum of Reserve Fund  2,434.52 
3. Principal/Subsidiary State Partnership Fund for Share Capital of 
a) Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 
b) Primary Agricultural Credit Societies  0.00 
c) Other Socieities  0.00 
Sum of Share Capital  0.00 
4. Demand Liabilities 
a) Current Deposits 
From Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 i) 
From Primary Co-operative Banks  0.00 ii) 
From Other Societies  28.48 iii) 
From Individuals, Firms, Associations etc.  2,932.72 iv) 
Reserve Fund Deposits maintained by Societies within the                  
Bank's Area of Operation 
 0.00 v) 
Sum of Current Deposits  2,961.20 
b) Savings Deposits (Demand Liability portion only) 
From Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 i) 
From Primary Co-operative Banks  0.00 ii) 
From Other Societies  2.20 iii) 
From Individual, Firms, Association etc.  539.50 iv) 
Reserve Fund Deposits maintained by Societies within the Bank's 
Area of Operation 
 0.00 v) 
Sum of Savings Deposit  541.70 
c) Borrowings from Banks 
From the Reserve Bank of India  0.00 i) 
From the State Bank of India  0.00 ii) 
From the Development Bank  0.00 iii) 
From the National Bank  0.00 iv) 
From the EXIM Bank  0.00 v) 
From the National Cooperative Development Corporation  0.00 vi) 
From the State Co-operative Bank  0.00 vii) 
From the Central Co-operative Bank  0.00 viii) 
Others  0.00 ix) 
Sum of Borrowings from Banks  0.00 
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nnexure-8 
Rs. in lakhs 
A. Liabilities in India 
d) Other Demand liabilities  176.41 
Sum of Demand Liabilities  3,679.31 
5. Time Liabilities 
a) Fixed Deposits 
From Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 i) 
From Primary Co-operative Banks  0.00 ii) 
From Other Societies  35.23 iii) 
From Individuals, Firms, Associations etc.  4,810.85 iv) 
Reserve Fund Deposits maintained by Societies within the Bank's 
Area of Operation 
 0.00 v) 
Sum of Fixed Deposits  4,846.08 
b) Savings Deposits (Time Liability portion only) 
From Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 i) 
From Primary Co-operative Banks  0.00 ii) 
From Other Societies  13.52 iii) 
From Idividuals, Firms, Associations etc.  3,314.09 iv) 
Reserve Fund Deposits maintained by Societies within the Bank's 
Area of Operation 
 0.00 v) 
Sum of Savings Deposits  3,327.61 
c) Borrowings from Banks 
From the Reserve Bank of India  0.00 i) 
From the State Bank of India  0.00 ii) 
From the Development Bank  0.00 iii) 
From the National Bank  0.00 iv) 
From the EXIM Bank  0.00 v) 
From the National Cooperative Development Corporation  0.00 vi) 
From the State Co-operative Bank  0.00 vii) 
From the Central Co-operative Bank  0.00 viii) 
Others  0.00 ix) 
Sum of Borrowings from Banks  0.00 
d) Cash Certificates, Recurring Deposits etc.  40.94 
e) Other Time Liabilities  0.00 
Sum of Time Liabilities  8,214.63 
6. Branch Adjustments  1.43 
 0.00 7. Overdue Interest Reserve 
 11,895.37 8. Total Demand and Time liabilities (A4, A5 and A6) 
 80.57 9. Balance of Profit 
Total Liabilities  14,571.50 
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Rs. in lakhs 
B.Assets in india 
1. Cash in Hand  285.10 
Total Saving Current 2. Balance with Banks 
a) With the Reserve Bank  0.00  0.00  0.00 
b) With the State Bank of India and its Subsidiaries  38.30  0.01  38.31 
c) With Banking System  102.17  0.00  102.17 
d) With the State Co-operative Bank of the State concerned  1.53  0.00  1.53 
e) With the Central Co-operative Bank of the District 
concerned 
 303.02  0.00  303.02 
f) With other Co-operative Banks  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sum of Balance with Banks  445.02  0.01  445.03 
3. Money at Call and Short notice: 
a) With the State Bank of India and its Subsidiaries  0.00 
b) With Banking System  0.00 
c) With the State Co-operative Bank of the State concerned  0.00 
d) With the Central Co-operative Bank of the District concerned  0.00 
e) With other Co-operative Banks  0.00 
Sum of Money at Call and Short Notice  0.00 
4. Investments 
a) In Central and State Government Securities (including Treasury Bills) 
Central Government  2,045.31 i) 
State Government  1,134.97 ii) 
Sum of Central & State Government Securities  3,180.28 
b) Debentures of Land Mortgage Banks  0.00 
c) Other Trustee Securities  0.00 
d) Shares of the State Co-operative Banks  0.30 
e) Shares of the Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 
 f) Shares of other Co-operative Institutions  0.00 
g) Fixed Deposits 
With the State Bank of India and its Subsidiaries  384.00 i) 
With Banking System  525.00 ii) 
 3,261.50 iii) With the State Co-operative Bank of the State concerned 
 1,200.00 iv) With the Central Co-operative Bank of the District concerned 
With other Co-operative Banks  1,016.64 v) 
Sum of Fixed Deposits  6,387.14 
h) Other Investments  0.00 
Sum of Investments  9,567.72 
5. Investments out of the Principal / Subsidiary State Partnership Fund in the shares of 
a) Central Co-operative Banks  0.00 
b) Primary Agricultural Credit Societies  0.00 
c) Other Societies  0.00 
Sum of Investments out of the Principal / Subsidiary State Partnership fund in 
the shares 
 0.00 
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6. Loans and Advances 
Loans, Cash Credits and Overdrafts 
a) For Seasonal Agricultural Operations 
b) For Marketing of Crops 
 i) Secured 
ii) Unsecured 
Sum of Marketing Crops 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
 0.00 
c) For Medium Term Agricultural purposes  0.00 
d) For Weavers Societies  0.00 
e) For other Industrial purposes Secured Unsecured Total 
 i) Short Term  2,661.05  0.00  2,661.05 
ii) Medium Term  196.17  0.00  196.17 
f) For Other purposes Secured Unsecured Total 
 i) Short Term  967.09  0.00  967.09 
ii) Medium Term  17.00  0.00  17.00 
Sum of Loans and Advances  3,841.31 
g) Explanation of the above Advances 
i) Those which are Overdue  584.52 
Percentage of Overdues to Total Loans and Advances 
a) Demand %  0.00 
b) Outstanding %  15.22 
 2,815.52 a) Advances Oustanding in respect of Priority Sector ii) 
b) Their percentage to Total Loans Outstanding  73.30 
7. Bills Purchased and Discounted  4.67 
8. Interest Receivable (of which Overdue)  218.18 
9. Premises, Furnitures, Fixtures and Other Fixed Assets  143.24 
10.Branch Adjustments  0.00 
11.Other Assets 
Tangible Assets  58.82 i) 
Intangible Assets  7.43 ii) 
 66.25 
Sum of Tangible and Intangible Assets 
12. Balance of Loss  0.00 
Total Assets  14,571.50 
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Other Funds And Reserves - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
    1 BUILDING FUND  119.83 
    2 GRATUITY FUND  0.06 
    3 DEVELOPMENT FUND  40.05 
    4 PROVISION ON  OVERDUE INTEREST  9.84 
    5 CHARITABLE FUND  26.99 
    6 MEMBER BENEFIT FUND  26.31 
    7 SAHAKARI PRACHAR FUND  14.96 
    8 CONTI. PROV. ON STD.  39.00 
    9 CONTIGENCY FUND  13.57 
   10 UR. BANK CR. EQU. FUND  12.96 
   11 INVESTMENT DEP. FUND  60.00 
Demand Liabilities Others Borrowing From Banks - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
Other Demand Liabilities  - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
DRAFT PAYABLE  2.99     1 
SUNDRY CREDITORS  0.58     2 
DIVIDEND  9.80     3 
INTEREST PAYABLE  5.28     4 
PAY ORDER ISSUED  15.31     5 
MAR. HELD AG. BP LIMIT  0.47     6 
CASH SURPLUS  0.27     7 
SHARE SUSPENCE  0.53     8 
PROV. FOR EXPENCES  6.82     9 
EPAY/FDR SUNDRY CR.  0.08    10 
INTEREST SUSPENCE  22.26    11 
UNPAID CHQ/DD/PAY ORDER  6.35    12 
CONT. BED & DOUBTFUL DEBTS  39.41    13 
T.D.S.  0.29    14 
CHQ. ISSUED BUT NOT REL.  25.97    15 
SALARY EXP. PAYABLE  40.00    16 
 Time Liabilities Others Borrowing From Banks - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
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  Other Time Liabilities - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
Others Investments - Specify 
Rs. in lakhs 
Sr No. Particulars Amount 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GEN. MANAGER JUNIOR OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
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Annexure-8G 
 (Private & Confidential) 
Monetary Aggregates 
Bank Name XYZ  BANK : 
999999999 Bank Code : 
ABCDEFG RO Name : 
: 31/12/2010 Period End Date 
04/01/2011 : Reporting Date 
Validation Status : Validated 
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Annexure-8 Rs. in lakhs 
Liabilities 
1. Capital Account   
a) Share Capital  183.17 
b) Reserves  2,495.02 
Total (a + b)  2,678.19 
2. Demand Liabilities 
i) Current Deposits  2,766.78 
a) Co-operative Societies other than Co-operative Banks  17.78 
b) Individuals, Firms etc.  2,749.00 
ii) Savings Deposits (Demand Liabilities)  0.00 
a) Co-operative Societies other than Co-operative Banks  0.00 
b) Individuals, Firms etc.  0.00 
Total (Demand Liabilities)  2,766.78 
3. Time Liabilities 
i) Fixed Deposits 
a) Co-operative Societies other than Co-operative Banks  37.75 
b) Individuals, Firms etc.  4,675.93 
Total (a + b)   4,713.68 
Total (a + b) of which 
c) Upto 1 year  331.76 
d) Above 1 year  4,381.92 
Total (c + d)   4,713.68 
ii) Savings Deposits (Time Liabilities)  3,952.24 
a) Co-operative Societies other than Co-operative Banks  4.41 
b) Individuals, Firms etc.  3,947.83 
iii) Cash Certificate, Recurring Deposit etc.  25.79 
iv) Other Time Liabilities  0.00 
Total Time Liabilities   8,691.71 
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Annexure-8 Rs. in lakhs 
Assets       
 337.50 1. Cash in hand 
2. Investments in Govt. and Other Approved Securities 
i) Approved Securities  3,610.75 
a) Central Govt Securities  2,245.31 
b) State Govt Securities  1,365.44 
c) Other Trustee Securities approved for SLR   0.00 
d) Debentures/ Land Mortgage for Banks  0.00 
 Investments with other Cooperative societies other than 
 Co-operative Banks 
 0.00 ii) 
 0.00 Other Trustee Securities including PSU Bond which are  
not reckoned for SLR purpose 
iii 
Total of 2  3,610.75 
3. Bank Credit  
i) Loans and Advances  4,298.93 
ii) Bills Purchased and Discounted  6.16 
Total of 3  4,305.09 
Total of Assets (1 + 2 + 3)  8,253.34 
Authorised Reporting Official Countersigned By 
Signature    
Name 
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER OFFICER Designation 
e-mail ID 
Tel. No. (O) 
Tel. No. (R) 
Place 
Date 
07/03/2011  15:52 Page 3 of 3 Printed on : 






APPENDIX I 
 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
A STUDY ON GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN  
CO-OPERATIVE BANKS 
Date                 :____________________ 
 
Name of Bank _________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
A  -  Introduction 
 
QA1. For how long has this bank in operation ?  [ ______Years ] 
 
QA2. How would you classify this bank? 
  [1] Commercial bank 
  [2] Non-bank financial institution [other than mortgage or building] 
  [3] Mortgage finance company 
  [4] Building society 
 
QA5.  What is the range of services that the banks offers? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
B - Management and the Board 
 
QB1. What is the total number of the Board of Directors [ ______ ] 
 
QB2. How is the board appointed? 
  [1] by the vote of majority shareholders 
  [2] by the vote of all shareholders  
[3] by the old board when a new one is coming into office 
  [4] a head hunt by the chairman 
  [5] other process [please state] ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
QB3. What is the composition of the board in terms of professional qualification? 
 [1] Lawyers [give number               [_________] 
 [2] Banking and finance specialists [_________] 
 [3] CA                    [_________] 
[4] Engineers                                    [_________] 
 [5] Economists                                 [_________]  
 [6] Business Men                              [_________] 
 [6] Other professions [list and give numbers] ------------------------------------------- 
  
 
1 
  
 
QB4. What is the composition of the board in terms of gender? 
  [1] male 
  [2] female 
 
QB5.  How effective do you consider the Board to be in exercising the following so as to 
achieve the banks objectives: 
  [1] very effective [2] not very effective [3] effective [4] below average 
 
i. Leadership           [____] 
ii. Integrity               [____] 
iii. Enterprise            [____] 
iv. Judgment             [____] 
v. Decision making [____] 
 
QB6.  How frequently does the Board meet? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QB7. How is there deliberations communicated to shareholders and other stakeholders?          
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QB8. Does the board assess the performance and effectiveness of: 
 
1. itself?    [1. yes 2. no] 
2. individuals members?  [1. yes 2. no] 
3. the Chief Executive?  [1. yes 2. no] 
 
QB9. If Yes how frequently is this done? 
 
1. for itself                ________________________________   
2. for individuals members ________________________________ 
3. for the Chief Executive ________________________________ 
 
QB10. Are reports made from these assessments? 
 
[1] yes 
  [2] no 
 
QB11. At what level are the reports discussed? 
 
  [1] board meeting 
  [2] AGM 
  [3] special meetings 
  [4] other [indicate] 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QB12. Are there any induction programmes in place for new Board members? 
 
[1] yes 
  [2] no 
2 
  
QB13. Are there continuous members’ skill development programmes for the Board? 
 
[1] yes 
  [2] no 
 
QB14. Is there any training programme for the management and other staff? 
 
[1] yes 
  [2] no 
 
QB15. Does the bank have a succession plan for the senior management? 
 
[1] yes 
  [2] no 
 
 
Q16. If yes, briefly explain how it works____________________________________________ 
 
Q17. Do you have Internal Audit? 
    Yes      No 
Q18. Is there a concurrent audit? 
    Yes       No 
Q 19. Is there a full compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)? 
   Yes      No 
Q 20. Do you think that statutory reports submitted by your bank are sufficient for effective 
governance of urban co-operative bank? 
 
  Completely sufficient    Partially sufficient 
  Not sufficient  
Q. 21 Kindly rate role of Apex bank(Gujarat state co-operative bank) in effective governing Of 
Co-operative banks? 
 
  Highly effective    Effective 
  Average                                                                 Not so effective 
  Highly ineffective   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
  
 
 
C: Shareholders and stakeholders 
 
 
QC1. What is the approximate total number of shareholders? [___________] 
 
QC2. To what extent do the shareholders exercise the authority to ensure that only competent and   
          reliable persons are elected or appointed to the Board of Directors? __________________ 
         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QC3. To extent do the share holders ensure that the Board is held accountable for the effective 
running   of the bank – so as to achieve its objectives? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
QC4. Do the shareholders have the power to change the composition of the Board that does not   
          perform to expectations or in accordance with the mandate of the bank? 
  [1] yes 
  [2] no 
 
QC5. How does the bank communicate with its shareholders and stakeholders? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
          
______________________________________________________________________________ 
          
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
QC6. To what extent is the bank accountable to its members?  
          
______________________________________________________________________________ 
          
______________________________________________________________________________ 
          
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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QC7. What accounting procedures are there in place to effect this?          
______________________________________________________________________________ 
          
______________________________________________________________________________ 
          
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QC8. Do you think the members are satisfied with this? 
  [1] very satisfied 
  [2] satisfied 
  [3] not satisfied at all 
 
QC9. Who are the internal stakeholders of the bank? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QC10.Who are the external stakeholders of the bank? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QC11. Is there a policy which guides how the bank should relate with them? 
  [1] yes 
  [2] no 
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D - Strategy, values performance and compliance 
 
QD1. Would you say the Board of Directors do determine the following: 
    
   [1] in all cases [2] sometimes [3] not at all 
 
i. The purpose and values of the bank               [ ___ ] 
ii. The strategy to achieve the bank’s purpose   [ ___  ] 
iii. Implementation of the banks values              [ ___  ] 
 
QD2. Who ensures that the procedures and values that protect the assets and reputation of the 
bank are  put in place? 
 
  [1] the board 
  [2] the chief executive 
  [3] the share holders 
  [4] all departmental heads 
  [5] everybody in the management position including the board and the CEO 
 
QD4. Who monitors and evaluates the implementation of the bank’s strategies,  policies, plans 
and  management performance? 
 
[1] the board 
  [2] the chief executive 
  [3] the share holders 
  [4] all departmental heads 
[5] everybody in the management position including the board and the CEO 
 
QD5. Who reviews the viability and financial sustainability of the bank? 
 
[1] the board 
  [2] the chief executive 
  [3] the share holders 
  [4] all departmental heads 
  [5] everybody in the management position including the board and the CEO 
 
QD6. How frequently is this done? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
QD7. Is there any measure in place to ensure that the bank complies with all relevant   
         laws, regulations, governance practices, accounting and auditing standards? 
 
  [1] Yes 
  [2] No 
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QD8 Please the measures 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
         
______________________________________________________________________________  
          
QD9. Who enforces these measures? 
 
[1] the board 
  [2] the chief executive 
  [3] the share holders 
  [4] all departmental heads 
  [5] everybody in the management position including the board and the CEO 
 
 
 
E: Management of corporate risk and social responsibility 
 
QE1. What are some of the key risk areas that the board has so far identified?  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
QE2. What are some of the key performance indicators that the bank has in place? 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QE3. In what circumstances does the bank seek professional advise? 
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
QE4. What are some of the banks social responsibility?  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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 Appendix IV 
 
The sampled Co-operative  Banks 
 
 
Sr. No. Name of Co-operative Banks 
1 Jamnagar Mahila Sahakari Bank Ltd. 
2 Jamnagar Peoples Bank Ltd. 
3 Vardhman Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
4 Rajkot Nagarik Bank Ltd. 
5 Rajkot Peoples Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
6 Co-operative Bank of Rajkot Ltd. 
7 Kalupr Commercial Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
8 Navnirman Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
9 Ahmedabad Mercantile Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
10 The Bhagyoday Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
11 Commercial Co-operative bank Jamnagar Ltd. 
12 Gujarat State Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
13 Bhavanagr Nagarik Sahakari Bank Ltd. 
14 The Veraval Mercantile Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
15 The Junagadh Commercial Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
16 The Jamnagr District Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
17 Sardar Bhiladvala Pardi Peoples Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
18 Amreli Nagarik Sahakari Bank Ltd. 
19 Varachha Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
20 Vijay Commercial Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
21 The Bhuj  Mercantile Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
22 The Modasa Nagarik Sahakari Bank Ltd. 
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